rfc-app/CHANGELOG.md

# Changelog

The binding policy for what each kind of version bump means and what
the changelog has to carry is in [`SPEC.md` §20](./SPEC.md). The
practical recipe downstream deployments follow when reading this file
is in [`docs/DEPLOYMENTS.md`](./docs/DEPLOYMENTS.md).

The canonical version is the `VERSION` file at the repo root;
`frontend/package.json#version` mirrors it. Deployments pin to a
specific framework version in their own `.rfc-app-version` file
(per §20.5).

While the framework is pre-1.0, minor-version bumps may introduce
breaking changes; the entry below each such bump documents the
upgrade steps a deployment must apply.

Upgrade-steps blocks use the [RFC 2119](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119)
/ [RFC 8174](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174) normative-
language convention per `SPEC.md` §20.4. **MUST** / **SHALL** steps
are required; **SHOULD** steps are recommended (the framework's
default and tested path); **MAY** steps are optional. Upgrades that
skip versions are the composition of each intervening adjacent
release's steps in order — no A-to-B path is pre-computed beyond
that.

## 0.13.0 — 2026-05-28

**Minor — schema migration required; new optional env vars.** This
release ships the cookie / privacy consent surface (roadmap item #11,
SPEC §14.5 / §14.6). Every viewer — authenticated and anonymous alike —
now sees a non-modal bottom-of-page banner on first visit asking which
categories of cookies they allow (essential / essential + analytics /
essential + analytics + other). The choice persists in `localStorage`
for anonymous viewers and in a new `cookie_consent` table for
authenticated viewers, with server-side overriding local on sign-in.
The framework also ships default `/privacy` and `/cookies` policy pages
that deployments can layer their own policy URL on top of via two new
optional env vars. No analytics SDK ships in this release — the
consent infrastructure is wired so item #13 (v0.15.0) can read from
`frontend/src/lib/consent.js` when the SDK lands.

### Added

- **Cookie consent banner** (`frontend/src/components/CookieConsentBanner.jsx`).
  Non-modal, bottom of viewport. Three single-select choices with
  inline descriptions. Visible until the user makes a choice; hides
  thereafter. Reachable for revision via the settings surface.
- **Consent helper** (`frontend/src/lib/consent.js`). Exports
  `getConsent()`, `hasChosen()`, `onConsentChange(cb)`, `setConsent()`,
  `hydrateFromServer()`, `clearLocal()`. Cross-tab sync via the
  `storage` event. Item #13's analytics SDK reads consent here before
  importing.
- **Privacy and cookies policy pages**
  (`frontend/src/pages/Privacy.jsx`, `frontend/src/pages/Cookies.jsx`).
  Default minimal policies that describe the framework's stance and
  list the cookies the framework sets. Deployments override via the
  two new env vars below; the framework's stub always renders above
  the link so the framework-level contract stays visible.
- **"Privacy & cookies" tab** in `/settings/notifications` showing
  the current consent choice, the recorded-at stamp, and a "Change"
  button that re-opens the banner via a custom DOM event.
- **`§17` endpoints** —
  - `GET  /api/users/me/cookie-consent` — read the current consent
    record.
  - `PUT  /api/users/me/cookie-consent` — write a new consent record.
    Upserts a single row per user, stamps `recorded_at` to now,
    accepts `essential` for symmetry but always persists it as true.
- **Schema migration** `013_cookie_consent.sql` — new
  `cookie_consent` table keyed by `user_id`, three flags
  (`essential`, `analytics`, `other_cookies`), and `recorded_at`.
  (Renumbered from `012_*` during driver integration because v0.7.0
  also added a `012_otc.sql` migration that landed in the integration
  order before this one.)
- **SPEC `§14.5` Cookie / privacy consent** — settles the banner
  shape, the three-category single-select, the storage shape (local
  for anon, server row for authenticated), the precedence rule on
  sign-in, and the `consent.js` helper surface for downstream
  callers including item #13.
- **SPEC `§14.6` Privacy and cookies policy pages** — settles the
  `/privacy` and `/cookies` routes, the framework's stub content, and
  the `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` / `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL` override
  shape.
- **SPEC `§5`** — names the `cookie_consent` table in the canonical
  app-tables list.
- **SPEC `§17`** — lists the two new cookie-consent endpoints.
- **SPEC `§19.2`** — surfaces four candidates: policy content via
  content-repo file vs env var, GPC / DNT headers, multi-language
  consent text, and the item #13 analytics-SDK gating dependency.

### Changed

- **`frontend/.env.example`** — documents the two new optional env
  vars `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` and `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL`. Unset
  is supported; defaults render the framework's stub.
- **`backend/app/api_notifications.py`** — module docstring grew two
  endpoint lines; the new endpoints sit alongside the existing
  `/api/users/me/*` neighbors.
- **`frontend/src/App.jsx`** — registers `/privacy` and `/cookies`
  routes (anonymous-reachable), wires `<CookieConsentBanner>` into
  the global chrome, and listens for a `rfc-app:cookie-consent-reopen`
  custom event to re-open the banner from the settings surface.

### Upgrade steps (from 0.7.0)

- You **MUST** rebuild the frontend and restart the backend after
  upgrading. `frontend/package.json#version` and `VERSION` both move
  to `0.13.0` and the build embeds the new env-var contract.
- You **MUST** apply schema migration `013_cookie_consent.sql`. The
  migration creates a single new table keyed by `user_id` with three
  flag columns and a `recorded_at` stamp. The framework runs
  migrations automatically at process start; no manual step is
  required beyond restarting the backend so the migration runner
  picks the file up.
- You **MAY** set `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` to an http(s) URL that
  points at your deployment's full privacy policy. The framework's
  `/privacy` page renders its built-in stub above a link to the
  configured URL. Unset is supported — the stub is sufficient for a
  default-config deployment.
- You **MAY** set `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL` to an http(s) URL that
  points at your deployment's full cookies policy. Same shape as the
  privacy URL.
- You **MAY** announce the new consent banner to your users. Existing
  authenticated users will see the banner on their next visit
  (because their `cookie_consent` row does not yet exist); their
  current sessions remain valid.

## 0.10.0 — 2026-05-28

**Minor — schema migration required; new auth path is additive.**
This release lands user-set passcodes after OTC (roadmap item #8,
SPEC §6.2). After a successful one-time-code sign-in, the user can
set a passcode (4–20 characters) and use email + passcode for
subsequent sign-ins. OTC remains the structural fallback: a
forgotten passcode is recovered by requesting a fresh code, and
five consecutive failed passcode verifies lock the passcode path
for 15 minutes (HTTP 423) while leaving the OTC path open. The
`/login` surface now consults a new `GET /auth/passcode/check`
endpoint after the email step to decide whether to render a
passcode input or an OTC code input; an "Use a code instead" link
on the passcode step lets the user fall back to OTC manually. The
`/settings/notifications` page grew a new "Sign-in" tab where the
user can set, change, or remove their passcode.

### Upgrade steps (from 0.8.0)

1. **MUST** restart the backend so migration `015_passcode.sql`
   runs. The migration adds four nullable columns to the `users`
   table: `passcode_hash`, `passcode_set_at`,
   `passcode_failed_attempts` (default 0), `passcode_locked_until`.
   Existing rows pass through with `passcode_hash = NULL`, which
   the runtime treats as "no passcode set" — every existing user
   continues to sign in via OTC unchanged, and can opt into a
   passcode from the new settings tab at any time.
2. **MUST** rebuild the frontend so the v0.10.0 `/login` flow and
   the new settings tab ship. `frontend/package.json#version` and
   `VERSION` both move to `0.10.0`.
3. **SHOULD** announce the new sign-in option to users. Wording
   suggestion: "You can now set a passcode for faster sign-in.
   We'll keep emailing one-time codes as a fallback — if you
   forget your passcode, just request a code as usual."
4. **MAY** leave the §6.2 default lockout shape (5 attempts,
   15-minute window) unchanged. v0.10.0 does not expose env
   tunables for these; raising or lowering them lives in §19.2
   as a candidate.

### Added

- **`POST /auth/passcode/set`** — authenticated. Body `{passcode}`.
  Validates length (4–20) and refuses obvious patterns from a small
  denylist (`0000`, `1234`, `aaaa`, `password`, etc.). bcrypt-hashes
  the passcode and writes `users.passcode_hash` plus
  `users.passcode_set_at`. Clears any active lockout and the
  failure counter (a user setting a fresh passcode is implicitly
  re-authenticating). Replaces any prior passcode.
- **`DELETE /auth/passcode`** — authenticated. Clears the passcode
  hash and the set-at stamp; the user is back to OTC-only.
- **`POST /auth/passcode/verify`** — unauthenticated. Body
  `{email, passcode}`. Returns HTTP 200 + minimal user payload on
  success; HTTP 423 with `locked_until` when the account is in the
  lockout window; HTTP 400 for every other failure (the
  wrong-passcode and unknown-email modes both collapse to 400 so
  the response does not enumerate account state).
- **`GET /auth/passcode/check`** — unauthenticated. Query param
  `email`. Returns `{has_passcode: boolean}`. The Login.jsx flow
  consults this after the email step to decide whether to render a
  passcode input or fall back to OTC. The response carries only
  the boolean; lockout state, the hash, and the `passcode_set_at`
  stamp are not leaked. An unknown email and a known-without-
  passcode email both return `false`, so the endpoint is
  account-enumeration-safe.
- **Schema migration** `015_passcode.sql` — four ALTER TABLE ADD
  COLUMN statements on the `users` table:
  - `passcode_hash TEXT` (nullable) — the bcrypt hash. NULL means
    "no passcode set".
  - `passcode_set_at TEXT` (nullable) — ISO-8601 timestamp.
  - `passcode_failed_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0` —
    consecutive failure counter since last success.
  - `passcode_locked_until TEXT` (nullable) — lockout window
    expiry; verify refuses with HTTP 423 while populated and
    in the future.
- **`backend/app/passcode.py`** — the passcode state machine:
  validation (length + denylist), bcrypt hashing, set/clear,
  status check, and the verify path with lockout management.
- **`frontend/src/components/Login.jsx`** — extended to a five-step
  surface: email → passcode-or-code → optional post-OTC
  passcode-offer → optional set-passcode. The "Use a code instead"
  link on the passcode step re-dispatches an OTC and switches to
  the code step. A 423 from passcode verify auto-falls back to OTC
  with a visible status message.
- **"Sign-in" tab** in `/settings/notifications` — shows
  passcode-set status, the recorded `passcode_set_at` stamp when
  set, and Set / Change / Remove buttons. Mirrors the §14.5
  "Privacy & cookies" tab pattern.
- **SPEC `§6` / `§14.1` / `§17` / `§19.2`** corrections per §19.3
  rule 2:
  - §6 names the three current auth paths (OTC, passcode-with-OTC-
    fallback, OAuth-fallback-during-migration).
  - §14.1 documents the stepped `/login` surface and the passcode
    check endpoint.
  - §17 lists the four new `/auth/passcode/*` endpoints.
  - §19.2 surfaces four new candidates (passcode policy tunables
    via env, per-IP rate-limit on `/auth/passcode/verify`,
    passcode-change "old passcode" challenge, passkey/WebAuthn);
    the "device-trust 30d" entry's passcode cross-ref is updated;
    the "first-OTC profile capture" entry's roadmap cross-ref is
    updated.

### Changed

- **`backend/app/main.py`** — registers the four new
  `/auth/passcode/*` routes on the existing oauth router, alongside
  the v0.7.0 `/auth/otc/*` routes.
- **`backend/app/api.py`** — `/api/auth/me` payload now includes
  `has_passcode` (boolean) and `passcode_set_at` (string or null)
  so the settings surface can render the Set / Change / Remove
  affordances without a second round trip.
- **`frontend/src/api.js`** — adds `checkPasscode`, `verifyPasscode`,
  `setPasscode`, `clearPasscode` helpers, neighboring the v0.7.0
  `requestOtc` / `verifyOtc` block.
- **`frontend/src/components/NotificationSettings.jsx`** — adds the
  `SignInSection` component between `MutesSection` and
  `PrivacyCookiesSection`.

### Tests

- **`backend/tests/test_passcode_vertical.py`** — 17 new tests
  cover: set requires session; check returns false for unknown and
  for set-less users; check returns true after set without leaking
  other fields; happy-path OTC → set → verify roundtrip; wrong
  passcode increments the counter without locking; five consecutive
  failures lock with 423 and persist `passcode_locked_until`;
  lockout expires and the next attempt clears the counter; the OTC
  path is unaffected by passcode lockout; clear wipes the hash and
  set-at; setting a new passcode replaces the prior one and resets
  the lockout; `passcode_set_at` updates on every set; validation
  refuses too-short passcodes and denylist patterns; `/api/auth/me`
  carries `has_passcode` and `passcode_set_at` correctly.

### Environment variables

None new. The existing `SECRET_KEY` continues to sign session
cookies; passcode hashing reuses the bcrypt dependency added in
v0.7.0. The lockout shape (5 attempts, 15 minutes) and the length
range (4–20) are hard-coded in `backend/app/passcode.py`. See
§19.2 for the env-tunable candidate.

## 0.8.0 — 2026-05-28

**Minor — schema migration required; admission semantics shift.**
This release replaces the v0.3.0 / v0.7.0 `allowed_emails` admission
gate with an admin-grant flow (roadmap item #6, SPEC §6.1 / §6.2 /
§14.1 / §17). Anyone with a valid email can sign in via the v0.7.0
OTC flow; the OTC request endpoint no longer consults the
allowlist. A fresh user lands in `permission_state='pending'` until
an admin grants access. The first-OTC sign-in captures first name,
last name, and a free-text "why I should be included in the beta"
via a new `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request` endpoint; the captured
fields populate the same `users` row alongside the OAuth-era
columns.

A pending user has the same read access an anonymous viewer has —
the catalog, RFC bodies, the philosophy page, and every public
conversation are reachable. Every write-shaped endpoint
(`auth.require_contributor` floor) refuses pending users with 403.
The frontend renders a thin "Your beta access request is in
review" banner on every page and re-purposes the v0.3.0
`/beta-pending` page as the post-capture landing surface.

Grandfathered behavior: every `users` row at migration time
carries `permission_state='granted'` via the column default, so
existing contributors are unaffected. The OAuth fallback at
`/auth/callback` still consults the v0.3.0 allowlist (legacy
path); the OTC flow does not.

The `allowed_emails` table stays in the schema as a fast-path
bypass — the v0.3.0 admin UI continues to manage it, but the OTC
request handler no longer reads it. v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7) is
expected to ship the admin user-management page that replaces the
allowlist surface entirely; until then, admin grants are done by
direct DB `UPDATE`.

### Upgrade steps (from 0.13.0)

1. **MUST** restart the backend so migration `014_beta_access.sql`
   runs. The migration adds `permission_state` (default `'granted'`,
   so existing rows pass through unaffected), `first_name`,
   `last_name`, `beta_request_reason`, `permission_decided_by`,
   and `permission_decided_at` to the `users` table, plus an index
   on `permission_state` for the pending queue. The migration is
   ALTER-TABLE-based (no table rebuild) — every foreign key and
   existing row passes through untouched.
2. **MUST** rebuild the frontend. The `Login.jsx` surface now
   runs a conditional third step (the capture form) on fresh OTC
   sign-ins; `BetaPending.jsx` carries the new "your request is
   in review" copy; `App.jsx` renders a thin pending-access
   banner. The build embeds the new `/api/auth/me/beta-request`
   client call.
3. **SHOULD** announce the new admission flow to existing users.
   Wording suggestion: "We've replaced our email-allowlist gate
   with an admin-review flow. Existing users are unaffected;
   new visitors sign in with their email, tell us a bit about
   themselves, and an admin reviews their request before
   discussion and contribution unlock." Existing sessions
   remain valid.
4. **SHOULD** plan the admin grant mechanism. v0.8.0 does not
   ship a UI for the grant — v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7) will. For
   the v0.8.0 window, an admin grants access via direct DB
   gesture:
   ```sql
   UPDATE users
      SET permission_state = 'granted',
          permission_decided_by = <admin_user_id>,
          permission_decided_at = datetime('now')
    WHERE email = '<approved>';
   ```
   The pending queue lives in `SELECT * FROM users WHERE
   permission_state = 'pending' ORDER BY created_at`.
5. **MUST** decide whether to drain the `allowed_emails` table.
   The OTC request handler no longer consults it; populated
   rows are inert at the request surface. Three operator
   choices, all valid:
   * **Leave as-is** (the framework's default behavior — the
     v0.3.0 admin UI continues to work, the rows stay as a
     fast-path bypass record). Recommended if you anticipate
     v0.9.0's user-management page folding the allowlist UI
     into its surface.
   * **Drain via the existing admin UI** (`/admin/allowlist`)
     — one row at a time, no data loss elsewhere.
   * **Bulk-drain via DB** — `DELETE FROM allowed_emails;`
     drops every row; the table stays.
6. **MAY** announce write access individually to grandfathered
   users you want to keep at `'granted'`. The default-`'granted'`
   migration means no action is required for them; this step
   exists only if you want to send a "you're still in" message.

### Added

- **`backend/migrations/014_beta_access.sql`** — adds
  `permission_state` (CHECK in `('pending', 'granted', 'revoked')`,
  default `'granted'`), `first_name`, `last_name`,
  `beta_request_reason`, `permission_decided_by` (FK to users,
  ON DELETE SET NULL), `permission_decided_at` to the `users`
  table. Plus `idx_users_permission_state` for the pending
  queue.
- **`POST /api/auth/me/beta-request`** — body
  `{first_name, last_name, beta_request_reason}` (all required;
  bounds 120 / 120 / 4000). Writes the fields to the signed-in
  user's row and leaves `permission_state='pending'`. Refuses
  HTTP 409 for already-granted / revoked users; refuses HTTP
  401 for anonymous callers.
- **`needs_profile` flag** on the `/auth/otc/verify` response.
  `true` iff the user is `permission_state='pending'` AND
  carries no profile fields yet (a fresh OTC sign-in). The
  Login.jsx surface uses the flag to gate the capture step.
- **`permission_state` field** on the `/api/auth/me` response,
  plus `first_name`, `last_name`, `beta_request_reason`, and
  the same `needs_profile` flag.
- **First-OTC profile capture step** in `Login.jsx`. Third
  step in the sign-in surface, gated by the verify response's
  `needs_profile` flag.
- **`/beta-pending` repurpose** in `BetaPending.jsx`. The
  page now reads as "your request is in review" when the
  viewer is pending; the v0.3.0 "private beta" framing
  remains as the anonymous-viewer fallback.
- **Thin pending-access banner** at the top of every page
  for `permission_state='pending'` viewers (other than
  `/beta-pending` itself).
- **SPEC `§6` opening / `§6.1` / `§6.2` / `§14.1` / `§17` /
  `§19.2`** corrections per §19.3 rule-2 — the admission
  shift, the orthogonality of permission_state vs role / muted
  / notification-mutes, the new endpoints, and the
  newly-surfaced §19.2 candidates (admin user-management page,
  allowlist deprecation, admin notification on new request).
- **`backend/tests/test_beta_access_vertical.py`** — 9 new
  tests covering: a fresh OTC user lands pending with empty
  profile; the capture endpoint populates the fields and
  keeps state pending; the capture endpoint refuses
  anonymous / granted / revoked callers; a pending user is
  refused write endpoints; an admin grant promotes pending →
  granted; a grandfathered user is unaffected by the
  migration; the OTC request endpoint accepts any email
  regardless of allowlist state; the `allowed_emails` table
  is still present in the schema.

### Changed

- **`backend/app/auth.py#require_contributor`** widens its
  gate to refuse `permission_state != 'granted'` with HTTP
  403. The §6.1 contributor capabilities (propose, branch,
  PR, chat, claim) all funnel through this dependency, so
  the widening covers them transitively. `SessionUser` now
  carries `permission_state` (default `'granted'` for the
  dataclass-default fallback path).
- **`backend/app/otc.py#request_code`** drops the allowlist
  check from the OTC request flow. The `RequestOutcome`
  shape loses the `'allowlist'` reason (replaced by
  `'sent'` / `'cooldown'` / `'invalid'`).
- **`backend/app/otc.py#provision_or_link_user`** sets
  `permission_state='pending'` explicitly on a fresh row.
  Grandfathered (link-by-email) users pass through with
  their existing column value.
- **`backend/app/auth.py#provision_user`** (OAuth fallback)
  now sets `permission_state='granted'` explicitly on a
  fresh row. The OAuth callback still consults the
  `is_allowed_sign_in` allowlist check (the legacy fallback
  path retains its v0.3.0 admission shape during the OAuth
  migration window).
- **`backend/tests/test_otc_vertical.py`** — the
  `test_otc_request_silently_drops_when_email_not_on_allowlist`
  test (asserted the v0.7.0 allowlist gate) is replaced by
  `test_otc_request_admits_emails_regardless_of_allowlist_population`
  which asserts the v0.8.0 open-request contract. The
  on-list test stays as a regression net for the
  rate-limit / outbound-buffer plumbing.
- **`SPEC.md`** §6 opening, §6.1, §6.2, §14.1, §17, §19.2
  per §19.3 rule-2.
- **`VERSION`** → `0.8.0`. `frontend/package.json#version` and
  the lockfile mirror.

### Deferred to later releases

- **Admin user-management page** at `/admin/users` (item #7,
  v0.9.0) — replaces the manual DB `UPDATE` gesture.
- **Allowlist UI deprecation** (also v0.9.0) — once the
  admin user-management page lands, the `/admin/allowlist`
  surface and the `allowed_emails` table both retire.
- **Admin email notification on new beta request** (item #7
  again, v0.9.0).
- **Revoke gesture in the UI** — the `permission_state='revoked'`
  state is wired in the schema and the auth gate; v0.9.0 ships
  the admin UI that flips the column.

## 0.7.0 — 2026-05-28

**Minor — schema migration required; new auth path is additive.**
This release lands email + one-time-code sign-in (roadmap item #5,
SPEC §6.2) as the primary human-auth gesture. Users sign in by
typing their email, receiving a six-digit code via email, and
entering it. The Gitea OAuth callback (`/auth/callback`) remains
functional during migration — the new UI no longer points at it
primarily, but a "Sign in with Gitea (fallback)" link survives on
the new login surface so users with active OAuth sessions or older
invite paths still have a way in. A future release retires the
OAuth path entirely once every active user has signed in at least
once via OTC.

The migration path for existing users: first OTC sign-in matches by
`users.email` (case-insensitive) to the OAuth-era row and reuses
that row's `id` and `gitea_id`. New users provisioned via OTC carry
`gitea_id = NULL` and `gitea_login = NULL`. The `gitea_id` linker
remains the canonical handle for grandfathered users; `email`
becomes the identity key for everything provisioned after v0.7.0.

The Gitea **bot** user + token are still required (server-side git
operations — repo reads, PR creation — still flow through it). Only
the operator-facing sign-in surface moves.

### Upgrade steps (from 0.6.0)

1. **MUST** restart the backend so migration `012_otc.sql` runs.
   The migration rebuilds the `users` table (SQLite cannot ALTER
   COLUMN); existing rows pass through unchanged, but the new
   schema relaxes `gitea_id` / `gitea_login` to nullable (with
   partial unique indexes that ignore NULL) and adds a partial
   unique index on `email`. A new `otc_codes` table is created.
2. **MUST** confirm the SMTP overlay is set (`SMTP_HOST`,
   `SMTP_PORT`, `SMTP_USER`, `SMTP_PASSWORD`, `SMTP_STARTTLS`,
   `EMAIL_FROM`, `EMAIL_FROM_NAME`). The OHM overlay already
   carries these as of v0.5.0; deployments without them fall back
   to logging the code to stdout (dev-only path — production
   visitors will not receive their codes).
3. **SHOULD** announce the new email-based sign-in to existing
   users. Wording suggestion: "You can now sign in by entering
   your email and a one-time code we'll send you. Your old
   account is linked automatically the first time you sign in."
4. **MAY** keep the existing OAuth callback as a fallback path.
   The new login UI surfaces a small "Sign in with Gitea
   (fallback)" link beneath the primary email/code form; a
   deployment that prefers to hide it can override the Login
   component in a future framework release that exposes the link
   behind a feature flag. For v0.7.0, the link is hard-coded.

### New environment variables (all optional with defaults)

- `OTC_TTL_MINUTES` (default `10`) — how long a one-time code is
  valid after issuance. Re-requesting invalidates the prior code
  immediately regardless of TTL.
- `OTC_REQUEST_COOLDOWN_SECONDS` (default `60`) — per-email cooldown
  between successive `/auth/otc/request` calls. The endpoint returns
  HTTP 429 when the cooldown blocks a request (the loud-failure
  shape; the abuse path is visible rather than swallowed).

No new secrets are required. The existing `SECRET_KEY` continues to
sign session cookies; OTC codes are bcrypt-hashed at rest using a
per-row salt the library generates.

### Added

- **`POST /auth/otc/request`** — body `{email}`. Generates a six-digit
  code, stores its bcrypt hash with an expiry, and dispatches a plain
  text email via the existing SMTP layer. Returns HTTP 200 (`{ok:true}`)
  uniformly so allowlist state is not leaked. Returns HTTP 429 when
  the per-email cooldown blocks the request.
- **`POST /auth/otc/verify`** — body `{email, code}`. Validates the
  bcrypt hash against the most-recent unconsumed non-expired row, marks
  the row consumed, provisions or links the `users` row by email, and
  stores the session cookie. Returns HTTP 200 on success, HTTP 400 on
  any failure (expired, consumed, wrong, unknown).
- **`backend/migrations/012_otc.sql`** — creates `otc_codes` and
  rebuilds `users` with nullable `gitea_id` / `gitea_login` plus a
  partial unique index on `email`.
- **`backend/app/otc.py`** — the OTC request/verify state machine and
  the `provision_or_link_user` linker.
- **`backend/app/email_otc.py`** — outbound OTC mail composition. Reuses
  the SMTP plumbing from `email.py` (`EmailConfig.from_env()`) and the
  test buffer (`_SENT`) but writes its own envelope (no unsubscribe
  footer, no quiet-hours hold — OTC mail carries a credential and
  ignores notification preferences).
- **`frontend/src/components/Login.jsx`** — two-step sign-in surface
  at `/login`. Step 1: enter email → request code. Step 2: enter
  six-digit code → verify. Cmd/Ctrl+Enter on the code field submits.
  The previous header "Sign in" link and the `Welcome` component's
  inline link now route to `/login` instead of jumping straight to
  the Gitea OAuth dance.
- **SPEC `§6.1` / `§6.2` / `§14.1` / `§17` / `§19.2`** corrections per
  §19.3 rule-2 — see below.
- **`backend/tests/test_otc_vertical.py`** — 11 new tests covering
  the happy path, expired/consumed/wrong codes, the per-email rate
  limit (and its per-email isolation), the allowlist gate, the
  migration link to OAuth-era users, fresh provisioning, and the
  prior-code-invalidation behavior on re-request.

### Changed

- **`backend/app/auth.py#current_user`** — coerces NULL `gitea_id` and
  NULL `gitea_login` to `0` / `""` so the `SessionUser` shape stays
  stable for OTC-only users. The DB remains the source of truth for
  "is this user OAuth-linked" (`gitea_id IS NOT NULL`).
- **`backend/requirements.txt`** — adds `bcrypt>=4.2` for OTC code
  hashing. Pure-Python wheels are available on every platform the
  deployment matrix targets; `pip install -r backend/requirements.txt`
  picks it up.
- **`frontend/src/App.jsx`** — adds the `/login` route and replaces
  the header "Sign in" `<a href="/auth/login">` with `<Link to="/login">`.
  The `Welcome` component's inline sign-in link follows suit.
- **`frontend/src/components/Landing.jsx`** — the `/welcome` page's
  primary action moves from "Sign in with Gitea" to "Sign in" pointing
  at `/login`.

### Deferred to later releases

Per the v0.7.0 scope discipline (the foundation for items #6, #8, #9,
#10), several adjacent capabilities are intentionally not in this
release and surface as §19.2 candidates:

- **First-OTC profile capture** (first name, last name, "why") — item
  #6, expected v0.8.0.
- **Open beta-access request flow** replacing the allowlist gate —
  also item #6, v0.8.0.
- **Passcodes** (a long-term reauth token alternative) — item #8,
  expected v0.10.0.
- **Device-trust 30-day skip** — item #9, expected v0.11.0.
- **Cloudflare Turnstile** on `/auth/otc/request` — item #10,
  expected v0.12.0.
- **Removing the Gitea OAuth `/auth/callback` route entirely** — a
  later release after every active user has signed in via OTC.

## 0.6.0 — 2026-05-28

**Minor — no operator action required.** A sweep-the-edges hardening
release (roadmap item #4, "anon discuss + contribute off-limits") that
audits every write-shaped backend endpoint and asserts each one
enforces an explicit `auth.require_contributor` (or stricter) gate
before doing any state-changing work. v0.3.0 hid write affordances
behind a sign-in CTA on the frontend; v0.5.0 added the PR-less
discussion surface with its own write gate; v0.6.0 sweeps the rest
and adds a regression test net so future endpoints can't quietly
ship without a gate. No schema migration, no env-var changes, no
new dependencies. The only behavioural change is one tightening: the
`GET /api/rfcs/<slug>/graduate/progress` SSE now requires
`auth.require_user` since it surfaces operator-visible step detail
(repo name, PR number, rollback steps) not part of the v0.3.0
anonymous-read contract for catalog/RFC bodies.

### Changed

- **`backend/app/api_graduation.py`** — `GET /graduate/progress`
  now calls `auth.require_user(request)` as its first line.
  Anonymous callers receive 401 instead of being able to subscribe
  to a graduation's SSE. The floor is `require_user` (not
  `require_contributor`) so a write-muted operator can still observe
  the progress of a graduation they kicked off before being muted.
- **SPEC `§6.1`** (`SPEC.md`) — the Anonymous role's bullet now
  documents the v0.6.0 audit: every write-shaped endpoint in §17
  enforces an explicit gate; anonymous writes refuse 401. The list
  of audited write families is recorded in-line.
- **SPEC `§10.10`** — the discussion-vs-contribution section now
  records that the v0.5.0 write gates have a regression test net
  (`test_anon_offlimits_vertical.py`) added in v0.6.0.
- **SPEC `§17`** — the `GET /api/rfcs/<slug>/graduate/progress`
  bullet now documents the `require_user` gate added in v0.6.0,
  with the rationale.

### Added (tests)

- **`backend/tests/test_anon_offlimits_vertical.py`** — twelve new
  tests asserting that every write-shaped endpoint surveyed in the
  v0.6.0 audit refuses anonymous callers with 401, and that the five
  anonymous-read surfaces (health, philosophy, auth/me, catalog,
  RFC view, discussion threads, proposals) stay reachable. Sixty-six
  assertions in total, covering: propose; proposal merge / decline /
  withdraw; branch promote-to-branch / start-edit-branch / metadata /
  manual-flush / visibility / grants (POST + DELETE) / threads (POST)
  / messages (POST) / resolve / chat-seen / changes (accept / decline
  / reask) / chat-stream; super-draft start-edit-branch + metadata;
  PR pr-draft / open / seen / review / merge / withdraw /
  description / resolution-branch; discussion thread create + message
  post + resolve; admin role / mute / allowlist (POST + DELETE) plus
  the admin reads; notification preferences / quiet-hours / watch /
  mark-read / user-mute (POST + DELETE); funder credentials (POST +
  DELETE) + consent (POST + DELETE); graduation kickoff + claim +
  progress SSE; PR review page anonymous-readable.

### Anonymous-writeable allowlist

Two endpoints are intentionally anonymous-by-design. They are not
audit findings; they are documented here so the contract is
explicit:

- `GET  /auth/login` and `GET  /auth/callback` — the OAuth
  round-trip. Anonymous-by-design because they ARE the sign-in
  entrypoint.
- `POST /api/webhooks/gitea` and `POST /api/webhooks/email-bounce`
  — anonymous in the session sense but authenticated by HMAC shared
  secret (`GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` and `WEBHOOK_EMAIL_BOUNCE_SECRET`
  respectively). The webhook receiver is the wrong place for an
  authenticated session; the shared-secret shape is correct.

### §19.2 candidates surfaced

- None unique to this release. The two pre-existing candidates the
  audit touched — anonymous-read polish for the discussion surface
  (carried from v0.5.0) and the operator-visibility floor on
  graduation progress — were settled here as `require_user` on
  `/graduate/progress` rather than deferred.

### Upgrade steps (from 0.5.0)

1. The deployment **MUST** rebuild the frontend (`npm install &&
   npm run build`) so the frontend bundle's reported version matches
   the backend's. No new env vars; existing `frontend/.env` is
   sufficient.
2. The deployment **MUST** restart the backend so the new
   `require_user` gate on `/graduate/progress` is enforced. No
   schema migration runs.
3. The deployment **MAY** announce the audit completion to
   operators: every write-shaped backend endpoint now enforces an
   explicit gate, and the `test_anon_offlimits_vertical.py` test
   net asserts the contract on every CI run. The audited surfaces
   are listed in the `Added (tests)` section above and in `SPEC.md`
   §6.1.
4. The deployment **MUST NOT** assume any new envelope behaviour:
   v0.6.0 is purely a hardening release. No schema, no env, no
   dependency changes; the operator's role is reduced to rebuild +
   restart.


## 0.5.0 — 2026-05-27

**Minor — no operator action required.** This release wires the
PR-less per-RFC discussion surface (roadmap item #3, SPEC §10.10).
An RFC's main view now carries a discussion panel distinct from PR
comments and branch chat; contribution — proposing edits the document
will land — still requires opening a PR via the §10.1 affordance.
The substrate is the existing `threads` / `thread_messages` tables;
rows with `threads.branch_name IS NULL` scope to the RFC's main view.
No schema migration is required.

### Added

- **PR-less discussion endpoints** (`backend/app/api_discussion.py`)
  mounted at `/api/rfcs/<slug>/discussion/...`:
  - `GET  /api/rfcs/<slug>/discussion/threads` — list threads where
    `threads.branch_name IS NULL`. Anonymous-readable per the v0.3.0
    contract; the default whole-doc chat thread is materialized
    lazily on first read.
  - `POST /api/rfcs/<slug>/discussion/threads` — open a new
    discussion thread (`thread_kind='chat'`, `anchor_kind='whole-doc'`,
    `branch_name=NULL`). Body: optional `label`, optional first
    `message`. Requires contributor role.
  - `GET  /api/rfcs/<slug>/discussion/threads/<thread_id>/messages`
    — read messages on a discussion thread. Anonymous-readable.
  - `POST /api/rfcs/<slug>/discussion/threads/<thread_id>/messages`
    — post a message. Body: `text`, optional `quote`. Requires
    contributor role.
  - `POST /api/rfcs/<slug>/discussion/threads/<thread_id>/resolve`
    — resolve a discussion thread. Permission per §10.10: thread
    creator, RFC owner / arbiter, or app admin / owner.
- **`RFCDiscussionPanel.jsx`** — the right-column surface on the RFC
  view when the viewer is on `main`. Composer requires sign-in;
  Cmd/Ctrl+Enter sends. Multiple threads surface as pill-shaped
  tabs above the message feed. A "New thread" affordance opens a
  fresh thread on the same RFC.
- **SPEC `§10.10` PR-less discussion vs. contribution** — settles
  the distinction between discussion (RFC-scoped, no PR, both
  anonymous-readable and contributor-writeable) and contribution
  (still requires a PR via §10.1). Also extends `§5`'s `threads`
  table commentary so the null-branch interpretation is documented
  as actively used rather than reserved scaffold.
- **SPEC `§17`** — lists the five new `discussion/...` endpoints
  in the illustrative table.

### Changed

- **`backend/app/chat.py`** — `_fan_out_chat` now passes
  `branch_name` straight through to the notify chokepoint instead of
  coercing `None` to `"main"`. The notifications row carries the
  null through, which preserves the §15.7 reconciler's keying on
  `(rfc_slug, branch_name)` for the eventual discussion-side
  chat-seen advance (deferred to a §19.2 candidate). Existing
  branch-scoped chat continues to pass non-null branch names; the
  change is invisible to that path.
- **`backend/app/notify.py`** — `fan_out_chat_message`'s
  `branch_name` parameter is now typed `str | None` to match the
  v0.5.0 PR-less shape. Routing rules are unchanged; the inbox prose
  renders identically whether the chat lives on a branch or on the
  RFC's discussion surface, which is the right honest signal.
- **`RFCView.jsx`** — the right-column panel is now conditional:
  when `branchParam === 'main'`, render `RFCDiscussionPanel`
  (the new PR-less surface); otherwise render the existing
  `ChatPanel` (branch chat unchanged).

### §19.2 candidates surfaced

- PR-less discussion: range / paragraph anchors (the data model
  permits them; the UI is the deferred part).
- PR-less discussion: distinct notification `event_kind`s
  (`open_rfc_discussion_thread`, etc.) if usage shows contributors
  want to filter discussion-vs-branch in the §15.2 inbox.
- PR-less discussion: chat-seen cursor closing the §15.7
  reconciliation loop for the new surface.
- PR-less discussion: AI participant invocation (discussion-only,
  no `<change>` block side-effects).
- PR-less discussion: anonymous-read polish to match the v0.6.0
  write-gate hardening (item #4).

### Upgrade steps (from 0.4.0)

1. The deployment **MUST** rebuild the frontend (`npm install &&
   npm run build`) so `RFCDiscussionPanel.jsx` ships in the bundle.
   No new env vars; existing `frontend/.env` is sufficient.
2. The deployment **MUST** restart the backend so the new
   `api_discussion` router mounts. No schema migration runs — the
   `threads` table already supports `branch_name IS NULL` per §5,
   and the v0.5.0 build is the first to write rows in that shape.
3. The deployment **MAY** announce the new surface to its
   contributors: the RFC view's main page now carries a discussion
   panel below the document. Existing branch chat and PR review
   surfaces are unchanged.
4. The deployment **SHOULD NOT** expect a hardening of the
   anonymous-write gate in v0.5.0 — that lands in v0.6.0 (item #4).
   v0.5.0's write paths already refuse anonymous posts, so no
   pre-emptive operator action is needed.

## 0.4.0 — 2026-05-27

**Minor — no operator action required beyond rebuild + restart.** The
proposer of a new RFC is now the implicit first owner of its super-
draft entry, set automatically at propose time from the session user.
The §13.1 claim flow remains available for *additional* owners. No
schema changes, no env-var changes, no API-shape changes; only newly
proposed RFCs receive the auto-owner — existing super-drafts whose
`owners:` is empty are unaffected and can still be claimed via §13.1
as before. This is a §19.3 rule-2 spec correction: `SPEC.md` §9.1,
§9.2, and §13.1 are updated to reflect the new shape.

### Changed

- **`POST /api/rfcs/propose`** (`backend/app/api.py`) now sets
  `Entry.owners = [user.gitea_login]` when constructing the new
  super-draft entry, instead of `owners=[]`. The session's
  `gitea_login` is the canonical source; the endpoint never accepted
  an owner field from the request payload and still doesn't.
- **`SPEC.md` §9.1** narrowed: the "no proposed-owner or working-
  group fields" sentence becomes a proposer-owner-auto / working-
  group-deferred split, with a §19.3 rule-2 note.
- **`SPEC.md` §9.2** frontmatter shape: `owners: []` → `owners:
  [<proposer.gitea_login>]`, with a §19.3 rule-2 note.
- **`SPEC.md` §13.1** reframed: claim flow is now a graduation-time
  broadening for additional owners, not a precondition for the
  proposer's own RFC. The §13.1 / §13.2 / §13.3 graduation pipeline
  itself is unchanged — the "at least one owner" precondition for
  graduation still holds and is now satisfied by default.

### Upgrade steps (from 0.3.0)

1. The deployment **MUST** rebuild and restart per the routine
   deploy steps. No `.env` changes, no schema/migration changes, no
   API-shape changes.
2. Operators **SHOULD** note that newly proposed RFCs after the
   upgrade carry the proposer in `owners:` automatically. Existing
   super-drafts with empty `owners:` are not migrated; they remain
   claimable via the §13.1 flow exactly as before. No deployment-
   side data action is required.
3. Deployments **MAY** communicate the UX shift to active proposers
   (the "Claim ownership" affordance no longer applies to your own
   newly proposed RFC), but the affordance simply hides on RFCs the
   viewer already owns, so no operator-side action is required.

## 0.3.0 — 2026-05-27

**Minor — operator action required if a deployment wants to enable the
private-beta gate; no action required to stay open.** This release adds
an email allowlist that, when populated, restricts OAuth sign-in to the
listed emails while keeping all read paths public. Anonymous visitors
now see the full app (catalog, RFC bodies, public branch conversations)
in read-only mode instead of the §14.1 landing-page wall.

### Added

- **`allowed_emails` table** (`backend/migrations/011_allowlist.sql`).
  Empty list = gate off (any successful OAuth provisions a user, as
  before). Any rows present = gate on (only listed emails, plus
  users already grandfathered by `gitea_id`, may sign in).
- **Admin → Allowlist tab** at `/admin/allowlist`. Add/remove emails,
  see who added each row and when. Status banner shows whether the
  gate is currently active.
- **`/beta-pending` page** shown after a rejected OAuth callback. Free-
  text invite-contact line is configurable via the new
  `VITE_BETA_CONTACT` env var (optional; falls back to a generic line).
- **Beta chips** next to the Discuss/Contribute mode toggle, the Sign
  in link, and the header Sign-in button so anonymous viewers see
  immediately what is gated.
- **Anonymous read mode** in the React app: the §14.1 Landing page is
  preserved at `/welcome` for deployments that want to link to it, but
  the default route now renders the full app shell with write
  affordances hidden behind a sign-in CTA.

### Changed

- **`/auth/callback`** now consults `auth.is_allowed_sign_in()` after
  fetching the Gitea profile. Rejected sign-ins clear the OAuth state
  and redirect to `/beta-pending`; the session is not populated.
- **`Catalog`** receives a `viewer` prop. Anonymous viewers see "Sign
  in to propose (Beta)" instead of "+ Propose New RFC".
- **`PhilosophyWithSidebar`** now reads `authenticated` from the
  current viewer instead of hardcoded `true`.

### Fixed

- **Single-finger scroll on the `/philosophy` page** (and any other
  `.chrome-pane`-hosted view: `/admin/*`, `/settings/notifications`)
  was broken on iOS Safari. The `.app` container used `height: 100vh`,
  which on iOS measures the URL-bar-hidden ("largest") viewport — so
  `.app` overflowed what's actually visible. Combined with the
  `body { overflow: hidden }` in `index.css`, this meant single-finger
  touches on the visible area were consumed by the (blocked) page-
  level scroll attempt rather than reaching the nested `.chrome-pane`
  scroll. Two-finger touches bypassed the page-level layer and
  one-finger then worked once the URL bar had collapsed. Switched
  `.app` to `height: 100dvh` (dynamic viewport — adjusts as the URL
  bar shows/hides), with `100vh` retained as a fallback for browsers
  predating iOS 15.4 / Chrome 108.

### Upgrade steps (from 0.2.3)

1. The deployment **MUST** rebuild the frontend with the new
   `VITE_BETA_CONTACT` env var optionally set in `frontend/.env` (it
   is OK to leave it blank — the `/beta-pending` page falls back to
   a generic line).
2. The deployment **MUST** restart the backend so migration
   `011_allowlist.sql` runs. No data loss; the new table starts
   empty, which keeps the gate off and preserves existing behavior.
3. To **enable** the private-beta gate, the deployment operator
   **SHOULD** sign in once (so their `users` row exists and they
   grandfather in by `gitea_id`), then open `/admin/allowlist` and
   add the first invited email. The first row added turns the gate
   on for any user not yet in `users`.
4. To **stay open**, do nothing — leave `allowed_emails` empty and
   the deployment behaves exactly as 0.2.3.
5. The deployment **MAY** customise its `/beta-pending` contact line
   by setting `VITE_BETA_CONTACT` (an email, a URL, or a short
   instruction) before the frontend build. Unset is fine.

## 0.2.3 — 2026-05-26

**Patch — no operator action required.** Rebuild and restart per the
routine deploy steps; no `.env` changes, no schema changes, no
behavior changes a deployment would notice in steady state beyond
the new endpoint below.

### Added

- **`GET /api/health`** — an unauthenticated probe returning JSON
  `{version, status}` for ops tooling. `version` is the running
  framework version (the contents of `VERSION` per §20.1, read at
  process start and cached as a module-level constant in
  `backend/app/health.py`); `status` is `"ok"` with HTTP 200 in
  v1. The `"degraded"` / HTTP 503 path stays reserved in the
  response shape so a later release can wire real degradation
  conditions without breaking the contract. The version-match
  check is the structural value — a deploy-control-panel polling
  the endpoint after `systemctl restart` catches the failure mode
  where a restart did not pick up the new code. See `SPEC.md` §17
  and the §19.2 settlement.

### Upgrade steps (from 0.2.2)

1. The deployment **MAY** configure its monitoring (Pingdom,
   Healthchecks.io, the flotilla deploy control panel, etc.) to
   probe `/api/health` and compare the returned `version` against
   the tag last deployed. The endpoint is unauthenticated by
   design — no PII in the payload, no session required.

## 0.2.2 — 2026-05-26

**Patch — no operator action required.** Rebuild the frontend and
restart per the routine deploy steps; no `.env` changes, no schema
changes, no behavior changes a deployment would notice in steady
state beyond the fix below.

### Fixed

- **Mermaid blocks rendered as raw code on `/philosophy`.**
  `frontend/src/components/Philosophy.jsx` parsed PHILOSOPHY.md with
  the bare `marked` import and `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`, so
  ```` ```mermaid ```` fences fell through as `<pre>` blocks rather
  than rendered diagrams. Swapped to `MarkdownPreview`, which already
  carries the lazy mermaid loader + SVG render path used by the RFC
  body view, so the philosophy surface now renders mermaid the same
  way RFC bodies do. Pre-existing gap, surfaced when a deployment
  authored a mermaid block in its `PHILOSOPHY_PATH` override.

## 0.2.1 — 2026-05-26

**Patch — no operator action required.** Rebuild the frontend and
restart per the routine deploy steps; no `.env` changes, no schema
changes, no behavior changes a deployment would notice in steady
state.

### Fixed

- **PR view blank page (React #310).** `frontend/src/components/PRView.jsx`
  declared its `threadsByKind` `useMemo` *after* the early-return
  guard for the loading state (`if (!pr) return …`). On first mount
  `pr` was null so the early return fired and 14 hooks were called;
  on the second render `pr` was populated and execution reached the
  `useMemo`, calling 15 hooks — violating the Rules of Hooks and
  unmounting the page subtree (blank screen). The `useMemo` is now
  declared above the early returns with optional-chaining on `pr`,
  keeping the hook count stable between the loading and loaded
  renders. Pre-existing bug in the post-Contribute-rewrite PR view;
  surfaced in production by 0.2.0's graduation merge race fix
  enabling the workflow that opens this code path.

## 0.2.0 — 2026-05-26

**Breaking config change.** The frontend now requires
`VITE_APP_NAME` to be set at build time. `npm run build` fails with a
clear message if it is missing. There is no default; every deployment
names itself.

### Upgrade steps (from 0.1.0)

1. The deployment **MUST** create a `frontend/.env` file before
   building. See `frontend/.env.example` for the contract.
2. The deployment **MUST** set `VITE_APP_NAME` in `frontend/.env` to
   the user-visible name it wants to ship — the string used as the
   browser tab title, the header brand, and the landing H1. The
   build will fail loudly if this is unset or blank.
3. The deployment **MUST** rebuild the frontend (`npm install && npm
   run build`) and redeploy the resulting bundle. The previous
   bundle does not read `VITE_APP_NAME`.
4. The deployment **SHOULD** verify the name appears correctly in
   the browser tab and the header after redeploy before bumping its
   `.rfc-app-version` pin to `0.2.0`.
5. The deployment **MAY**, in the same upgrade, take the opportunity
   to retire any local overrides it was using to brand the
   pre-0.2.0 hardcoded strings — those overrides are now obsolete.
6. The deployment **MUST NOT** continue to expect graduation step 4
   to fail on Gitea's "Please try again later" race; that path is
   now handled by `wait_for_mergeable` + bounded retry. Any local
   workaround retrying graduation at the deployment level is now
   redundant and **SHOULD** be removed.

### Fixed

- **Graduation merge race.** §13.3 step 4 (`merge_pr`) used to call
  Gitea's merge endpoint the instant step 3 returned, which races
  Gitea's background mergeability computation and produces the
  `405 "Please try again later"` response. Step 4 now waits for the
  `mergeable` field to become non-null (bounded by a 30s timeout) and
  retries the merge call up to three times on the transient response.
  See `backend/app/gitea.py#wait_for_mergeable` and
  `backend/app/bot.py#_merge_with_retry`.

### Changed

- `frontend/src/App.jsx` header brand reads `VITE_APP_NAME` instead of
  a hardcoded string.
- `frontend/src/components/Landing.jsx` H1 reads `VITE_APP_NAME`
  instead of a hardcoded string. The pitch / deck / attribution copy
  in this file is still deployment-specific and tracked as a follow-up
  for extraction into deployment config.
- `frontend/index.html` `<title>` is rewritten at build time via Vite's
  HTML transform.

### Added

- `frontend/.env.example` documenting the new required variable.
- Top-level `VERSION` file and this `CHANGELOG.md` as the canonical
  release log.
- `SPEC.md` §20 (versioning and downstream deployments) as the
  binding policy for the framework/deployment relationship.
- `docs/DEPLOYMENTS.md` as the practical guide for building on
  rfc-app and upgrading existing deployments to new versions.
- `CLAUDE.md` at the repo root capturing the separation-of-concerns
  rule for working sessions.