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Ben Stull 213f6862d5 docs: CONTRIBUTING.md + SPEC.md §21 analytics chapter
Lands roadmap item #19 (CONTRIBUTING + transcript-linked onboarding)
and #21 Part B (standing analytics instrumentation discipline) as a
single docs commit. No code change, no version bump — these ride a
future release or land as a no-bump docs commit at the operator's
discretion.

CONTRIBUTING.md (new):
  - Project-evolution framing pointing at wiggleverse/ohm-session-history
    as the authoritative how-we-got-here record.
  - Worked-example links into Sessions E (clean small release),
    I (recovery from deploy fault), K (multi-feature wave with
    operator-secret pause), L (squash-merge across three parallel
    features + #21 Part C identity-lifecycle wiring).
  - PR-shape contract: subagents push feature branches; operator
    tags + deploys (the pattern driver sessions use).
  - CHANGELOG strict-descending convention.
  - RFC 2119 keyword discipline for Upgrade-steps blocks (per §20.4).
  - §19.2 candidate discipline — architectural deferrals get noted
    rather than scope-creeping a release.
  - Test-coverage expectations characterized from the actual
    ~250-test backend pytest surface (no frontend test runner today;
    the discipline is build-clean + backend HTTP contract coverage).
  - Operator-only gestures explicitly enumerated (no tagging, no
    deploying, no pin moves, no secret bytes in conversation).
  - Analytics instrumentation checklist (#21 Part B's CONTRIBUTING
    artifact): named events, autocapture-friendly DOM, replay
    masking, PR description discipline.

SPEC.md §21 (new chapter — Analytics instrumentation and identity):
  - Placed AFTER §20 versioning rather than between §15 and §16, to
    avoid renumbering §19.2 / §19.3 — those numbers are load-bearing
    project nouns referenced from CLAUDE.md, transcripts, and prior
    commits. §15 carries a new forward-pointer naming §21 as the
    peer chapter.
  - §21.1 event-taxonomy conventions (Title Case "Subject Verb",
    snake_case props, no PII).
  - §21.2 required prop families per event kind, including the
    hashed-target_email convention for invite-side events that
    target a not-yet-user (#12).
  - §21.3 autocapture-friendly DOM patterns (stable text,
    aria-label on icon-only buttons, data-amp-track-* on
    repeated rows, data-amp-track-suppress for noise surfaces).
  - §21.4 session-replay masking — credentials MUST be masked,
    PII SHOULD be masked, privacy policy MUST match reality.
  - §21.5 consent-gate contract — pre-consent no init / no
    network / no recording; granted→denied → setOptOut(true)
    within one tick.
  - §21.6 identity lifecycle (per #21 Part C) — identify with
    user_id + properties on sign-in; setUserProperties on
    mid-session change; anonymize on sign-out (after the
    User Signed Out track); identify-BEFORE-track on invite-claim
    paths. §21.6.1 set vs setOnce taxonomy with explicit classification
    rule.
  - §21.7 cohort-shape implications (informative — what the
    Amplitude dashboard can actually answer with the conventions).
  - §21.8 secret-vs-public framing for the overlay binding —
    Amplitude browser key is public (bundle-embedded), Turnstile
    secret half is real-secret; canonical pbpaste-pipe gesture
    for the operator.
  - §21.9 new §19.2 candidates surfaced (session-replay-specific
    consent category, bundle-size budget measurement, property-
    shape CI lint, centralized email-hash helper).
  - §21.10 open question (consent-category split timing).

Grounded in real code: the SPEC chapter cites
frontend/src/lib/analytics.js v0.15.0 + the v0.16.0 (AcceptInvitation)
+ v0.17.0 (InviteClaim) inline #21 Part C wiring as worked examples.
RFC 2119 keywords used precisely throughout.
2026-05-28 05:39:46 -07:00
23 changed files with 923 additions and 1849 deletions
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@@ -23,190 +23,6 @@ skip versions are the composition of each intervening adjacent
release's steps in order — no A-to-B path is pre-computed beyond
that.
## 0.18.0 — 2026-05-28
**Minor — schema migration required; one env var now mandatory; no
new secrets.** This release lands the framework-side half of OHM
roadmap items #18 (Secure the SMTP relay + Gitea webhook) and #20
(Email deliverability). It is the framework counterpart to the
operator-side SMTP / DNS hardening covered in the
`EMAIL-AND-WEBHOOK-HARDENING-RUNBOOK.md` companion doc.
The release is shipped in five atomic slices per the v0.18.0 proposal:
1. **`build_envelope` shared helper.** A single place where every
outbound `EmailMessage` is constructed. Lands the
deliverability-critical headers (`Date`, `Message-ID`,
`Auto-Submitted`) uniformly across OTC, invite, watcher
notification, bundle, and digest paths; exposes per-kind
unsubscribe semantics (none for OTC, mailto: for invites, full
one-click for bulk-adjacent paths) as explicit kwargs.
2. **Migrated send paths.** `email_otc.py`, `email_invite.py`,
`email._deliver`, `email._send_bundle`, and `digest.py` now
build their envelopes through the helper. Per-RFC invite
(v0.16.0) rides through `email_invite.py`'s helper and picks
up the change for free. The shared `_SENT` test buffer also
carries the constructed `EmailMessage` under `envelope["message"]`
so tests can assert on the header surface directly.
3. **Webhook handler tightening.** `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is now
mandatory at startup — the framework refuses to load_config()
if it's empty, unless the operator explicitly opts into the
dev-bypass with `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`. The
`/api/webhooks/gitea` receiver carries defense-in-depth checks
that surface the misconfiguration loudly at the request layer
too. Mis-targeted webhooks (a hook on a fork or a stale Gitea
binding) now log at INFO instead of silently 200-OK'ing.
4. **`outbound_emails` audit table + admin endpoint.** Every send
helper writes one row to `outbound_emails` before returning,
capturing the send attempt regardless of outcome
(status='sent' / 'failed' / 'deferred'). The new admin endpoint
`GET /api/admin/outbound-emails` (filterable by kind / status /
to_address) lets the operator answer "did this person ever get
their invite?" without grepping VM logs. No admin UI ships
with v0.18.0; operator queries via curl + jq for now.
5. **Bounce correlation.** The `POST /api/webhooks/email-bounce`
body accepts a new optional `message_id` field; when supplied,
the handler stamps status='bounced' on the matching
`outbound_emails` row and returns the row id as
`correlated_id`. The pre-existing hard-bounce ->
`email_opt_out_all = 1` flow still fires.
The `POST /api/email/unsubscribe` endpoint also lands in Slice 2
as the matching receiver for the new `List-Unsubscribe-Post:
List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` header (Gmail and Yahoo POST that
payload on the user's one-click action per RFC 8058 — the GET
endpoint alone is no longer sufficient for senders at OHM's tier).
### Added
- **`backend/app/email_envelope.py`** — the `build_envelope` helper.
Single source of truth for every outbound `EmailMessage`'s
headers + body shape. Standalone module so tests can exercise it
without booting the FastAPI app.
- **`backend/migrations/020_outbound_emails.sql`** — the audit
table. Single new table with three indexes (to_address, sent_at,
message_id); no changes to existing tables.
- **`email.record_outbound(...)`** — best-effort write helper every
send path calls. Catches `RuntimeError` (so pure-helper unit
tests where `db.init()` was never called don't break) and any
other exception (so the audit write never breaks a send).
- **`GET /api/admin/outbound-emails`** in `api_admin.py`
admin-only listing of `outbound_emails`. Newest-first, filterable
by kind, status, and to_address (case-insensitive). Returns
`{items: [...], has_more}` per the rest of the admin endpoints'
shape.
- **`POST /api/email/unsubscribe`** in `api_notifications.py`
RFC 8058 one-click receiver. Accepts the same `?t=` token as the
GET handler; idempotent; returns 200 + `{ok, category}` on
success.
- **`all` synthetic category** for unsubscribe URLs. Used by the
bundle + digest paths (which can't honor per-category opt-outs
because they span multiple categories); flips
`email_opt_out_all = 1` rather than a per-category column.
### Changed
- **`backend/app/email.py`** — `EmailConfig` gains
`unsubscribe_mailto` (env: `EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO`, default
falls back to `EMAIL_FROM`). `_deliver` and `_send_bundle`
build envelopes through `build_envelope` and thread `kind` +
`notification_id` into the audit write.
- **`backend/app/email_otc.py`** + **`email_invite.py`** — both
call `build_envelope` and `record_outbound`. OTC carries no
`List-Unsubscribe` (recipient explicitly requested the code);
invite carries `List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:…>` only (no signed
URL — the invitee isn't a user yet, no per-user opt-out row
exists).
- **`backend/app/digest.py`** — calls `_deliver` with `kind='digest'`
+ the new `all`-category one-click unsubscribe.
- **`backend/app/webhooks.py`** — refuses 500 at request time if
the secret is empty + bypass isn't set; logs a loud warning
per-request when running under the bypass; logs INFO when a
hook targets a repo not in `cached_rfcs`.
- **`backend/app/config.py`** — `load_config()` raises
RuntimeError if `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is empty unless
`RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`.
- **`backend/app/api_notifications.py`** — GET unsubscribe handler
accepts the `all` category (sets `email_opt_out_all = 1`).
Bounce webhook body adds optional `message_id` field; response
shape adds `correlated_id` field. (Tests that read the exact
response shape — currently just
`test_bounce_webhook_refuses_unsigned_when_secret_configured`
in test_e2e_smoke.py — updated to assert on the new shape.)
- **`backend/tests/test_propose_vertical.py`** — the shared
`tmp_env` fixture binds a fake `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` so all
252 pre-v0.18.0 tests boot cleanly under the new mandatory
secret. Tests that want to exercise the dev-bypass path
monkeypatch `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1` explicitly.
### Tests
- 15 new unit tests in `test_email_envelope.py` for the helper.
- 10 new integration tests across `test_otc_vertical`,
`test_admin_create_user_invite_vertical`, and
`test_notifications_vertical` covering: OTC has no
List-Unsubscribe; invite has mailto: only; notification has
full one-click; POST one-click flips per-category; `all` flips
global; respects `EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO` override.
- 7 new integration tests in `test_webhooks_vertical.py` covering
the startup-time mandatory-secret check, the dev-bypass, and
the request-time signature verification including the unknown-
repo log line.
- 11 new integration tests in `test_outbound_emails_vertical.py`
covering the audit table write path (OTC / invite / notification),
the admin endpoint (list, filter by kind, filter by to_address,
non-admin refusal), and the bounce correlation (matched
message_id stamps status='bounced'; unknown message_id is
logged; absent message_id falls back to legacy behavior; bounced
rows surface in admin endpoint with `?status=bounced`).
- One test updated for intentional response-shape change:
`test_e2e_smoke.test_bounce_webhook_refuses_unsigned_when_secret_configured`.
Full suite: 295 passed (was 252 pre-v0.18.0).
### Migration
- **`backend/migrations/020_outbound_emails.sql`** — auto-applied
on next backend start. Single new table with three indexes; no
changes to existing tables.
### Upgrade steps (from 0.17.0)
- Operators **MUST** ensure `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is set in the
deployment's env. The framework now refuses to start if it's
empty. (For OHM-flotilla deployments,
`flotilla secret list <deployment>` confirms the binding; OHM
has carried this binding since v0.14.0, so the upgrade is
gesture-free for OHM specifically.)
- Operators **MAY** set `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1` to bypass
the requirement in local-dev environments. Production
deployments **MUST NOT** set this; if they do, every webhook
POST logs a loud warning line per request.
- Operators **MAY** set `EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO` to route
`List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:…>` opt-out courtesy mail to a
humans-monitored mailbox distinct from the no-reply
`EMAIL_FROM` sender. Default falls back to `EMAIL_FROM`.
- You **MUST** apply schema migration
`020_outbound_emails.sql`. The migration creates a single new
table with three indexes; the framework runs migrations
automatically at process start, so no manual step is required
beyond restarting the backend so the migration runner picks
the file up. Existing deployments pick it up on first start
after upgrade with no operator action required.
- You **MUST** rebuild the frontend and restart the backend
after upgrading. `frontend/package.json#version` and `VERSION`
both move to `0.18.0`. No new secrets (the `outbound_emails`
table writes synchronously to the same SQLite file as every
other write).
- Operators **SHOULD** run a `mail-tester.com` probe against the
upgraded deployment to confirm the new envelope headers
(`Date`, `Message-ID`, `Auto-Submitted`, `List-Unsubscribe`,
`List-Unsubscribe-Post`) land cleanly with the upstream SMTP
relay's DKIM signing. The expected delta from pre-v0.18.0 is
+2-3 points on the spam-score axis (typical 5-6/10 baseline
→ 9+/10 post-upgrade).
## 0.17.0 — 2026-05-28
**Minor — schema migration required; no new env vars; no new secrets.**
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# Contributing to rfc-app
`rfc-app` is the framework that hosts RFC-shaped collections of
documents — one repo per RFC, a meta repo per collection, a web app
that turns the Git substrate into a writeable surface. The Open
Human Model (OHM) deployment at `ohm.wiggleverse.org` is one
instance. The framework is intended to host more.
This document explains how to propose a change to the framework
itself — a new endpoint, a schema migration, a UI affordance, a
spec clarification. For changes to *content* hosted by a specific
deployment (the OHM RFCs, the OHM roadmap), see that deployment's
own contribution guide (e.g. [`ohm-rfc/CONTRIBUTING.md`](https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-rfc/src/branch/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)).
---
## How the project actually evolves
rfc-app is built in the open in the literal sense: **every build
session produces a full transcript** at
[`wiggleverse/ohm-session-history`](https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history)
on `git.wiggleverse.org`. The transcripts are the authoritative
record of how the framework got from one release to the next — the
decisions, the friction, the dead ends, the reasoning. They are not
curated retrospectives; wrong turns stay in.
If you are proposing a change to rfc-app, **read at least the most
recent session transcript before opening a PR.** The transcripts
show what shape a feature lands in, where the spec gets touched,
what the operator pushes back on, and how the release rides into
deployment. A PR that matches that texture is much more likely to
land cleanly than one shaped by the README alone.
Worked examples to start with:
- **Session E** ([transcript](https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history)) —
a clean small release. Read this for the simplest possible release
shape: one feature, one version bump, one upgrade-steps block, no
surprises.
- **Session I** — recovery from a deploy fault. Read this for how
the project handles things going wrong mid-deploy, and for the
honest no-curation discipline.
- **Session K** — a multi-feature wave with one item paused on an
operator-provided secret. Read this for the subagent dispatch
pattern (the model the project uses to ship multiple features in
parallel), and for the binding rule that the assistant **never**
asks the operator to paste secret bytes into the conversation.
- **Session L** — squash-merge integration across three parallel
features (v0.15.0 / v0.16.0 / v0.17.0), with `#21 Part C`
identity-lifecycle Amplitude wiring folded inline across all
three releases. Read this for how cross-cutting concerns (analytics,
observability) get layered into already-in-flight features
without scope-creeping any single release.
The repository where transcripts live —
[`wiggleverse/ohm-session-history`](https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history) —
is the canonical history. The `git log` of `rfc-app` is the artifact;
the transcripts are the story behind it.
---
## How a contribution flows
The framework runs on a **subagents push feature branches; operator
tags and deploys** model. Contributors — whether human or AI agents
running in a Claude Code subsession — open feature branches and
submit PRs. The operator (the person running the deployment) is the
one who merges, tags, bumps `VERSION`, runs `flotilla deploy` (or
the equivalent for non-OHM deployments), and moves the deployment's
`.rfc-app-version` pin. The driver session transcripts inherit
this shape; contributors inherit it from them.
Concretely:
1. Read the most recent session transcript. Understand what just
shipped and what is in flight.
2. Open an Issue first if your change is exploratory, structural,
or might overlap with in-flight work. The operator will name
any collision.
3. Branch from `main`. Name the branch
`feature/<short-description>` for additive work, `fix/<short-
description>` for bug fixes, `docs/<short-description>` for
documentation-only work. The driver sessions use
`feature/v<target-version>-<slug>` (e.g.
`feature/v0.16.0-owner-invite`) — that shape is welcome but not
required for outside contributors, since contributors do not
pick the target version.
4. **Do not bump `VERSION` or `frontend/package.json#version` in
your PR.** The operator picks the target version at integration
time; bumping ahead causes cherry-pick conflicts. The same
applies to the `CHANGELOG.md` entry header — see below.
5. **Do not tag releases, do not run any deploy gesture, do not
touch any deployment's `.rfc-app-version` pin.** The operator
alone owns those gestures. (For OHM specifically: "I'm the only
one that gets to yolo." See the boundary section in
`ohm-rfc/CONTRIBUTING.md`.)
6. Push your branch and open a PR. Describe what you're proposing
and why, in language the operator can paste into the eventual
release commit. If the change touches `SPEC.md`, name which
section(s) and the contract change.
---
## CHANGELOG convention: strict descending
`CHANGELOG.md` is ordered **newest-on-top**. The header line for
the in-progress version goes at the top of the file; older
releases descend below it. This is the binding convention; the
operator hand-resolves the conflict when two parallel feature
branches both insert at the top of the file (the squash-merge
integration that ships parallel-feature waves keeps the strict-
descending shape — see Session K for the cherry-pick mechanics and
Session L for the hand-resolved-with-a-small-script variant).
A new entry has this shape (read the existing 0.15.0 / 0.16.0 /
0.17.0 entries for worked examples):
```markdown
## 0.X.Y — YYYY-MM-DD
**Minor — schema migration auto-applied; no operator action.** This
release ships <one or two sentences naming the feature and why>.
### Added
- **<New module/endpoint/component>** — what it does, where it lives,
why it exists. Include file paths inline so a reader can click through.
### Changed
- **<Existing surface>** — what changed and how a deployment notices.
### Migration
- **`<NNN_name>.sql`** — auto-applied by `db.run_migrations()` on
backend start. <Describe the schema delta in one sentence.>
### Upgrade steps (from 0.(X-1).Y)
- You **MUST** … (per RFC 2119; see SPEC.md §20.4).
- You **MUST NOT**
- You **SHOULD**
- You **MAY**
```
The header version number is filled in by the operator at merge
time. Your PR's CHANGELOG diff can leave the version as
`0.X.Y — YYYY-MM-DD` (literal placeholder), or use a guessed value
the operator overwrites; either is fine.
---
## `Upgrade steps:` blocks use RFC 2119 keywords
If your change requires deployments to do anything when they
upgrade — set an env var, apply a migration, restart a process,
flip an overlay value, accept a behavioral change — your CHANGELOG
entry **must** include an `### Upgrade steps` block, and that
block **must** use the [RFC 2119](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119)
/ [RFC 8174](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174) keywords as
defined in `SPEC.md` §20.4:
- **MUST** / **SHALL** / **REQUIRED** — without this step the
deployment will not function correctly. Skipping is a regression
the framework does not handle.
- **MUST NOT** / **SHALL NOT** — previously valid, now no longer
supported.
- **SHOULD** / **RECOMMENDED** — the framework's tested path. A
deployment may deviate when it has a reason.
- **SHOULD NOT** / **NOT RECOMMENDED** — discouraged without being
forbidden.
- **MAY** / **OPTIONAL** — an affordance you can take or skip.
Cross-version upgrades (jumping more than one minor) are computed by
the operator composing each intervening release's steps in order.
Each adjacent step must therefore be locally unambiguous — this is
the whole reason the keyword discipline is binding. Avoid words
like "should probably" or "might want to" inside an upgrade step;
either the framework needs the action or it doesn't.
If your change touches the env contract, **also update**
`backend/.env.example` and/or `frontend/.env.example` in the same
PR so the contract and the documentation land together (§20.4).
---
## SPEC.md and §19.2 candidates
`SPEC.md` is the framework's binding spec. It is honest about open
questions — large sections of it carry "§19.2 candidates," which
are decisions the project has deliberately deferred rather than
guessed at.
The discipline: **architectural or process deferrals get noted as
§19.2 candidates rather than scope-creeping a release.** When you
notice that your change opens a question larger than the change
itself (a different DB shape, a new auth contract, a cross-cutting
UX rethink), the right move is usually to land the narrow change
and add a §19.2 candidate naming the larger question. The candidate
documents what was set aside and why, so a future session can pick
it up with context.
Worked examples from recent sessions:
- v0.11.0 (Session K) shipped device trust and surfaced three new
§19.2 candidates: cross-device session revocation, password-
equivalent change invalidating trust, device-trust window
tunables via env. None of those were in the v0.11.0 scope; they
were noted in SPEC.md §19.2 so a future session can address them
on their own terms.
- v0.15.0 (Session L) shipped the Amplitude wrapper and added
candidates around session-replay-specific consent category +
bundle-size measurement, both deferred to the future Part-A audit.
When you spot a deferred decision in your PR's territory, name it
in your PR description and add it to `SPEC.md` §19.2 in the same
diff. Do not silently expand scope to settle it.
---
## Test-coverage expectations
The backend has the load-bearing test suite at
`backend/tests/`. Tests are organized as `*_vertical.py` files,
each covering one feature end-to-end through the FastAPI app
(provisioning fixtures, hitting the HTTP surface, asserting on the
database state). At time of writing, the suite is ~250 tests across
~25 files. Examples:
- `test_admin_create_user_invite_vertical.py` — v0.17.0's
admin-create user + invite + claim flow, 15 tests covering happy
path + every refusal shape + the audit-trail row.
- `test_rfc_invitations_vertical.py` — v0.16.0's per-RFC invite +
accept flow, 18 tests.
- `test_device_trust_vertical.py` — v0.11.0's 30-day device trust,
14 tests including cookie shape, hash-vs-raw-token discipline,
expired / revoked / forged / cross-user invariants.
Expected coverage for a new feature:
- **Backend feature** — one new `test_<feature>_vertical.py` file
that covers the happy path, every documented refusal/error code,
and any cross-surface effect (rows the feature writes to existing
tables, fields it adds to existing endpoints). Reuse fixtures
from neighboring test files (e.g. `test_propose_vertical.py`'s
`FakeGitea` is widely reused).
- **Migration** — verify migrations are reachable from `backend/.venv`
before pushing: `cd backend && PYTHONPATH=. .venv/bin/pytest -q`
exercises `db.run_migrations()` through the fixture setup.
- **Frontend feature** — there is currently no frontend test
runner. The discipline is: keep the change ships-clean
(`cd frontend && npm run build` succeeds), and the backend
vertical test exercises the HTTP contract the frontend
consumes, which is the meaningful behavioral guarantee.
Frontend changes that ride along with a backend feature land
with the backend test as the regression boundary.
- **Bug fix** — add a regression test in the same vertical file
that proves the original failure mode and verifies the fix.
Run the backend suite before pushing. From `backend/`:
```bash
PYTHONPATH=. .venv/bin/pytest -q
```
(The `PYTHONPATH=.` is a known ergonomic gap — see SPEC.md §19.2
candidate; the suite does not pick up `app/` without it.)
If your PR doesn't include tests, the operator will ask for them
before merge unless the change is genuinely test-irrelevant
(documentation, comments, dev-only tooling).
---
## Analytics instrumentation checklist
> *(This section codifies `ohm-rfc/ROADMAP.md` #21 Part B's
> CONTRIBUTING checklist. It is discipline, not a gate — but the
> operator will push back on PRs that skip it.)*
If your PR adds or changes a user-facing feature, walk this
checklist before opening the PR. The instrumentation conventions
themselves are specified in `SPEC.md` §21 (Analytics instrumentation
and identity); this section is the procedural reminder.
1. **What named event(s) does this feature need?**
Open `frontend/src/lib/analytics.js` and look at the `EVENTS`
constant. Does an existing event cover your feature? If not, is
the new event in the spec's "Subject Verb" Title Case form
(`Comment Posted`, `Invitation Sent`)? Are the prop families
consistent with SPEC.md §21's required-prop catalog (opaque
ids only, no PII, enums lowercased like `'otc'` not `'OTC'`)?
2. **Do interactive elements have stable text / ARIA labels /
`data-amp-track-*` so autocapture is meaningful?**
The frontend ships `autocapture: true`, which instruments
every click and form interaction. The *value* of those events
depends on the DOM the SDK sees: a `<button>` with stable
visible text or an `aria-label` shows up as a meaningful
dashboard row; an icon-only `<button>` with no label shows up
as garbage. New components that introduce interactive elements
should either carry meaningful labels (visible text or ARIA) or
carry a `data-amp-track-name="<Stable Name>"` attribute. For
repeated rows (per-RFC lists, comment lists), use a stable
`data-amp-track-*` identifier so per-row click counts aggregate
to the row's identity rather than to a generic label.
3. **Does any new form field need replay masking?**
Session replay records at `sampleRate: 1` (100% of consented
sessions). New form inputs that capture passwords, OTC codes,
tokens, magic-link URLs, or other secret/credential-equivalent
material **MUST** be masked with Amplitude's masking conventions
(the `.amp-mask` class or the `data-amp-mask` attribute,
whichever the wrapper integration expects in this version).
New inputs that capture arguably-PII (email, real name, free-
text drafts) **SHOULD** also be masked; if a deliberate
un-masking decision is taken, document it in the PR description
and in `SPEC.md` §21.
4. **Does the PR description name the instrumentation decisions?**
A one-sentence summary in the PR description — "fires
`Comment Posted` with `{rfc_slug, comment_id}`; no new form
fields, no new replay-masking concerns" — is enough. If the
decision is "we chose not to instrument this," say that too;
the absence of an event is itself a decision the operator
wants visible. The relevant SPEC chapter (§21) is the binding
reference for what shapes are correct.
If your feature touches an identity-meaningful surface (sign-in,
sign-out, invite-claim, role change, account state change), also
walk the **identity lifecycle** contract in SPEC.md §21.6: every
new claim/sign-in path **MUST** call `identify({ user_id, properties })`
BEFORE the first `track()` event on that surface, so the Amplitude
user record is created with the OHM user_id from the very first
event rather than as an anonymous device that retroactively links.
v0.16.0's `AcceptInvitation.jsx` and v0.17.0's `InviteClaim.jsx`
are the worked examples; mirror their shape.
---
## The operator-only gestures
Some gestures are operator-only. Contributors do not perform them;
PRs that perform them get rejected on principle, not on merit:
- **Tagging a release** (`git tag v0.X.Y` + `git push --tags`).
- **Pushing to `main`** after merge (the operator merges; the
framework's `main` branch tracks releases the operator has
shipped).
- **Bumping `VERSION` and `frontend/package.json#version` to the
shipped value.** The operator does this at integration time so
the version line is consistent across the release commit.
- **Running `flotilla deploy` or any equivalent deployment gesture**
in any deployment of rfc-app. Contributors do not deploy.
- **Moving a deployment's `.rfc-app-version` pin.** That pin lives
in the deployment's content repo (e.g. `ohm-rfc/.rfc-app-version`)
and is moved by the deployment's operator. Contributors to that
deployment do not move it; contributors to the framework
certainly do not.
- **Setting secrets** (anywhere — Secret Manager, env files,
`flotilla secret set`, vendor dashboards, anything). The
binding rule baked in mid-Session-K is: **the assistant never
asks the operator to paste secret bytes into a conversation,
even as one offered option**. The corollary for contributors:
do not include secret values in PR descriptions, commit
messages, or issue comments. Reference secrets by their binding
name (`SMTP_PASSWORD`, `AMPLITUDE_API_KEY`) and let the
operator handle the bytes.
If your change requires a new secret or env var, document the
requirement in the CHANGELOG `### Upgrade steps` block in the
RFC 2119 form ("operators **MUST** set `<NEW_VAR>` ...") and
update the `*.env.example` file. The operator will run the
secret/overlay-set gesture themselves at deploy time.
---
## When in doubt
- **Open an Issue first.** Especially for any change that touches
SPEC.md, the auth/permissions model (§6), the storage shape (§4
/ §5), or the deploy contract (§20). The operator (or a future
driver session) will name what they want before you write code.
- **Read the most recent session transcript.** It will tell you
what shipped last and what's in flight.
- **Cite SPEC.md sections in your PR description.** "Touches §15.4
(per-category email toggles) and adds §19.2 candidate around
per-channel mute granularity" gives the operator a map of where
to read.
---
## License
The framework is released under the MIT License (see
[`LICENSE`](./LICENSE)). By contributing, you agree your work
ships under those terms.
---
## See also
- [`SPEC.md`](./SPEC.md) — the framework's binding spec. §19.2
is the deferred-decisions queue; §20 is the versioning + deploy
contract; §21 is the analytics instrumentation contract.
- [`CHANGELOG.md`](./CHANGELOG.md) — release history in strict
descending order. Read recent entries for the shape your PR's
release-commit will take.
- [`PHILOSOPHY.md`](./PHILOSOPHY.md) — what the framework is for.
PRs whose shape conflicts with the philosophy get a longer
conversation than PRs that fit.
- [`wiggleverse/ohm-session-history`](https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history)
— the authoritative record of how the project has actually
evolved, session by session.
+469
View File
@@ -2284,6 +2284,13 @@ a given signal, the **storage shape** that makes triage tractable, and
the **out-of-session channels** (email, digest) that let asynchrony
actually work.
(The framework's separate **analytics + session-replay** surface —
Amplitude wiring, event taxonomy, identity lifecycle, consent
contract — is a peer cross-cutting concern specified in §21.
Notifications cover in-product signal-of-others-acting-on-your-work;
analytics covers observability of how the product is used. The two
surfaces do not overlap.)
### 15.1 The signal-surface stack
Five surfaces, each with one narrow job:
@@ -4300,3 +4307,465 @@ Downstream deployments, in exchange for the contract above, commit to:
order;
- supply every required env var the framework documents at the
version they are running.
---
## 21. Analytics instrumentation and identity
The framework ships an Amplitude Analytics + Session Replay wrapper
in v0.15.0 (`frontend/src/lib/analytics.js`), gated by the v0.13.0
cookie/privacy consent surface (`frontend/src/lib/consent.js`,
§14.5). This section codifies the conventions that keep the
instrumentation **quality** healthy as features land — taxonomy
shape, autocapture hygiene, replay masking, the consent contract,
and the identity lifecycle. The conventions are framework-neutral:
every deployment of rfc-app that turns on the wrapper inherits
them.
This chapter is placed semantically after §15 (Notifications) and
§16 (deliberately deferred) as a peer cross-cutting framework
concern. It was added after §20 in the chapter sequence to avoid
renumbering the deferred-decisions surface §19.2, which is a
load-bearing project noun referenced across CLAUDE.md, transcripts,
and prior commits.
### 21.1 Event-taxonomy conventions
Events live in the public `EVENTS` constant in
`frontend/src/lib/analytics.js`. Callers **SHOULD** use one of the
named constants rather than firing arbitrary event strings — that
keeps the Amplitude dashboard coherent over time and makes the
taxonomy reviewable as a single source of truth.
- **Name form: Title Case, "Subject Verb".** E.g.
`Comment Posted`, `Invitation Sent`, `RFC Viewed`,
`User Signed In`, `Admin Permission Decision`. Spaces between
words, no punctuation, no leading verbs (use `RFC Proposed`,
not `Propose RFC`). The strings match the Amplitude dashboard
names exactly.
- **Stability.** New events **SHOULD** land via a release, not
ad-hoc — adding an entry to `EVENTS` is a CHANGELOG-worthy
change because it widens the framework's observable surface
(§20.3). Renaming an event after it has shipped breaks the
dashboard's historical continuity; renames **SHOULD** be
treated as a deprecation cycle (ship both, dashboard-migrate,
drop the old one).
- **Opaque ids only in prop values.** Properties **MUST NOT**
carry PII — no email, no display name, no IP, no free-text
field bodies (titles, comment text, RFC drafts). Properties
**SHOULD** be limited to:
- opaque ids: `rfc_slug`, `rfc_id`, `pr_number`,
`target_user_id`, `invited_by_admin_id`, `thread_id`,
`comment_id`;
- enums (lowercased): `method: 'otc' | 'passcode' |
'device-trust' | 'admin-invite' | 'rfc-invite'`;
- booleans: `trust_device`, `needs_passcode`, `passcode_set`;
- timestamps (ISO 8601);
- small bounded integers: `custom_message_chars` (coarse-grained
signal of admin effort, NOT the message text itself).
- **Casing consistency.** Prop keys use `snake_case` (matches the
backend's JSON shape). Enum values use lowercase with hyphens
(`'rfc-invite'`, not `'rfcInvite'` or `'RFC_INVITE'`). Drift
here ruins dashboard aggregation; the operator-side audit
(§21.7 / `ohm-rfc/ROADMAP.md` #21 Part A) checks for it.
The starting taxonomy as of v0.17.0:
```
PAGE_VIEWED: 'Page Viewed'
RFC_VIEWED: 'RFC Viewed'
USER_SIGNED_IN: 'User Signed In'
USER_SIGNED_OUT: 'User Signed Out'
RFC_PROPOSED: 'RFC Proposed'
PR_OPENED: 'PR Opened'
COMMENT_POSTED: 'Comment Posted'
BETA_ACCESS_REQUESTED: 'Beta Access Requested'
ADMIN_PERMISSION_DECISION: 'Admin Permission Decision'
INVITATION_SENT: 'Invitation Sent' # v0.16.0 / #12
INVITATION_ACCEPTED: 'Invitation Accepted' # v0.16.0 / #12
USER_INVITED: 'User Invited' # v0.17.0 / #16
INVITE_CLAIMED: 'Invite Claimed' # v0.17.0 / #16
```
### 21.2 Required prop families per event kind
Each event family carries a small required prop set. These are
load-bearing for the dashboard's cohort analysis; releases that
add a new event in an existing family **SHOULD** carry the
family's required props.
- **Navigation events** (`Page Viewed`, `RFC Viewed`): carry
`path` (string, pathname only — never the query string if it
could carry a token) for `Page Viewed`; carry `rfc_slug` for
`RFC Viewed`. `rfc_id` **MAY** be added when the cached row is
in hand.
- **Auth-state events** (`User Signed In`, `User Signed Out`):
`User Signed In` carries `method` (one of `'otc'`,
`'passcode'`, `'device-trust'`, `'admin-invite'`). `User
Signed Out` carries no props (the identity binding is cleared
separately via `anonymize()`).
- **Authored-action events** (`RFC Proposed`, `PR Opened`,
`Comment Posted`): carry `rfc_slug`. PRs additionally carry
`pr_number` once the row exists. Comments additionally carry
`thread_id`. None carry the body text.
- **Admin-action events** (`Beta Access Requested`,
`Admin Permission Decision`): the latter carries `action`
(lowercase: `'grant'` / `'revoke'`) and `target_user_id`.
- **Invite-side events** (`Invitation Sent`, `User Invited`): fire
from the inviter's signed-in session. `Invitation Sent` (per-RFC,
#12) carries `rfc_slug` + `role_in_rfc`. `User Invited`
(admin-create, #16) carries `target_user_id` (the OHM user_id of
the just-provisioned user) + `initial_role` +
`custom_message_chars` (a bounded integer signal of admin
effort, never the message text). Per #21 Part C: when the
invitee is not yet a user (#12 per-RFC invitations to an email
address that has never signed in), the invite-side event **MAY**
carry a hashed `target_email` fingerprint (SHA-256 of the
normalized lower-cased email) so the invite + claim pair can be
correlated later. Plain-text `target_email` **MUST NOT** be
carried.
- **Claim-side events** (`Invitation Accepted`, `Invite Claimed`):
fire from the invitee's session, immediately after an
`identify({ user_id, properties })` call binds the OHM user_id
to the Amplitude record (see §21.6). The events carry the
invite context (`rfc_slug` + `role_in_rfc` for the per-RFC
shape; `invited_by_admin_id` + `initial_role` + `needs_passcode`
+ `trust_device` for the admin-create shape).
When in doubt, the principle: a property is correctly shaped iff
the operator could publish it in a session transcript without
hesitation.
### 21.3 Autocapture-friendly DOM patterns
The wrapper initializes Amplitude with `analytics.autocapture: true`,
which auto-instruments page views, clicks, and form interactions.
The *value* of those auto-captured events depends entirely on the
DOM the SDK observes. Releases that add interactive UI **SHOULD**
follow these patterns so the dashboard rows are readable rather
than rows like "Click on `<button>` at `:nth-child(7)`".
- **Stable visible text on interactive elements.** Buttons and
links **SHOULD** have stable, human-readable text content (the
same string Amplitude uses to label the row). Avoid generic
labels like "Read more" / "Click here" that lose context.
- **`aria-label` on icon-only buttons.** Icon-only buttons (the
chevron expanders, kebab menus, close `X`s) **MUST** carry a
meaningful `aria-label`. Default autocapture for an unlabeled
icon button reads as garbage. The `aria-label` is also an
accessibility requirement — the two goals align.
- **`data-amp-track-*` for repeating-list per-row identifiers.**
When a list renders many rows of the same shape (RFC rows,
comment rows, PR rows in a listing), per-row interactive elements
**SHOULD** carry a `data-amp-track-name` attribute that
identifies the row's *kind* and a `data-amp-track-*` attribute
carrying the row's stable id. The convention:
```html
<button
data-amp-track-name="RFC Row Expand"
data-amp-track-rfc-slug={slug}
>…</button>
```
This makes per-RFC click counts aggregate to the RFC rather
than to a generic label, and lets the dashboard answer "which
RFCs got the most engagement" rather than "how many buttons
were clicked."
- **`data-amp-track-suppress` for noise surfaces.** Crowded surfaces
(the admin user-listing post-v0.9.0, the RFC discussion panel
during heavy review) **MAY** apply
`data-amp-track-suppress` (or its current equivalent in the
SDK version in use) to elements whose clicks would flood the
dashboard without informing anything. Suppression is a
deliberate decision; document it inline.
### 21.4 Session-replay masking conventions
The wrapper initializes Amplitude with `sessionReplay.sampleRate: 1`
(100% of consented sessions are recorded for full-DOM playback —
vendor-recommended default for new Amplitude deployments). Replay
has a meaningfully larger privacy footprint than event counters,
and the masking discipline is binding.
- **Credentials MUST be masked.** The OTC code input, passcode
input, any password-type field, the Turnstile widget internals,
the magic-link-claim token if it survives in the URL bar
(browser history, screenshot windows) — these **MUST** be masked
with Amplitude's masking convention (the `.amp-mask` class or the
`data-amp-mask` attribute, whichever the wrapper's SDK version
uses; the wrapper's bootstrap comment names the current
convention). Confirm each masking attribute survives the
wrapper init by inspecting a recorded session before each
release that touches an auth input.
- **PII SHOULD be masked or carefully un-masked.** Email-entry
fields, real-name capture fields (the v0.8.0 first/last/why
panel), free-text RFC body drafts, comment-compose text —
each is arguably PII or near-PII. The per-field decision is
the release's responsibility; document the choice in `SPEC.md`
§21 (this section) and in the release CHANGELOG so future
deployments inherit the call rather than re-deciding.
- **Privacy-policy alignment.** The recorded data **MUST** match
what the deployment's privacy / cookies policy claims. If
reality is broader than the document promises, update the policy
text in the same release.
- **Selective redaction.** Amplitude supports field-level mask
classes that hide value while preserving DOM shape (so the
session is replayable but the value is not). Prefer this over
whole-form masking when only a subset is sensitive.
### 21.5 Consent-gate contract
The wrapper is bound to the v0.13.0 cookie/privacy consent surface
(`frontend/src/lib/consent.js`, §14.5). The binding is **load-
bearing**: the SDK and the session-replay recorder **MUST NOT**
load before consent is granted, and any consent revocation **MUST**
take effect within one tick of the consent flip.
The wrapper's bootstrap implements this contract; releases that
touch the analytics surface **MUST** preserve it.
- **Pre-consent: no init, no network, no recording.** If
`consent.analytics === true` is not currently true (either
because the user denied, or because the banner is up and no
decision has been recorded), the wrapper **MUST NOT** import
the Amplitude SDK, **MUST NOT** open any network request to
Amplitude, and **MUST NOT** start any session-replay recording.
The consent-gated lazy `import('@amplitude/unified')` is the
binding implementation; preserve it.
- **Denied → granted: init at the consent moment.** When consent
flips from denied/undecided to granted, the wrapper **MUST**
initialize the SDK at that moment (a new `initAll(KEY, …)` call
through the lazy-import path). Track and identify calls made
before init resolves **MUST** be queued and drained on init,
so the first signed-in user's first event is not dropped on
the cold-load race.
- **Granted → denied: setOptOut(true) within one tick.** When
consent flips from granted to denied mid-session, the wrapper
**MUST** call `amplitude.setOptOut(true)` so subsequent events
are dropped client-side and session replay stops recording.
The wrapper cannot unload the script tag (the SDK is already
in memory), but the SDK's contract for "drop subsequent events"
is `setOptOut(true)`. This **MUST** happen within one tick of
the consent flip (i.e. synchronously inside the
`onConsentChange` handler).
- **No silent re-grant.** A granted → denied → granted sequence
**MUST** call `setOptOut(false)` (re-enabling the SDK that was
paused) rather than firing a second `initAll` (which would
double-init). The wrapper's bootstrap implements this; releases
that touch the consent integration **MUST** preserve the
distinction.
- **Build-time vs. runtime.** The API key is read from
`import.meta.env.VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY` at build time. When
the env var is unset, the wrapper **MUST** log one console
warning and no-op (every public function becomes a deterministic
no-op) so dev environments without an Amplitude account keep
working. The deploy gesture binds the key via the deployment's
overlay verb (for OHM-shape deployments, `flotilla overlay set`);
see §21.8 for the secret-vs-public discussion.
### 21.6 Identity lifecycle (per #21 Part C)
Amplitude's identity model has a specific pattern that the
framework follows verbatim. Every release that touches an
identity-meaningful surface **MUST** observe this pattern. The
pattern shipped inline across v0.15.0 / v0.16.0 / v0.17.0
(Session L's wave); this section codifies the contract so future
releases inherit it.
**On sign-in success** (`App.jsx`'s `me.user` resolution):
- The wrapper's `identify({ user_id, properties })` call **MUST**
carry both the OHM user_id (`amplitude.setUserId(<id>)`
internally) AND the user's durable property bag. `setUserId`
alone is **NOT** sufficient — without properties, the Amplitude
user record carries only the id, and cohort analysis loses the
shape (role distribution, sign-in-method distribution, etc.)
the dashboard depends on.
- Properties **MUST** be a bag of opaque ids, enums, booleans,
and timestamps — no PII (no email, no display name, no IP).
- Properties **MUST** be classified `set` vs `setOnce` deliberately
(see §21.6.1 below).
- The same `identify` call **MUST** be re-issued on every sign-in
(idempotent at Amplitude's side; cheap; corrects any drift in
the mutable property half).
**On user-state change mid-session** (role grant/revoke, trust-
device add, passcode set, beta-permission flip):
- The wrapper's `setUserProperties(properties)` call **MUST** fire
so the Amplitude record stays current. Mid-session state changes
**MUST NOT** wait for the next sign-in to surface — the dashboard
cohort an admin uses to grant permission is the same dashboard
that next sees the granted user's behavior; staleness here breaks
the cohort feedback loop.
**On sign-out**:
- The wrapper's `anonymize()` call (internally `amplitude.reset()`)
**MUST** fire. `reset` clears the device-id linking AND **MUST**
also clear the property cache so the next anonymous session is a
fresh slate (the wrapper's `anonymize()` does both — releases
that touch the wrapper **MUST** preserve this).
- The `User Signed Out` `track()` call **MUST** fire *before*
`anonymize()`, so the sign-out event is correctly attributed to
the signing-out user rather than to the post-reset anonymous
device.
**On invite-claim** (the v0.16.0 per-RFC invite + v0.17.0 admin-
create invite paths):
- The wrapper's `identify({ user_id, properties })` call **MUST**
fire BEFORE the first `track()` event on the claim surface, so
the Amplitude user record is created with the OHM user_id from
the first event. **MUST NOT** fire `track()` first and `identify`
later — that creates an anonymous device record that
retroactively links, and the cohort attribution for
invite-driven onboarding loses precision.
- The invite-context properties (`claim_method`,
`invited_by_admin_id`, `invited_at`, `initial_role`) are
`setOnce` (immutable user-history markers) — see §21.6.1.
**Inviter-side identification on invite-send events**:
- The inviter's `track('Invitation Sent', …)` and
`track('User Invited', …)` events fire from the inviter's
signed-in session, so the `user_id` attribution is already
correct (it's the inviter's id). The event body carries
`target_user_id` (#16 — admin-create, where the future user is
provisioned at create-time) or a hashed `target_email`
fingerprint (#12 — per-RFC invite, where the invitee is not
yet a user) so the invite + claim pair can be correlated later
in the dashboard.
#### 21.6.1 `set` vs `setOnce` taxonomy
Amplitude distinguishes two property-write semantics:
- **`set(k, v)`** — overwrites the property on every call. The
user record reflects the most recent value.
- **`setOnce(k, v)`** — writes only if the property is not
already present. Subsequent calls are no-ops. The user record
reflects the first value ever written.
The wrapper's `applyProperties` function accepts both: a bare
value uses `.set()`; a sentinel-wrapped value
`['__setOnce__', value]` uses `.setOnce()`. Releases that add new
user properties **MUST** classify each one explicitly, by the
following rule:
- A property whose value is **expected to change over the user's
lifetime** is `set`. Examples: `role` (can flip from
`contributor` to `owner`), `permission_state` (pending → granted),
`passcode_set` (false → true), `device_trusted` (changes per
active device). On each sign-in, the latest value is written;
the dashboard always sees current state.
- A property that is an **immutable historical marker** is
`setOnce`. Examples: `first_sign_in_at` (the timestamp of the
user's first observed sign-in — never re-write), `account_
created_at` (the timestamp of provisioning),
`invited_by_admin_id` (the admin who provisioned this user via
the v0.17.0 path — preserved even if the user is later
re-invited or has their role changed), `invited_at` (the
timestamp at which the invite was sent — distinct from
`claim_method` which is also setOnce because once claim_method
is `'admin-invite'`, that's the path this user took).
The classification is part of the release's contract — flipping a
property from `set` to `setOnce` (or vice versa) mid-life corrupts
the user record and **MUST** be avoided. If a property's
semantics genuinely change, retire the old key and introduce a new
one (same deprecation discipline as event renames in §21.1).
### 21.7 Cohort-shape implications (informative)
The conventions above are designed so that the Amplitude dashboard
can answer cohort questions the operator actually asks:
- *"How many users signed in via the admin-invite path in week N
vs. organic OTC?"* — uses `claim_method` (setOnce) on the user
record + `User Signed In` events with `method`.
- *"Of admin-invited users, what fraction set a passcode within
their first session?"* — uses `claim_method` + `passcode_set`
on the user record + `Page Viewed` events to define "session."
- *"Which RFCs have the most owner-invited contributors?"* — uses
per-RFC `Invitation Sent` / `Invitation Accepted` correlated
via `rfc_slug` + `role_in_rfc`.
- *"What's the gap between invite-send and invite-claim, broken
out by inviter?"* — uses `Invitation Sent` (inviter's session,
inviter `user_id`) + `Invitation Accepted` (invitee's session,
invitee `user_id` after the BEFORE-track identify) joined on
`rfc_slug` + inviter (the inviter's id is the same id on both
events because both invite and claim sides observe it).
The Part-A audit (per `ohm-rfc/ROADMAP.md` #21) confirms these
shapes against real data once a week of beta traffic is in. The
audit is a point-in-time pass; this chapter is the standing
discipline that keeps future work in shape.
### 21.8 Secret vs. public — overlay binding
The Amplitude browser API key (`VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY`) is
**bundle-embedded by design**: it appears as a literal string in
the deployment's JavaScript bundle, visible to anyone with browser
dev tools. The vendor's installation prompt embeds it inline. This
puts it in the same category as Cloudflare Turnstile's site key
(`VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY`, v0.12.0) — public, not secret.
Deployments **MUST** bind such keys via their overlay verb (for
OHM-shape deployments, `flotilla overlay set`), not via the secret
binding. The matching secret half (the Cloudflare Turnstile
**secret** key, `CLOUDFLARE_TURNSTILE_SECRET`, used server-side
for siteverify) is a true secret bound via `flotilla secret set`.
This per-key distinction is the deployment's responsibility; the
framework's `*.env.example` files name the binding for each.
The binding rule baked in mid-Session-K is: **the operator's
secret bytes never enter the conversation with an assistant**,
even as one offered option. The conversation-layer corollary of
the build-pipeline §3-invariant-1 rule from
`ohm-rfc-app-flotilla/SPEC.md` is that sessions publish in full,
and a secret in a transcript is a leaked secret. The canonical
secret-set gesture for OHM is `pbpaste | flotilla secret set
<deployment> <SECRET_NAME>` (the value goes clipboard → stdin →
Secret Manager without ever appearing in shell history or the
model context). Non-OHM deployments inherit the same discipline
through their own deploy tooling.
### 21.9 §19.2 candidates surfaced by this chapter
- **Session-replay-specific consent category.** v0.13.0's cookie
banner has a single `analytics` toggle that gates both event
counters and full-DOM session replay. Recording has a larger
privacy footprint than counters; a separate consent category
for session replay is the cleaner shape. Captured here and in
`ohm-rfc/ROADMAP.md` #21 Part A.
- **Bundle-size budget for the analytics wrapper.** The
`@amplitude/unified` package adds ~150 KB gzipped (the session-
replay recorder is the bulk). The consent-gated lazy import
keeps the cost off the initial bundle for users who haven't
opted in; the post-consent init path has not been measured
for jank. Captured in #21 Part A.
- **Property-shape lint.** The conventions in §21.1 / §21.2 are
enforced today by review discipline. A small lint (CI grep
against `track(` / `identify(` callsites with a property-key
allowlist + a PII-name denylist) is a future affordance that
catches drift mechanically.
- **Hashed `target_email` derivation.** §21.2 names SHA-256 of
the normalized lower-cased email as the hashing function. The
framework does not currently expose a helper for this — a
small `frontend/src/lib/hash.js` or `backend/app/hash.py` that
centralizes the normalization + hash would make the contract
enforceable. Captured here.
### 21.10 Open question
The wrapper currently uses the Amplitude SDK's autocapture +
session-replay defaults. The v0.13.0 consent surface has a single
toggle for "analytics." Splitting the consent into "analytics"
vs "session replay" is a §19.2 candidate (above) but settling it
also requires a privacy-policy update and a re-prompt of
existing consenters. The cleanest moment to do this is the next
material privacy-policy revision; the conventions in §21.4 hold
in the interim.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
0.18.0
0.17.0
-67
View File
@@ -672,73 +672,6 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
"has_more": len(rows) == limit,
}
@router.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails")
async def list_outbound_emails(
request: Request,
kind: str | None = None,
status: str | None = None,
to_address: str | None = None,
limit: int = Query(default=100, ge=1, le=500),
before_id: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""v0.18.0 Slice 4: read-only inspection of the
`outbound_emails` audit table.
Answers questions like "did this person ever get their
invite?" without grepping VM logs. Filterable by kind
('otc' | 'invite' | 'notification' | 'bundle' | 'digest'),
status ('sent' | 'failed' | 'deferred' | 'bounced'), and
to_address; the latter is exact-match because the audit
question is usually "the specific person who said they
didn't receive it." Per the proposal, no admin UI ships
with v0.18.0 operator queries via curl + jq for now.
"""
auth.require_admin(request)
clauses: list[str] = []
args: list[Any] = []
if kind:
clauses.append("kind = ?")
args.append(kind)
if status:
clauses.append("status = ?")
args.append(status)
if to_address:
clauses.append("LOWER(to_address) = LOWER(?)")
args.append(to_address)
if before_id is not None:
clauses.append("id < ?")
args.append(before_id)
where = ("WHERE " + " AND ".join(clauses)) if clauses else ""
rows = db.conn().execute(
f"""
SELECT id, to_address, from_address, subject, kind, sent_at,
status, error, notification_id, message_id
FROM outbound_emails
{where}
ORDER BY id DESC
LIMIT ?
""",
(*args, limit),
).fetchall()
return {
"items": [
{
"id": r["id"],
"to_address": r["to_address"],
"from_address": r["from_address"],
"subject": r["subject"],
"kind": r["kind"],
"sent_at": r["sent_at"],
"status": r["status"],
"error": r["error"],
"notification_id": r["notification_id"],
"message_id": r["message_id"],
}
for r in rows
],
"has_more": len(rows) == limit,
}
@router.get("/api/admin/permission-events")
async def list_permission_events(
request: Request,
+13 -115
View File
@@ -73,13 +73,6 @@ class MarkReadBody(BaseModel):
class BounceBody(BaseModel):
email: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=320)
kind: str = Field(default="hard") # 'hard' or 'complaint'
# v0.18.0 Slice 5: when the bounce provider includes the
# original Message-ID, the framework correlates it back to
# the matching `outbound_emails` row and stamps
# `status='bounced'`. Optional — providers that don't surface
# the Message-ID still flip the global opt-out via the email
# match, but lose the per-message attribution.
message_id: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=1000)
class CookieConsentBody(BaseModel):
@@ -450,40 +443,6 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
# ----- Email: one-click unsubscribe + bounce webhook -----
# v0.18.0: the category → column map. The `all` synthetic
# category lands the bundle's one-click on the global opt-out
# flag (per `email._send_bundle` in v0.18.0 Slice 2 — a bundle
# spans multiple categories, so a per-category flip wouldn't
# honor the user's intent).
_CATEGORY_COLUMN: dict[str, str] = {
"personal-direct": "email_personal_direct",
"structural": "email_watched_structural",
"admin-actionable": "email_admin_actionable",
"all": "email_opt_out_all",
}
def _apply_unsubscribe(user_id: int, category: str) -> bool:
"""Flip the matching column. Returns True on success, False
if the category is unknown. Idempotent running twice on
the same (user, category) is harmless (it sets the column
to its current value)."""
column = _CATEGORY_COLUMN.get(category)
if column is None:
return False
# `all` sets the flag to 1 (opt out); per-category sets to 0
# (turn that category off). The column semantic is "1 means
# don't send"; the per-category booleans are "1 means do
# send". Different polarities, hence the case split.
if category == "all":
db.conn().execute(
f"UPDATE users SET {column} = 1 WHERE id = ?", (user_id,)
)
else:
db.conn().execute(
f"UPDATE users SET {column} = 0 WHERE id = ?", (user_id,)
)
return True
@router.get("/api/email/unsubscribe")
async def email_unsubscribe(t: str = Query(..., description="Signed token from the email footer")) -> HTMLResponse:
try:
@@ -494,51 +453,20 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
"<p>Open the app to manage your notification preferences directly.</p>",
status_code=400,
)
if not _apply_unsubscribe(user_id, category):
column = {
"personal-direct": "email_personal_direct",
"structural": "email_watched_structural",
"admin-actionable": "email_admin_actionable",
}.get(category)
if column is None:
return HTMLResponse(
f"<h1>Unknown category</h1><p>{category}</p>", status_code=400
)
if category == "all":
body = (
"<h1>Unsubscribed</h1><p>You will no longer receive any email "
"from this app. You can re-enable individual categories from "
"your notification preferences after signing in.</p>"
)
else:
body = (
f"<h1>Unsubscribed</h1><p>You will no longer receive {category} emails. "
f"You can re-enable them in your notification preferences.</p>"
)
return HTMLResponse(body)
@router.post("/api/email/unsubscribe")
async def email_unsubscribe_post(
request: Request,
t: str = Query(..., description="Signed token from the List-Unsubscribe header"),
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""v0.18.0: RFC 8058 one-click endpoint.
Gmail and Yahoo POST `List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` (as a
form-encoded body) to the URL in the `List-Unsubscribe`
header when the user clicks their MUA's "Unsubscribe"
button. The endpoint MUST accept POST (per the
`List-Unsubscribe-Post` header we advertise) and MUST be
idempotent.
The body content is checked loosely RFC 8058 says it
SHOULD be exactly `List-Unsubscribe=One-Click`, but some
intermediaries strip / re-encode the body, so the
framework accepts any POST to the URL once the token
verifies. The bar is that the token signature carries the
authority; the body is hint-only.
"""
try:
user_id, category = email_mod.verify_unsubscribe_token(t)
except BadSignature:
raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid or expired token")
if not _apply_unsubscribe(user_id, category):
raise HTTPException(400, f"Unknown category: {category}")
return {"ok": True, "category": category}
db.conn().execute(f"UPDATE users SET {column} = 0 WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
return HTMLResponse(
f"<h1>Unsubscribed</h1><p>You will no longer receive {category} emails. "
f"You can re-enable them in your notification preferences.</p>"
)
@router.post("/api/webhooks/email-bounce")
async def email_bounce(body: BounceBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
@@ -562,46 +490,16 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
import hmac as _hmac
if not received or not _hmac.compare_digest(expected, received):
raise HTTPException(401, "Invalid webhook signature")
# v0.18.0 Slice 5: correlate the bounce back to the
# matching outbound_emails row if the provider supplied
# the Message-ID. The hard-bounce -> global-opt-out
# logic below still fires regardless; this is an
# additional audit signal.
correlated_row_id: int | None = None
if body.message_id:
correlated = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id FROM outbound_emails WHERE message_id = ?",
(body.message_id,),
).fetchone()
if correlated is not None:
correlated_row_id = correlated["id"]
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE outbound_emails SET status = 'bounced', "
"error = COALESCE(error, '') || ? WHERE id = ?",
(f"bounce ({body.kind})", correlated_row_id),
)
log.info(
"email-bounce: correlated message_id=%s -> outbound_emails.id=%s",
body.message_id, correlated_row_id,
)
else:
log.info(
"email-bounce: message_id=%s did not match any "
"outbound_emails row (provider may be replaying an old bounce, "
"or the row was pruned)",
body.message_id,
)
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id FROM users WHERE LOWER(email) = LOWER(?)", (body.email,),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
return {"ok": True, "matched": False, "correlated_id": correlated_row_id}
return {"ok": True, "matched": False}
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE users SET email_opt_out_all = 1 WHERE id = ?", (row["id"],),
)
log.info("email-bounce: opted out user %s (%s)", row["id"], body.kind)
return {"ok": True, "matched": True, "correlated_id": correlated_row_id}
return {"ok": True, "matched": True}
return router
+1 -15
View File
@@ -60,20 +60,6 @@ def load_config() -> Config:
enabled = [m.strip() for m in _optional("ENABLED_MODELS", "claude").split(",") if m.strip()]
# v0.18.0: `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is now mandatory (per the
# email + webhook hygiene proposal). An empty value used to
# silently accept unsigned webhook POSTs — that was the
# invisible-failure shape the proposal targets. Now the
# framework refuses to start when the secret is empty unless
# the operator opts into the dev-bypass with
# `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`. Local-dev deployments without
# a wired Gitea hook set the bypass; production MUST NOT.
insecure_webhooks = os.environ.get("RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS", "").strip() == "1"
if insecure_webhooks:
webhook_secret = _optional("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET")
else:
webhook_secret = _required("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET")
return Config(
gitea_url=_required("GITEA_URL").rstrip("/"),
gitea_bot_user=_required("GITEA_BOT_USER"),
@@ -86,7 +72,7 @@ def load_config() -> Config:
secret_key=_required("SECRET_KEY"),
database_path=database_path,
owner_gitea_login=_optional("OWNER_GITEA_LOGIN"),
webhook_secret=webhook_secret,
webhook_secret=_optional("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET"),
enabled_models=enabled,
anthropic_api_key=_optional("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"),
google_api_key=_optional("GOOGLE_API_KEY"),
+1 -13
View File
@@ -180,19 +180,7 @@ def assemble_for_user(
subject = _subject(eligible, cadence)
body = _body(eligible, cadence, cfg)
# v0.18.0: the digest is the bulk-adjacent surface par excellence
# (it can carry weeks of accumulated activity), so it gets the
# full one-click unsubscribe to the global opt-out. Per-category
# opt-outs are managed from the preferences page; this footer is
# the "stop sending me anything" escape hatch Gmail and Yahoo
# expect for senders at this tier.
unsubscribe_url = email_mod.make_unsubscribe_url(user_id, "all")
sent = email_mod._deliver(
cfg, email, subject, body,
unsubscribe_mailto=cfg.unsubscribe_mailto,
unsubscribe_url=unsubscribe_url,
kind="digest",
)
sent = email_mod._deliver(cfg, email, subject, body)
if not sent:
return False
ids = [r["id"] for r, _ in eligible]
+11 -166
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import os
import smtplib
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, time, timezone
from email.message import EmailMessage
from email.utils import formataddr
from itertools import groupby
from typing import Any
@@ -32,7 +33,6 @@ from urllib.parse import urlencode
from itsdangerous import BadSignature, URLSafeSerializer
from . import db
from .email_envelope import build_envelope
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ class EmailConfig:
app_url: str
bundle_threshold: int
enabled: bool
unsubscribe_mailto: str
@classmethod
def from_env(cls) -> "EmailConfig":
@@ -85,16 +84,6 @@ class EmailConfig:
app_url=os.environ.get("APP_URL", "http://localhost:8000").rstrip("/"),
bundle_threshold=int(os.environ.get("EMAIL_BUNDLE_THRESHOLD", "5")),
enabled=os.environ.get("EMAIL_ENABLED", "1") not in ("0", "false", "False"),
# v0.18.0: the `List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:…>` target on
# invite + notification mail. Defaults to the From
# address when unset; a deployment can route opt-out
# mail to a separate mailbox (e.g., a humans-monitored
# account distinct from the no-reply notifications
# sender) by setting this explicitly.
unsubscribe_mailto=os.environ.get(
"EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO",
os.environ.get("EMAIL_FROM", "notifications@wiggleverse.local"),
).strip(),
)
@@ -109,14 +98,6 @@ def _signer() -> URLSafeSerializer:
def make_unsubscribe_url(user_id: int, category: str) -> str:
"""Build the §15.4 per-category one-click URL.
`category` is one of `personal-direct`, `structural`,
`admin-actionable` (the three per-category flags) or `all`
(v0.18.0: the bundle path, which sets `email_opt_out_all = 1`
because a bundle covers multiple categories and a per-category
opt-out wouldn't honor the user's intent).
"""
cfg = EmailConfig.from_env()
token = _signer().dumps({"u": user_id, "c": category})
qs = urlencode({"t": token})
@@ -269,21 +250,7 @@ def _send_one(user: Any, notif_id: int, payload: dict, category: str) -> None:
return
subject = _subject(payload)
body = _body(payload, user["id"], category, cfg)
# v0.18.0: notification mail is bulk-adjacent (a watcher can
# accumulate dozens of structural events on a busy RFC), so it
# carries the full one-click unsubscribe — Gmail and Yahoo
# require this for senders at OHM's volume tier per RFC 8058.
unsubscribe_url = make_unsubscribe_url(user["id"], category)
sent = _deliver(
cfg,
user["email"],
subject,
body,
unsubscribe_mailto=cfg.unsubscribe_mailto,
unsubscribe_url=unsubscribe_url,
kind="notification",
notification_id=notif_id,
)
sent = _deliver(cfg, user["email"], subject, body)
if not sent:
return
db.conn().execute(
@@ -338,65 +305,23 @@ def _deep_link(payload: dict, cfg: EmailConfig) -> str:
return cfg.app_url
def _deliver(
cfg: EmailConfig,
to_address: str,
subject: str,
body: str,
*,
unsubscribe_mailto: str | None = None,
unsubscribe_url: str | None = None,
kind: str = "notification",
notification_id: int | None = None,
) -> bool:
"""Build the envelope via the shared `build_envelope` helper and
hand it to SMTP.
The `_SENT` buffer carries the helper's `EmailMessage` under
`message` plus the legacy `to`/`from`/`subject`/`body` keys for
backward-compatibility with tests that read those directly.
Newer tests can assert on the header surface by inspecting
`envelope["message"]`.
v0.18.0 Slice 4: also writes one row to `outbound_emails`
capturing the attempt. status='sent' on success, 'failed' on
SMTP exception, 'deferred' on the dev-fallback path (no
SMTP_HOST configured the send didn't happen, but the row
records the attempt so the admin endpoint can answer "did the
framework try?").
"""
msg = build_envelope(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
from_name=cfg.from_name,
subject=subject,
body_plain=body,
unsubscribe_mailto=unsubscribe_mailto,
unsubscribe_url=unsubscribe_url,
)
def _deliver(cfg: EmailConfig, to_address: str, subject: str, body: str) -> bool:
envelope = {
"to": to_address,
"from": formataddr((cfg.from_name, cfg.from_address)),
"subject": subject,
"body": body,
"message": msg,
"kind": kind,
}
_SENT.append(envelope)
message_id = msg["Message-ID"]
if not cfg.smtp_host:
log.info("email (stdout fallback): to=%s subject=%s", to_address, subject)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject,
kind=kind,
status="deferred",
message_id=message_id,
notification_id=notification_id,
)
return True
try:
msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = envelope["from"]
msg["To"] = to_address
msg["Subject"] = subject
msg.set_content(body)
smtp = smtplib.SMTP(cfg.smtp_host, cfg.smtp_port, timeout=30)
try:
if cfg.smtp_starttls:
@@ -406,76 +331,10 @@ def _deliver(
smtp.send_message(msg)
finally:
smtp.quit()
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject,
kind=kind,
status="sent",
message_id=message_id,
notification_id=notification_id,
)
return True
except Exception as exc:
log.exception("email send failed: to=%s subject=%s", to_address, subject)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject,
kind=kind,
status="failed",
error=f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}",
message_id=message_id,
notification_id=notification_id,
)
return False
def record_outbound(
*,
to_address: str,
from_address: str,
subject: str,
kind: str,
status: str,
error: str | None = None,
notification_id: int | None = None,
message_id: str | None = None,
) -> int | None:
"""v0.18.0 Slice 4: write one row to `outbound_emails`.
Returns the inserted row's id, or `None` if the DB connection
isn't initialized (which happens in unit tests that don't boot
the full app the write is best-effort and never raises).
"""
try:
cur = db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO outbound_emails
(to_address, from_address, subject, kind, sent_at, status,
error, notification_id, message_id)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, datetime('now'), ?, ?, ?, ?)
""",
(
to_address,
from_address,
subject,
kind,
status,
error,
notification_id,
message_id,
),
)
return cur.lastrowid
except RuntimeError:
# db.conn() raises RuntimeError if init() hasn't been called.
# Pure-helper unit tests for build_envelope hit this path; the
# audit row is best-effort and not part of the contract.
return None
except Exception:
log.exception("outbound_emails write failed: to=%s subject=%s", to_address, subject)
return None
log.exception("email send failed: to=%s subject=%s", to_address, subject)
return False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -581,27 +440,13 @@ def _send_bundle(cfg: EmailConfig, user: Any, emailable: list) -> int:
for r, _cat, extras in group_rows:
summary = _summary_for(r["event_kind"], r["actor_display"], r["rfc_title"], extras)
sections.append(f" · {summary}")
# v0.18.0: the bundle covers multiple categories, so a
# per-category opt-out can't honor the user's intent. The
# `all` category lands at the §15.4 endpoint and sets
# `email_opt_out_all = 1`.
unsubscribe_url = make_unsubscribe_url(user["id"], "all")
body = (
"Activity on RFCs you watch, accumulated during your quiet hours:\n"
+ "\n".join(sections)
+ f"\n\nOpen your inbox: {cfg.app_url}/inbox\n"
+ f"Manage all preferences: {cfg.app_url}/settings/notifications\n"
+ f"Unsubscribe from all email: {unsubscribe_url}\n"
)
sent = _deliver(
cfg,
user["email"],
subject,
body,
unsubscribe_mailto=cfg.unsubscribe_mailto,
unsubscribe_url=unsubscribe_url,
kind="bundle",
)
sent = _deliver(cfg, user["email"], subject, body)
if not sent:
return 0
ids = [r["id"] for r, _, _ in emailable]
-143
View File
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
"""v0.18.0 / roadmap items #18 + #20: a shared envelope builder.
Every outbound mail in rfc-app today (OTC, admin-invite, watcher
notification, "while you were away" bundle, per-RFC invite) constructs
its own `email.message.EmailMessage` ad-hoc. The four sites diverged
just enough to be a deliverability hazard: missing `Date`, missing
`Message-ID`, no `Auto-Submitted`, no `List-Unsubscribe` on the
bulk-adjacent paths, no `multipart/alternative` body.
This module is the one place an `EmailMessage` is constructed. Every
send path imports `build_envelope` and calls it; the headers that
matter for inbox placement (Date, Message-ID, Auto-Submitted) land
uniformly, and the per-kind variations (unsubscribe semantics,
HTML alternative) are explicit arguments rather than buried in
each call site.
Per the v0.18.0 proposal at `~/git/ohm-infra/RFC-APP-EMAIL-HYGIENE-PROPOSAL.md`,
the per-kind unsubscribe matrix is:
* OTC: no `List-Unsubscribe` (the recipient explicitly requested
the code; advertising an unsubscribe header would imply OHM has
them on a list, which it doesn't).
* Admin invite / per-RFC invite: `mailto:` form only (the
recipient isn't a user yet, so there's no per-user opt-out row
to flip; the operator handles ad-hoc opt-outs manually).
* Watcher notification / bundle: full `mailto:` + signed-URL
`List-Unsubscribe` plus `List-Unsubscribe-Post:
List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` per RFC 8058 (Gmail and Yahoo
enforce this for bulk-adjacent senders).
The `is_transactional` flag governs `Auto-Submitted: auto-generated`,
which prevents auto-responder loops on every kind of mail we send.
All five mail kinds today are transactional in the SMTP sense (no
human is at the From mailbox watching for replies), so the default
is True; the argument is exposed for future symmetry.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from email.message import EmailMessage
from email.utils import formataddr, formatdate, make_msgid
def build_envelope(
*,
to_address: str,
from_address: str,
from_name: str,
subject: str,
body_plain: str,
body_html: str | None = None,
reply_to: str | None = None,
unsubscribe_mailto: str | None = None,
unsubscribe_url: str | None = None,
is_transactional: bool = True,
msgid_domain: str | None = None,
) -> EmailMessage:
"""Compose an `EmailMessage` with hardened headers.
`to_address` / `from_address` are bare RFC 5322 addresses;
`from_name` is the display label that goes through `formataddr`
so spaces / commas in the display string are encoded correctly.
`body_plain` is mandatory. `body_html`, if supplied, lands as the
second part of a `multipart/alternative` body mail clients
that prefer HTML render it; clients that don't fall back to the
plain part. The text/plain part comes first per RFC 2046, so a
plain-text client that picks the first body gets the readable
text.
`reply_to`, when set, lets a send path point replies at a
different mailbox than the From line (e.g., a watcher
notification with From=notifications@... but Reply-To=
ohm@... so a confused recipient who hits Reply lands at a
monitored mailbox).
`unsubscribe_mailto` / `unsubscribe_url` populate
`List-Unsubscribe`. If `unsubscribe_url` is set, the helper also
emits `List-Unsubscribe-Post: List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` per
RFC 8058 Gmail and Yahoo POST that payload on the user's
one-click action. (Send paths that wire `unsubscribe_url`
therefore MUST also expose a matching POST endpoint that accepts
the same token; see `api_notifications.py:email_unsubscribe`.)
`msgid_domain` defaults to the @-domain of `from_address` so
Message-IDs are aligned with the sending domain by default. A
deployment that wants the Message-ID domain to track a different
surface (e.g., a tracking-domain that's separate from the From
domain) can override.
`Date` is RFC 5322 formatted via `email.utils.formatdate`; the
`localtime=True` setting picks the running process's local
timezone, which is what every popular MUA does too. (A
deployment running in UTC stamps UTC; that's correct, not a
bug.)
"""
msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = formataddr((from_name, from_address))
msg["To"] = to_address
msg["Subject"] = subject
msg["Date"] = formatdate(localtime=True)
# If the caller didn't pin a Message-ID domain, derive it from the
# From address. `make_msgid` accepts None and falls back to the
# local hostname, which is the wrong shape for a deliverable
# message (the hostname might be `gke-pool-xxx`); a deployment
# without a configured From would surface that as a build-time
# config error elsewhere, so the fallback here is just defensive.
if msgid_domain is None:
if "@" in from_address:
msgid_domain = from_address.split("@", 1)[1]
else:
msgid_domain = "localhost"
msg["Message-ID"] = make_msgid(domain=msgid_domain)
if reply_to:
msg["Reply-To"] = reply_to
if is_transactional:
# RFC 3834: prevents auto-responders (vacation replies, etc.)
# from triggering on this message. Every kind of mail rfc-app
# sends today is transactional in this sense.
msg["Auto-Submitted"] = "auto-generated"
if unsubscribe_mailto or unsubscribe_url:
parts: list[str] = []
if unsubscribe_mailto:
parts.append(f"<mailto:{unsubscribe_mailto}>")
if unsubscribe_url:
parts.append(f"<{unsubscribe_url}>")
msg["List-Unsubscribe"] = ", ".join(parts)
if unsubscribe_url:
# RFC 8058 one-click. Gmail and Yahoo POST the payload
# `List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` to the URL on the user's
# one-click action; the matching POST endpoint must be
# idempotent and not require auth. See
# `api_notifications.py` for the receiver.
msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] = "List-Unsubscribe=One-Click"
if body_html:
# multipart/alternative: text/plain first, text/html second.
# `set_content` sets the first part (and the message's main
# body); `add_alternative` adds the second part and
# restructures the message as multipart/alternative.
msg.set_content(body_plain)
msg.add_alternative(body_html, subtype="html")
else:
msg.set_content(body_plain)
return msg
+8 -38
View File
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import smtplib
from email.message import EmailMessage
from email.utils import formataddr
from .email import EmailConfig, _SENT, record_outbound
from .email_envelope import build_envelope
from .email import EmailConfig, _SENT
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -59,52 +59,31 @@ def send_invite_email(
cfg = EmailConfig.from_env()
subject = _subject(inviter_display, cfg)
body = _body(claim_url, inviter_display, inviter_email, custom_message, cfg)
# v0.18.0: invite mail carries a `List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:…>`
# only (no signed URL) — the invitee isn't a user yet, so there
# is no per-user opt-out row to flip. The operator handles
# ad-hoc opt-outs from the mailto: target. Per the proposal's
# "Tradeoff discussion": the invite was unsolicited from the
# recipient's perspective, so the courtesy header is right;
# but it can't be a one-click URL because the row doesn't
# exist yet.
msg = build_envelope(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
from_name=cfg.from_name,
subject=subject,
body_plain=body,
unsubscribe_mailto=cfg.unsubscribe_mailto,
)
envelope = {
"to": to_address,
"from": formataddr((cfg.from_name, cfg.from_address)),
"subject": subject,
"body": body,
"kind": "invite",
"message": msg,
}
_SENT.append(envelope)
message_id = msg["Message-ID"]
if not cfg.enabled:
log.info("invite email disabled (EMAIL_ENABLED=0): to=%s", to_address)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="invite", status="deferred", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
if not cfg.smtp_host:
# Dev fallback: surface the claim URL at INFO so the operator can
# complete a claim flow without an SMTP relay. In production
# SMTP_HOST is always set per OHM's overlay.
log.info("invite email (stdout fallback): to=%s claim_url=%s", to_address, claim_url)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="invite", status="deferred", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
try:
msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = envelope["from"]
msg["To"] = to_address
msg["Subject"] = subject
msg.set_content(body)
smtp = smtplib.SMTP(cfg.smtp_host, cfg.smtp_port, timeout=30)
try:
if cfg.smtp_starttls:
@@ -114,18 +93,9 @@ def send_invite_email(
smtp.send_message(msg)
finally:
smtp.quit()
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="invite", status="sent", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
except Exception as exc:
except Exception:
log.exception("invite email send failed: to=%s", to_address)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="invite", status="failed",
error=f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}", message_id=message_id,
)
return False
+8 -34
View File
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import smtplib
from email.message import EmailMessage
from email.utils import formataddr
from .email import EmailConfig, _SENT, record_outbound
from .email_envelope import build_envelope
from .email import EmailConfig, _SENT
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -44,48 +44,31 @@ def send_otc_email(to_address: str, code: str) -> bool:
cfg = EmailConfig.from_env()
subject = f"Your sign-in code for {cfg.from_name}"
body = _body(code, cfg)
# v0.18.0: OTC mail carries NO List-Unsubscribe — the recipient
# explicitly requested the code; advertising an unsubscribe
# header would imply OHM has them on a list, which it doesn't.
# See the proposal's "Tradeoff discussion" for the binding
# rationale.
msg = build_envelope(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
from_name=cfg.from_name,
subject=subject,
body_plain=body,
)
envelope = {
"to": to_address,
"from": formataddr((cfg.from_name, cfg.from_address)),
"subject": subject,
"body": body,
"kind": "otc",
"message": msg,
}
_SENT.append(envelope)
message_id = msg["Message-ID"]
if not cfg.enabled:
log.info("otc email disabled (EMAIL_ENABLED=0): to=%s", to_address)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="otc", status="deferred", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
if not cfg.smtp_host:
# Dev fallback: surface the code at INFO so the operator can
# complete a sign-in flow without an SMTP relay. In production
# SMTP_HOST is always set per OHM's overlay.
log.info("otc email (stdout fallback): to=%s code=%s", to_address, code)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="otc", status="deferred", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
try:
msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = envelope["from"]
msg["To"] = to_address
msg["Subject"] = subject
msg.set_content(body)
smtp = smtplib.SMTP(cfg.smtp_host, cfg.smtp_port, timeout=30)
try:
if cfg.smtp_starttls:
@@ -95,18 +78,9 @@ def send_otc_email(to_address: str, code: str) -> bool:
smtp.send_message(msg)
finally:
smtp.quit()
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="otc", status="sent", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
except Exception as exc:
except Exception:
log.exception("otc email send failed: to=%s", to_address)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="otc", status="failed",
error=f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}", message_id=message_id,
)
return False
+1 -33
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import logging
import os
from fastapi import APIRouter, Header, HTTPException, Request
@@ -41,27 +40,7 @@ def make_router(config: Config, gitea: Gitea) -> APIRouter:
x_gitea_signature: str = Header(default=""),
):
body = await request.body()
# v0.18.0: defense in depth. config.py refuses to start
# when the secret is empty unless `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`
# is set; this branch catches the dev-bypass case (the only
# path where `config.webhook_secret` can be empty) and surfaces
# it loudly to the client. A POST that lands here with an
# empty secret on a production deployment indicates a
# mis-configuration (somebody flipped the bypass in prod),
# and the loud 500 is the proposal's whole point.
insecure = os.environ.get("RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS", "").strip() == "1"
if not config.webhook_secret:
if not insecure:
log.error(
"webhook receiver misconfigured: GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET is empty "
"and RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1 is not set"
)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Webhook receiver misconfigured")
log.warning(
"webhook receiver running with RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1 — "
"signature verification is DISABLED. Production deployments MUST NOT set this."
)
else:
if config.webhook_secret:
if not _verify_signature(body, x_gitea_signature, config.webhook_secret):
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid signature")
@@ -89,17 +68,6 @@ def make_router(config: Config, gitea: Gitea) -> APIRouter:
slug = _slug_for_repo(repo_full)
if slug:
await cache.refresh_rfc_repo(config, gitea, slug)
else:
# v0.18.0: the proposal's "unknown-repo logging"
# gesture — a hook on a fork or a stale repo binding
# used to silently 200-OK here, hiding the
# misconfiguration. Now the operator sees it in
# the log.
log.info(
"webhook received for unknown repo: repo_full=%s event=%s "
"(no cached_rfcs row matched; hook may be on a fork or stale)",
repo_full, event,
)
except Exception:
log.exception("webhook refresh failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Refresh failed")
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-- v0.18.0 Slice 4: outbound_emails audit table.
--
-- Per the v0.18.0 email + webhook hygiene proposal §3, every send
-- helper writes a row to this table before returning, regardless
-- of outcome. status='sent' on success, 'failed' on exception,
-- 'deferred' on the dev-fallback path (no SMTP_HOST configured).
--
-- The table is queried by `GET /api/admin/outbound-emails` to
-- answer "did this person ever get their invite?" without having
-- to grep VM logs, and by the v0.18.0 Slice 5 bounce-correlation
-- hook (which looks up message_id when a POST lands at
-- /api/webhooks/email-bounce and marks the matching row
-- status='bounced').
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS outbound_emails (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
to_address TEXT NOT NULL,
from_address TEXT NOT NULL,
subject TEXT NOT NULL,
kind TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'otc' | 'invite' | 'notification' | 'bundle' | 'digest' | 'rfc-invite'
sent_at TEXT NOT NULL, -- ISO 8601, time the send was attempted
status TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'sent' | 'failed' | 'deferred' | 'bounced'
error TEXT, -- exception class + message if status='failed'
notification_id INTEGER, -- nullable FK to notifications.id for the watcher path
message_id TEXT -- the Message-ID header value, for bounce correlation
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_outbound_emails_to ON outbound_emails(to_address);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_outbound_emails_sent_at ON outbound_emails(sent_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_outbound_emails_message ON outbound_emails(message_id);
@@ -647,82 +647,3 @@ def test_pending_invites_listing_admin_only(app_with_fake_gitea):
)
r = client.get("/api/admin/users/invites")
assert r.status_code == 403
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.18.0: invite-envelope header shape — Slice 2
#
# Invite mail goes through `build_envelope` and MUST land Date,
# Message-ID, Auto-Submitted, AND a `List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:…>`
# (no URL — the invitee isn't a user yet, so no per-user opt-out
# row exists). The mailto: target is the operator's `EMAIL_FROM`
# by default; the operator can override via `EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO`.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _provision_admin_and_send_invite(client, app_with_fake_gitea_fixture, *, to: str = "headers@ex.co"):
provision_user_row(user_id=400, login="adminH", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=400, gitea_login="adminH",
display_name="Admin H", role="admin",
email="adminh@test",
)
_reset_outbound()
r = client.post(
"/api/admin/users",
json={
"email": to,
"first_name": "Header",
"last_name": "Test",
"role": "contributor",
"custom_message": "",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
return _outbound_invite_envelopes(to)[-1]
def test_invite_envelope_sets_date_messageid_autosubmitted(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
env = _provision_admin_and_send_invite(client, (app, _fake))
msg = env["message"]
assert parsedate_to_datetime(msg["Date"]) is not None
assert msg["Message-ID"].startswith("<") and msg["Message-ID"].endswith(">")
assert msg["Auto-Submitted"] == "auto-generated"
def test_invite_envelope_has_mailto_list_unsubscribe_only(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The invitee isn't a user yet — no per-user opt-out URL is
available. The `List-Unsubscribe` MUST be a mailto: form, and
the `List-Unsubscribe-Post` header MUST be absent (the
one-click semantic requires a URL the MUA can POST to)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
env = _provision_admin_and_send_invite(client, (app, _fake))
msg = env["message"]
lu = msg["List-Unsubscribe"]
assert lu is not None and lu.startswith("<mailto:")
# No URL part — invite is mailto-only.
assert "https://" not in lu and "http://" not in lu
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] is None
def test_invite_envelope_respects_email_unsubscribe_mailto_override(app_with_fake_gitea, monkeypatch):
"""When `EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO` is set, the mailto: target on
`List-Unsubscribe` honors it (lets a deployment route opt-outs
to a humans-monitored mailbox distinct from the no-reply
sender)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
monkeypatch.setenv("EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO", "ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove")
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
env = _provision_admin_and_send_invite(client, (app, _fake))
msg = env["message"]
assert "ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove" in msg["List-Unsubscribe"]
+1 -5
View File
@@ -231,17 +231,13 @@ def test_bounce_webhook_refuses_unsigned_when_secret_configured(app_with_fake_gi
# With the right header, the call passes the guard. (No matching
# user exists, so we get {matched: False} — that's the v1 contract.)
# v0.18.0 Slice 5: the response now includes `correlated_id`
# (the outbound_emails row id that matched the bounce's
# `message_id`, if one was supplied). The body didn't pass a
# message_id, so correlated_id is None.
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/email-bounce",
json={"email": "stranger@example.com", "kind": "hard"},
headers={"X-Webhook-Secret": "shhh"},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
assert r.json() == {"ok": True, "matched": False, "correlated_id": None}
assert r.json() == {"ok": True, "matched": False}
def test_bounce_webhook_open_when_secret_unset(app_with_fake_gitea):
-173
View File
@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
"""Unit tests for `app.email_envelope.build_envelope` (v0.18.0 Slice 1).
These tests don't spin up the FastAPI app or touch the DB — they
exercise the helper directly. The integration tests in
test_otc_vertical / test_admin_create_user_invite_vertical /
test_notifications_vertical exercise the helper's *use* via the
shared `_SENT` buffer (the send path appends the envelope dict
before invoking the helper).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
from app.email_envelope import build_envelope
def _base_kwargs(**overrides):
base = dict(
to_address="recipient@example.com",
from_address="notifications@ohm.wiggleverse.org",
from_name="OHM",
subject="A test subject",
body_plain="Hello, world.\n",
)
base.update(overrides)
return base
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Always-present headers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_envelope_sets_from_to_subject():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
assert msg["To"] == "recipient@example.com"
assert msg["Subject"] == "A test subject"
# `From` is the display-form: "OHM <notifications@ohm.wiggleverse.org>".
assert "OHM" in msg["From"]
assert "<notifications@ohm.wiggleverse.org>" in msg["From"]
def test_envelope_sets_date_header_parseable():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
raw = msg["Date"]
assert raw, "Date header must be set"
# parsedate_to_datetime raises ValueError on malformed input.
dt = parsedate_to_datetime(raw)
assert dt is not None
def test_envelope_sets_message_id_with_from_domain_by_default():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
mid = msg["Message-ID"]
assert mid, "Message-ID must be set"
# Shape per RFC 5322 / make_msgid: <random@domain>
assert mid.startswith("<") and mid.endswith(">")
assert "@ohm.wiggleverse.org>" in mid
def test_envelope_message_id_domain_override():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(msgid_domain="example.test"))
assert "@example.test>" in msg["Message-ID"]
def test_envelope_message_id_falls_back_to_localhost_if_from_has_no_at():
# Defensive: a malformed from_address shouldn't crash the helper.
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(from_address="bare-no-at-sign"))
assert "@localhost>" in msg["Message-ID"]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Auto-Submitted (RFC 3834)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_envelope_sets_auto_submitted_for_transactional_default():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
assert msg["Auto-Submitted"] == "auto-generated"
def test_envelope_omits_auto_submitted_when_transactional_is_false():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(is_transactional=False))
assert msg["Auto-Submitted"] is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Reply-To
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_envelope_sets_reply_to_when_provided():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(reply_to="ohm@wiggleverse.org"))
assert msg["Reply-To"] == "ohm@wiggleverse.org"
def test_envelope_omits_reply_to_when_absent():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
assert msg["Reply-To"] is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# List-Unsubscribe (the headers RFC 8058 / Gmail-Yahoo care about)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_envelope_no_list_unsubscribe_when_neither_given():
"""OTC mail: the recipient explicitly requested the code; no
unsubscribe semantics. The header MUST be absent (presence would
imply OHM has the recipient on a list, which it doesn't)."""
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe"] is None
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] is None
def test_envelope_mailto_only_list_unsubscribe():
"""Admin invite / per-RFC invite: `mailto:` form only, no URL.
The recipient isn't a user yet, so there's no per-user opt-out
URL to flip; the operator handles ad-hoc opt-outs manually."""
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(
unsubscribe_mailto="ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove",
))
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe"] == "<mailto:ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove>"
# NO List-Unsubscribe-Post when only a mailto is present — the
# one-click semantic requires a URL the MUA can POST to.
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] is None
def test_envelope_full_one_click_list_unsubscribe():
"""Watcher notification / bundle: `mailto:` + signed-URL +
`List-Unsubscribe-Post: List-Unsubscribe=One-Click`. Gmail and
Yahoo enforce this for bulk-adjacent mail per RFC 8058."""
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(
unsubscribe_mailto="ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove",
unsubscribe_url="https://ohm.wiggleverse.org/api/email/unsubscribe?t=abc",
))
lu = msg["List-Unsubscribe"]
assert "<mailto:ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove>" in lu
assert "<https://ohm.wiggleverse.org/api/email/unsubscribe?t=abc>" in lu
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] == "List-Unsubscribe=One-Click"
def test_envelope_url_only_list_unsubscribe_still_sets_post():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(
unsubscribe_url="https://ohm.wiggleverse.org/api/email/unsubscribe?t=abc",
))
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe"] == "<https://ohm.wiggleverse.org/api/email/unsubscribe?t=abc>"
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] == "List-Unsubscribe=One-Click"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Body shape — plain-only vs multipart/alternative
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_envelope_plain_only_body_is_text_plain():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
# No HTML alternative -> single-part text/plain.
assert msg.get_content_type() == "text/plain"
assert msg.get_content().strip() == "Hello, world."
def test_envelope_with_html_is_multipart_alternative():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(body_html="<p>Hello, <b>world</b>.</p>"))
assert msg.get_content_type() == "multipart/alternative"
# Two parts: text/plain first (so plain-text clients picking the
# first part get the readable text), text/html second.
parts = list(msg.iter_parts())
assert len(parts) == 2
assert parts[0].get_content_type() == "text/plain"
assert parts[1].get_content_type() == "text/html"
assert "Hello, world." in parts[0].get_content()
assert "<b>world</b>" in parts[1].get_content()
@@ -612,127 +612,3 @@ def test_explicit_watch_set_overrides_auto(app_with_fake_gitea):
# the user put them.
assert row["set_by"] == "explicit"
assert row["state"] == "following"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.18.0 — envelope headers + RFC 8058 one-click POST endpoint
#
# Watcher notifications are bulk-adjacent (a busy RFC can produce
# dozens of structural events); per the proposal, they MUST carry
# `Date`, `Message-ID`, `Auto-Submitted`, full `List-Unsubscribe`
# (mailto + signed URL), AND `List-Unsubscribe-Post:
# List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` per RFC 8058. Gmail and Yahoo
# enforce this for senders at OHM's volume tier.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_notification_envelope_carries_full_one_click_headers(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""A `proposal_merged` event lands a watcher notification email
with the full one-click unsubscribe shape."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="ben", role="owner")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor", email="alice@test")
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/propose", json={"title": "OHM", "slug": "ohm", "pitch": PITCH, "tags": []})
assert r.status_code == 200
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="ben", display_name="Ben", role="owner", email="ben@test")
merge_r = client.post(f"/api/proposals/{r.json()['pr_number']}/merge")
assert merge_r.status_code == 200, merge_r.text
envelopes = [e for e in email_mod.sent_envelopes() if e["to"] == "alice@test"]
assert envelopes, "watcher notification did not fire"
msg = envelopes[-1]["message"]
# Always-present headers from the helper.
assert parsedate_to_datetime(msg["Date"]) is not None
assert msg["Message-ID"].startswith("<") and msg["Message-ID"].endswith(">")
assert msg["Auto-Submitted"] == "auto-generated"
# Full one-click unsubscribe.
lu = msg["List-Unsubscribe"]
assert lu is not None
assert "<mailto:" in lu
# URL part carries the signed token per make_unsubscribe_url.
assert "/api/email/unsubscribe?t=" in lu
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] == "List-Unsubscribe=One-Click"
def test_email_unsubscribe_post_one_click_flips_category_off(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""RFC 8058: Gmail/Yahoo POST `List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` to the
URL in the List-Unsubscribe header. The endpoint MUST accept POST
+ the same token shape as the GET handler + return 200 + flip the
flag."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
token = email_mod.make_unsubscribe_url(2, "personal-direct").split("t=", 1)[1]
r = client.post(
f"/api/email/unsubscribe?t={token}",
data={"List-Unsubscribe": "One-Click"},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
body = r.json()
assert body["ok"] is True
assert body["category"] == "personal-direct"
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email_personal_direct FROM users WHERE id = 2"
).fetchone()
assert row["email_personal_direct"] == 0
def test_email_unsubscribe_post_all_sets_global_opt_out(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The v0.18.0 `all` synthetic category (used by the bundle +
digest paths) MUST set `email_opt_out_all = 1`."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
token = email_mod.make_unsubscribe_url(2, "all").split("t=", 1)[1]
r = client.post(f"/api/email/unsubscribe?t={token}")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json() == {"ok": True, "category": "all"}
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email_opt_out_all FROM users WHERE id = 2"
).fetchone()
assert row["email_opt_out_all"] == 1
def test_email_unsubscribe_get_all_sets_global_opt_out(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""GET handler also accepts the `all` category and lands the
global opt-out (so an MUA that doesn't honor RFC 8058 POST and
just opens the URL in a browser still works)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
token = email_mod.make_unsubscribe_url(2, "all").split("t=", 1)[1]
r = client.get(f"/api/email/unsubscribe?t={token}")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert "Unsubscribed" in r.text
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email_opt_out_all FROM users WHERE id = 2"
).fetchone()
assert row["email_opt_out_all"] == 1
def test_email_unsubscribe_post_refuses_invalid_token(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.post("/api/email/unsubscribe?t=not-a-valid-token")
assert r.status_code == 400
-50
View File
@@ -347,53 +347,3 @@ def test_otc_re_request_invalidates_prior_unused_code(app_with_fake_gitea, monke
# The new code still works.
r = client.post("/auth/otc/verify", json={"email": "alice@example.com", "code": second})
assert r.status_code == 200
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.18.0: envelope headers — Slice 2
#
# OTC mail goes through `build_envelope` and MUST land Date,
# Message-ID, and Auto-Submitted but MUST NOT carry a
# List-Unsubscribe header (the recipient explicitly requested the
# code; advertising a list semantic would be wrong).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _last_otc_envelope():
from app import email as email_mod
otc = [e for e in email_mod.sent_envelopes() if e.get("kind") == "otc"]
assert otc, "no OTC envelope in the buffer"
return otc[-1]
def test_otc_envelope_sets_date_messageid_autosubmitted(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "headers@example.com"})
msg = _last_otc_envelope()["message"]
# Date is RFC 5322 parseable.
assert parsedate_to_datetime(msg["Date"]) is not None
# Message-ID is bracketed and carries the From-address @-domain.
mid = msg["Message-ID"]
assert mid.startswith("<") and mid.endswith(">")
# Auto-Submitted prevents auto-responder loops.
assert msg["Auto-Submitted"] == "auto-generated"
def test_otc_envelope_has_no_list_unsubscribe(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The recipient explicitly typed their email and asked for a
code; the framework MUST NOT advertise a list semantic on this
mail. Per the v0.18.0 proposal's tradeoff discussion."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "headers@example.com"})
msg = _last_otc_envelope()["message"]
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe"] is None
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] is None
@@ -1,368 +0,0 @@
"""End-to-end integration tests for the v0.18.0 Slice 4
outbound_emails audit table + admin endpoint.
The release adds:
* `backend/migrations/020_outbound_emails.sql` the audit table.
* `record_outbound()` in `email.py` the write helper every send
path calls before returning, capturing status='sent' / 'failed'
/ 'deferred' (the dev-fallback path when SMTP_HOST is unset).
* `GET /api/admin/outbound-emails` admin-only listing, filterable
by kind / status / to_address.
These tests prove:
* Sending OTC / invite / notification mail writes one row per send
(status='deferred' under tests since SMTP_HOST is unset).
* The Message-ID on the row matches the envelope's Message-ID
header (the seam Slice 5 uses for bounce correlation).
* `kind` is populated per send path.
* `GET /api/admin/outbound-emails` lists rows newest-first,
accepts filters, refuses non-admins.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Write-on-send wiring
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_otc_send_writes_outbound_row_with_message_id(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
r = client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "newcomer@ex.co"})
assert r.status_code == 200
# Audit row landed.
rows = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id, to_address, kind, status, message_id, error "
"FROM outbound_emails WHERE to_address = 'newcomer@ex.co'"
).fetchall()
assert len(rows) == 1
row = rows[0]
assert row["kind"] == "otc"
# No SMTP_HOST in tests -> 'deferred', not 'sent'.
assert row["status"] == "deferred"
assert row["error"] is None
# Message-ID matches the envelope's header (the seam Slice 5 uses).
envelopes = [e for e in email_mod.sent_envelopes() if e.get("kind") == "otc"]
assert envelopes
envelope_mid = envelopes[-1]["message"]["Message-ID"]
assert row["message_id"] == envelope_mid
def test_invite_send_writes_outbound_row(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=500, login="adminQ", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=500, gitea_login="adminQ",
display_name="Admin Q", role="admin",
email="adminq@test",
)
r = client.post(
"/api/admin/users",
json={
"email": "invitee@ex.co",
"first_name": "Inv", "last_name": "Itee",
"role": "contributor", "custom_message": "",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
rows = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT kind, status, message_id FROM outbound_emails "
"WHERE to_address = 'invitee@ex.co'"
).fetchall()
assert len(rows) == 1
assert rows[0]["kind"] == "invite"
assert rows[0]["status"] == "deferred"
assert rows[0]["message_id"] is not None
def test_notification_send_writes_outbound_row_with_notification_id(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Watcher notifications carry a `notification_id` FK so the
admin can join through to the notifications table to see what
triggered the send."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
from test_notifications_vertical import PITCH
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="ben", role="owner")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor", email="alice@test",
)
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/propose", json={
"title": "OHM", "slug": "ohm", "pitch": PITCH, "tags": [],
})
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
# Wipe pre-merge audit rows so the assertion below is unambiguous.
db.conn().execute("DELETE FROM outbound_emails")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=1, gitea_login="ben",
display_name="Ben", role="owner", email="ben@test",
)
merge_r = client.post(f"/api/proposals/{r.json()['pr_number']}/merge")
assert merge_r.status_code == 200, merge_r.text
rows = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT kind, status, notification_id, message_id "
"FROM outbound_emails WHERE to_address = 'alice@test'"
).fetchall()
assert rows, "no outbound_emails row for alice@test"
# At least one notification kind, with a populated FK.
notif_rows = [r for r in rows if r["kind"] == "notification"]
assert notif_rows
for nr in notif_rows:
assert nr["status"] == "deferred"
assert nr["notification_id"] is not None
assert nr["message_id"] is not None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Admin endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_admin_outbound_emails_lists_rows(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
# Generate a few rows.
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "one@ex.co"})
provision_user_row(user_id=600, login="adminR", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=600, gitea_login="adminR",
display_name="Admin R", role="admin", email="adminr@test",
)
client.post("/api/admin/users", json={
"email": "two@ex.co", "first_name": "T", "last_name": "Wo",
"role": "contributor", "custom_message": "",
})
r = client.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
items = r.json()["items"]
kinds = {it["kind"] for it in items}
assert "otc" in kinds
assert "invite" in kinds
# Newest-first.
ids = [it["id"] for it in items]
assert ids == sorted(ids, reverse=True)
def test_admin_outbound_emails_filters_by_kind(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "filter1@ex.co"})
provision_user_row(user_id=601, login="adminS", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=601, gitea_login="adminS",
display_name="Admin S", role="admin", email="admins@test",
)
client.post("/api/admin/users", json={
"email": "filter2@ex.co", "first_name": "F", "last_name": "Two",
"role": "contributor", "custom_message": "",
})
r = client.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails?kind=otc")
assert r.status_code == 200
items = r.json()["items"]
assert items
assert all(it["kind"] == "otc" for it in items)
def test_admin_outbound_emails_filters_by_to_address(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "TARGET@ex.co"})
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "other@ex.co"})
provision_user_row(user_id=602, login="adminT", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=602, gitea_login="adminT",
display_name="Admin T", role="admin", email="admint@test",
)
# to_address filter is case-insensitive.
r = client.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails?to_address=target@ex.co")
assert r.status_code == 200
items = r.json()["items"]
assert items
assert all(it["to_address"].lower() == "target@ex.co" for it in items)
def test_admin_outbound_emails_refuses_non_admin(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=700, login="contribU", role="contributor")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=700, gitea_login="contribU",
display_name="Contrib U", role="contributor",
)
r = client.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails")
assert r.status_code == 403
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.18.0 Slice 5: bounce correlation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_bounce_with_message_id_marks_outbound_row_bounced(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""When the bounce body includes the original `message_id`, the
framework looks it up in outbound_emails and stamps
status='bounced' on the matching row. The hard-bounce ->
global-opt-out logic still fires."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=800, login="bouncey", role="contributor")
db.conn().execute("UPDATE users SET email = 'bouncey@ex.co' WHERE id = 800")
# Send something to bouncey to land an outbound_emails row.
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "bouncey@ex.co"})
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id, message_id, status FROM outbound_emails "
"WHERE to_address = 'bouncey@ex.co'"
).fetchone()
assert row is not None
original_id = row["id"]
message_id = row["message_id"]
assert row["status"] == "deferred" # pre-bounce baseline
# Bounce comes in carrying that message_id.
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/email-bounce",
json={
"email": "bouncey@ex.co",
"kind": "hard",
"message_id": message_id,
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["matched"] is True
assert body["correlated_id"] == original_id
# Audit row stamped.
post = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT status, error FROM outbound_emails WHERE id = ?",
(original_id,),
).fetchone()
assert post["status"] == "bounced"
assert "bounce (hard)" in (post["error"] or "")
# Hard-bounce global opt-out still fires.
urow = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email_opt_out_all FROM users WHERE id = 800"
).fetchone()
assert urow["email_opt_out_all"] == 1
def test_bounce_with_unknown_message_id_does_not_crash(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""A message_id the framework doesn't recognize logs but does
NOT 5xx bounce providers replay old bounces, and the
framework can't refuse just because the row was pruned."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/email-bounce",
json={
"email": "nobody@ex.co",
"kind": "hard",
"message_id": "<not-in-our-db@ex.co>",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json()["correlated_id"] is None
def test_bounce_without_message_id_still_flips_opt_out(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Backward compat: providers that don't surface Message-ID
still get the legacy v1 behavior match by email + flip the
global opt-out."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=801, login="legacybounce", role="contributor")
db.conn().execute("UPDATE users SET email = 'legacy@ex.co' WHERE id = 801")
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/email-bounce",
json={"email": "legacy@ex.co", "kind": "hard"},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["matched"] is True
assert body["correlated_id"] is None
urow = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email_opt_out_all FROM users WHERE id = 801"
).fetchone()
assert urow["email_opt_out_all"] == 1
def test_bounced_rows_show_in_admin_endpoint(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The admin endpoint surfaces bounced rows alongside the rest;
filtering by `status=bounced` isolates them."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=802, login="adminB", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=802, gitea_login="adminB",
display_name="Admin B", role="admin", email="adminb@test",
)
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "willbounce@ex.co"})
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT message_id FROM outbound_emails WHERE to_address = 'willbounce@ex.co'"
).fetchone()
client.post(
"/api/webhooks/email-bounce",
json={"email": "willbounce@ex.co", "kind": "hard", "message_id": row["message_id"]},
)
r = client.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails?status=bounced")
assert r.status_code == 200
items = r.json()["items"]
assert items
assert all(it["status"] == "bounced" for it in items)
assert any(it["to_address"] == "willbounce@ex.co" for it in items)
+1 -5
View File
@@ -438,11 +438,7 @@ def tmp_env(monkeypatch):
"SECRET_KEY": "test-secret-key-for-cookies",
"DATABASE_PATH": str(db_path),
"OWNER_GITEA_LOGIN": "ben",
# v0.18.0: `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is now mandatory at startup
# per the email + webhook hygiene proposal. Tests bind a fake
# value so the framework boots; tests that want to exercise
# the dev-bypass path monkeypatch `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`.
"GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET": "test-webhook-secret-for-signature-verification",
"GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET": "",
"ENABLED_MODELS": "claude",
}
for k, v in env.items():
-205
View File
@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
"""End-to-end integration tests for the Gitea webhook receiver
(v0.18.0 Slice 3 webhook tightening per the email + webhook
hygiene proposal).
The release changes the receiver from "verifies the signature only
when a secret is configured; silently accepts unsigned POSTs
otherwise" to "requires the secret unless `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`
is set as an explicit dev-bypass." The startup-time check lives in
`config.load_config()`; the request-time check lives in
`webhooks.receive`.
These tests prove:
* The framework refuses to start when `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is
empty and the dev-bypass is not set.
* The dev-bypass (`RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`) lets the
framework boot with an empty secret AND lets webhook POSTs
land without signature verification (a loud-warning log line
surfaces, but the request is accepted).
* Default path (secret bound): a POST with a valid signature
lands; a POST with an invalid signature gets 401; a POST with
no signature gets 401.
* Unknown-repo POSTs surface in the log (the "stale Gitea hook"
case the proposal targets).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import logging
import pytest
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
tmp_env,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Startup-time secret check (config.load_config)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_config_refuses_to_load_with_empty_secret_and_no_bypass(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""The framework MUST refuse to start when `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET`
is empty unless `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1` is set. This is
the v0.18.0 startup-loud-failure shape silent acceptance was
the bug."""
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "http://gitea.test")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_USER", "rfc-bot")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_TOKEN", "bot-token")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_ORG", "wiggleverse")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_ID", "cid")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "csec")
monkeypatch.setenv("SECRET_KEY", "test-secret-key")
monkeypatch.setenv("DATABASE_PATH", str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "")
monkeypatch.delenv("RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS", raising=False)
from app.config import load_config
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET"):
load_config()
def test_config_loads_with_empty_secret_when_bypass_is_set(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""The explicit `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1` opt-in lets the
framework boot with an empty webhook secret. This is the
local-dev escape hatch."""
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "http://gitea.test")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_USER", "rfc-bot")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_TOKEN", "bot-token")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_ORG", "wiggleverse")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_ID", "cid")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "csec")
monkeypatch.setenv("SECRET_KEY", "test-secret-key")
monkeypatch.setenv("DATABASE_PATH", str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "")
monkeypatch.setenv("RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS", "1")
from app.config import load_config
cfg = load_config() # MUST NOT raise
assert cfg.webhook_secret == ""
def test_config_loads_with_secret_set(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""Sanity: the happy path (secret bound, bypass not set) loads
cleanly."""
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "http://gitea.test")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_USER", "rfc-bot")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_TOKEN", "bot-token")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_ORG", "wiggleverse")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_ID", "cid")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "csec")
monkeypatch.setenv("SECRET_KEY", "test-secret-key")
monkeypatch.setenv("DATABASE_PATH", str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "my-real-secret")
monkeypatch.delenv("RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS", raising=False)
from app.config import load_config
cfg = load_config()
assert cfg.webhook_secret == "my-real-secret"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Request-time signature verification (webhooks.receive)
#
# The default `app_with_fake_gitea` fixture binds
# `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET=test-webhook-secret-for-signature-verification`,
# so these tests exercise the production path.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_SECRET = "test-webhook-secret-for-signature-verification"
def _sign(body: bytes) -> str:
return hmac.new(_SECRET.encode("utf-8"), body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def test_webhook_post_with_valid_signature_accepted(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
body = json.dumps({"repository": {"full_name": "wiggleverse/meta"}}).encode()
sig = _sign(body)
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/gitea",
content=body,
headers={
"X-Gitea-Event": "push",
"X-Gitea-Signature": sig,
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
def test_webhook_post_with_invalid_signature_refused_401(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
body = json.dumps({"repository": {"full_name": "wiggleverse/meta"}}).encode()
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/gitea",
content=body,
headers={
"X-Gitea-Event": "push",
"X-Gitea-Signature": "0" * 64, # wrong signature
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 401
def test_webhook_post_with_missing_signature_refused_401(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
body = json.dumps({"repository": {"full_name": "wiggleverse/meta"}}).encode()
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/gitea",
content=body,
headers={
"X-Gitea-Event": "push",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 401
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Unknown-repo logging (the "stale hook on a fork" surface)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_webhook_unknown_repo_logs_at_info(app_with_fake_gitea, caplog):
"""Per the proposal: a hook on a fork or a stale Gitea binding
used to silently 200-OK. v0.18.0 surfaces it as an INFO log."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
body = json.dumps({"repository": {"full_name": "someone-else/unrelated"}}).encode()
sig = _sign(body)
with caplog.at_level(logging.INFO, logger="app.webhooks"):
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/gitea",
content=body,
headers={
"X-Gitea-Event": "push",
"X-Gitea-Signature": sig,
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200 # the handler still 200s; surface is the log line
assert any(
"unknown repo" in rec.message and "someone-else/unrelated" in rec.message
for rec in caplog.records
), f"expected unknown-repo log line; got: {[r.message for r in caplog.records]}"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"name": "rfc-app-frontend",
"private": true,
"version": "0.18.0",
"version": "0.17.0",
"type": "module",
"scripts": {
"dev": "vite",