41b0c6af99
Roadmap item #16 / §6.1. From the v0.9.0 /admin/users surface, an admin can now create a user record before that person has ever signed in — typing first name, last name, email, role, and an optional custom message — and the framework sends an invite email carrying a single-use claim link. The invitee clicks through to /invites/claim?token=…, the token is consumed, the session is established, and the user is routed to the passcode-set screen on first sign-in. New endpoints: * POST /api/admin/users — admin-only; provisions the users row + user_invite_tokens row + sends the invite email + writes a permission_events row with event_kind='user_invited'. * GET /api/admin/users/invites — admin-only; lists active (not-claimed, not-expired) invites with the issuing admin. * POST /api/invites/claim — anonymous-reachable; validates the token, consumes the row, signs the invitee in (skipping OTC per the roadmap — clicking the email link is itself proof of email control), returns needs_passcode for the frontend's route-onward decision. Schema: migration slot 019 — user_invite_tokens (id, email, role, first/last name, custom_message, bcrypt token_hash, expires_at, created_at, created_by_admin_id, claimed_at, claimed_by_user_id, invited_user_id). Slot 018 reserved for the parallel #12 release (per-RFC invitation) shipping in the same wave; distinct table (rfc_invitations there vs. user_invite_tokens here) so they coexist cleanly. No users-table changes — the brief floated a NULL-column discriminator for "(pending invite)" but the existing users.last_seen_at is NOT NULL with a datetime('now') default, so the discriminator is the active user_invite_tokens row joined on invited_user_id; the admin user-listing carries a pending_invite field populated via that join. Claim route: frontend /invites/claim?token=… (new InviteClaim.jsx). Anonymous-reachable; renders "Claim my account" CTA with an optional v0.11.0-style "trust this device" checkbox, calls the claim endpoint, routes onward. Token shape: opaque DB token (256 bits CSPRNG via secrets.token_urlsafe(32), bcrypt-at-rest), not JWT. Opaque chosen because admin revocation is then a single SQL UPDATE — JWT would be stateless but harder to invalidate. Open-question decisions: immediate-send (no admin-review-then- send queue; future enhancement), no bulk-invite (deferred to follow-up; v0.17.0 is one-at-a-time), 7-day expiry as a constant (INVITE_TOKEN_TTL_DAYS in backend/app/invites.py; env-var configurability is a §19.2 candidate), OTC skipped on first sign-in (the token in the email is itself proof of email control; subsequent sign-ins go through OTC / passcode unchanged). Refusals on POST /api/admin/users: * 422 self-invite (use the role-change channel for self-edits) * 409 duplicate email (use the existing grant/role gestures) * 422 owner-grant by non-owner admin (§6.1 owner-zero is the only owner bootstrap path) * 422 pydantic — malformed email / unknown role / custom_message > 500 chars * 403 non-admin caller / 401 anonymous 15 new backend tests in test_admin_create_user_invite_vertical.py (happy path, all four refusals, claim with valid / expired / already-claimed / unknown token, pending-invite badge before and after claim, listing admin-only). 234 total backend tests pass; frontend build succeeds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
106 lines
5.9 KiB
SQL
106 lines
5.9 KiB
SQL
-- §6.1 / v0.17.0: admin-create user with role + invite email (roadmap item #16).
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--
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-- Distinguishes from the v0.8.0 / v0.9.0 self-serve beta-access shape:
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-- here an *admin* creates a `users` row *before* the invited person has
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-- ever signed in, assigns them a role at creation time, and sends them
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-- an invite email carrying a claim link. The invitee clicks the link,
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-- the claim flow consumes the token (which is itself proof of email
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-- control), the row is marked claimed, and the user is signed in
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-- inheriting the pre-set role.
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--
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-- Migration slot 019 is allocated to this release. Slot 018 is reserved
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-- for the parallel #12 release (per-RFC invitation, owner-only) shipping
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-- in the same wave; the two features live in distinct tables
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-- (`user_invite_tokens` here vs. `rfc_invitations` there) so they
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-- coexist cleanly. Slot 016 was reserved+skipped by Session K during
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-- v0.9.0 integration; slot 017 is the v0.11.0 device-trust table.
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--
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-- Open-question decisions settled in this release (see CHANGELOG):
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-- * No `users` table changes — the brief floated `first_sign_in_at`
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-- / `last_seen_at IS NULL` as the "(pending invite)" discriminator,
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-- but the existing `users.last_seen_at` is NOT NULL with a
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-- `datetime('now')` default (migrations/001) and there is no
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-- `first_sign_in_at` column. Rather than land a schema migration to
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-- introduce one, the discriminator is the existence of an active
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-- (not-claimed, not-expired) row in `user_invite_tokens` joined on
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-- `invited_user_id`. The admin user-listing carries a
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-- `pending_invite` field populated via that join; on claim, the
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-- invite row's `claimed_at` populates and the badge clears.
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-- No new `permission_state` value is introduced either.
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-- * The token is opaque (random URL-safe string, bcrypt-hashed at
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-- rest), not a JWT, so admin revocation by row UPDATE works
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-- without distributing a key-rotation gesture.
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-- * The TTL is a constant (`INVITE_TOKEN_TTL_DAYS = 7` in
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-- `backend/app/invites.py`); env-var configurability is a follow-up.
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-- * Immediate-send (no admin-review-then-send queue) ships in this
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-- release; admin-preview is a future enhancement.
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-- * Bulk-invite (CSV paste) is deferred to a follow-up release;
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-- v0.17.0 is one-at-a-time.
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--
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-- Storage shape:
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--
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-- * `id` — surrogate key. Lets the admin "pending invites" listing
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-- address a row without leaking the token shape.
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-- * `email` — the address the invite was sent to (case-insensitive
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-- match at claim time, persisted verbatim for the audit trail).
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-- * `role` — the role the invitee inherits on first sign-in. Pinned
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-- via CHECK to the same set the §6.1 role flip accepts
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-- (`owner` / `admin` / `contributor`) so a future role-set drift
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-- fails loudly at insert rather than provisioning a ghost role.
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-- * `first_name` / `last_name` — captured at create time so the
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-- invitee skips the v0.8.0 capture-form step on first sign-in.
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-- * `custom_message` — optional free-text from the admin (max 500
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-- chars enforced at the API layer); embedded verbatim in the
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-- email body if present.
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-- * `token_hash` — bcrypt hash of the random opaque token. The
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-- raw token only ever lives in the outbound email link and the
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-- inbound claim body; server-side storage is the hash.
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-- * `expires_at` — `created_at + 7 days` (default at the app layer
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-- via `INVITE_TOKEN_TTL_DAYS`). A row past this stamp is dead;
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-- the claim path refuses with HTTP 410.
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-- * `created_at` — when the admin issued the invite.
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-- * `created_by_admin_id` — FK into users(id) for the admin who
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-- created the invite (no cascade; if the admin's row is deleted
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-- the invite history stays so the audit trail survives).
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-- * `claimed_at` — non-NULL once the invitee successfully claims.
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-- A second claim attempt against an already-claimed row returns
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-- HTTP 410.
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-- * `claimed_by_user_id` — FK into users(id) for the user row
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-- that consumed the token. In the common case this equals the
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-- freshly-provisioned row that was created at invite time; the
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-- FK lets the admin's "claimed" list join through.
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-- * `invited_user_id` — FK into users(id) for the pre-provisioned
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-- row. Created at invite time with `last_seen_at IS NULL` so the
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-- v0.9.0 admin user-management page can render a "(pending
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-- invite)" badge alongside existing users.
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--
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-- Indexing:
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-- * Unique index on `token_hash` documents the no-collision
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-- invariant (256 bits of CSPRNG entropy; collision is
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-- structurally impossible, the unique constraint catches a
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-- bug at insert time).
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-- * Index on `(email, claimed_at)` so the "is this email already
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-- invited?" pre-check the admin endpoint runs is a covering walk.
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-- * Index on `(created_by_admin_id, created_at DESC)` for the
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-- admin's "invites I've sent" listing.
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CREATE TABLE user_invite_tokens (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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email TEXT NOT NULL,
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role TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('owner', 'admin', 'contributor')),
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first_name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
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last_name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
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custom_message TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
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token_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
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expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
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created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
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created_by_admin_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id),
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claimed_at TEXT,
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claimed_by_user_id INTEGER REFERENCES users(id),
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invited_user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
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);
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CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_user_invite_tokens_hash ON user_invite_tokens (token_hash);
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CREATE INDEX idx_user_invite_tokens_email ON user_invite_tokens (email, claimed_at);
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CREATE INDEX idx_user_invite_tokens_admin ON user_invite_tokens (created_by_admin_id, created_at DESC);
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