Ben Stull
113 lines
4.4 KiB
Bash
113 lines
4.4 KiB
Bash
# --- Gitea ---
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# Base URL of the Gitea instance the app speaks to.
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GITEA_URL=http://localhost:3000
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# The bot service account that performs every Git operation per §1.
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# Provision a real Gitea user, generate a personal access token with
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# repo and admin (or at minimum: repo, write:repository) scopes, and
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# put the token here. The bot is the only Git writer.
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GITEA_BOT_USER=rfc-bot
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GITEA_BOT_TOKEN=
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# The Gitea org or user that owns the meta repo and every RFC repo
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# the bot will create on graduation.
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GITEA_ORG=wiggleverse
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META_REPO=meta
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# --- OAuth (Gitea) ---
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# In Gitea: Site Administration → Applications → Add OAuth2 Application.
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# Redirect URI: {APP_URL}/auth/callback
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OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=
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OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# --- App ---
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APP_URL=http://localhost:8000
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SECRET_KEY=change-me-to-a-long-random-string
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DATABASE_PATH=data/rfc-app.db
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# Per §1: owner zero. The Gitea login that gets the owner role on
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# first sign-in.
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OWNER_GITEA_LOGIN=ben
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# Webhook signature secret. Gitea sends X-Gitea-Signature as the
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# HMAC-SHA256 of the body using this secret. Per §4.1 the webhook is
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# one of two cache writers; signing keeps spurious writes out.
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GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET=change-me-to-a-shared-secret
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# --- LLM providers (carryover §18) ---
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# Comma-separated list of provider keys to enable. Per the §19.2
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# per-RFC-model topic, this is app-wide until that topic lands.
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ENABLED_MODELS=claude
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ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=
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GOOGLE_API_KEY=
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OPENAI_API_KEY=
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# --- Email (§15.4) ---
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# Leave SMTP_HOST unset to use the stdout fallback — the integration
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# tests rely on it, and a dev environment without a real SMTP provider
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# still sees envelope traces in the logs. Set the rest to wire a real
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# provider (Postmark, Mailgun, SES, etc.).
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SMTP_HOST=
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SMTP_PORT=587
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SMTP_USER=
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SMTP_PASSWORD=
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SMTP_STARTTLS=1
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# Single non-spoofing envelope identity per §15.9 — every notification
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# email goes out from the same address regardless of which user's
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# gesture produced it. Configure both the SPF and DKIM records for
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# this address with the chosen SMTP provider.
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EMAIL_FROM=notifications@wiggleverse.local
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EMAIL_FROM_NAME=Wiggleverse
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# §15.4 bundle threshold: when a user's quiet-hours release queue is
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# at least this big, the flush goes out as one bundled "Activity while
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# you were away" email instead of individual sends.
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EMAIL_BUNDLE_THRESHOLD=5
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# Set to 0 to suppress every outbound email (the inbox and SSE still
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# work — only the email channel turns off).
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EMAIL_ENABLED=1
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# --- Email-bounce webhook (§15.4 + §19.2-settled) ---
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# When set, `/api/webhooks/email-bounce` requires the same value in
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# the `X-Webhook-Secret` header. Pick a long random string and
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# configure the SMTP provider's webhook to inject it. When unset,
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# the webhook stays unauthenticated for dev — the v1 contract.
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WEBHOOK_EMAIL_BOUNCE_SECRET=
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# --- §12 hygiene cadence (Slice 8) ---
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# How often the hygiene scheduler sweeps for the 30/90-day boundaries.
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# Production default is hourly; tests override to seconds via the same
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# env var.
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HYGIENE_TICK_SECONDS=3600
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# --- v0.7.0: email + one-time-code sign-in (§6.2) ---
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# How long a one-time code stays valid after issuance. Re-requesting
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# invalidates the prior code immediately regardless of TTL.
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OTC_TTL_MINUTES=10
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# Per-email cooldown between successive /auth/otc/request calls. The
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# endpoint returns HTTP 429 when the cooldown blocks a request (the
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# loud-failure shape so the abuse path is visible). Set to 0 to
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# disable the cooldown — useful for tests but never in production.
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OTC_REQUEST_COOLDOWN_SECONDS=60
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# --- v0.12.0: CloudFlare Turnstile gate on OTC dispatch (§6.2, item #10) ---
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# Provision a Turnstile site at dash.cloudflare.com → Turnstile → Add
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# site. The site key (public) goes in `frontend/.env` as
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# VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY. The secret key (private) goes here and is
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# what the backend POSTs to /siteverify alongside the user's response
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# token. Leave both unset for dev/test paths; the gate stays open when
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# the secret is absent AND TURNSTILE_REQUIRED=false (the default).
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CLOUDFLARE_TURNSTILE_SECRET=
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# When `true`, /auth/otc/request fails closed (HTTP 500 "auth
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# misconfigured") if CLOUDFLARE_TURNSTILE_SECRET is unset. When `false`
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# (the default), a missing secret skips verification — useful in dev
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# and during the pre-rollout window when the operator hasn't wired
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# the secret yet. Flip to `true` once the secret is wired so a future
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# config drift surfaces as a loud 500 rather than a silent abuse-
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# defense disablement.
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TURNSTILE_REQUIRED=false
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