Compare commits

..

1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ben Stull 41b0c6af99 Release 0.17.0: admin-create user + invite email (custom message; claim-link claim flow)
Roadmap item #16 / §6.1. From the v0.9.0 /admin/users surface, an
admin can now create a user record before that person has ever
signed in — typing first name, last name, email, role, and an
optional custom message — and the framework sends an invite email
carrying a single-use claim link. The invitee clicks through to
/invites/claim?token=…, the token is consumed, the session is
established, and the user is routed to the passcode-set screen on
first sign-in.

New endpoints:
  * POST /api/admin/users — admin-only; provisions the users row +
    user_invite_tokens row + sends the invite email + writes a
    permission_events row with event_kind='user_invited'.
  * GET  /api/admin/users/invites — admin-only; lists active
    (not-claimed, not-expired) invites with the issuing admin.
  * POST /api/invites/claim — anonymous-reachable; validates the
    token, consumes the row, signs the invitee in (skipping OTC
    per the roadmap — clicking the email link is itself proof of
    email control), returns needs_passcode for the frontend's
    route-onward decision.

Schema: migration slot 019 — user_invite_tokens (id, email, role,
first/last name, custom_message, bcrypt token_hash, expires_at,
created_at, created_by_admin_id, claimed_at, claimed_by_user_id,
invited_user_id). Slot 018 reserved for the parallel #12 release
(per-RFC invitation) shipping in the same wave; distinct table
(rfc_invitations there vs. user_invite_tokens here) so they
coexist cleanly. No users-table changes — the brief floated a
NULL-column discriminator for "(pending invite)" but the existing
users.last_seen_at is NOT NULL with a datetime('now') default, so
the discriminator is the active user_invite_tokens row joined on
invited_user_id; the admin user-listing carries a pending_invite
field populated via that join.

Claim route: frontend /invites/claim?token=… (new
InviteClaim.jsx). Anonymous-reachable; renders "Claim my account"
CTA with an optional v0.11.0-style "trust this device" checkbox,
calls the claim endpoint, routes onward.

Token shape: opaque DB token (256 bits CSPRNG via
secrets.token_urlsafe(32), bcrypt-at-rest), not JWT. Opaque
chosen because admin revocation is then a single SQL UPDATE — JWT
would be stateless but harder to invalidate.

Open-question decisions: immediate-send (no admin-review-then-
send queue; future enhancement), no bulk-invite (deferred to
follow-up; v0.17.0 is one-at-a-time), 7-day expiry as a constant
(INVITE_TOKEN_TTL_DAYS in backend/app/invites.py; env-var
configurability is a §19.2 candidate), OTC skipped on first
sign-in (the token in the email is itself proof of email control;
subsequent sign-ins go through OTC / passcode unchanged).

Refusals on POST /api/admin/users:
  * 422 self-invite (use the role-change channel for self-edits)
  * 409 duplicate email (use the existing grant/role gestures)
  * 422 owner-grant by non-owner admin (§6.1 owner-zero is the
    only owner bootstrap path)
  * 422 pydantic — malformed email / unknown role /
    custom_message > 500 chars
  * 403 non-admin caller / 401 anonymous

15 new backend tests in test_admin_create_user_invite_vertical.py
(happy path, all four refusals, claim with valid / expired /
already-claimed / unknown token, pending-invite badge before and
after claim, listing admin-only). 234 total backend tests pass;
frontend build succeeds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 04:48:02 -07:00
98 changed files with 900 additions and 15271 deletions
-1038
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-407
View File
@@ -1,407 +0,0 @@
# Contributing to rfc-app
`rfc-app` is the framework that hosts RFC-shaped collections of
documents — one repo per RFC, a meta repo per collection, a web app
that turns the Git substrate into a writeable surface. The Open
Human Model (OHM) deployment at `ohm.wiggleverse.org` is one
instance. The framework is intended to host more.
This document explains how to propose a change to the framework
itself — a new endpoint, a schema migration, a UI affordance, a
spec clarification. For changes to *content* hosted by a specific
deployment (the OHM RFCs, the OHM roadmap), see that deployment's
own contribution guide (e.g. [`ohm-rfc/CONTRIBUTING.md`](https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-rfc/src/branch/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)).
---
## How the project actually evolves
rfc-app is built in the open in the literal sense: **every build
session produces a full transcript** at
[`wiggleverse/ohm-session-history`](https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history)
on `git.wiggleverse.org`. The transcripts are the authoritative
record of how the framework got from one release to the next — the
decisions, the friction, the dead ends, the reasoning. They are not
curated retrospectives; wrong turns stay in.
If you are proposing a change to rfc-app, **read at least the most
recent session transcript before opening a PR.** The transcripts
show what shape a feature lands in, where the spec gets touched,
what the operator pushes back on, and how the release rides into
deployment. A PR that matches that texture is much more likely to
land cleanly than one shaped by the README alone.
Worked examples to start with:
- **Session E** ([transcript](https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history)) —
a clean small release. Read this for the simplest possible release
shape: one feature, one version bump, one upgrade-steps block, no
surprises.
- **Session I** — recovery from a deploy fault. Read this for how
the project handles things going wrong mid-deploy, and for the
honest no-curation discipline.
- **Session K** — a multi-feature wave with one item paused on an
operator-provided secret. Read this for the subagent dispatch
pattern (the model the project uses to ship multiple features in
parallel), and for the binding rule that the assistant **never**
asks the operator to paste secret bytes into the conversation.
- **Session L** — squash-merge integration across three parallel
features (v0.15.0 / v0.16.0 / v0.17.0), with `#21 Part C`
identity-lifecycle Amplitude wiring folded inline across all
three releases. Read this for how cross-cutting concerns (analytics,
observability) get layered into already-in-flight features
without scope-creeping any single release.
The repository where transcripts live —
[`wiggleverse/ohm-session-history`](https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history) —
is the canonical history. The `git log` of `rfc-app` is the artifact;
the transcripts are the story behind it.
---
## How a contribution flows
The framework runs on a **subagents push feature branches; operator
tags and deploys** model. Contributors — whether human or AI agents
running in a Claude Code subsession — open feature branches and
submit PRs. The operator (the person running the deployment) is the
one who merges, tags, bumps `VERSION`, runs `flotilla deploy` (or
the equivalent for non-OHM deployments), and moves the deployment's
`.rfc-app-version` pin. The driver session transcripts inherit
this shape; contributors inherit it from them.
Concretely:
1. Read the most recent session transcript. Understand what just
shipped and what is in flight.
2. Open an Issue first if your change is exploratory, structural,
or might overlap with in-flight work. The operator will name
any collision.
3. Branch from `main`. Name the branch
`feature/<short-description>` for additive work, `fix/<short-
description>` for bug fixes, `docs/<short-description>` for
documentation-only work. The driver sessions use
`feature/v<target-version>-<slug>` (e.g.
`feature/v0.16.0-owner-invite`) — that shape is welcome but not
required for outside contributors, since contributors do not
pick the target version.
4. **Do not bump `VERSION` or `frontend/package.json#version` in
your PR.** The operator picks the target version at integration
time; bumping ahead causes cherry-pick conflicts. The same
applies to the `CHANGELOG.md` entry header — see below.
5. **Do not tag releases, do not run any deploy gesture, do not
touch any deployment's `.rfc-app-version` pin.** The operator
alone owns those gestures. (For OHM specifically: "I'm the only
one that gets to yolo." See the boundary section in
`ohm-rfc/CONTRIBUTING.md`.)
6. Push your branch and open a PR. Describe what you're proposing
and why, in language the operator can paste into the eventual
release commit. If the change touches `SPEC.md`, name which
section(s) and the contract change.
---
## CHANGELOG convention: strict descending
`CHANGELOG.md` is ordered **newest-on-top**. The header line for
the in-progress version goes at the top of the file; older
releases descend below it. This is the binding convention; the
operator hand-resolves the conflict when two parallel feature
branches both insert at the top of the file (the squash-merge
integration that ships parallel-feature waves keeps the strict-
descending shape — see Session K for the cherry-pick mechanics and
Session L for the hand-resolved-with-a-small-script variant).
A new entry has this shape (read the existing 0.15.0 / 0.16.0 /
0.17.0 entries for worked examples):
```markdown
## 0.X.Y — YYYY-MM-DD
**Minor — schema migration auto-applied; no operator action.** This
release ships <one or two sentences naming the feature and why>.
### Added
- **<New module/endpoint/component>** — what it does, where it lives,
why it exists. Include file paths inline so a reader can click through.
### Changed
- **<Existing surface>** — what changed and how a deployment notices.
### Migration
- **`<NNN_name>.sql`** — auto-applied by `db.run_migrations()` on
backend start. <Describe the schema delta in one sentence.>
### Upgrade steps (from 0.(X-1).Y)
- You **MUST** … (per RFC 2119; see SPEC.md §20.4).
- You **MUST NOT**
- You **SHOULD**
- You **MAY**
```
The header version number is filled in by the operator at merge
time. Your PR's CHANGELOG diff can leave the version as
`0.X.Y — YYYY-MM-DD` (literal placeholder), or use a guessed value
the operator overwrites; either is fine.
---
## `Upgrade steps:` blocks use RFC 2119 keywords
If your change requires deployments to do anything when they
upgrade — set an env var, apply a migration, restart a process,
flip an overlay value, accept a behavioral change — your CHANGELOG
entry **must** include an `### Upgrade steps` block, and that
block **must** use the [RFC 2119](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119)
/ [RFC 8174](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174) keywords as
defined in `SPEC.md` §20.4:
- **MUST** / **SHALL** / **REQUIRED** — without this step the
deployment will not function correctly. Skipping is a regression
the framework does not handle.
- **MUST NOT** / **SHALL NOT** — previously valid, now no longer
supported.
- **SHOULD** / **RECOMMENDED** — the framework's tested path. A
deployment may deviate when it has a reason.
- **SHOULD NOT** / **NOT RECOMMENDED** — discouraged without being
forbidden.
- **MAY** / **OPTIONAL** — an affordance you can take or skip.
Cross-version upgrades (jumping more than one minor) are computed by
the operator composing each intervening release's steps in order.
Each adjacent step must therefore be locally unambiguous — this is
the whole reason the keyword discipline is binding. Avoid words
like "should probably" or "might want to" inside an upgrade step;
either the framework needs the action or it doesn't.
If your change touches the env contract, **also update**
`backend/.env.example` and/or `frontend/.env.example` in the same
PR so the contract and the documentation land together (§20.4).
---
## SPEC.md and §19.2 candidates
`SPEC.md` is the framework's binding spec. It is honest about open
questions — large sections of it carry "§19.2 candidates," which
are decisions the project has deliberately deferred rather than
guessed at.
The discipline: **architectural or process deferrals get noted as
§19.2 candidates rather than scope-creeping a release.** When you
notice that your change opens a question larger than the change
itself (a different DB shape, a new auth contract, a cross-cutting
UX rethink), the right move is usually to land the narrow change
and add a §19.2 candidate naming the larger question. The candidate
documents what was set aside and why, so a future session can pick
it up with context.
Worked examples from recent sessions:
- v0.11.0 (Session K) shipped device trust and surfaced three new
§19.2 candidates: cross-device session revocation, password-
equivalent change invalidating trust, device-trust window
tunables via env. None of those were in the v0.11.0 scope; they
were noted in SPEC.md §19.2 so a future session can address them
on their own terms.
- v0.15.0 (Session L) shipped the Amplitude wrapper and added
candidates around session-replay-specific consent category +
bundle-size measurement, both deferred to the future Part-A audit.
When you spot a deferred decision in your PR's territory, name it
in your PR description and add it to `SPEC.md` §19.2 in the same
diff. Do not silently expand scope to settle it.
---
## Test-coverage expectations
The backend has the load-bearing test suite at
`backend/tests/`. Tests are organized as `*_vertical.py` files,
each covering one feature end-to-end through the FastAPI app
(provisioning fixtures, hitting the HTTP surface, asserting on the
database state). At time of writing, the suite is ~250 tests across
~25 files. Examples:
- `test_admin_create_user_invite_vertical.py` — v0.17.0's
admin-create user + invite + claim flow, 15 tests covering happy
path + every refusal shape + the audit-trail row.
- `test_rfc_invitations_vertical.py` — v0.16.0's per-RFC invite +
accept flow, 18 tests.
- `test_device_trust_vertical.py` — v0.11.0's 30-day device trust,
14 tests including cookie shape, hash-vs-raw-token discipline,
expired / revoked / forged / cross-user invariants.
Expected coverage for a new feature:
- **Backend feature** — one new `test_<feature>_vertical.py` file
that covers the happy path, every documented refusal/error code,
and any cross-surface effect (rows the feature writes to existing
tables, fields it adds to existing endpoints). Reuse fixtures
from neighboring test files (e.g. `test_propose_vertical.py`'s
`FakeGitea` is widely reused).
- **Migration** — verify migrations are reachable from `backend/.venv`
before pushing: `cd backend && PYTHONPATH=. .venv/bin/pytest -q`
exercises `db.run_migrations()` through the fixture setup.
- **Frontend feature** — there is currently no frontend test
runner. The discipline is: keep the change ships-clean
(`cd frontend && npm run build` succeeds), and the backend
vertical test exercises the HTTP contract the frontend
consumes, which is the meaningful behavioral guarantee.
Frontend changes that ride along with a backend feature land
with the backend test as the regression boundary.
- **Bug fix** — add a regression test in the same vertical file
that proves the original failure mode and verifies the fix.
Run the backend suite before pushing. From `backend/`:
```bash
PYTHONPATH=. .venv/bin/pytest -q
```
(The `PYTHONPATH=.` is a known ergonomic gap — see SPEC.md §19.2
candidate; the suite does not pick up `app/` without it.)
If your PR doesn't include tests, the operator will ask for them
before merge unless the change is genuinely test-irrelevant
(documentation, comments, dev-only tooling).
---
## Analytics instrumentation checklist
> *(This section codifies `ohm-rfc/ROADMAP.md` #21 Part B's
> CONTRIBUTING checklist. It is discipline, not a gate — but the
> operator will push back on PRs that skip it.)*
If your PR adds or changes a user-facing feature, walk this
checklist before opening the PR. The instrumentation conventions
themselves are specified in `SPEC.md` §21 (Analytics instrumentation
and identity); this section is the procedural reminder.
1. **What named event(s) does this feature need?**
Open `frontend/src/lib/analytics.js` and look at the `EVENTS`
constant. Does an existing event cover your feature? If not, is
the new event in the spec's "Subject Verb" Title Case form
(`Comment Posted`, `Invitation Sent`)? Are the prop families
consistent with SPEC.md §21's required-prop catalog (opaque
ids only, no PII, enums lowercased like `'otc'` not `'OTC'`)?
2. **Do interactive elements have stable text / ARIA labels /
`data-amp-track-*` so autocapture is meaningful?**
The frontend ships `autocapture: true`, which instruments
every click and form interaction. The *value* of those events
depends on the DOM the SDK sees: a `<button>` with stable
visible text or an `aria-label` shows up as a meaningful
dashboard row; an icon-only `<button>` with no label shows up
as garbage. New components that introduce interactive elements
should either carry meaningful labels (visible text or ARIA) or
carry a `data-amp-track-name="<Stable Name>"` attribute. For
repeated rows (per-RFC lists, comment lists), use a stable
`data-amp-track-*` identifier so per-row click counts aggregate
to the row's identity rather than to a generic label.
3. **Does any new form field need replay masking?**
Session replay records at `sampleRate: 1` (100% of consented
sessions). New form inputs that capture passwords, OTC codes,
tokens, magic-link URLs, or other secret/credential-equivalent
material **MUST** be masked with Amplitude's masking conventions
(the `.amp-mask` class or the `data-amp-mask` attribute,
whichever the wrapper integration expects in this version).
New inputs that capture arguably-PII (email, real name, free-
text drafts) **SHOULD** also be masked; if a deliberate
un-masking decision is taken, document it in the PR description
and in `SPEC.md` §21.
4. **Does the PR description name the instrumentation decisions?**
A one-sentence summary in the PR description — "fires
`Comment Posted` with `{rfc_slug, comment_id}`; no new form
fields, no new replay-masking concerns" — is enough. If the
decision is "we chose not to instrument this," say that too;
the absence of an event is itself a decision the operator
wants visible. The relevant SPEC chapter (§21) is the binding
reference for what shapes are correct.
If your feature touches an identity-meaningful surface (sign-in,
sign-out, invite-claim, role change, account state change), also
walk the **identity lifecycle** contract in SPEC.md §21.6: every
new claim/sign-in path **MUST** call `identify({ user_id, properties })`
BEFORE the first `track()` event on that surface, so the Amplitude
user record is created with the OHM user_id from the very first
event rather than as an anonymous device that retroactively links.
v0.16.0's `AcceptInvitation.jsx` and v0.17.0's `InviteClaim.jsx`
are the worked examples; mirror their shape.
---
## The operator-only gestures
Some gestures are operator-only. Contributors do not perform them;
PRs that perform them get rejected on principle, not on merit:
- **Tagging a release** (`git tag v0.X.Y` + `git push --tags`).
- **Pushing to `main`** after merge (the operator merges; the
framework's `main` branch tracks releases the operator has
shipped).
- **Bumping `VERSION` and `frontend/package.json#version` to the
shipped value.** The operator does this at integration time so
the version line is consistent across the release commit.
- **Running `flotilla deploy` or any equivalent deployment gesture**
in any deployment of rfc-app. Contributors do not deploy.
- **Moving a deployment's `.rfc-app-version` pin.** That pin lives
in the deployment's content repo (e.g. `ohm-rfc/.rfc-app-version`)
and is moved by the deployment's operator. Contributors to that
deployment do not move it; contributors to the framework
certainly do not.
- **Setting secrets** (anywhere — Secret Manager, env files,
`flotilla secret set`, vendor dashboards, anything). The
binding rule baked in mid-Session-K is: **the assistant never
asks the operator to paste secret bytes into a conversation,
even as one offered option**. The corollary for contributors:
do not include secret values in PR descriptions, commit
messages, or issue comments. Reference secrets by their binding
name (`SMTP_PASSWORD`, `AMPLITUDE_API_KEY`) and let the
operator handle the bytes.
If your change requires a new secret or env var, document the
requirement in the CHANGELOG `### Upgrade steps` block in the
RFC 2119 form ("operators **MUST** set `<NEW_VAR>` ...") and
update the `*.env.example` file. The operator will run the
secret/overlay-set gesture themselves at deploy time.
---
## When in doubt
- **Open an Issue first.** Especially for any change that touches
SPEC.md, the auth/permissions model (§6), the storage shape (§4
/ §5), or the deploy contract (§20). The operator (or a future
driver session) will name what they want before you write code.
- **Read the most recent session transcript.** It will tell you
what shipped last and what's in flight.
- **Cite SPEC.md sections in your PR description.** "Touches §15.4
(per-category email toggles) and adds §19.2 candidate around
per-channel mute granularity" gives the operator a map of where
to read.
---
## License
The framework is released under the MIT License (see
[`LICENSE`](./LICENSE)). By contributing, you agree your work
ships under those terms.
---
## See also
- [`SPEC.md`](./SPEC.md) — the framework's binding spec. §19.2
is the deferred-decisions queue; §20 is the versioning + deploy
contract; §21 is the analytics instrumentation contract.
- [`CHANGELOG.md`](./CHANGELOG.md) — release history in strict
descending order. Read recent entries for the shape your PR's
release-commit will take.
- [`PHILOSOPHY.md`](./PHILOSOPHY.md) — what the framework is for.
PRs whose shape conflicts with the philosophy get a longer
conversation than PRs that fit.
- [`wiggleverse/ohm-session-history`](https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history)
— the authoritative record of how the project has actually
evolved, session by session.
-510
View File
@@ -714,47 +714,6 @@ The lighter half ships the structural shape — frontmatter, consent,
resolution, revocation. The heavier half ships the runtime
hardening.
### 6.8 Sign-in state resume (roadmap item #29, v0.23.0)
Signing in lands the user back on their most recently-viewed app
state instead of always on the empty-state home view. The model is
**per-user**, not per-device — the safe default the roadmap calls
for: a sign-in on any device resumes the most-recently-recorded
route. A per-device split and a profile-settings toggle UI are
follow-ups; v0.23.0 ships the column-level opt-out flag
(`resume_enabled`, default on) and the default-on behavior.
**Storage.** A single row per user in `user_session_state`
(migration 022): `user_id` (PK, FK → `users.id`, cascade-delete),
`last_route` (TEXT, the frontend pathname), `last_route_state`
(TEXT, JSON-encoded — SQLite has no native JSONB, so JSON-as-TEXT
matches how the app stores every other JSON blob), `resume_enabled`
(INTEGER, default 1), and `last_updated_at`.
**Wiring.** A debounced (~1s) frontend route-change hook posts the
current route to `PUT /api/me/last-state` for authenticated users
(anonymous: no-op). The stored `last_route` is folded onto the
existing `/api/auth/me` payload (no extra round-trip); on sign-in,
after the §21-Part-C Amplitude `identify` fires, the frontend
`navigate()`s to it. The identify-then-redirect ordering is
preserved: the redirect is gated on identify having fired.
**Stale state.** If the stored route is an RFC since withdrawn or
one the user lost rights to read, the redirect is a graceful no-op:
`navigate(last_route)` lands on whatever that route renders today,
and the existing routing already falls through to the
catalog/empty-state for a missing/unreadable RFC. No special-casing
on the server.
**Privacy (binding).** The stored state is **route + light view
state ONLY** — scroll anchors, open-tab selection, filter chips, and
the like. It **MUST NOT** carry draft-buffer contents, PR/comment
draft text, or any user-typed content. The frontend never sends such
content; the `last_route_state` column comment in migration 022 and
this paragraph are the contract. Resume state is purposely cheap to
discard: a deliberate "clear" (or `resume_enabled = 0`) drops the
user back to today's empty-state behavior.
---
## 7. The left pane
@@ -2325,13 +2284,6 @@ a given signal, the **storage shape** that makes triage tractable, and
the **out-of-session channels** (email, digest) that let asynchrony
actually work.
(The framework's separate **analytics + session-replay** surface —
Amplitude wiring, event taxonomy, identity lifecycle, consent
contract — is a peer cross-cutting concern specified in §21.
Notifications cover in-product signal-of-others-acting-on-your-work;
analytics covers observability of how the product is used. The two
surfaces do not overlap.)
### 15.1 The signal-surface stack
Five surfaces, each with one narrow job:
@@ -4348,465 +4300,3 @@ Downstream deployments, in exchange for the contract above, commit to:
order;
- supply every required env var the framework documents at the
version they are running.
---
## 21. Analytics instrumentation and identity
The framework ships an Amplitude Analytics + Session Replay wrapper
in v0.15.0 (`frontend/src/lib/analytics.js`), gated by the v0.13.0
cookie/privacy consent surface (`frontend/src/lib/consent.js`,
§14.5). This section codifies the conventions that keep the
instrumentation **quality** healthy as features land — taxonomy
shape, autocapture hygiene, replay masking, the consent contract,
and the identity lifecycle. The conventions are framework-neutral:
every deployment of rfc-app that turns on the wrapper inherits
them.
This chapter is placed semantically after §15 (Notifications) and
§16 (deliberately deferred) as a peer cross-cutting framework
concern. It was added after §20 in the chapter sequence to avoid
renumbering the deferred-decisions surface §19.2, which is a
load-bearing project noun referenced across CLAUDE.md, transcripts,
and prior commits.
### 21.1 Event-taxonomy conventions
Events live in the public `EVENTS` constant in
`frontend/src/lib/analytics.js`. Callers **SHOULD** use one of the
named constants rather than firing arbitrary event strings — that
keeps the Amplitude dashboard coherent over time and makes the
taxonomy reviewable as a single source of truth.
- **Name form: Title Case, "Subject Verb".** E.g.
`Comment Posted`, `Invitation Sent`, `RFC Viewed`,
`User Signed In`, `Admin Permission Decision`. Spaces between
words, no punctuation, no leading verbs (use `RFC Proposed`,
not `Propose RFC`). The strings match the Amplitude dashboard
names exactly.
- **Stability.** New events **SHOULD** land via a release, not
ad-hoc — adding an entry to `EVENTS` is a CHANGELOG-worthy
change because it widens the framework's observable surface
(§20.3). Renaming an event after it has shipped breaks the
dashboard's historical continuity; renames **SHOULD** be
treated as a deprecation cycle (ship both, dashboard-migrate,
drop the old one).
- **Opaque ids only in prop values.** Properties **MUST NOT**
carry PII — no email, no display name, no IP, no free-text
field bodies (titles, comment text, RFC drafts). Properties
**SHOULD** be limited to:
- opaque ids: `rfc_slug`, `rfc_id`, `pr_number`,
`target_user_id`, `invited_by_admin_id`, `thread_id`,
`comment_id`;
- enums (lowercased): `method: 'otc' | 'passcode' |
'device-trust' | 'admin-invite' | 'rfc-invite'`;
- booleans: `trust_device`, `needs_passcode`, `passcode_set`;
- timestamps (ISO 8601);
- small bounded integers: `custom_message_chars` (coarse-grained
signal of admin effort, NOT the message text itself).
- **Casing consistency.** Prop keys use `snake_case` (matches the
backend's JSON shape). Enum values use lowercase with hyphens
(`'rfc-invite'`, not `'rfcInvite'` or `'RFC_INVITE'`). Drift
here ruins dashboard aggregation; the operator-side audit
(§21.7 / `ohm-rfc/ROADMAP.md` #21 Part A) checks for it.
The starting taxonomy as of v0.17.0:
```
PAGE_VIEWED: 'Page Viewed'
RFC_VIEWED: 'RFC Viewed'
USER_SIGNED_IN: 'User Signed In'
USER_SIGNED_OUT: 'User Signed Out'
RFC_PROPOSED: 'RFC Proposed'
PR_OPENED: 'PR Opened'
COMMENT_POSTED: 'Comment Posted'
BETA_ACCESS_REQUESTED: 'Beta Access Requested'
ADMIN_PERMISSION_DECISION: 'Admin Permission Decision'
INVITATION_SENT: 'Invitation Sent' # v0.16.0 / #12
INVITATION_ACCEPTED: 'Invitation Accepted' # v0.16.0 / #12
USER_INVITED: 'User Invited' # v0.17.0 / #16
INVITE_CLAIMED: 'Invite Claimed' # v0.17.0 / #16
```
### 21.2 Required prop families per event kind
Each event family carries a small required prop set. These are
load-bearing for the dashboard's cohort analysis; releases that
add a new event in an existing family **SHOULD** carry the
family's required props.
- **Navigation events** (`Page Viewed`, `RFC Viewed`): carry
`path` (string, pathname only — never the query string if it
could carry a token) for `Page Viewed`; carry `rfc_slug` for
`RFC Viewed`. `rfc_id` **MAY** be added when the cached row is
in hand.
- **Auth-state events** (`User Signed In`, `User Signed Out`):
`User Signed In` carries `method` (one of `'otc'`,
`'passcode'`, `'device-trust'`, `'admin-invite'`). `User
Signed Out` carries no props (the identity binding is cleared
separately via `anonymize()`).
- **Authored-action events** (`RFC Proposed`, `PR Opened`,
`Comment Posted`): carry `rfc_slug`. PRs additionally carry
`pr_number` once the row exists. Comments additionally carry
`thread_id`. None carry the body text.
- **Admin-action events** (`Beta Access Requested`,
`Admin Permission Decision`): the latter carries `action`
(lowercase: `'grant'` / `'revoke'`) and `target_user_id`.
- **Invite-side events** (`Invitation Sent`, `User Invited`): fire
from the inviter's signed-in session. `Invitation Sent` (per-RFC,
#12) carries `rfc_slug` + `role_in_rfc`. `User Invited`
(admin-create, #16) carries `target_user_id` (the OHM user_id of
the just-provisioned user) + `initial_role` +
`custom_message_chars` (a bounded integer signal of admin
effort, never the message text). Per #21 Part C: when the
invitee is not yet a user (#12 per-RFC invitations to an email
address that has never signed in), the invite-side event **MAY**
carry a hashed `target_email` fingerprint (SHA-256 of the
normalized lower-cased email) so the invite + claim pair can be
correlated later. Plain-text `target_email` **MUST NOT** be
carried.
- **Claim-side events** (`Invitation Accepted`, `Invite Claimed`):
fire from the invitee's session, immediately after an
`identify({ user_id, properties })` call binds the OHM user_id
to the Amplitude record (see §21.6). The events carry the
invite context (`rfc_slug` + `role_in_rfc` for the per-RFC
shape; `invited_by_admin_id` + `initial_role` + `needs_passcode`
+ `trust_device` for the admin-create shape).
When in doubt, the principle: a property is correctly shaped iff
the operator could publish it in a session transcript without
hesitation.
### 21.3 Autocapture-friendly DOM patterns
The wrapper initializes Amplitude with `analytics.autocapture: true`,
which auto-instruments page views, clicks, and form interactions.
The *value* of those auto-captured events depends entirely on the
DOM the SDK observes. Releases that add interactive UI **SHOULD**
follow these patterns so the dashboard rows are readable rather
than rows like "Click on `<button>` at `:nth-child(7)`".
- **Stable visible text on interactive elements.** Buttons and
links **SHOULD** have stable, human-readable text content (the
same string Amplitude uses to label the row). Avoid generic
labels like "Read more" / "Click here" that lose context.
- **`aria-label` on icon-only buttons.** Icon-only buttons (the
chevron expanders, kebab menus, close `X`s) **MUST** carry a
meaningful `aria-label`. Default autocapture for an unlabeled
icon button reads as garbage. The `aria-label` is also an
accessibility requirement — the two goals align.
- **`data-amp-track-*` for repeating-list per-row identifiers.**
When a list renders many rows of the same shape (RFC rows,
comment rows, PR rows in a listing), per-row interactive elements
**SHOULD** carry a `data-amp-track-name` attribute that
identifies the row's *kind* and a `data-amp-track-*` attribute
carrying the row's stable id. The convention:
```html
<button
data-amp-track-name="RFC Row Expand"
data-amp-track-rfc-slug={slug}
>…</button>
```
This makes per-RFC click counts aggregate to the RFC rather
than to a generic label, and lets the dashboard answer "which
RFCs got the most engagement" rather than "how many buttons
were clicked."
- **`data-amp-track-suppress` for noise surfaces.** Crowded surfaces
(the admin user-listing post-v0.9.0, the RFC discussion panel
during heavy review) **MAY** apply
`data-amp-track-suppress` (or its current equivalent in the
SDK version in use) to elements whose clicks would flood the
dashboard without informing anything. Suppression is a
deliberate decision; document it inline.
### 21.4 Session-replay masking conventions
The wrapper initializes Amplitude with `sessionReplay.sampleRate: 1`
(100% of consented sessions are recorded for full-DOM playback —
vendor-recommended default for new Amplitude deployments). Replay
has a meaningfully larger privacy footprint than event counters,
and the masking discipline is binding.
- **Credentials MUST be masked.** The OTC code input, passcode
input, any password-type field, the Turnstile widget internals,
the magic-link-claim token if it survives in the URL bar
(browser history, screenshot windows) — these **MUST** be masked
with Amplitude's masking convention (the `.amp-mask` class or the
`data-amp-mask` attribute, whichever the wrapper's SDK version
uses; the wrapper's bootstrap comment names the current
convention). Confirm each masking attribute survives the
wrapper init by inspecting a recorded session before each
release that touches an auth input.
- **PII SHOULD be masked or carefully un-masked.** Email-entry
fields, real-name capture fields (the v0.8.0 first/last/why
panel), free-text RFC body drafts, comment-compose text —
each is arguably PII or near-PII. The per-field decision is
the release's responsibility; document the choice in `SPEC.md`
§21 (this section) and in the release CHANGELOG so future
deployments inherit the call rather than re-deciding.
- **Privacy-policy alignment.** The recorded data **MUST** match
what the deployment's privacy / cookies policy claims. If
reality is broader than the document promises, update the policy
text in the same release.
- **Selective redaction.** Amplitude supports field-level mask
classes that hide value while preserving DOM shape (so the
session is replayable but the value is not). Prefer this over
whole-form masking when only a subset is sensitive.
### 21.5 Consent-gate contract
The wrapper is bound to the v0.13.0 cookie/privacy consent surface
(`frontend/src/lib/consent.js`, §14.5). The binding is **load-
bearing**: the SDK and the session-replay recorder **MUST NOT**
load before consent is granted, and any consent revocation **MUST**
take effect within one tick of the consent flip.
The wrapper's bootstrap implements this contract; releases that
touch the analytics surface **MUST** preserve it.
- **Pre-consent: no init, no network, no recording.** If
`consent.analytics === true` is not currently true (either
because the user denied, or because the banner is up and no
decision has been recorded), the wrapper **MUST NOT** import
the Amplitude SDK, **MUST NOT** open any network request to
Amplitude, and **MUST NOT** start any session-replay recording.
The consent-gated lazy `import('@amplitude/unified')` is the
binding implementation; preserve it.
- **Denied → granted: init at the consent moment.** When consent
flips from denied/undecided to granted, the wrapper **MUST**
initialize the SDK at that moment (a new `initAll(KEY, …)` call
through the lazy-import path). Track and identify calls made
before init resolves **MUST** be queued and drained on init,
so the first signed-in user's first event is not dropped on
the cold-load race.
- **Granted → denied: setOptOut(true) within one tick.** When
consent flips from granted to denied mid-session, the wrapper
**MUST** call `amplitude.setOptOut(true)` so subsequent events
are dropped client-side and session replay stops recording.
The wrapper cannot unload the script tag (the SDK is already
in memory), but the SDK's contract for "drop subsequent events"
is `setOptOut(true)`. This **MUST** happen within one tick of
the consent flip (i.e. synchronously inside the
`onConsentChange` handler).
- **No silent re-grant.** A granted → denied → granted sequence
**MUST** call `setOptOut(false)` (re-enabling the SDK that was
paused) rather than firing a second `initAll` (which would
double-init). The wrapper's bootstrap implements this; releases
that touch the consent integration **MUST** preserve the
distinction.
- **Build-time vs. runtime.** The API key is read from
`import.meta.env.VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY` at build time. When
the env var is unset, the wrapper **MUST** log one console
warning and no-op (every public function becomes a deterministic
no-op) so dev environments without an Amplitude account keep
working. The deploy gesture binds the key via the deployment's
overlay verb (for OHM-shape deployments, `flotilla overlay set`);
see §21.8 for the secret-vs-public discussion.
### 21.6 Identity lifecycle (per #21 Part C)
Amplitude's identity model has a specific pattern that the
framework follows verbatim. Every release that touches an
identity-meaningful surface **MUST** observe this pattern. The
pattern shipped inline across v0.15.0 / v0.16.0 / v0.17.0
(Session L's wave); this section codifies the contract so future
releases inherit it.
**On sign-in success** (`App.jsx`'s `me.user` resolution):
- The wrapper's `identify({ user_id, properties })` call **MUST**
carry both the OHM user_id (`amplitude.setUserId(<id>)`
internally) AND the user's durable property bag. `setUserId`
alone is **NOT** sufficient — without properties, the Amplitude
user record carries only the id, and cohort analysis loses the
shape (role distribution, sign-in-method distribution, etc.)
the dashboard depends on.
- Properties **MUST** be a bag of opaque ids, enums, booleans,
and timestamps — no PII (no email, no display name, no IP).
- Properties **MUST** be classified `set` vs `setOnce` deliberately
(see §21.6.1 below).
- The same `identify` call **MUST** be re-issued on every sign-in
(idempotent at Amplitude's side; cheap; corrects any drift in
the mutable property half).
**On user-state change mid-session** (role grant/revoke, trust-
device add, passcode set, beta-permission flip):
- The wrapper's `setUserProperties(properties)` call **MUST** fire
so the Amplitude record stays current. Mid-session state changes
**MUST NOT** wait for the next sign-in to surface — the dashboard
cohort an admin uses to grant permission is the same dashboard
that next sees the granted user's behavior; staleness here breaks
the cohort feedback loop.
**On sign-out**:
- The wrapper's `anonymize()` call (internally `amplitude.reset()`)
**MUST** fire. `reset` clears the device-id linking AND **MUST**
also clear the property cache so the next anonymous session is a
fresh slate (the wrapper's `anonymize()` does both — releases
that touch the wrapper **MUST** preserve this).
- The `User Signed Out` `track()` call **MUST** fire *before*
`anonymize()`, so the sign-out event is correctly attributed to
the signing-out user rather than to the post-reset anonymous
device.
**On invite-claim** (the v0.16.0 per-RFC invite + v0.17.0 admin-
create invite paths):
- The wrapper's `identify({ user_id, properties })` call **MUST**
fire BEFORE the first `track()` event on the claim surface, so
the Amplitude user record is created with the OHM user_id from
the first event. **MUST NOT** fire `track()` first and `identify`
later — that creates an anonymous device record that
retroactively links, and the cohort attribution for
invite-driven onboarding loses precision.
- The invite-context properties (`claim_method`,
`invited_by_admin_id`, `invited_at`, `initial_role`) are
`setOnce` (immutable user-history markers) — see §21.6.1.
**Inviter-side identification on invite-send events**:
- The inviter's `track('Invitation Sent', …)` and
`track('User Invited', …)` events fire from the inviter's
signed-in session, so the `user_id` attribution is already
correct (it's the inviter's id). The event body carries
`target_user_id` (#16 — admin-create, where the future user is
provisioned at create-time) or a hashed `target_email`
fingerprint (#12 — per-RFC invite, where the invitee is not
yet a user) so the invite + claim pair can be correlated later
in the dashboard.
#### 21.6.1 `set` vs `setOnce` taxonomy
Amplitude distinguishes two property-write semantics:
- **`set(k, v)`** — overwrites the property on every call. The
user record reflects the most recent value.
- **`setOnce(k, v)`** — writes only if the property is not
already present. Subsequent calls are no-ops. The user record
reflects the first value ever written.
The wrapper's `applyProperties` function accepts both: a bare
value uses `.set()`; a sentinel-wrapped value
`['__setOnce__', value]` uses `.setOnce()`. Releases that add new
user properties **MUST** classify each one explicitly, by the
following rule:
- A property whose value is **expected to change over the user's
lifetime** is `set`. Examples: `role` (can flip from
`contributor` to `owner`), `permission_state` (pending → granted),
`passcode_set` (false → true), `device_trusted` (changes per
active device). On each sign-in, the latest value is written;
the dashboard always sees current state.
- A property that is an **immutable historical marker** is
`setOnce`. Examples: `first_sign_in_at` (the timestamp of the
user's first observed sign-in — never re-write), `account_
created_at` (the timestamp of provisioning),
`invited_by_admin_id` (the admin who provisioned this user via
the v0.17.0 path — preserved even if the user is later
re-invited or has their role changed), `invited_at` (the
timestamp at which the invite was sent — distinct from
`claim_method` which is also setOnce because once claim_method
is `'admin-invite'`, that's the path this user took).
The classification is part of the release's contract — flipping a
property from `set` to `setOnce` (or vice versa) mid-life corrupts
the user record and **MUST** be avoided. If a property's
semantics genuinely change, retire the old key and introduce a new
one (same deprecation discipline as event renames in §21.1).
### 21.7 Cohort-shape implications (informative)
The conventions above are designed so that the Amplitude dashboard
can answer cohort questions the operator actually asks:
- *"How many users signed in via the admin-invite path in week N
vs. organic OTC?"* — uses `claim_method` (setOnce) on the user
record + `User Signed In` events with `method`.
- *"Of admin-invited users, what fraction set a passcode within
their first session?"* — uses `claim_method` + `passcode_set`
on the user record + `Page Viewed` events to define "session."
- *"Which RFCs have the most owner-invited contributors?"* — uses
per-RFC `Invitation Sent` / `Invitation Accepted` correlated
via `rfc_slug` + `role_in_rfc`.
- *"What's the gap between invite-send and invite-claim, broken
out by inviter?"* — uses `Invitation Sent` (inviter's session,
inviter `user_id`) + `Invitation Accepted` (invitee's session,
invitee `user_id` after the BEFORE-track identify) joined on
`rfc_slug` + inviter (the inviter's id is the same id on both
events because both invite and claim sides observe it).
The Part-A audit (per `ohm-rfc/ROADMAP.md` #21) confirms these
shapes against real data once a week of beta traffic is in. The
audit is a point-in-time pass; this chapter is the standing
discipline that keeps future work in shape.
### 21.8 Secret vs. public — overlay binding
The Amplitude browser API key (`VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY`) is
**bundle-embedded by design**: it appears as a literal string in
the deployment's JavaScript bundle, visible to anyone with browser
dev tools. The vendor's installation prompt embeds it inline. This
puts it in the same category as Cloudflare Turnstile's site key
(`VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY`, v0.12.0) — public, not secret.
Deployments **MUST** bind such keys via their overlay verb (for
OHM-shape deployments, `flotilla overlay set`), not via the secret
binding. The matching secret half (the Cloudflare Turnstile
**secret** key, `CLOUDFLARE_TURNSTILE_SECRET`, used server-side
for siteverify) is a true secret bound via `flotilla secret set`.
This per-key distinction is the deployment's responsibility; the
framework's `*.env.example` files name the binding for each.
The binding rule baked in mid-Session-K is: **the operator's
secret bytes never enter the conversation with an assistant**,
even as one offered option. The conversation-layer corollary of
the build-pipeline §3-invariant-1 rule from
`ohm-rfc-app-flotilla/SPEC.md` is that sessions publish in full,
and a secret in a transcript is a leaked secret. The canonical
secret-set gesture for OHM is `pbpaste | flotilla secret set
<deployment> <SECRET_NAME>` (the value goes clipboard → stdin →
Secret Manager without ever appearing in shell history or the
model context). Non-OHM deployments inherit the same discipline
through their own deploy tooling.
### 21.9 §19.2 candidates surfaced by this chapter
- **Session-replay-specific consent category.** v0.13.0's cookie
banner has a single `analytics` toggle that gates both event
counters and full-DOM session replay. Recording has a larger
privacy footprint than counters; a separate consent category
for session replay is the cleaner shape. Captured here and in
`ohm-rfc/ROADMAP.md` #21 Part A.
- **Bundle-size budget for the analytics wrapper.** The
`@amplitude/unified` package adds ~150 KB gzipped (the session-
replay recorder is the bulk). The consent-gated lazy import
keeps the cost off the initial bundle for users who haven't
opted in; the post-consent init path has not been measured
for jank. Captured in #21 Part A.
- **Property-shape lint.** The conventions in §21.1 / §21.2 are
enforced today by review discipline. A small lint (CI grep
against `track(` / `identify(` callsites with a property-key
allowlist + a PII-name denylist) is a future affordance that
catches drift mechanically.
- **Hashed `target_email` derivation.** §21.2 names SHA-256 of
the normalized lower-cased email as the hashing function. The
framework does not currently expose a helper for this — a
small `frontend/src/lib/hash.js` or `backend/app/hash.py` that
centralizes the normalization + hash would make the contract
enforceable. Captured here.
### 21.10 Open question
The wrapper currently uses the Amplitude SDK's autocapture +
session-replay defaults. The v0.13.0 consent surface has a single
toggle for "analytics." Splitting the consent into "analytics"
vs "session replay" is a §19.2 candidate (above) but settling it
also requires a privacy-policy update and a re-prompt of
existing consenters. The cleanest moment to do this is the next
material privacy-policy revision; the conventions in §21.4 hold
in the interim.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
0.29.0
0.17.0
-12
View File
@@ -38,22 +38,10 @@ GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET=change-me-to-a-shared-secret
# Comma-separated list of provider keys to enable. Per the §19.2
# per-RFC-model topic, this is app-wide until that topic lands.
ENABLED_MODELS=claude
# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY also powers the §9.1 propose-RFC tag suggestions
# (roadmap #27) — that surface always uses Claude Haiku for cost,
# independent of ENABLED_MODELS. With no key set, tag suggestions are
# simply unavailable (the modal hides the row); the rest of the app is
# unaffected.
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=
GOOGLE_API_KEY=
OPENAI_API_KEY=
# --- Tag suggestions (§9.1 / roadmap #27) ---
# Per-user rate limit on the suggest-tags endpoint (cost backstop; the
# modal debounces and the endpoint is contributor-gated). Optional —
# these defaults apply when unset.
TAG_SUGGEST_RATE_MAX=30
TAG_SUGGEST_RATE_WINDOW_SECONDS=60
# --- Email (§15.4) ---
# Leave SMTP_HOST unset to use the stdout fallback — the integration
# tests rely on it, and a dev environment without a real SMTP provider
+1 -361
View File
@@ -15,24 +15,19 @@ import json
from typing import Any
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import PlainTextResponse, Response
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from . import (
api_admin,
api_branches,
api_contributions,
api_discussion,
api_graduation,
api_invitations,
api_notifications,
api_prs,
auth,
db,
device_trust as device_trust_mod,
docs as docs_mod,
docs_sessions,
docs_specs,
entry as entry_mod,
cache,
funder,
@@ -40,7 +35,6 @@ from . import (
notify,
philosophy,
providers as providers_mod,
tag_suggest,
)
from .bot import Bot
from .config import Config
@@ -53,22 +47,6 @@ class ProposeBody(BaseModel):
slug: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=80)
pitch: str = Field(min_length=1)
tags: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
# Roadmap #26: optional "What will you be using this RFC for?" — the
# concrete ground-truth use case, distinct from the `pitch`'s abstract
# "why is this needed." Optional (NULL/omitted accepted), no minimum,
# generous cap matching the pitch's free-text body bound.
proposed_use_case: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=8000)
class SuggestTagsBody(BaseModel):
# Roadmap #27: the partial propose-RFC draft, sent as the user types
# (debounced on the frontend). All fields optional — suggestions
# refine as the draft fills in. `pitch` is the "why is this needed"
# rationale; `use_case` is the #26 optional ground-truth field.
# Bounds mirror the propose body's free-text caps.
title: str = Field(default="", max_length=200)
pitch: str = Field(default="", max_length=8000)
use_case: str = Field(default="", max_length=8000)
class DeclineBody(BaseModel):
@@ -80,18 +58,6 @@ class FunderCredentialBody(BaseModel):
api_key: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=2048)
class LastStateBody(BaseModel):
# v0.23.0 / roadmap item #29: server-side sign-in state resume.
# `route` is a frontend pathname the user was last on (bounded so a
# hostile client can't stuff arbitrary blobs through). `state` is an
# optional bag of *light* view state (scroll anchors, open tab,
# filter chips). PRIVACY: it MUST NOT carry draft-buffer contents —
# the frontend only ever sends ephemeral view state, and the column
# comment in migration 022 + SPEC §6.2 are the binding contract.
route: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=2048)
state: dict[str, Any] | None = None
class BetaRequestBody(BaseModel):
# v0.8.0 — captured on the first OTC sign-in. All three fields are
# required so the admin queue has a coherent triage shape.
@@ -136,16 +102,6 @@ def make_router(
# Contribution still requires a PR (api_prs above); this surface
# is for discussion that does not yet warrant a branch.
router.include_router(api_discussion.make_router())
# v0.16.0 (roadmap item #12): owner-only invite for per-RFC
# contribution + discussion. The RFC's owner can invite specific
# users by email to either open PRs or join the discussion; non-
# invited users keep read access but cannot write (v0.6.0
# contract extended to per-RFC scope).
router.include_router(api_invitations.make_router())
# v0.29.0 (roadmap item #28 Part 3): offer-to-contribute-to-a-pending
# (super-draft) RFC. Reuses the #12 invite flow (api_invitations above)
# on accept; lands the request + owner notifications via §15 notify.
router.include_router(api_contributions.make_router())
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# §17: /api/health — unauthenticated post-flight probe.
@@ -180,177 +136,6 @@ def make_router(
payload = docs_mod.load()
return {"body": payload["body"]}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.19.0 / roadmap item #30 — /api/docs/sessions/*
#
# The framework mediates reads against the public
# `wiggleverse/ohm-session-history` gitea repo so the rendered
# `/docs/sessions/*` surface inherits the same chrome as the
# /docs/user-guide route and doesn't require a cross-origin
# gesture from the frontend. See backend/app/docs_sessions.py
# for the cache shape and env knobs.
#
# The route mapping for the three `status` values returned by
# the fetchers:
#
# "ok" → HTTP 200, payload as documented per endpoint
# "404" → HTTP 200/404 depending on the endpoint (the
# manifest's empty state is 200 + {} so the
# frontend can short-circuit without an error
# banner; transcripts/about return 404 so the
# frontend can render its own empty-state)
# "error" → HTTP 502, {"error": ..., "detail": ...} so the
# frontend retry surface reads as "couldn't reach
# the session-history repo" rather than as a
# generic 5xx.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.get("/api/docs/sessions/manifest")
async def get_sessions_manifest() -> dict[str, Any]:
result = await docs_sessions.fetch_manifest()
if result["status"] == "ok":
return result["manifest"]
if result["status"] == "404":
# Empty-state contract: render no session rows in the
# flyout but don't show an error banner. The frontend
# treats `{}` as "no sessions published yet".
return {}
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail={
"error": "session-history fetch failed",
"detail": result.get("detail", "unknown"),
},
)
@router.get("/api/docs/sessions/about")
async def get_sessions_about() -> Response:
result = await docs_sessions.fetch_about()
if result["status"] == "ok":
return PlainTextResponse(
content=result["body"],
media_type="text/markdown; charset=utf-8",
)
if result["status"] == "404":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="session-history README not yet published",
)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail={
"error": "session-history fetch failed",
"detail": result.get("detail", "unknown"),
},
)
@router.get("/api/docs/sessions/{nnnn}/index")
async def get_sessions_index(nnnn: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not docs_sessions._is_valid_session_dir(nnnn):
# 400 over 404: the request itself is malformed (the
# session directory name doesn't match `^\d{4}$`),
# distinct from "no such session published yet".
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="invalid session directory")
result = await docs_sessions.fetch_session_index(nnnn)
if result["status"] == "ok":
return {"files": result["files"]}
if result["status"] == "404":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="no transcripts published for this session",
)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail={
"error": "session-history fetch failed",
"detail": result.get("detail", "unknown"),
},
)
@router.get("/api/docs/sessions/{nnnn}/{filename}")
async def get_sessions_transcript(nnnn: str, filename: str) -> Response:
# Path-shape validation before any network — refuses anything
# that would resolve outside the `NNNN/SESSION-...md` layout
# (e.g. legacy `SESSION-A-TRANSCRIPT.md` at the repo root,
# `../etc/passwd`, or any non-numeric session dir).
if not docs_sessions._is_valid_session_dir(nnnn):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="invalid session directory")
if not docs_sessions._is_valid_transcript_filename(filename):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="invalid transcript filename")
result = await docs_sessions.fetch_transcript(nnnn, filename)
if result["status"] == "ok":
return PlainTextResponse(
content=result["body"],
media_type="text/markdown; charset=utf-8",
)
if result["status"] == "404":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="transcript not found",
)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail={
"error": "session-history fetch failed",
"detail": result.get("detail", "unknown"),
},
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.20.0 — /api/docs/specs/*
#
# Sibling of the v0.19.0 docs-sessions surface: the framework
# mediates a fetch against the public gitea raw URL for each
# configured spec so the rendered `/docs/specs/*` route inherits
# the same chrome (and the same auth-less reach) as the user
# guide and the session-history browser. See
# backend/app/docs_specs.py for the manifest shape, the env
# knobs, and the cache.
#
# Status-to-HTTP mapping mirrors docs_sessions:
# "ok" → HTTP 200, payload as documented per endpoint
# "404" → HTTP 200 / 404 (manifest 404 doesn't apply here —
# the manifest is derived from env, never 404s; spec
# 404 returns HTTP 404 so the frontend can render
# "spec not yet published / unknown name")
# "error" → HTTP 502
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.get("/api/docs/specs/manifest")
async def get_specs_manifest() -> dict[str, Any]:
# The manifest is derived from env (`OHM_DOCS_SPECS`) and
# never fails — a malformed value falls back to the framework
# default at parse time. So this endpoint always returns 200
# + a list (the framework default is non-empty).
result = docs_specs.fetch_specs_manifest()
return {"specs": result["specs"]}
@router.get("/api/docs/specs/{name}")
async def get_spec(name: str) -> Response:
# Slug validation before any network — refuses `..`, `/`,
# uppercase, whitespace, etc. Same defense-in-depth posture
# as the docs-sessions transcript endpoint.
if not docs_specs._is_valid_name(name):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="invalid spec name")
result = await docs_specs.fetch_spec(name)
if result["status"] == "ok":
return PlainTextResponse(
content=result["body"],
media_type="text/markdown; charset=utf-8",
)
if result["status"] == "404":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="spec not found",
)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail={
"error": "specs fetch failed",
"detail": result.get("detail", "unknown"),
},
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# Auth surface — reads role from our users table per §6.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -383,28 +168,6 @@ def make_router(
)
has_passcode = bool(row and row["passcode_hash"])
passcode_set_at = row["passcode_set_at"] if (row and has_passcode) else None
# v0.23.0 / item #29: fold the sign-in-resume state onto the
# same round-trip the frontend already makes on boot. When
# resume is disabled (resume_enabled = 0) we hand back a null
# route so the client never redirects; the stored row stays put
# so re-enabling later resumes the last-known route.
state_row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT last_route, last_route_state, resume_enabled "
"FROM user_session_state WHERE user_id = ?",
(user.user_id,),
).fetchone()
resume_enabled = bool(state_row["resume_enabled"]) if state_row else True
last_route = (
state_row["last_route"]
if (state_row and resume_enabled)
else None
)
last_route_state = None
if state_row and resume_enabled and state_row["last_route_state"]:
try:
last_route_state = json.loads(state_row["last_route_state"])
except (ValueError, TypeError):
last_route_state = None
return {
"authenticated": True,
"user": {
@@ -421,10 +184,6 @@ def make_router(
"needs_profile": needs_profile,
"has_passcode": has_passcode,
"passcode_set_at": passcode_set_at,
# v0.23.0 / item #29 — sign-in state resume.
"resume_enabled": resume_enabled,
"last_route": last_route,
"last_route_state": last_route_state,
},
}
@@ -494,52 +253,6 @@ def make_router(
notify.fan_out_new_beta_request(requester_user_id=user.user_id)
return {"ok": True}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.23.0 (§6.2, roadmap item #29): server-side sign-in state
# resume. The frontend debounce-posts the user's current route +
# a small bag of light view state here on every route change; the
# next sign-in reads `last_route` off `/api/auth/me` and redirects.
#
# Per-user (NOT per-device) — one row per user, keyed on user_id.
# `resume_enabled` is the opt-out flag (default on); when it's 0
# this endpoint no-ops so a user who turned resume off doesn't keep
# silently rewriting their stored route. PRIVACY: the body carries
# route + light state ONLY, never draft-buffer contents (migration
# 022 column comment + SPEC §6.2 are the binding contract).
#
# `require_user` (not `require_contributor`) — a pending/granted
# distinction is irrelevant for "remember where I was", and a
# pending user navigating read-only surfaces should still resume.
# Anonymous callers get the 401 `require_user` raises.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.put("/api/me/last-state")
async def put_last_state(body: LastStateBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
user = auth.require_user(request)
# Respect the opt-out: if a row already exists with resume
# disabled, leave it untouched and report the no-op. A first-
# ever POST (no row yet) defaults to enabled and stores.
existing = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT resume_enabled FROM user_session_state WHERE user_id = ?",
(user.user_id,),
).fetchone()
if existing is not None and not existing["resume_enabled"]:
return {"ok": True, "stored": False}
state_json = json.dumps(body.state) if body.state is not None else None
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO user_session_state
(user_id, last_route, last_route_state, last_updated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, datetime('now'))
ON CONFLICT(user_id) DO UPDATE SET
last_route = excluded.last_route,
last_route_state = excluded.last_route_state,
last_updated_at = excluded.last_updated_at
""",
(user.user_id, body.route, state_json),
)
return {"ok": True, "stored": True}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.11.0: trust device for 30 days (§6.2, roadmap item #9).
#
@@ -663,36 +376,12 @@ def make_router(
).fetchone()
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "Not found")
payload = _serialize_rfc(row)
# Roadmap #26: surface the optional propose-time use case on the
# RFC view. The idea PR closes on merge, but the canonical row in
# `proposed_use_cases` persists; look it up by slug (the latest
# 'rfc'-scope row for this slug). NULL == "left blank".
uc = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT use_case FROM proposed_use_cases
WHERE scope = 'rfc' AND rfc_slug = ?
ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1
""",
(slug,),
).fetchone()
payload["proposed_use_case"] = uc["use_case"] if uc else None
return payload
return _serialize_rfc(row)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# §7.3 / §9.3: pending ideas
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
def _proposal_use_case(pr_number: int) -> str | None:
"""Roadmap #26: read the optional use case for an idea PR from the
canonical side table. Returns None when none was supplied (the
"left blank" sentinel the frontend renders tastefully)."""
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT use_case FROM proposed_use_cases WHERE scope = 'rfc' AND pr_number = ?",
(pr_number,),
).fetchone()
return row["use_case"] if row else None
@router.get("/api/proposals")
async def list_proposals() -> dict[str, Any]:
rows = db.conn().execute(
@@ -712,7 +401,6 @@ def make_router(
"description": r["description"],
"opened_by": r["opened_by"],
"opened_at": r["opened_at"],
"proposed_use_case": _proposal_use_case(r["pr_number"]),
}
for r in rows
]
@@ -761,7 +449,6 @@ def make_router(
"opened_at": row["opened_at"],
"entry": entry_payload,
"affordances": affordances,
"proposed_use_case": _proposal_use_case(pr_number),
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -838,55 +525,8 @@ def make_router(
# cache write is idempotent.)
await cache.refresh_meta_pulls(config, gitea)
# Roadmap #26: persist the optional use case to the canonical,
# reconcile-proof side table keyed by the idea PR number. NULL/
# blank simply writes no row (absence == "left blank"). Done after
# the refresh so the cache row exists; the mirror onto cached_prs
# keeps the cache column in parity for any read that uses it.
use_case = (payload.proposed_use_case or "").strip()
if use_case:
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO proposed_use_cases (scope, rfc_slug, pr_number, use_case)
VALUES ('rfc', ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(scope, pr_number) DO UPDATE SET use_case = excluded.use_case
""",
(slug, pr["number"], use_case),
)
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE cached_prs SET proposed_use_case = ? WHERE pr_kind = 'idea' AND pr_number = ?",
(use_case, pr["number"]),
)
return {"pr_number": pr["number"], "slug": slug}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# §9.1 Slice 2 (roadmap #27): Claude Haiku tag suggestions as the
# propose-RFC fields fill in. The modal debounce-posts the partial
# draft; we constrain Haiku to the corpus's existing tag set and
# return a short ranked list of clickable chips. Gated to
# contributors (same gate as propose) so the cost surface is bounded
# to people who can actually file an RFC; rate-limited per user as a
# backstop. Degrades to an empty list (no error) when no Anthropic
# key is bound, the corpus has no tags yet, or the draft is empty —
# so the modal simply shows nothing extra.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.post("/api/rfcs/suggest-tags")
async def suggest_rfc_tags(payload: SuggestTagsBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
user = auth.require_contributor(request)
if not tag_suggest.rate_limit_ok(user.user_id):
raise HTTPException(429, "Too many tag-suggestion requests; please slow down.")
provider = tag_suggest.haiku_provider(config)
if provider is None:
return {"suggestions": []}
universe = tag_suggest.gather_tag_universe()
draft = tag_suggest.Draft(
title=payload.title, pitch=payload.pitch, use_case=payload.use_case
)
suggestions = tag_suggest.suggest(provider, draft, universe)
return {"suggestions": suggestions}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# §9.3: merge / decline / withdraw an idea PR
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
-110
View File
@@ -119,17 +119,6 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
`permission_decided_by_login` joins the deciding admin row so
the UI can render "granted by @ben" without a second round-trip.
v0.16.0 (roadmap item #12) additive: each user row now carries
an `rfc_invitations` array the per-RFC invitations the user
has accepted. This is the "permission-grant requests from
invited users" hook the roadmap text calls for: when a user
accepts a per-RFC invite and they're not yet platform-granted,
the admin sees "here because @ben invited them to <RFC> as
<role>" alongside their pending row, informing (not deciding)
the platform grant. The two write surfaces remain distinct
the RFC's owner controls per-RFC roles; the admin controls
platform-grant state.
"""
auth.require_admin(request)
rows = db.conn().execute(
@@ -155,36 +144,6 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
u.display_name COLLATE NOCASE
"""
).fetchall()
# v0.16.0 — per-user accepted per-RFC invitations. One query
# over the full set, indexed bucket-by-user-id in Python so
# the per-row attachment below is O(1). Empty array for users
# who hold no accepted invitations.
invitation_rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT c.user_id, c.rfc_slug, c.role_in_rfc, c.created_at,
r.title AS rfc_title,
i.id AS invitation_id, i.invitee_email,
ui.gitea_login AS inviter_login,
ui.display_name AS inviter_display
FROM rfc_collaborators c
LEFT JOIN cached_rfcs r ON r.slug = c.rfc_slug
LEFT JOIN rfc_invitations i ON i.id = c.invitation_id
LEFT JOIN users ui ON ui.id = i.inviter_user_id
ORDER BY c.created_at DESC
"""
).fetchall()
per_user_invites: dict[int, list[dict]] = {}
for ir in invitation_rows:
per_user_invites.setdefault(ir["user_id"], []).append({
"rfc_slug": ir["rfc_slug"],
"rfc_title": ir["rfc_title"] or ir["rfc_slug"],
"role_in_rfc": ir["role_in_rfc"],
"invited_at": ir["created_at"],
"invitation_id": ir["invitation_id"],
"invitee_email": ir["invitee_email"],
"inviter_login": ir["inviter_login"],
"inviter_display": ir["inviter_display"],
})
# v0.17.0 / roadmap item #16: a user row whose `last_seen_at`
# is NULL is one of two things — a brand-new row that was just
# provisioned (rare, and the v0.7.0 OTC verify path stamps
@@ -229,8 +188,6 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
"permission_decided_at": r["permission_decided_at"],
"permission_decided_by_login": r["decided_by_login"],
"permission_decided_by_display": r["decided_by_display"],
# v0.16.0 additive — never null, always an array.
"rfc_invitations": per_user_invites.get(r["id"], []),
# v0.17.0: present iff the row is invited-but-not-
# claimed-yet. The frontend renders a "(pending
# invite)" badge when this is non-null.
@@ -672,73 +629,6 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
"has_more": len(rows) == limit,
}
@router.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails")
async def list_outbound_emails(
request: Request,
kind: str | None = None,
status: str | None = None,
to_address: str | None = None,
limit: int = Query(default=100, ge=1, le=500),
before_id: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""v0.18.0 Slice 4: read-only inspection of the
`outbound_emails` audit table.
Answers questions like "did this person ever get their
invite?" without grepping VM logs. Filterable by kind
('otc' | 'invite' | 'notification' | 'bundle' | 'digest'),
status ('sent' | 'failed' | 'deferred' | 'bounced'), and
to_address; the latter is exact-match because the audit
question is usually "the specific person who said they
didn't receive it." Per the proposal, no admin UI ships
with v0.18.0 operator queries via curl + jq for now.
"""
auth.require_admin(request)
clauses: list[str] = []
args: list[Any] = []
if kind:
clauses.append("kind = ?")
args.append(kind)
if status:
clauses.append("status = ?")
args.append(status)
if to_address:
clauses.append("LOWER(to_address) = LOWER(?)")
args.append(to_address)
if before_id is not None:
clauses.append("id < ?")
args.append(before_id)
where = ("WHERE " + " AND ".join(clauses)) if clauses else ""
rows = db.conn().execute(
f"""
SELECT id, to_address, from_address, subject, kind, sent_at,
status, error, notification_id, message_id
FROM outbound_emails
{where}
ORDER BY id DESC
LIMIT ?
""",
(*args, limit),
).fetchall()
return {
"items": [
{
"id": r["id"],
"to_address": r["to_address"],
"from_address": r["from_address"],
"subject": r["subject"],
"kind": r["kind"],
"sent_at": r["sent_at"],
"status": r["status"],
"error": r["error"],
"notification_id": r["notification_id"],
"message_id": r["message_id"],
}
for r in rows
],
"has_more": len(rows) == limit,
}
@router.get("/api/admin/permission-events")
async def list_permission_events(
request: Request,
-17
View File
@@ -279,15 +279,6 @@ def make_router(
@router.post("/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/main/promote-to-branch")
async def promote_to_branch(slug: str, body: PromoteToBranchBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
# v0.16.0 (item #12): cutting a contribute branch is the
# PR-shaped write surface gate. A platform-granted user who is
# not invited as a per-RFC contributor cannot start work that
# only exists to land in a PR.
if not auth.can_contribute_to_rfc(viewer, slug):
raise HTTPException(
403,
"This RFC's owner has not invited you to contribute PRs",
)
rfc = _require_active_rfc(slug)
owner, repo = _repo_for(rfc)
new_branch = (body.branch_name or "").strip()
@@ -340,14 +331,6 @@ def make_router(
@router.post("/api/rfcs/{slug}/start-edit-branch")
async def start_edit_branch(slug: str, body: StartEditBranchBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
# v0.16.0 (item #12): same per-RFC contribute gate as
# promote-to-branch — kicking off a super-draft edit branch is
# also PR-shaped work.
if not auth.can_contribute_to_rfc(viewer, slug):
raise HTTPException(
403,
"This RFC's owner has not invited you to contribute PRs",
)
rfc = _require_super_draft(slug)
owner, repo = _repo_for(rfc)
new_branch = (body.branch_name or "").strip()
-311
View File
@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
"""v0.29.0 / roadmap #28 Part 3 — offer-to-contribute-to-a-pending-RFC.
When the #28 scanner (see ``rfc_links.py``) matches a term in submitted
PR/comment text to a **pending** RFC a super-draft
(``cached_rfcs.state='super-draft'``: accepted as an idea, owned, with a
contribution surface, but not yet graduated to an active RFC) the
reader is offered an "ask to contribute" popover. This module is the
backend for that flow:
* ``GET /api/rfcs/{slug}/contribution-target`` what the
contribute form needs (RFC title, owner display, the viewer's
eligibility + whether they already have a pending ask).
* ``POST /api/rfcs/{slug}/contribution-requests`` submit the ask
(who-I-am / why / optional use-case); lands a row + one §15
notification per owner.
* ``POST /api/rfcs/{slug}/contribution-requests/{id}/accept`` owner:
accept, which fires #12's owner-invite flow with the requester as the
invitee (opening the RFC's discussion/contribution surface), then
echoes a notification back to the requester.
* ``POST /api/rfcs/{slug}/contribution-requests/{id}/decline`` owner:
decline; the request closes and the requester is notified.
"Pending" is scoped to a super-draft because that is the state with an
owner to route to, a contribution surface to open, and a row in
``cached_rfcs`` for the ``rfc_invitations`` FK the accept path reuses.
Pre-merge idea PRs are deliberately out of scope (no contribution
surface yet) a documented future extension, mirroring the
conservative scoping in ``rfc_links.py``.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import sqlite3
from typing import Any
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from . import api_invitations, auth, db, notify
# Field caps — generous for free text, bounded so a request row (and the
# notification payload that carries it) can't be used to store unbounded
# blobs. Mirrors the order-of-magnitude of the propose/tag-suggest caps.
_WHO_MAX = 2000
_WHY_MAX = 4000
_USE_CASE_MAX = 4000
_TERM_MAX = 200
class ContributionRequestBody(BaseModel):
# The term in the PR/comment text that surfaced the offer (the
# super-draft's title/slug). Carried for the owner's context line.
matched_term: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=_TERM_MAX)
who_i_am: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=_WHO_MAX)
why: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=_WHY_MAX)
use_case: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=_USE_CASE_MAX)
def _require_super_draft(slug: str):
"""The contribute surface only operates on a *pending* RFC. 404 on
unknown; 409 on a state that isn't a super-draft (active RFCs use the
Part-1 link, not a contribute offer; withdrawn is closed)."""
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT slug, title, state, owners_json, proposed_by FROM cached_rfcs WHERE slug = ?",
(slug,),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "RFC not found")
if row["state"] != "super-draft":
raise HTTPException(409, "RFC is not a pending super-draft")
return row
def _require_request(slug: str, request_id: int):
row = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT id, rfc_slug, requester_user_id, matched_term, who_i_am, why,
use_case, status
FROM contribution_requests WHERE id = ? AND rfc_slug = ?
""",
(request_id, slug),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "Contribution request not found")
return row
def _viewer_relationship(viewer, slug: str) -> str | None:
"""Why this viewer can't *request* to contribute — or None if they can.
Owners/admins already have the RFC; existing collaborators are already
in. Both get a clear 409 rather than a useless self-request."""
if auth.is_rfc_owner(viewer, slug) or viewer.role in ("owner", "admin"):
return "You already own or administer this RFC."
if auth.is_rfc_collaborator(viewer, slug):
return "You're already a collaborator on this RFC."
return None
def make_router() -> APIRouter:
router = APIRouter()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# GET — what the contribute form needs to render + gate itself.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.get("/api/rfcs/{slug}/contribution-target")
async def contribution_target(slug: str, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT slug, title, state, owners_json, proposed_by FROM cached_rfcs WHERE slug = ?",
(slug,),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "RFC not found")
from . import rfc_links # local import: avoid a module import cycle
owner = rfc_links._owner_display(db.conn(), row["owners_json"], row["proposed_by"])
viewer = auth.current_user(request)
eligible = True
reason: str | None = None
already_requested = False
if row["state"] != "super-draft":
eligible, reason = False, "This RFC is no longer pending."
elif viewer is None:
eligible, reason = False, "Sign in to ask to contribute."
elif viewer.permission_state != "granted":
eligible, reason = False, "Your beta access request is in review."
else:
reason = _viewer_relationship(viewer, slug)
if reason is not None:
eligible = False
else:
already_requested = bool(
db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT 1 FROM contribution_requests
WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND requester_user_id = ? AND status = 'pending'
LIMIT 1
""",
(slug, viewer.user_id),
).fetchone()
)
return {
"slug": row["slug"],
"title": row["title"],
"owner": owner,
"eligible": eligible and not already_requested,
"reason": reason,
"already_requested": already_requested,
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# POST — submit a contribute request.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.post("/api/rfcs/{slug}/contribution-requests")
async def create_contribution_request(
slug: str, body: ContributionRequestBody, request: Request
) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
_require_super_draft(slug)
reason = _viewer_relationship(viewer, slug)
if reason is not None:
raise HTTPException(409, reason)
who_i_am = body.who_i_am.strip()
why = body.why.strip()
use_case = (body.use_case or "").strip() or None
matched_term = body.matched_term.strip()
if not who_i_am or not why:
raise HTTPException(422, "Both 'who I am' and 'why' are required.")
try:
cur = db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO contribution_requests
(rfc_slug, requester_user_id, matched_term, who_i_am, why, use_case)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
""",
(slug, viewer.user_id, matched_term, who_i_am, why, use_case),
)
except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
# The partial unique index — one open request per (RFC, user).
raise HTTPException(409, "You already have a pending request to contribute to this RFC.")
request_id = cur.lastrowid
# One actionable notification per owner; stamp the first onto the
# row as the inbox-action handle (any owner can act on the request).
notif_ids = notify.fan_out_contribution_request(
rfc_slug=slug,
requester_user_id=viewer.user_id,
request_id=request_id,
matched_term=matched_term,
who_i_am=who_i_am,
why=why,
use_case=use_case,
)
if notif_ids:
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE contribution_requests SET notification_id = ? WHERE id = ?",
(notif_ids[0], request_id),
)
return {"id": request_id, "rfc_slug": slug, "status": "pending"}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# POST — owner accepts → fire #12's invite flow.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.post("/api/rfcs/{slug}/contribution-requests/{request_id}/accept")
async def accept_contribution_request(
slug: str, request_id: int, request: Request
) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
rfc = _require_super_draft(slug)
if not auth.can_invite_to_rfc(viewer, slug):
raise HTTPException(403, "Only the RFC's owner can act on contribution requests")
req = _require_request(slug, request_id)
if req["status"] != "pending":
raise HTTPException(409, f"This request was already {req['status']}.")
requester = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = ?", (req["requester_user_id"],)
).fetchone()
if requester is None or not (requester["email"] or "").strip():
raise HTTPException(422, "The requester has no email address on file to invite.")
# Fire #12's owner-invite flow with the requester as the invitee.
# If a pending contributor invitation already exists (the owner
# invited them out-of-band first), reuse it rather than failing.
try:
invitation = api_invitations.issue_invitation(
slug=slug,
inviter_user_id=viewer.user_id,
inviter_display=viewer.display_name or viewer.gitea_login or "An RFC owner",
invitee_email=requester["email"],
role_in_rfc="contributor",
rfc_title=rfc["title"],
)
invitation_id = invitation["id"]
except HTTPException as exc:
if exc.status_code != 409:
raise
existing = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT id FROM rfc_invitations
WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND invitee_email = ? COLLATE NOCASE
AND role_in_rfc = 'contributor' AND status = 'pending'
ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1
""",
(slug, requester["email"].strip()),
).fetchone()
invitation_id = existing["id"] if existing else None
db.conn().execute(
"""
UPDATE contribution_requests
SET status = 'accepted', decided_at = datetime('now'),
decided_by_user_id = ?, invitation_id = ?
WHERE id = ?
""",
(viewer.user_id, invitation_id, request_id),
)
notify.notify_contribution_decided(
rfc_slug=slug,
requester_user_id=req["requester_user_id"],
decider_user_id=viewer.user_id,
request_id=request_id,
accepted=True,
)
return {"ok": True, "status": "accepted", "invitation_id": invitation_id}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# POST — owner declines.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.post("/api/rfcs/{slug}/contribution-requests/{request_id}/decline")
async def decline_contribution_request(
slug: str, request_id: int, request: Request
) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
_require_super_draft(slug)
if not auth.can_invite_to_rfc(viewer, slug):
raise HTTPException(403, "Only the RFC's owner can act on contribution requests")
req = _require_request(slug, request_id)
if req["status"] != "pending":
raise HTTPException(409, f"This request was already {req['status']}.")
db.conn().execute(
"""
UPDATE contribution_requests
SET status = 'declined', decided_at = datetime('now'),
decided_by_user_id = ?
WHERE id = ?
""",
(viewer.user_id, request_id),
)
notify.notify_contribution_decided(
rfc_slug=slug,
requester_user_id=req["requester_user_id"],
decider_user_id=viewer.user_id,
request_id=request_id,
accepted=False,
)
return {"ok": True, "status": "declined"}
return router
+2 -27
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ from typing import Any
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from . import auth, chat as chat_layer, db, rfc_links
from . import auth, chat as chat_layer, db
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -116,17 +116,6 @@ def make_router() -> APIRouter:
) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
_require_rfc_readable(slug)
# v0.16.0 (roadmap item #12): the per-RFC discussion is now a
# gated surface. The platform-level `require_contributor` above
# ensures the user is signed in + admin-granted; this layer
# narrows further to "is this user named for this RFC?" The
# 403 here is structurally the v0.6.0 anon-write refusal
# extended to non-invited platform users.
if not auth.can_discuss_rfc(viewer, slug):
raise HTTPException(
403,
"This RFC's owner has not invited you to its discussion",
)
cur = db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO threads
@@ -171,17 +160,9 @@ def make_router() -> APIRouter:
""",
(thread_id,),
).fetchall()
# Roadmap #28 Part 1: enrich each discussion comment with RFC
# auto-link segments scanned against the live accepted-RFC corpus
# (read-time; see rfc_links.py). exclude_slug suppresses self-links
# to this RFC inside its own discussion.
link_index = rfc_links.build_index(db.conn(), exclude_slug=slug)
messages = [_serialize_message(r) for r in rows]
for m in messages:
m["text_segments"] = link_index.segment(m["text"])
return {
"thread": _serialize_thread(thread),
"messages": messages,
"messages": [_serialize_message(r) for r in rows],
}
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -194,12 +175,6 @@ def make_router() -> APIRouter:
) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
_require_rfc_readable(slug)
# v0.16.0 (item #12): same per-RFC gate as create_discussion_thread.
if not auth.can_discuss_rfc(viewer, slug):
raise HTTPException(
403,
"This RFC's owner has not invited you to its discussion",
)
_require_discussion_thread(slug, thread_id)
message_id = chat_layer.append_user_message(
thread_id=thread_id,
-593
View File
@@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
"""v0.16.0 / §6 / §10 — owner-only invite for per-RFC PR or PR-less
discussion (roadmap item #12).
The RFC's owner can invite a specific email to one of two per-RFC roles:
* `contributor` may open PRs against this RFC AND post in its
discussion (PR-permission strictly includes discussion-permission).
* `discussant` may post in this RFC's PR-less discussion only.
Non-invited users keep the v0.6.0 anonymous-read contract: they can
read but cannot write/discuss the RFC. Reads are not narrowed by
this item.
Endpoints:
* `POST /api/rfcs/{slug}/invitations` owner: create + email
* `GET /api/rfcs/{slug}/invitations` owner: list pending/accepted
* `POST /api/rfcs/{slug}/invitations/{id}/revoke` owner: revoke
* `GET /api/invitations/accept` token lookup (signed-in user)
* `POST /api/invitations/accept` token redeem (signed-in user)
The accept endpoints are deliberately platform-scoped (not nested under
the RFC slug) because the user clicking the email link only has the
token and may not even know the slug yet. The GET shape lets the
frontend show a confirmation page ("RFC <X> invited you to be a
<role> accept?") before the POST commits the membership.
Permission gates (composed with `require_contributor`):
* Issue / list / revoke: `auth.can_invite_to_rfc` RFC owner or
platform admin/owner.
* Accept: any platform-granted signed-in user; the gate is the
token, not the role. The token also constrains which email the
accept lands under the accepting user's email must match the
invitation's invitee_email (case-insensitive). This prevents an
invited-but-not-the-account-holder situation from minting a
collaborator row under the wrong identity.
Email shape: a single plain-text body sent via the existing SMTP path
(reuses `EmailConfig.from_env()` like `email_otc.py` does). No
unsubscribe footer the email is transactional and per-invite, not a
recurring notification. No tracking pixel.
Admin-page hook: when an accept lands and the user's
`permission_state` is still `pending`, that signals to the admin's
`/admin/users` queue that the user is here because they accepted a
per-RFC invitation informing (not deciding) the admin's
platform-grant call. v0.16.0 surfaces this via additive columns on
the existing `GET /api/admin/users` listing (see `api_admin.py`'s
diff in the same release) no new endpoint, no restructure.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import secrets
import smtplib
from email.message import EmailMessage
from email.utils import formataddr
from typing import Any
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from . import auth, db
from .email import EmailConfig, _SENT
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Pydantic bodies
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class CreateInvitationBody(BaseModel):
"""The owner picks an email and a role-in-RFC. No custom-message
field that belongs to item #16's platform-level invite surface,
not here.
We validate the email with a deliberately narrow pattern rather
than `pydantic.EmailStr` to avoid pulling in `email-validator` as
a dependency (and v0.7.0's OTC body does the same — see
`OTCRequestBody`'s shape). The validation here is intentionally
permissive: a local-part, an `@`, and a domain part with no
whitespace. Operator-side typo catching is the job of the email
transport; the framework only guards against obviously malformed
input."""
invitee_email: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=320,
pattern=r"^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+$")
role_in_rfc: str = Field(pattern="^(contributor|discussant)$")
class AcceptInvitationBody(BaseModel):
token: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=200)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Constants
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 30-day TTL matches the device-trust window the framework already
# ships (v0.11.0). A pending invitation past this is rejected at the
# accept endpoint regardless of the row's `status` column.
INVITATION_TTL_DAYS = 30
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Router
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def make_router() -> APIRouter:
router = APIRouter()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# POST /api/rfcs/<slug>/invitations
# The owner creates an invitation. The endpoint mints the token,
# writes the row, and dispatches the email synchronously. A failure
# to send the email does NOT roll back the row — the owner can
# share the link directly out-of-band if SMTP is briefly down (the
# `GET /api/rfcs/<slug>/invitations` response carries the token
# for that fallback).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.post("/api/rfcs/{slug}/invitations")
async def create_invitation(slug: str, body: CreateInvitationBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
rfc = _require_rfc(slug)
if not auth.can_invite_to_rfc(viewer, slug):
raise HTTPException(
403,
"Only the RFC's owner can invite collaborators",
)
return issue_invitation(
slug=slug,
inviter_user_id=viewer.user_id,
inviter_display=viewer.display_name or viewer.gitea_login or "An RFC owner",
invitee_email=body.invitee_email,
role_in_rfc=body.role_in_rfc,
rfc_title=rfc["title"],
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# GET /api/rfcs/<slug>/invitations
# The owner's listing of every invitation on the RFC, regardless
# of status. Carries the token (for the resend / re-share path).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.get("/api/rfcs/{slug}/invitations")
async def list_invitations(slug: str, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
_require_rfc(slug)
if not auth.can_invite_to_rfc(viewer, slug):
raise HTTPException(
403,
"Only the RFC's owner can view invitations",
)
rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT i.id, i.invitee_email, i.role_in_rfc, i.status, i.token,
i.expires_at, i.created_at, i.accepted_at,
i.inviter_user_id, i.accepted_by_user_id,
u_inviter.display_name AS inviter_display,
u_inviter.gitea_login AS inviter_login,
u_accept.display_name AS accepted_by_display,
u_accept.gitea_login AS accepted_by_login
FROM rfc_invitations i
LEFT JOIN users u_inviter ON u_inviter.id = i.inviter_user_id
LEFT JOIN users u_accept ON u_accept.id = i.accepted_by_user_id
WHERE i.rfc_slug = ?
ORDER BY i.id DESC
""",
(slug,),
).fetchall()
return {
"items": [
{
"id": r["id"],
"invitee_email": r["invitee_email"],
"role_in_rfc": r["role_in_rfc"],
"status": _effective_status(r),
"token": r["token"],
"expires_at": r["expires_at"],
"created_at": r["created_at"],
"accepted_at": r["accepted_at"],
"inviter_display": r["inviter_display"],
"inviter_login": r["inviter_login"],
"accepted_by_display": r["accepted_by_display"],
"accepted_by_login": r["accepted_by_login"],
}
for r in rows
],
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# POST /api/rfcs/<slug>/invitations/<id>/revoke
# Revokes a pending invitation. Already-accepted invitations
# cannot be "revoked" from this surface — the corresponding
# collaborator-removal surface is a §19.2 candidate; v0.16.0
# only lifts the *pending* link.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.post("/api/rfcs/{slug}/invitations/{invitation_id}/revoke")
async def revoke_invitation(slug: str, invitation_id: int, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
_require_rfc(slug)
if not auth.can_invite_to_rfc(viewer, slug):
raise HTTPException(
403,
"Only the RFC's owner can revoke invitations",
)
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id, status FROM rfc_invitations WHERE id = ? AND rfc_slug = ?",
(invitation_id, slug),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "Invitation not found")
if row["status"] != "pending":
raise HTTPException(
409,
f"Invitation is {row['status']}; only pending invitations can be revoked",
)
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE rfc_invitations SET status = 'revoked' WHERE id = ?",
(invitation_id,),
)
return {"ok": True, "id": invitation_id, "status": "revoked"}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# GET /api/invitations/accept?token=...
# Lookup-only — returns what the invitation grants so the
# frontend can render a confirmation page before the POST. The
# token is required; no token, no peek.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.get("/api/invitations/accept")
async def preview_invitation(token: str, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_user(request)
row = _lookup_invitation_by_token(token)
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "Invitation not found")
effective = _effective_status(row)
rfc = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT slug, title FROM cached_rfcs WHERE slug = ?", (row["rfc_slug"],),
).fetchone()
return {
"rfc_slug": row["rfc_slug"],
"rfc_title": rfc["title"] if rfc else row["rfc_slug"],
"role_in_rfc": row["role_in_rfc"],
"status": effective,
"invitee_email": row["invitee_email"],
"email_matches_you": (viewer.email or "").strip().lower()
== row["invitee_email"].strip().lower(),
"expires_at": row["expires_at"],
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# POST /api/invitations/accept
# The accept gesture: token → collaborator row.
#
# Requires:
# * an authenticated user (no token-only acceptance — we want
# the per-user audit trail),
# * a valid (pending, non-expired, non-revoked) invitation,
# * the accepting user's email matches invitee_email
# (case-insensitive).
#
# On success the row's status flips to 'accepted' and a
# rfc_collaborators row is inserted (or upgraded if the user
# already had a lower role). Idempotent: re-accepting the same
# already-accepted invitation reads as a 200 no-op with
# `changed=false`.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.post("/api/invitations/accept")
async def accept_invitation(body: AcceptInvitationBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_user(request)
row = _lookup_invitation_by_token(body.token)
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "Invitation not found")
effective = _effective_status(row)
if effective == "revoked":
raise HTTPException(409, "Invitation was revoked")
if effective == "expired":
raise HTTPException(409, "Invitation has expired")
# Email match — case-insensitive. Empty viewer email cannot
# accept (an OAuth-only user with no captured email shape).
viewer_email = (viewer.email or "").strip().lower()
invitee_email = row["invitee_email"].strip().lower()
if not viewer_email or viewer_email != invitee_email:
raise HTTPException(
403,
"This invitation was sent to a different email; sign in with that address",
)
if effective == "accepted":
# Idempotent re-accept — surface the existing collaborator
# row without writing anything new.
collab = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT role_in_rfc FROM rfc_collaborators WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND user_id = ?",
(row["rfc_slug"], viewer.user_id),
).fetchone()
return {
"ok": True,
"changed": False,
"rfc_slug": row["rfc_slug"],
"role_in_rfc": collab["role_in_rfc"] if collab else row["role_in_rfc"],
}
# First-time accept. Flip the invitation; upsert the
# collaborator. We do the upsert with ON CONFLICT so a
# user who already held a lower role gets upgraded, never
# downgraded (the MAX-style precedence is contributor >
# discussant; lower roles never overwrite higher).
with db.tx() as c:
c.execute(
"""
UPDATE rfc_invitations
SET status = 'accepted',
accepted_at = datetime('now'),
accepted_by_user_id = ?
WHERE id = ?
""",
(viewer.user_id, row["id"]),
)
existing = c.execute(
"SELECT role_in_rfc FROM rfc_collaborators WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND user_id = ?",
(row["rfc_slug"], viewer.user_id),
).fetchone()
target_role = _max_role(
existing["role_in_rfc"] if existing else None,
row["role_in_rfc"],
)
if existing is None:
c.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO rfc_collaborators
(rfc_slug, user_id, role_in_rfc, invitation_id)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
""",
(row["rfc_slug"], viewer.user_id, target_role, row["id"]),
)
elif existing["role_in_rfc"] != target_role:
c.execute(
"""
UPDATE rfc_collaborators
SET role_in_rfc = ?, invitation_id = ?
WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND user_id = ?
""",
(target_role, row["id"], row["rfc_slug"], viewer.user_id),
)
return {
"ok": True,
"changed": True,
"rfc_slug": row["rfc_slug"],
"role_in_rfc": target_role,
}
return router
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _require_rfc(slug: str):
"""The invitation surface only operates on a known, non-withdrawn
RFC. We refuse 404 on unknown and 409 on withdrawn mirrors the
discussion endpoints' `_require_rfc_readable` shape."""
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT slug, title, state FROM cached_rfcs WHERE slug = ?", (slug,),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "RFC not found")
if row["state"] == "withdrawn":
raise HTTPException(409, "RFC is withdrawn")
return row
def _lookup_invitation_by_token(token: str):
return db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT id, rfc_slug, inviter_user_id, invitee_email, role_in_rfc,
status, token, expires_at, created_at, accepted_at,
accepted_by_user_id
FROM rfc_invitations
WHERE token = ?
""",
(token,),
).fetchone()
def _effective_status(row) -> str:
"""The row's column status is the authoritative truth except for
`expired` that is derived from `expires_at` at read time so an
unattended cron isn't required to flip rows. A revoked-then-
expired row reads as `revoked` (the explicit gesture wins)."""
column_status = row["status"]
if column_status != "pending":
return column_status
# Compare via SQL so the comparison is in sqlite-time, matching the
# `datetime('now')` insert. A simpler same-process comparison would
# work too, but routing through the DB keeps the timezone handling
# consistent with the inserts.
is_past = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT datetime(?) <= datetime('now') AS past",
(row["expires_at"],),
).fetchone()["past"]
return "expired" if is_past else "pending"
def issue_invitation(
*,
slug: str,
inviter_user_id: int,
inviter_display: str,
invitee_email: str,
role_in_rfc: str,
rfc_title: str,
) -> dict:
"""Mint + persist + email one ``rfc_invitations`` row.
The single chokepoint for issuing an invitation: the owner's manual
`POST /api/rfcs/{slug}/invitations` endpoint and roadmap #28 Part 3's
accept path both route through here, so the dup-guard, token mint,
insert, and transactional email stay identical.
Refuses (409) re-inviting an email that already has a pending
invitation on this RFC at the same role. A different-role re-invite is
allowed (the discussant contributor upgrade) the new row
supersedes the old in the listing's natural ordering, and acceptance
of either picks up the corresponding role.
Returns the new row's dict (including the raw token, for the owner's
out-of-band share / the caller's record-keeping). A send failure logs
and returns; the row stays so the owner can recover via the listing.
"""
invitee_email = invitee_email.strip()
existing = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT id FROM rfc_invitations
WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND invitee_email = ? COLLATE NOCASE
AND role_in_rfc = ? AND status = 'pending'
LIMIT 1
""",
(slug, invitee_email, role_in_rfc),
).fetchone()
if existing:
raise HTTPException(
409,
f"{invitee_email} already has a pending {role_in_rfc} invitation for this RFC",
)
token = _mint_token()
cur = db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO rfc_invitations
(rfc_slug, inviter_user_id, invitee_email, role_in_rfc,
token, expires_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, datetime('now', ?))
""",
(slug, inviter_user_id, invitee_email, role_in_rfc, token, f"+{INVITATION_TTL_DAYS} days"),
)
invitation_id = cur.lastrowid
_send_invitation_email(
to_address=invitee_email,
inviter_display=inviter_display,
rfc_title=rfc_title,
role_in_rfc=role_in_rfc,
token=token,
)
return {
"id": invitation_id,
"rfc_slug": slug,
"invitee_email": invitee_email,
"role_in_rfc": role_in_rfc,
"status": "pending",
"token": token,
}
def _mint_token() -> str:
"""A 256-bit URL-safe token. The token shape is opaque to the
consumer; the email link encodes it as a query param."""
return secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
def _max_role(existing: str | None, new: str) -> str:
"""contributor strictly dominates discussant. A re-accept that
would lower the role is a no-op (the existing role survives)."""
precedence = {"discussant": 0, "contributor": 1}
if existing is None:
return new
if precedence.get(new, 0) > precedence.get(existing, 0):
return new
return existing
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Email dispatch — transactional, no preferences honored
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _send_invitation_email(
*,
to_address: str,
inviter_display: str,
rfc_title: str,
role_in_rfc: str,
token: str,
) -> bool:
"""Compose and send the invitation email.
Like `email_otc.send_otc_email`, this writes its own envelope and
reuses `EmailConfig.from_env()` for the SMTP plumbing. The
`_SENT` buffer is appended either way so integration tests can
assert on the outbound shape without a real SMTP server.
Returns True on the happy path / dev fallback; False on SMTP
failure. The caller does not roll back the invitation row on
failure the owner has the token in the create response and on
the listing surface for an out-of-band share.
"""
cfg = EmailConfig.from_env()
subject = f"{inviter_display} invited you to {rfc_title} on {cfg.from_name}"
role_label = (
"open PRs against the RFC and join its discussion"
if role_in_rfc == "contributor"
else "join the RFC's discussion"
)
link = f"{cfg.app_url}/invitations/accept?token={token}"
body = (
f"{inviter_display} invited you to {rfc_title} on {cfg.from_name} as {role_in_rfc}.\n\n"
f"This invitation lets you {role_label}.\n\n"
f"Click to accept (you'll be asked to sign in first if you aren't already):\n\n"
f" {link}\n\n"
f"The invitation expires in {INVITATION_TTL_DAYS} days. If you weren't expecting\n"
f"this, you can safely ignore the email.\n\n"
f"---\n"
f"{cfg.from_name} · {cfg.app_url}\n"
)
envelope = {
"to": to_address,
"from": formataddr((cfg.from_name, cfg.from_address)),
"subject": subject,
"body": body,
"kind": "rfc_invitation",
}
_SENT.append(envelope)
if not cfg.enabled:
log.info("invitation email disabled (EMAIL_ENABLED=0): to=%s", to_address)
return True
if not cfg.smtp_host:
# Dev fallback — surface the link at INFO so the operator can
# complete an accept flow without an SMTP relay.
log.info(
"invitation email (stdout fallback): to=%s rfc=%s role=%s link=%s",
to_address, rfc_title, role_in_rfc, link,
)
return True
try:
msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = envelope["from"]
msg["To"] = to_address
msg["Subject"] = subject
msg.set_content(body)
smtp = smtplib.SMTP(cfg.smtp_host, cfg.smtp_port, timeout=30)
try:
if cfg.smtp_starttls:
smtp.starttls()
if cfg.smtp_user:
smtp.login(cfg.smtp_user, cfg.smtp_password)
smtp.send_message(msg)
finally:
smtp.quit()
return True
except Exception:
log.exception("invitation email send failed: to=%s", to_address)
return False
+14 -135
View File
@@ -73,13 +73,6 @@ class MarkReadBody(BaseModel):
class BounceBody(BaseModel):
email: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=320)
kind: str = Field(default="hard") # 'hard' or 'complaint'
# v0.18.0 Slice 5: when the bounce provider includes the
# original Message-ID, the framework correlates it back to
# the matching `outbound_emails` row and stamps
# `status='bounced'`. Optional — providers that don't surface
# the Message-ID still flip the global opt-out via the email
# match, but lose the per-message attribution.
message_id: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=1000)
class CookieConsentBody(BaseModel):
@@ -450,40 +443,6 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
# ----- Email: one-click unsubscribe + bounce webhook -----
# v0.18.0: the category → column map. The `all` synthetic
# category lands the bundle's one-click on the global opt-out
# flag (per `email._send_bundle` in v0.18.0 Slice 2 — a bundle
# spans multiple categories, so a per-category flip wouldn't
# honor the user's intent).
_CATEGORY_COLUMN: dict[str, str] = {
"personal-direct": "email_personal_direct",
"structural": "email_watched_structural",
"admin-actionable": "email_admin_actionable",
"all": "email_opt_out_all",
}
def _apply_unsubscribe(user_id: int, category: str) -> bool:
"""Flip the matching column. Returns True on success, False
if the category is unknown. Idempotent running twice on
the same (user, category) is harmless (it sets the column
to its current value)."""
column = _CATEGORY_COLUMN.get(category)
if column is None:
return False
# `all` sets the flag to 1 (opt out); per-category sets to 0
# (turn that category off). The column semantic is "1 means
# don't send"; the per-category booleans are "1 means do
# send". Different polarities, hence the case split.
if category == "all":
db.conn().execute(
f"UPDATE users SET {column} = 1 WHERE id = ?", (user_id,)
)
else:
db.conn().execute(
f"UPDATE users SET {column} = 0 WHERE id = ?", (user_id,)
)
return True
@router.get("/api/email/unsubscribe")
async def email_unsubscribe(t: str = Query(..., description="Signed token from the email footer")) -> HTMLResponse:
try:
@@ -494,51 +453,20 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
"<p>Open the app to manage your notification preferences directly.</p>",
status_code=400,
)
if not _apply_unsubscribe(user_id, category):
column = {
"personal-direct": "email_personal_direct",
"structural": "email_watched_structural",
"admin-actionable": "email_admin_actionable",
}.get(category)
if column is None:
return HTMLResponse(
f"<h1>Unknown category</h1><p>{category}</p>", status_code=400
)
if category == "all":
body = (
"<h1>Unsubscribed</h1><p>You will no longer receive any email "
"from this app. You can re-enable individual categories from "
"your notification preferences after signing in.</p>"
)
else:
body = (
f"<h1>Unsubscribed</h1><p>You will no longer receive {category} emails. "
f"You can re-enable them in your notification preferences.</p>"
)
return HTMLResponse(body)
@router.post("/api/email/unsubscribe")
async def email_unsubscribe_post(
request: Request,
t: str = Query(..., description="Signed token from the List-Unsubscribe header"),
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""v0.18.0: RFC 8058 one-click endpoint.
Gmail and Yahoo POST `List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` (as a
form-encoded body) to the URL in the `List-Unsubscribe`
header when the user clicks their MUA's "Unsubscribe"
button. The endpoint MUST accept POST (per the
`List-Unsubscribe-Post` header we advertise) and MUST be
idempotent.
The body content is checked loosely RFC 8058 says it
SHOULD be exactly `List-Unsubscribe=One-Click`, but some
intermediaries strip / re-encode the body, so the
framework accepts any POST to the URL once the token
verifies. The bar is that the token signature carries the
authority; the body is hint-only.
"""
try:
user_id, category = email_mod.verify_unsubscribe_token(t)
except BadSignature:
raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid or expired token")
if not _apply_unsubscribe(user_id, category):
raise HTTPException(400, f"Unknown category: {category}")
return {"ok": True, "category": category}
db.conn().execute(f"UPDATE users SET {column} = 0 WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
return HTMLResponse(
f"<h1>Unsubscribed</h1><p>You will no longer receive {category} emails. "
f"You can re-enable them in your notification preferences.</p>"
)
@router.post("/api/webhooks/email-bounce")
async def email_bounce(body: BounceBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
@@ -557,70 +485,21 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
# stays unauthenticated for dev (the v1 contract).
import os as _os
expected = _os.environ.get("WEBHOOK_EMAIL_BOUNCE_SECRET", "").strip()
# v0.25.0 (audit 0026 M5): fail closed. An unset secret used to
# leave this endpoint fully unauthenticated — anyone could suppress
# any user's mail by POSTing their address (email_opt_out_all flip
# below). Now an unset secret DISABLES the endpoint (503) instead
# of opening it. A dev that genuinely wants it open opts in
# explicitly with RFC_APP_INSECURE_BOUNCE_WEBHOOK=1, mirroring the
# RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS dev-bypass on the Gitea hook.
if not expected:
if _os.environ.get("RFC_APP_INSECURE_BOUNCE_WEBHOOK", "").strip() == "1":
log.warning(
"email-bounce webhook running UNAUTHENTICATED "
"(RFC_APP_INSECURE_BOUNCE_WEBHOOK=1) — never set this in production"
)
else:
log.error(
"email-bounce webhook refused: WEBHOOK_EMAIL_BOUNCE_SECRET is unset "
"(set the secret to enable, or RFC_APP_INSECURE_BOUNCE_WEBHOOK=1 for dev)"
)
raise HTTPException(503, "Bounce webhook not configured")
else:
if expected:
received = request.headers.get("X-Webhook-Secret", "")
import hmac as _hmac
if not received or not _hmac.compare_digest(expected, received):
raise HTTPException(401, "Invalid webhook signature")
# v0.18.0 Slice 5: correlate the bounce back to the
# matching outbound_emails row if the provider supplied
# the Message-ID. The hard-bounce -> global-opt-out
# logic below still fires regardless; this is an
# additional audit signal.
correlated_row_id: int | None = None
if body.message_id:
correlated = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id FROM outbound_emails WHERE message_id = ?",
(body.message_id,),
).fetchone()
if correlated is not None:
correlated_row_id = correlated["id"]
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE outbound_emails SET status = 'bounced', "
"error = COALESCE(error, '') || ? WHERE id = ?",
(f"bounce ({body.kind})", correlated_row_id),
)
log.info(
"email-bounce: correlated message_id=%s -> outbound_emails.id=%s",
body.message_id, correlated_row_id,
)
else:
log.info(
"email-bounce: message_id=%s did not match any "
"outbound_emails row (provider may be replaying an old bounce, "
"or the row was pruned)",
body.message_id,
)
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id FROM users WHERE LOWER(email) = LOWER(?)", (body.email,),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
return {"ok": True, "matched": False, "correlated_id": correlated_row_id}
return {"ok": True, "matched": False}
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE users SET email_opt_out_all = 1 WHERE id = ?", (row["id"],),
)
log.info("email-bounce: opted out user %s (%s)", row["id"], body.kind)
return {"ok": True, "matched": True, "correlated_id": correlated_row_id}
return {"ok": True, "matched": True}
return router
+1 -63
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ from typing import Any
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from . import auth, cache, chat as chat_layer, db, entry as entry_mod, funder, models_resolver, rfc_links
from . import auth, cache, chat as chat_layer, db, entry as entry_mod, funder, models_resolver
from .bot import Bot
from .config import Config
from .gitea import Gitea, GiteaError
@@ -42,11 +42,6 @@ RFC_FILE_PATH = "RFC.md"
class OpenPRBody(BaseModel):
title: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=240)
description: str = Field(max_length=8000)
# Roadmap #26: optional "What will you be using this change for?" —
# the concrete ground-truth use case sibling to the required
# "why is this change needed" (the `description`). Optional, generous
# cap matching the description bound.
proposed_use_case: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=8000)
class PRDescriptionBody(BaseModel):
@@ -117,17 +112,6 @@ def make_router(
@router.post("/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch:path}/open-pr")
async def open_pr(slug: str, branch: str, body: OpenPRBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_contributor(request)
# v0.16.0 (item #12): opening a PR is the canonical PR-shaped
# write — the gate fires here even though the branch-cutting
# entry points also gate, since a user with prior branch access
# who's since had their per-RFC role revoked shouldn't be able
# to ship the PR. The branch-creation gate is the kickoff
# refusal; this one is the post-work refusal.
if not auth.can_contribute_to_rfc(viewer, slug):
raise HTTPException(
403,
"This RFC's owner has not invited you to contribute PRs",
)
rfc = _require_active_rfc(slug)
if branch == "main":
raise HTTPException(409, "PRs open from non-main branches")
@@ -178,26 +162,6 @@ def make_router(
raise HTTPException(502, f"Gitea: {e.detail}")
await _refresh_after_pr_write(rfc)
# Roadmap #26: persist the optional use case to the canonical,
# reconcile-proof side table keyed by the PR number. Blank/omitted
# writes no row (absence == "left blank"). The mirror onto
# cached_prs keeps the cache column in parity.
use_case = (body.proposed_use_case or "").strip()
if use_case:
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO proposed_use_cases (scope, rfc_slug, pr_number, use_case)
VALUES ('pr', ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(scope, pr_number) DO UPDATE SET use_case = excluded.use_case
""",
(slug, pr["number"], use_case),
)
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE cached_prs SET proposed_use_case = ? WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND pr_number = ?",
(use_case, slug, pr["number"]),
)
return {"pr_number": pr["number"], "slug": slug, "branch": branch}
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -213,12 +177,6 @@ def make_router(
path = _file_path_for(rfc)
head_branch = pr_row["head_branch"]
# Roadmap #28 Part 1: build the RFC auto-link index once for this
# PR view (read-time enrichment against the live accepted-RFC
# corpus; see rfc_links.py). exclude_slug suppresses self-links to
# this RFC inside its own PR.
link_index = rfc_links.build_index(db.conn(), exclude_slug=slug)
# §11.3: PRs are always public; no visibility check.
main_fetched = await gitea.read_file(owner, repo, path, ref="main")
main_body = _extract_body(rfc, (main_fetched or ("", ""))[0])
@@ -265,13 +223,6 @@ def make_router(
for r in msg_rows:
messages_by_thread.setdefault(r["thread_id"], []).append(_serialize_message(r))
# Roadmap #28 Part 1: enrich every comment with RFC auto-link
# segments (read-time; see rfc_links.py). The description is
# enriched alongside it in the return dict below.
for _msgs in messages_by_thread.values():
for _m in _msgs:
_m["text_segments"] = link_index.segment(_m["text"])
# Per-user seen cursor per §10.3. Anonymous viewers get no
# cursor — they always see "everything new" but cannot advance
# the cursor (no row to write to).
@@ -338,8 +289,6 @@ def make_router(
"pr_number": pr_number,
"title": pr_row["title"],
"description": pr_row["description"],
"description_segments": link_index.segment(pr_row["description"]),
"proposed_use_case": _pr_use_case(pr_number),
"state": pr_row["state"],
"opened_by": pr_row["opened_by"],
"opened_at": pr_row["opened_at"],
@@ -802,17 +751,6 @@ def _can_edit_pr_text(rfc, pr_row, viewer) -> bool:
return _can_withdraw(rfc, pr_row, viewer)
def _pr_use_case(pr_number: int) -> str | None:
"""Roadmap #26: the optional propose-PR use case from the canonical
side table, or None when the change was opened without one ("left
blank")."""
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT use_case FROM proposed_use_cases WHERE scope = 'pr' AND pr_number = ?",
(pr_number,),
).fetchone()
return row["use_case"] if row else None
def _pr_capabilities(rfc, pr_row, viewer) -> dict:
return {
"can_merge": _can_merge(rfc, viewer) and pr_row["state"] == "open",
-154
View File
@@ -290,159 +290,5 @@ def require_admin(request: Request) -> SessionUser:
return user
# v0.16.0 (roadmap item #12): per-RFC membership helpers.
#
# These don't replace `require_contributor` — they layer on top of it for
# endpoints that an RFC's owner can selectively open up. The "discussion"
# and "PR" write surfaces consult `is_rfc_writer(...)` / `is_rfc_discussant(...)`
# to admit users who are either platform-privileged (admin, RFC owner)
# OR who hold an explicit invitation-accepted per-RFC role.
#
# The platform gate still fires first: a user whose
# `permission_state != 'granted'` cannot write anywhere, invitation or
# not. v0.16.0 doesn't loosen that — a per-RFC invitation is additive
# *within* the granted-platform-user population. (Accepting an
# invitation as a pending user surfaces in the admin-page hook per
# the roadmap text; the platform grant remains the admin's decision.)
def _rfc_owners_set(rfc_slug: str) -> set[str]:
"""The gitea_logins named in the RFC's frontmatter owners array.
Read from `cached_rfcs.owners_json`. Returns an empty set if the RFC
isn't cached (the caller's earlier `_require_rfc_readable` will
already have rejected that case in practice).
"""
import json as _json
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT owners_json FROM cached_rfcs WHERE slug = ?", (rfc_slug,),
).fetchone()
if row is None:
return set()
try:
return set(_json.loads(row["owners_json"] or "[]"))
except Exception:
return set()
def is_rfc_owner(user: SessionUser | None, rfc_slug: str) -> bool:
"""True iff the user is named in the RFC's frontmatter `owners`
list. The platform-level admin/owner check is separate; per §6.1 an
app admin/owner has all per-RFC capabilities by construction, but
this predicate is intentionally narrow it answers "is this
person on the RFC's owners line?" and nothing more.
"""
if user is None:
return False
return user.gitea_login in _rfc_owners_set(rfc_slug)
def is_rfc_collaborator(user: SessionUser | None, rfc_slug: str, *, role_in_rfc: str | None = None) -> bool:
"""True iff the user has an accepted per-RFC collaborator row.
`role_in_rfc`:
* None any role qualifies (the discussion-write check uses this
shape: contributor strictly includes discussant).
* 'contributor' only the contributor role qualifies (the PR-write
check uses this shape).
* 'discussant' only the discussant role qualifies (not used by
v0.16.0 endpoints; included for symmetry).
"""
if user is None:
return False
if role_in_rfc is None:
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT 1 FROM rfc_collaborators WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND user_id = ? LIMIT 1",
(rfc_slug, user.user_id),
).fetchone()
return row is not None
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT 1 FROM rfc_collaborators WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND user_id = ? AND role_in_rfc = ? LIMIT 1",
(rfc_slug, user.user_id, role_in_rfc),
).fetchone()
return row is not None
def can_discuss_rfc(user: SessionUser | None, rfc_slug: str) -> bool:
"""v0.16.0 — admit to PR-less discussion writes on this RFC.
True if ANY of:
* platform admin/owner (the §6.1 maximal-capability path),
* the RFC has no frontmatter owners yet (the gate is open
until an owner exists to set it relevant for super-drafts
pre-§13.1 claim),
* RFC owner (frontmatter `owners` membership),
* accepted per-RFC collaborator at any role (contributor strictly
includes discussant).
Returns False for anonymous viewers and for users whose
`permission_state != 'granted'` the platform-level gate must hold
before any per-RFC layer can apply. The platform gate is also
enforced earlier in the request via `require_contributor`; the
helper here is defensive so callers that compose it with
`current_user` directly still respect the gate.
"""
if user is None:
return False
if user.permission_state != "granted":
return False
if user.role in ("owner", "admin"):
return True
owners = _rfc_owners_set(rfc_slug)
if not owners:
# No owner to gate the invite-list — fall through to the
# platform-granted contract. The first §13.1 claim engages
# the gate; before that, anyone platform-granted can
# contribute (mirrors the v0.5.0 / v0.6.0 contract).
return True
if user.gitea_login in owners:
return True
return is_rfc_collaborator(user, rfc_slug, role_in_rfc=None)
def can_contribute_to_rfc(user: SessionUser | None, rfc_slug: str) -> bool:
"""v0.16.0 — admit to PR-shaped writes on this RFC.
True if ANY of:
* platform admin/owner,
* the RFC has no frontmatter owners yet (gate open until an
owner exists),
* RFC owner,
* accepted per-RFC collaborator at role 'contributor' (a
'discussant' row is NOT sufficient PRs are the
higher-privilege surface).
Same `permission_state` and anonymous-viewer refusals as
`can_discuss_rfc`.
"""
if user is None:
return False
if user.permission_state != "granted":
return False
if user.role in ("owner", "admin"):
return True
owners = _rfc_owners_set(rfc_slug)
if not owners:
# Same fall-through as can_discuss_rfc: until an owner exists,
# the gate is open.
return True
if user.gitea_login in owners:
return True
return is_rfc_collaborator(user, rfc_slug, role_in_rfc="contributor")
def can_invite_to_rfc(user: SessionUser | None, rfc_slug: str) -> bool:
"""v0.16.0 — only RFC owners (frontmatter) and platform admin/owner
can issue invitations. Per-RFC collaborators do not get the
invite-others power; that stays with the RFC's owner."""
if user is None:
return False
if user.permission_state != "granted":
return False
if user.role in ("owner", "admin"):
return True
return is_rfc_owner(user, rfc_slug)
def new_state() -> str:
return secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
+1 -15
View File
@@ -60,20 +60,6 @@ def load_config() -> Config:
enabled = [m.strip() for m in _optional("ENABLED_MODELS", "claude").split(",") if m.strip()]
# v0.18.0: `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is now mandatory (per the
# email + webhook hygiene proposal). An empty value used to
# silently accept unsigned webhook POSTs — that was the
# invisible-failure shape the proposal targets. Now the
# framework refuses to start when the secret is empty unless
# the operator opts into the dev-bypass with
# `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`. Local-dev deployments without
# a wired Gitea hook set the bypass; production MUST NOT.
insecure_webhooks = os.environ.get("RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS", "").strip() == "1"
if insecure_webhooks:
webhook_secret = _optional("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET")
else:
webhook_secret = _required("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET")
return Config(
gitea_url=_required("GITEA_URL").rstrip("/"),
gitea_bot_user=_required("GITEA_BOT_USER"),
@@ -86,7 +72,7 @@ def load_config() -> Config:
secret_key=_required("SECRET_KEY"),
database_path=database_path,
owner_gitea_login=_optional("OWNER_GITEA_LOGIN"),
webhook_secret=webhook_secret,
webhook_secret=_optional("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET"),
enabled_models=enabled,
anthropic_api_key=_optional("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"),
google_api_key=_optional("GOOGLE_API_KEY"),
+21 -32
View File
@@ -97,13 +97,6 @@ class IssueOutcome:
raw_token: str
row_id: int
@property
def cookie_value(self) -> str:
"""The value to put in the `rfc_device_trust` cookie: the row-id
selector joined to the raw token (v0.25.0 / audit 0026 M1). The
selector lets `lookup` read one indexed row instead of scanning."""
return f"{self.row_id}.{self.raw_token}"
def _new_token() -> str:
return secrets.token_urlsafe(TOKEN_BYTES)
@@ -180,37 +173,33 @@ def lookup(raw_token: str) -> LookupOutcome:
if not raw:
return LookupOutcome(ok=False, user=None, reason="invalid")
# v0.25.0 (audit 0026 M1): the cookie is "<row_id>.<raw_token>". We
# parse the row-id selector and read exactly ONE row by its indexed
# primary key, then bcrypt-check the token against that single row.
# The unique index on `device_token_hash` would let us SELECT by
# hash if bcrypt were a stable hash, but bcrypt incorporates a
# per-row salt — equal tokens produce different hashes. We walk
# the candidate set instead. In practice the set is small (a
# human has a handful of trusted devices) and bcrypt is cheap on
# the order of milliseconds; the walk is bounded by the user's
# active device count.
#
# The previous shape read EVERY device_trust row (all users, including
# revoked/expired) and bcrypt-checked each — an unauthenticated
# CPU-amplification DoS reachable at /auth/device-trust/start that
# grew without bound as the table accumulated. bcrypt's per-row salt
# is why we can't SELECT by hash; carrying the row-id in the cookie is
# the standard fix (the id is not secret; the token still is).
selector, sep, token = raw.partition(".")
if not sep or not selector.isdigit() or not token:
# Legacy bare-token cookies (pre-v0.25.0) and malformed values land
# here. We refuse rather than fall back to a full-table scan, so
# the amplification path is fully closed; affected users simply
# re-authenticate once via OTC/passcode and get a new cookie.
return LookupOutcome(ok=False, user=None, reason="invalid")
matched = db.conn().execute(
# We don't pre-filter by `revoked_at IS NULL` here so that a
# token presented for a recently-revoked row produces a
# 'revoked' outcome (the endpoint surfaces a different shape).
# Same for expired: we let the walk hit and classify after.
rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT id, user_id, device_token_hash, expires_at, revoked_at
FROM device_trust
WHERE id = ?
ORDER BY id DESC
""",
(int(selector),),
).fetchone()
).fetchall()
# One bcrypt check, against the selected row only. A wrong/forged token
# for a real id reads as 'unknown' (cookie cleared), same as a missing
# row — a probing client can't distinguish the two.
if matched is None or not _check(token, matched["device_token_hash"]):
matched = None
for row in rows:
if _check(raw, row["device_token_hash"]):
matched = row
break
if matched is None:
return LookupOutcome(ok=False, user=None, reason="unknown")
if matched["revoked_at"] is not None:
+1 -13
View File
@@ -180,19 +180,7 @@ def assemble_for_user(
subject = _subject(eligible, cadence)
body = _body(eligible, cadence, cfg)
# v0.18.0: the digest is the bulk-adjacent surface par excellence
# (it can carry weeks of accumulated activity), so it gets the
# full one-click unsubscribe to the global opt-out. Per-category
# opt-outs are managed from the preferences page; this footer is
# the "stop sending me anything" escape hatch Gmail and Yahoo
# expect for senders at this tier.
unsubscribe_url = email_mod.make_unsubscribe_url(user_id, "all")
sent = email_mod._deliver(
cfg, email, subject, body,
unsubscribe_mailto=cfg.unsubscribe_mailto,
unsubscribe_url=unsubscribe_url,
kind="digest",
)
sent = email_mod._deliver(cfg, email, subject, body)
if not sent:
return False
ids = [r["id"] for r, _ in eligible]
-358
View File
@@ -1,358 +0,0 @@
"""§14 + roadmap item #30 — on-site sessions-history browser source.
Sibling of `docs.py` / `philosophy.py` but with a different read shape:
the bodies here live in the **public** `wiggleverse/ohm-session-history`
gitea repo (transcripts of every OHM build session, published per the
ohm-infra SESSION-PROTOCOL.md), not on disk. The framework mediates
the gitea fetch on behalf of the browser so the rendered `/docs/sessions/*`
surface inherits the same chrome as `/philosophy` and `/docs/user-guide`
and stays free of any cross-origin gestures from the frontend.
Three read endpoints, all anonymous-reachable:
GET /api/docs/sessions/manifest sessions.json (title manifest)
GET /api/docs/sessions/about README.md (the about page)
GET /api/docs/sessions/<NNNN>/<file> a transcript body
GET /api/docs/sessions/<NNNN>/index per-session file listing
All three sit behind a small in-process TTL cache (manifest TTL default
60 s, content TTL default 300 s). Negative results (404 from gitea) are
also cached at the content TTL to avoid hammering gitea when a
deployment hasn't yet been populated with transcripts. The cache key
is the URL path on the gitea raw base (or the contents API for the
per-session listing); the cache lives in-process, plain dict +
`time.monotonic()` check, no external dep.
Env knobs:
OHM_SESSION_HISTORY_RAW_BASE
Override the gitea raw base URL. Default points at OHM's canonical
transcript repo:
https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history/raw/branch/main
The framework-default value is OHM-flavored because OHM is the
only deployment to date a deployment running its own
transcript repo overrides this via flotilla's overlay.
OHM_SESSION_HISTORY_CONTENTS_BASE
Override the gitea contents-API base URL (for the per-session
listing endpoint, which enumerates files inside a `NNNN/` folder).
Default:
https://git.wiggleverse.org/api/v1/repos/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history/contents
OHM_DOCS_SESSIONS_MANIFEST_TTL_SEC
Cache TTL for the manifest (default 60 s). The manifest is small
and changes when a new session is added; 60 s strikes a balance
between freshness and gitea load.
OHM_DOCS_SESSIONS_CONTENT_TTL_SEC
Cache TTL for transcript bodies + README + per-session listings
(default 300 s = 5 minutes). Transcripts are append-only once
published, so 5 minutes of staleness is harmless.
§3 invariant 1 is preserved: the framework holds no secret bytes; the
gitea repo is public, the fetch carries no auth header.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
import re
import threading
import time
from typing import Any
import httpx
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_DEFAULT_RAW_BASE = (
"https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history/raw/branch/main"
)
_DEFAULT_CONTENTS_BASE = (
"https://git.wiggleverse.org/api/v1/repos/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history/contents"
)
_DEFAULT_MANIFEST_TTL_SEC = 60.0
_DEFAULT_CONTENT_TTL_SEC = 300.0
# The transcript filename shape per SESSION-PROTOCOL.md §1. The
# `<start>--<end>` suffix is optional so legacy renamed-letter
# transcripts (e.g. `SESSION-0009.0-TRANSCRIPT.md` without timestamps)
# remain reachable. The `\.\d+(\.\d+)*` after the session number
# accommodates `0017.0`, `0017.1`, `0017.1.1`, etc.
_TRANSCRIPT_FILENAME_RE = re.compile(
r"^SESSION-\d{4}\.\d+(\.\d+)*-TRANSCRIPT"
r"(-\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}-\d{2}--\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}-\d{2})?"
r"\.md$"
)
_SESSION_DIR_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{4}$")
_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC = 5.0
def _env_float(name: str, default: float) -> float:
raw = os.environ.get(name, "").strip()
if not raw:
return default
try:
return float(raw)
except ValueError:
log.warning("invalid %s=%r — falling back to %s", name, raw, default)
return default
def _raw_base() -> str:
return os.environ.get("OHM_SESSION_HISTORY_RAW_BASE", "").strip() or _DEFAULT_RAW_BASE
def _contents_base() -> str:
return (
os.environ.get("OHM_SESSION_HISTORY_CONTENTS_BASE", "").strip()
or _DEFAULT_CONTENTS_BASE
)
def _manifest_ttl() -> float:
return _env_float("OHM_DOCS_SESSIONS_MANIFEST_TTL_SEC", _DEFAULT_MANIFEST_TTL_SEC)
def _content_ttl() -> float:
return _env_float("OHM_DOCS_SESSIONS_CONTENT_TTL_SEC", _DEFAULT_CONTENT_TTL_SEC)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# In-process TTL cache
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Plain dict + `time.monotonic()` check, no external dep. The cache
# value is a `(stored_at, payload)` tuple; `payload` may carry an
# error-shape sentinel for negative caching (404s). Lock guards
# read-modify-write across worker tasks; entries are immutable once
# stored so reads under the lock are fast.
_lock = threading.Lock()
_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, dict[str, Any]]] = {}
def _cache_get(key: str, ttl_sec: float) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
with _lock:
entry = _cache.get(key)
if entry is None:
return None
stored_at, payload = entry
if time.monotonic() - stored_at > ttl_sec:
# Don't evict here; let _cache_put overwrite on next fetch.
# The stale entry is gated by the TTL check, so it stays
# invisible to readers regardless.
return None
return payload
def _cache_put(key: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
with _lock:
_cache[key] = (time.monotonic(), payload)
def reset_cache() -> None:
"""Drop every cached entry. Test seam — not called in production."""
with _lock:
_cache.clear()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Public fetch surface
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Each fetcher returns a `{status, ...}` dict. `status` is one of:
# "ok" — payload field carries the body
# "404" — gitea returned 404 (or content was missing)
# "error" — gitea returned 5xx, timed out, or returned malformed data
#
# The route layer maps these onto HTTP responses; keeping the mapping
# out of this module makes the cache transparent to the test harness.
async def _http_get(url: str) -> tuple[int, str]:
"""Perform a single GET against `url`; return (status_code, body).
On timeout or network error, returns (599, error_message). The 599
pseudo-status maps to a 502 at the route layer the same way an
upstream 5xx does the caller doesn't care which leg of the
network broke.
"""
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC) as client:
r = await client.get(url)
return r.status_code, r.text
except httpx.HTTPError as e:
log.warning("gitea fetch failed for %s: %s", url, e)
return 599, f"fetch error: {e}"
def _is_valid_session_dir(nnnn: str) -> bool:
return bool(_SESSION_DIR_RE.match(nnnn))
def _is_valid_transcript_filename(filename: str) -> bool:
return bool(_TRANSCRIPT_FILENAME_RE.match(filename))
async def fetch_manifest() -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Fetch and parse `sessions.json` from the public repo.
Returns one of:
{"status": "ok", "manifest": {...}} successful parse
{"status": "404"} gitea 404 (empty state)
{"status": "error", "detail": "..."} 5xx / timeout / bad JSON
"""
cache_key = "manifest"
cached = _cache_get(cache_key, _manifest_ttl())
if cached is not None:
return cached
url = f"{_raw_base()}/sessions.json"
status, body = await _http_get(url)
if status == 200:
try:
import json
data = json.loads(body)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as e:
payload: dict[str, Any] = {
"status": "error",
"detail": f"sessions.json malformed: {e}",
}
# Don't cache parse errors — give the upstream a chance to
# fix the file without waiting for TTL expiry.
return payload
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return {
"status": "error",
"detail": "sessions.json is not a JSON object",
}
payload = {"status": "ok", "manifest": data}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
if status == 404:
payload = {"status": "404"}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
return {"status": "error", "detail": f"upstream returned {status}"}
async def fetch_about() -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Fetch the repo's README.md (rendered as the /docs/sessions/about page).
Returns one of:
{"status": "ok", "body": "..."}
{"status": "404"}
{"status": "error", "detail": "..."}
"""
cache_key = "about:README.md"
cached = _cache_get(cache_key, _content_ttl())
if cached is not None:
return cached
url = f"{_raw_base()}/README.md"
status, body = await _http_get(url)
if status == 200:
payload: dict[str, Any] = {"status": "ok", "body": body}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
if status == 404:
payload = {"status": "404"}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
return {"status": "error", "detail": f"upstream returned {status}"}
async def fetch_transcript(nnnn: str, filename: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Fetch a single transcript body from `{nnnn}/{filename}` in the repo.
The caller is expected to have validated `nnnn` and `filename`
against `_is_valid_session_dir` / `_is_valid_transcript_filename`
before calling this invalid paths shouldn't reach the network.
"""
cache_key = f"transcript:{nnnn}/{filename}"
cached = _cache_get(cache_key, _content_ttl())
if cached is not None:
return cached
url = f"{_raw_base()}/{nnnn}/{filename}"
status, body = await _http_get(url)
if status == 200:
payload: dict[str, Any] = {"status": "ok", "body": body}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
if status == 404:
payload = {"status": "404"}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
return {"status": "error", "detail": f"upstream returned {status}"}
async def fetch_session_index(nnnn: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""List the transcript filenames inside the `{nnnn}/` folder.
Uses gitea's contents API (one HTTP per session-index page-view per
cache-TTL) rather than the raw URL there's no flat way to list a
folder via the raw mount.
Returns one of:
{"status": "ok", "files": ["SESSION-...md", ...]}
{"status": "404"}
{"status": "error", "detail": "..."}
Only filenames that match `_is_valid_transcript_filename` are
surfaced sibling files (e.g. an attached `notes.md`) are ignored
so the /docs/sessions/<NNNN> page never lists a non-transcript
masquerading as one.
"""
cache_key = f"index:{nnnn}"
cached = _cache_get(cache_key, _content_ttl())
if cached is not None:
return cached
url = f"{_contents_base()}/{nnnn}"
status, body = await _http_get(url)
if status == 200:
try:
import json
data = json.loads(body)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as e:
return {
"status": "error",
"detail": f"contents API response malformed: {e}",
}
if not isinstance(data, list):
return {
"status": "error",
"detail": "contents API returned non-list",
}
files: list[str] = []
for entry in data:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
if entry.get("type") != "file":
continue
name = entry.get("name")
if not isinstance(name, str):
continue
if _is_valid_transcript_filename(name):
files.append(name)
files.sort()
payload: dict[str, Any] = {"status": "ok", "files": files}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
if status == 404:
payload = {"status": "404"}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
return {"status": "error", "detail": f"upstream returned {status}"}
-326
View File
@@ -1,326 +0,0 @@
"""v0.20.0 — on-site framework-specs surface source.
Sibling of `docs_sessions.py` (v0.19.0 / roadmap item #30): the
framework mediates a gitea fetch on behalf of the browser so the
rendered `/docs/specs/*` surface inherits the same chrome as
`/docs/user-guide` and `/docs/sessions/*` and stays free of any
cross-origin gestures from the frontend.
Two read endpoints, both anonymous-reachable:
GET /api/docs/specs/manifest the configured spec list
GET /api/docs/specs/<name> a single spec body (markdown)
The framework-default manifest is OHM-flavored (rfc-app's own SPEC.md
+ flotilla's SPEC.md on `git.wiggleverse.org`) for the same reason
`docs_sessions.py`'s defaults are: OHM is the only deployment to
date. A deployment running its own spec set overrides the manifest
via the `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` env var (set through flotilla's overlay).
History is intentionally not surfaced here the operator-stated
intent is "current version only; git is the history surface".
Per-spec entries carry three fields:
name URL-safe slug (`[a-z0-9-]+`) the path segment
title human-readable label shown in the nav and the page header
url the upstream raw URL the framework fetches
Validation:
- The configured list must be a JSON array of `{name, title, url}`
objects. A malformed `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` value (bad JSON, wrong
shape, invalid slug) logs a warning and falls back to the default
so a typo in the overlay doesn't crash startup.
- Each `name` is checked against `^[a-z0-9-]+$` before the manifest
is accepted. The route layer also validates the path-bound `name`
parameter before any network call, so a malformed URL never
reaches the cache or the upstream.
Cache shape mirrors `docs_sessions.py`: in-process `dict` + monotonic
TTL check, negative results (404) cached, no external dep. The
manifest is cheap (parsed from an env var, no network), so it has no
TTL every request re-derives it. Per-spec content has a 5-minute
default TTL (env-tunable via `OHM_DOCS_SPECS_CONTENT_TTL_SEC`).
§3 invariant 1 is preserved: the framework holds no secret bytes;
the upstream specs are public-repo raw URLs, the fetch carries no
auth header.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import os
import re
import threading
import time
from typing import Any
import httpx
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# The framework-default spec set. OHM-flavored per the same precedent
# `docs_sessions.py` set: the only live deployment is OHM, so the
# default points there. A deployment running its own specs overrides
# `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` via the overlay.
_DEFAULT_SPECS: list[dict[str, str]] = [
{
"name": "rfc-app",
"title": "rfc-app SPEC",
"url": (
"https://git.wiggleverse.org/ben.stull/rfc-app/"
"raw/branch/main/SPEC.md"
),
},
{
"name": "flotilla",
"title": "flotilla SPEC",
"url": (
"https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-rfc-app-flotilla/"
"raw/branch/main/SPEC.md"
),
},
]
_DEFAULT_CONTENT_TTL_SEC = 300.0
# URL-safe slug. Matches `docs_sessions.py`'s `_SESSION_DIR_RE` spirit
# (rejecting anything that could resolve outside the intended layout)
# but with the lowercase-alphanumeric-plus-dash shape the manifest
# enforces. Path traversal (`..`), separators (`/`), tilde, uppercase,
# and whitespace all fail this regex; the route layer rejects 400
# before any cache or network call.
_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9-]+$")
_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC = 5.0
def _env_float(name: str, default: float) -> float:
raw = os.environ.get(name, "").strip()
if not raw:
return default
try:
return float(raw)
except ValueError:
log.warning("invalid %s=%r — falling back to %s", name, raw, default)
return default
def _content_ttl() -> float:
return _env_float("OHM_DOCS_SPECS_CONTENT_TTL_SEC", _DEFAULT_CONTENT_TTL_SEC)
def _is_valid_name(name: str) -> bool:
"""Slug guard for path-bound `name` parameters.
Mirrors `docs_sessions._is_valid_session_dir`'s contract: the
route layer calls this before any network or cache work, so a
malformed name never escapes the FastAPI surface.
"""
return bool(isinstance(name, str) and _NAME_RE.match(name))
def _parse_spec_entry(entry: Any) -> dict[str, str] | None:
"""Validate a single manifest entry; return None if invalid.
Required fields: `name`, `title`, `url`. All three must be
non-empty strings; `name` must match `_NAME_RE`. The validator is
strict: an entry that fails any check is dropped from the manifest
(and the caller logs at warning level).
"""
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
return None
name = entry.get("name")
title = entry.get("title")
url = entry.get("url")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not _is_valid_name(name):
return None
if not isinstance(title, str) or not title.strip():
return None
if not isinstance(url, str) or not url.strip():
return None
return {"name": name, "title": title.strip(), "url": url.strip()}
def _load_configured_specs() -> list[dict[str, str]]:
"""Parse `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` (if set) or return the default list.
Malformed JSON or wrong-shape values log a warning and fall back
to the default the deployment continues to render the spec
surface rather than crashing startup. The strict validation (each
entry's name slug, presence of all three fields) drops bad entries
one-by-one; if every entry is dropped, the default applies.
"""
raw = os.environ.get("OHM_DOCS_SPECS", "").strip()
if not raw:
return list(_DEFAULT_SPECS)
try:
parsed = json.loads(raw)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as e:
log.warning(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS is not valid JSON (%s) — falling back to default", e
)
return list(_DEFAULT_SPECS)
if not isinstance(parsed, list):
log.warning(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS must be a JSON array — falling back to default"
)
return list(_DEFAULT_SPECS)
out: list[dict[str, str]] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
for entry in parsed:
validated = _parse_spec_entry(entry)
if validated is None:
log.warning(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS entry %r failed validation — dropped", entry
)
continue
if validated["name"] in seen:
log.warning(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS has duplicate name %r — dropped", validated["name"]
)
continue
seen.add(validated["name"])
out.append(validated)
if not out:
log.warning(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS yielded no valid entries — falling back to default"
)
return list(_DEFAULT_SPECS)
return out
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# In-process TTL cache
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Same shape as `docs_sessions.py`: plain dict + `time.monotonic()` check,
# no external dep. The cache value is a `(stored_at, payload)` tuple;
# `payload` may carry an error-shape sentinel for negative caching (404s).
# Lock guards read-modify-write across worker tasks; entries are immutable
# once stored so reads under the lock are fast.
_lock = threading.Lock()
_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, dict[str, Any]]] = {}
def _cache_get(key: str, ttl_sec: float) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
with _lock:
entry = _cache.get(key)
if entry is None:
return None
stored_at, payload = entry
if time.monotonic() - stored_at > ttl_sec:
return None
return payload
def _cache_put(key: str, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
with _lock:
_cache[key] = (time.monotonic(), payload)
def reset_cache() -> None:
"""Drop every cached entry. Test seam — not called in production."""
with _lock:
_cache.clear()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Public fetch surface
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Each fetcher returns a `{status, ...}` dict, same convention as
# `docs_sessions.py`:
# "ok" — payload field carries the body / manifest
# "404" — gitea returned 404 (or the configured name doesn't exist)
# "error" — gitea returned 5xx, timed out, or returned malformed data
#
# The route layer maps these onto HTTP responses; keeping the mapping
# out of this module makes the cache transparent to the test harness.
async def _http_get(url: str) -> tuple[int, str]:
"""Perform a single GET against `url`; return (status_code, body).
On timeout or network error, returns (599, error_message). The 599
pseudo-status maps to a 502 at the route layer the same way an
upstream 5xx does the caller doesn't care which leg of the
network broke.
"""
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC) as client:
r = await client.get(url)
return r.status_code, r.text
except httpx.HTTPError as e:
log.warning("specs fetch failed for %s: %s", url, e)
return 599, f"fetch error: {e}"
def fetch_specs_manifest() -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Return the configured spec manifest.
The manifest is derived from the `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` env var (or the
framework default if unset / malformed) and carries no network
work it's safe to call on every request. The return shape mirrors
the docs_sessions manifest endpoint for frontend consistency:
{"status": "ok", "specs": [{"name", "title", "url"}, ...]}
The "url" field is exposed in the manifest so the frontend can
offer a "view source on gitea" affordance alongside each rendered
spec (operator-stated intent: "include the history so you can see
it in git" — that gesture lives in the source link, not on the
rendered page).
"""
specs = _load_configured_specs()
return {"status": "ok", "specs": specs}
async def fetch_spec(name: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Fetch a single spec body by its manifest `name`.
The caller is expected to have validated `name` against
`_is_valid_name` before calling this an invalid name shouldn't
reach the network. We re-check inside as defense-in-depth: a
bogus name here returns the same `{status: "404"}` shape so the
route layer's `404 → HTTP 404` mapping handles it uniformly.
Returns one of:
{"status": "ok", "body": "..."}
{"status": "404"} no such spec OR upstream 404
{"status": "error", "detail": "..."} upstream 5xx / timeout
"""
if not _is_valid_name(name):
return {"status": "404"}
cache_key = f"spec:{name}"
cached = _cache_get(cache_key, _content_ttl())
if cached is not None:
return cached
specs = _load_configured_specs()
match = next((s for s in specs if s["name"] == name), None)
if match is None:
# Cache the negative — a deployment with an unstable manifest
# would still benefit from the TTL window, and the cached 404
# is automatically displaced when the next request happens
# after TTL expiry.
payload: dict[str, Any] = {"status": "404"}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
url = match["url"]
status, body = await _http_get(url)
if status == 200:
payload = {"status": "ok", "body": body}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
if status == 404:
payload = {"status": "404"}
_cache_put(cache_key, payload)
return payload
return {"status": "error", "detail": f"upstream returned {status}"}
+11 -166
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import os
import smtplib
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, time, timezone
from email.message import EmailMessage
from email.utils import formataddr
from itertools import groupby
from typing import Any
@@ -32,7 +33,6 @@ from urllib.parse import urlencode
from itsdangerous import BadSignature, URLSafeSerializer
from . import db
from .email_envelope import build_envelope
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ class EmailConfig:
app_url: str
bundle_threshold: int
enabled: bool
unsubscribe_mailto: str
@classmethod
def from_env(cls) -> "EmailConfig":
@@ -85,16 +84,6 @@ class EmailConfig:
app_url=os.environ.get("APP_URL", "http://localhost:8000").rstrip("/"),
bundle_threshold=int(os.environ.get("EMAIL_BUNDLE_THRESHOLD", "5")),
enabled=os.environ.get("EMAIL_ENABLED", "1") not in ("0", "false", "False"),
# v0.18.0: the `List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:…>` target on
# invite + notification mail. Defaults to the From
# address when unset; a deployment can route opt-out
# mail to a separate mailbox (e.g., a humans-monitored
# account distinct from the no-reply notifications
# sender) by setting this explicitly.
unsubscribe_mailto=os.environ.get(
"EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO",
os.environ.get("EMAIL_FROM", "notifications@wiggleverse.local"),
).strip(),
)
@@ -109,14 +98,6 @@ def _signer() -> URLSafeSerializer:
def make_unsubscribe_url(user_id: int, category: str) -> str:
"""Build the §15.4 per-category one-click URL.
`category` is one of `personal-direct`, `structural`,
`admin-actionable` (the three per-category flags) or `all`
(v0.18.0: the bundle path, which sets `email_opt_out_all = 1`
because a bundle covers multiple categories and a per-category
opt-out wouldn't honor the user's intent).
"""
cfg = EmailConfig.from_env()
token = _signer().dumps({"u": user_id, "c": category})
qs = urlencode({"t": token})
@@ -269,21 +250,7 @@ def _send_one(user: Any, notif_id: int, payload: dict, category: str) -> None:
return
subject = _subject(payload)
body = _body(payload, user["id"], category, cfg)
# v0.18.0: notification mail is bulk-adjacent (a watcher can
# accumulate dozens of structural events on a busy RFC), so it
# carries the full one-click unsubscribe — Gmail and Yahoo
# require this for senders at OHM's volume tier per RFC 8058.
unsubscribe_url = make_unsubscribe_url(user["id"], category)
sent = _deliver(
cfg,
user["email"],
subject,
body,
unsubscribe_mailto=cfg.unsubscribe_mailto,
unsubscribe_url=unsubscribe_url,
kind="notification",
notification_id=notif_id,
)
sent = _deliver(cfg, user["email"], subject, body)
if not sent:
return
db.conn().execute(
@@ -338,65 +305,23 @@ def _deep_link(payload: dict, cfg: EmailConfig) -> str:
return cfg.app_url
def _deliver(
cfg: EmailConfig,
to_address: str,
subject: str,
body: str,
*,
unsubscribe_mailto: str | None = None,
unsubscribe_url: str | None = None,
kind: str = "notification",
notification_id: int | None = None,
) -> bool:
"""Build the envelope via the shared `build_envelope` helper and
hand it to SMTP.
The `_SENT` buffer carries the helper's `EmailMessage` under
`message` plus the legacy `to`/`from`/`subject`/`body` keys for
backward-compatibility with tests that read those directly.
Newer tests can assert on the header surface by inspecting
`envelope["message"]`.
v0.18.0 Slice 4: also writes one row to `outbound_emails`
capturing the attempt. status='sent' on success, 'failed' on
SMTP exception, 'deferred' on the dev-fallback path (no
SMTP_HOST configured the send didn't happen, but the row
records the attempt so the admin endpoint can answer "did the
framework try?").
"""
msg = build_envelope(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
from_name=cfg.from_name,
subject=subject,
body_plain=body,
unsubscribe_mailto=unsubscribe_mailto,
unsubscribe_url=unsubscribe_url,
)
def _deliver(cfg: EmailConfig, to_address: str, subject: str, body: str) -> bool:
envelope = {
"to": to_address,
"from": formataddr((cfg.from_name, cfg.from_address)),
"subject": subject,
"body": body,
"message": msg,
"kind": kind,
}
_SENT.append(envelope)
message_id = msg["Message-ID"]
if not cfg.smtp_host:
log.info("email (stdout fallback): to=%s subject=%s", to_address, subject)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject,
kind=kind,
status="deferred",
message_id=message_id,
notification_id=notification_id,
)
return True
try:
msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = envelope["from"]
msg["To"] = to_address
msg["Subject"] = subject
msg.set_content(body)
smtp = smtplib.SMTP(cfg.smtp_host, cfg.smtp_port, timeout=30)
try:
if cfg.smtp_starttls:
@@ -406,76 +331,10 @@ def _deliver(
smtp.send_message(msg)
finally:
smtp.quit()
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject,
kind=kind,
status="sent",
message_id=message_id,
notification_id=notification_id,
)
return True
except Exception as exc:
log.exception("email send failed: to=%s subject=%s", to_address, subject)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject,
kind=kind,
status="failed",
error=f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}",
message_id=message_id,
notification_id=notification_id,
)
return False
def record_outbound(
*,
to_address: str,
from_address: str,
subject: str,
kind: str,
status: str,
error: str | None = None,
notification_id: int | None = None,
message_id: str | None = None,
) -> int | None:
"""v0.18.0 Slice 4: write one row to `outbound_emails`.
Returns the inserted row's id, or `None` if the DB connection
isn't initialized (which happens in unit tests that don't boot
the full app the write is best-effort and never raises).
"""
try:
cur = db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO outbound_emails
(to_address, from_address, subject, kind, sent_at, status,
error, notification_id, message_id)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, datetime('now'), ?, ?, ?, ?)
""",
(
to_address,
from_address,
subject,
kind,
status,
error,
notification_id,
message_id,
),
)
return cur.lastrowid
except RuntimeError:
# db.conn() raises RuntimeError if init() hasn't been called.
# Pure-helper unit tests for build_envelope hit this path; the
# audit row is best-effort and not part of the contract.
return None
except Exception:
log.exception("outbound_emails write failed: to=%s subject=%s", to_address, subject)
return None
log.exception("email send failed: to=%s subject=%s", to_address, subject)
return False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -581,27 +440,13 @@ def _send_bundle(cfg: EmailConfig, user: Any, emailable: list) -> int:
for r, _cat, extras in group_rows:
summary = _summary_for(r["event_kind"], r["actor_display"], r["rfc_title"], extras)
sections.append(f" · {summary}")
# v0.18.0: the bundle covers multiple categories, so a
# per-category opt-out can't honor the user's intent. The
# `all` category lands at the §15.4 endpoint and sets
# `email_opt_out_all = 1`.
unsubscribe_url = make_unsubscribe_url(user["id"], "all")
body = (
"Activity on RFCs you watch, accumulated during your quiet hours:\n"
+ "\n".join(sections)
+ f"\n\nOpen your inbox: {cfg.app_url}/inbox\n"
+ f"Manage all preferences: {cfg.app_url}/settings/notifications\n"
+ f"Unsubscribe from all email: {unsubscribe_url}\n"
)
sent = _deliver(
cfg,
user["email"],
subject,
body,
unsubscribe_mailto=cfg.unsubscribe_mailto,
unsubscribe_url=unsubscribe_url,
kind="bundle",
)
sent = _deliver(cfg, user["email"], subject, body)
if not sent:
return 0
ids = [r["id"] for r, _, _ in emailable]
-155
View File
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
"""v0.18.0 / roadmap items #18 + #20: a shared envelope builder.
Every outbound mail in rfc-app today (OTC, admin-invite, watcher
notification, "while you were away" bundle, per-RFC invite) constructs
its own `email.message.EmailMessage` ad-hoc. The four sites diverged
just enough to be a deliverability hazard: missing `Date`, missing
`Message-ID`, no `Auto-Submitted`, no `List-Unsubscribe` on the
bulk-adjacent paths, no `multipart/alternative` body.
This module is the one place an `EmailMessage` is constructed. Every
send path imports `build_envelope` and calls it; the headers that
matter for inbox placement (Date, Message-ID, Auto-Submitted) land
uniformly, and the per-kind variations (unsubscribe semantics,
HTML alternative) are explicit arguments rather than buried in
each call site.
Per the v0.18.0 proposal at `~/git/ohm-infra/RFC-APP-EMAIL-HYGIENE-PROPOSAL.md`,
the per-kind unsubscribe matrix is:
* OTC: no `List-Unsubscribe` (the recipient explicitly requested
the code; advertising an unsubscribe header would imply OHM has
them on a list, which it doesn't).
* Admin invite / per-RFC invite: `mailto:` form only (the
recipient isn't a user yet, so there's no per-user opt-out row
to flip; the operator handles ad-hoc opt-outs manually).
* Watcher notification / bundle: full `mailto:` + signed-URL
`List-Unsubscribe` plus `List-Unsubscribe-Post:
List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` per RFC 8058 (Gmail and Yahoo
enforce this for bulk-adjacent senders).
The `is_transactional` flag governs `Auto-Submitted: auto-generated`,
which prevents auto-responder loops on every kind of mail we send.
All five mail kinds today are transactional in the SMTP sense (no
human is at the From mailbox watching for replies), so the default
is True; the argument is exposed for future symmetry.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from email.message import EmailMessage
from email.utils import formataddr, formatdate, make_msgid
def build_envelope(
*,
to_address: str,
from_address: str,
from_name: str,
subject: str,
body_plain: str,
body_html: str | None = None,
reply_to: str | None = None,
unsubscribe_mailto: str | None = None,
unsubscribe_url: str | None = None,
is_transactional: bool = True,
msgid_domain: str | None = None,
) -> EmailMessage:
"""Compose an `EmailMessage` with hardened headers.
`to_address` / `from_address` are bare RFC 5322 addresses;
`from_name` is the display label that goes through `formataddr`
so spaces / commas in the display string are encoded correctly.
`body_plain` is mandatory. `body_html` is **reserved and not yet
enabled** (security-audit-0026 I3): no send path supplies it today
every rfc-app mail is plain text and passing it raises
`NotImplementedError`. The parameter is kept in the signature for
documented future symmetry: when HTML mail is enabled it will land
as the second part of a `multipart/alternative` body (text/plain
first per RFC 2046, so a plain-text client picking the first part
still gets the readable text). Enabling it is a deliberate act the
caller MUST HTML-escape any user content into `body_html` first (cf.
the C1 stored-XSS class: a mail client renders the HTML) and remove
the guard below in the same change.
`reply_to`, when set, lets a send path point replies at a
different mailbox than the From line (e.g., a watcher
notification with From=notifications@... but Reply-To=
ohm@... so a confused recipient who hits Reply lands at a
monitored mailbox).
`unsubscribe_mailto` / `unsubscribe_url` populate
`List-Unsubscribe`. If `unsubscribe_url` is set, the helper also
emits `List-Unsubscribe-Post: List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` per
RFC 8058 Gmail and Yahoo POST that payload on the user's
one-click action. (Send paths that wire `unsubscribe_url`
therefore MUST also expose a matching POST endpoint that accepts
the same token; see `api_notifications.py:email_unsubscribe`.)
`msgid_domain` defaults to the @-domain of `from_address` so
Message-IDs are aligned with the sending domain by default. A
deployment that wants the Message-ID domain to track a different
surface (e.g., a tracking-domain that's separate from the From
domain) can override.
`Date` is RFC 5322 formatted via `email.utils.formatdate`; the
`localtime=True` setting picks the running process's local
timezone, which is what every popular MUA does too. (A
deployment running in UTC stamps UTC; that's correct, not a
bug.)
"""
msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = formataddr((from_name, from_address))
msg["To"] = to_address
msg["Subject"] = subject
msg["Date"] = formatdate(localtime=True)
# If the caller didn't pin a Message-ID domain, derive it from the
# From address. `make_msgid` accepts None and falls back to the
# local hostname, which is the wrong shape for a deliverable
# message (the hostname might be `gke-pool-xxx`); a deployment
# without a configured From would surface that as a build-time
# config error elsewhere, so the fallback here is just defensive.
if msgid_domain is None:
if "@" in from_address:
msgid_domain = from_address.split("@", 1)[1]
else:
msgid_domain = "localhost"
msg["Message-ID"] = make_msgid(domain=msgid_domain)
if reply_to:
msg["Reply-To"] = reply_to
if is_transactional:
# RFC 3834: prevents auto-responders (vacation replies, etc.)
# from triggering on this message. Every kind of mail rfc-app
# sends today is transactional in this sense.
msg["Auto-Submitted"] = "auto-generated"
if unsubscribe_mailto or unsubscribe_url:
parts: list[str] = []
if unsubscribe_mailto:
parts.append(f"<mailto:{unsubscribe_mailto}>")
if unsubscribe_url:
parts.append(f"<{unsubscribe_url}>")
msg["List-Unsubscribe"] = ", ".join(parts)
if unsubscribe_url:
# RFC 8058 one-click. Gmail and Yahoo POST the payload
# `List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` to the URL on the user's
# one-click action; the matching POST endpoint must be
# idempotent and not require auth. See
# `api_notifications.py` for the receiver.
msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] = "List-Unsubscribe=One-Click"
if body_html is not None:
# I3 (security-audit-0026): the multipart/alternative HTML path
# is intentionally NOT enabled. No send path passes `body_html`
# today, and emitting an HTML body built from user-supplied
# content without escaping it first would reintroduce the C1
# stored-XSS class in the mail channel (the recipient's client
# renders the HTML). Fail loudly here rather than silently
# shipping HTML: enabling HTML mail is a deliberate change that
# MUST HTML-escape user content at the call site and remove this
# guard together. The text/plain path below is the only live one.
raise NotImplementedError(
"HTML email is not enabled (security-audit-0026 I3): do not "
"pass body_html until user content is HTML-escaped at the "
"call site and this guard is intentionally removed."
)
msg.set_content(body_plain)
return msg
+8 -38
View File
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import smtplib
from email.message import EmailMessage
from email.utils import formataddr
from .email import EmailConfig, _SENT, record_outbound
from .email_envelope import build_envelope
from .email import EmailConfig, _SENT
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -59,52 +59,31 @@ def send_invite_email(
cfg = EmailConfig.from_env()
subject = _subject(inviter_display, cfg)
body = _body(claim_url, inviter_display, inviter_email, custom_message, cfg)
# v0.18.0: invite mail carries a `List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:…>`
# only (no signed URL) — the invitee isn't a user yet, so there
# is no per-user opt-out row to flip. The operator handles
# ad-hoc opt-outs from the mailto: target. Per the proposal's
# "Tradeoff discussion": the invite was unsolicited from the
# recipient's perspective, so the courtesy header is right;
# but it can't be a one-click URL because the row doesn't
# exist yet.
msg = build_envelope(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
from_name=cfg.from_name,
subject=subject,
body_plain=body,
unsubscribe_mailto=cfg.unsubscribe_mailto,
)
envelope = {
"to": to_address,
"from": formataddr((cfg.from_name, cfg.from_address)),
"subject": subject,
"body": body,
"kind": "invite",
"message": msg,
}
_SENT.append(envelope)
message_id = msg["Message-ID"]
if not cfg.enabled:
log.info("invite email disabled (EMAIL_ENABLED=0): to=%s", to_address)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="invite", status="deferred", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
if not cfg.smtp_host:
# Dev fallback: surface the claim URL at INFO so the operator can
# complete a claim flow without an SMTP relay. In production
# SMTP_HOST is always set per OHM's overlay.
log.info("invite email (stdout fallback): to=%s claim_url=%s", to_address, claim_url)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="invite", status="deferred", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
try:
msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = envelope["from"]
msg["To"] = to_address
msg["Subject"] = subject
msg.set_content(body)
smtp = smtplib.SMTP(cfg.smtp_host, cfg.smtp_port, timeout=30)
try:
if cfg.smtp_starttls:
@@ -114,18 +93,9 @@ def send_invite_email(
smtp.send_message(msg)
finally:
smtp.quit()
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="invite", status="sent", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
except Exception as exc:
except Exception:
log.exception("invite email send failed: to=%s", to_address)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="invite", status="failed",
error=f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}", message_id=message_id,
)
return False
+8 -34
View File
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import smtplib
from email.message import EmailMessage
from email.utils import formataddr
from .email import EmailConfig, _SENT, record_outbound
from .email_envelope import build_envelope
from .email import EmailConfig, _SENT
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -44,48 +44,31 @@ def send_otc_email(to_address: str, code: str) -> bool:
cfg = EmailConfig.from_env()
subject = f"Your sign-in code for {cfg.from_name}"
body = _body(code, cfg)
# v0.18.0: OTC mail carries NO List-Unsubscribe — the recipient
# explicitly requested the code; advertising an unsubscribe
# header would imply OHM has them on a list, which it doesn't.
# See the proposal's "Tradeoff discussion" for the binding
# rationale.
msg = build_envelope(
to_address=to_address,
from_address=cfg.from_address,
from_name=cfg.from_name,
subject=subject,
body_plain=body,
)
envelope = {
"to": to_address,
"from": formataddr((cfg.from_name, cfg.from_address)),
"subject": subject,
"body": body,
"kind": "otc",
"message": msg,
}
_SENT.append(envelope)
message_id = msg["Message-ID"]
if not cfg.enabled:
log.info("otc email disabled (EMAIL_ENABLED=0): to=%s", to_address)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="otc", status="deferred", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
if not cfg.smtp_host:
# Dev fallback: surface the code at INFO so the operator can
# complete a sign-in flow without an SMTP relay. In production
# SMTP_HOST is always set per OHM's overlay.
log.info("otc email (stdout fallback): to=%s code=%s", to_address, code)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="otc", status="deferred", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
try:
msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = envelope["from"]
msg["To"] = to_address
msg["Subject"] = subject
msg.set_content(body)
smtp = smtplib.SMTP(cfg.smtp_host, cfg.smtp_port, timeout=30)
try:
if cfg.smtp_starttls:
@@ -95,18 +78,9 @@ def send_otc_email(to_address: str, code: str) -> bool:
smtp.send_message(msg)
finally:
smtp.quit()
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="otc", status="sent", message_id=message_id,
)
return True
except Exception as exc:
except Exception:
log.exception("otc email send failed: to=%s", to_address)
record_outbound(
to_address=to_address, from_address=cfg.from_address,
subject=subject, kind="otc", status="failed",
error=f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}", message_id=message_id,
)
return False
+19 -61
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ no need for a separate worker.
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
import secrets
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
@@ -29,7 +28,6 @@ from . import (
otc,
passcode as passcode_mod,
providers as providers_mod,
ratelimit,
turnstile,
webhooks,
)
@@ -144,20 +142,12 @@ def create_app() -> FastAPI:
# eagerly via load_config(). Everything else waits for lifespan.
config = load_config()
app = FastAPI(lifespan=lifespan)
# v0.25.0 (audit 0026 M4): the session cookie is the primary 30-day
# auth credential and must carry `Secure` in production so it never
# travels cleartext. Default to Secure; a dev box serving over plain
# http opts out with SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=false. Production (OHM is
# HTTPS-only with an HTTP->HTTPS 301) leaves this unset → Secure on.
session_secure = os.environ.get("SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE", "true").strip().lower() not in (
"0", "false", "no", "off",
)
app.add_middleware(
SessionMiddleware,
secret_key=config.secret_key,
session_cookie="rfc_session",
max_age=60 * 60 * 24 * 30,
https_only=session_secure,
https_only=False,
)
return app
@@ -165,25 +155,24 @@ def create_app() -> FastAPI:
app = create_app()
def _set_device_trust_cookie(response: Response, cookie_value: str) -> None:
def _set_device_trust_cookie(response: Response, raw_token: str) -> None:
"""Attach the v0.11.0 device-trust cookie to the response.
HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=Lax + 30-day Max-Age + Path=/. As of
v0.25.0 (audit 0026 M1) the value is `IssueOutcome.cookie_value`
"<row_id>.<raw_token>" so `device_trust.lookup` can read one indexed
row instead of scanning; server-side storage remains the bcrypt hash
of the token half only. The cookie is "essential" per the v0.13.0
cookie-consent contract (it is part of authentication), so we set it
regardless of the user's analytics / other-cookies choice.
HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=Lax + 30-day Max-Age + Path=/. The
cookie value is the raw token; server-side storage is the hash.
The cookie is "essential" per the v0.13.0 cookie-consent contract
(it is part of authentication), so we set it regardless of the
user's analytics / other-cookies choice.
Secure=True means the cookie is only ever sent over HTTPS the
device-trust cookie holds a 30-day credential and must never travel
cleartext. (The session cookie now also defaults to Secure; see M4 in
`create_app`.)
Secure=True means the cookie is only ever sent over HTTPS. The
SessionMiddleware in `create_app` keeps `https_only=False` for
dev parity, but the device-trust cookie holds a 30-day credential
and must not travel cleartext production deployments serve over
HTTPS, so Secure on the device-trust cookie is non-negotiable.
"""
response.set_cookie(
key=device_trust_mod.COOKIE_NAME,
value=cookie_value,
value=raw_token,
max_age=device_trust_mod.COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
path="/",
secure=True,
@@ -256,10 +245,6 @@ def _oauth_router(config) -> APIRouter:
@router.post("/auth/otc/request")
async def otc_request(body: OtcRequestBody, request: Request):
# v0.25.0 (audit 0026 H1/L2): per-IP brake at the cheapest point,
# before the Turnstile network call or any bcrypt/SMTP work.
if not ratelimit.otc_request_limiter.allow(ratelimit.client_key(request)):
raise HTTPException(429, "Too many requests; please wait a few minutes")
# v0.12.0 / roadmap item #10: gate the request on a successful
# Turnstile siteverify before the bcrypt hash + SMTP send. The
# check runs first so a failed challenge spends no rate budget
@@ -267,7 +252,7 @@ def _oauth_router(config) -> APIRouter:
# secret AND TURNSTILE_REQUIRED=false (the default), the gate
# opens — see `backend/app/turnstile.py` for the full matrix.
client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else None
ts = await turnstile.verify_token(body.turnstile_token, client_ip=client_ip)
ts = turnstile.verify_token(body.turnstile_token, client_ip=client_ip)
if not ts.ok:
if ts.reason == "misconfigured":
# TURNSTILE_REQUIRED=true but the secret is unset. This
@@ -293,25 +278,9 @@ def _oauth_router(config) -> APIRouter:
@router.post("/auth/otc/verify")
async def otc_verify(body: OtcVerifyBody, request: Request, response: Response):
# v0.25.0 (audit 0026 H1): per-IP brake against fan-out guessing,
# plus the per-email lockout enforced inside otc.verify_code.
ip = ratelimit.client_key(request)
if not ratelimit.verify_limiter.allow(ip):
raise HTTPException(429, "Too many attempts; please wait a few minutes")
result = otc.verify_code(body.email, body.code)
if result.reason == "locked":
raise HTTPException(
423,
{
"detail": "Too many failed attempts; wait a few minutes or request a new code",
"locked_until": result.locked_until,
},
)
if not result.ok or result.user is None:
raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid or expired code")
# Legit sign-in: clear this IP's window so a user who fat-fingered
# a couple of codes isn't left throttled.
ratelimit.verify_limiter.reset(ip)
auth.store_session(request, result.user)
# v0.8.0: surface `needs_profile` so the Login.jsx surface can
# decide whether to advance to the first/last/why capture step
@@ -344,7 +313,7 @@ def _oauth_router(config) -> APIRouter:
if body.trust_device:
ua = request.headers.get("user-agent", "")
outcome = device_trust_mod.issue(result.user.user_id, ua)
_set_device_trust_cookie(response, outcome.cookie_value)
_set_device_trust_cookie(response, outcome.raw_token)
return {
"ok": True,
"user": {
@@ -368,17 +337,12 @@ def _oauth_router(config) -> APIRouter:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
@router.get("/auth/passcode/check")
async def passcode_check(request: Request, email: str = ""):
async def passcode_check(email: str = ""):
"""Does this email have a passcode set? Anonymous endpoint —
the Login.jsx flow calls this after the user types their email
to decide whether to render a passcode input or fall back to
OTC. We surface only the boolean; lockout state, the hash, and
the set-at stamp are not leaked here.
v0.25.0 (audit 0026 L3): per-IP rate limit so the has-passcode
boolean can't be bulk-harvested to enumerate accounts."""
if not ratelimit.check_limiter.allow(ratelimit.client_key(request)):
raise HTTPException(429, "Too many requests; please wait a few minutes")
the set-at stamp are not leaked here."""
status = passcode_mod.passcode_status(email)
return {"has_passcode": status.has_passcode}
@@ -412,11 +376,6 @@ def _oauth_router(config) -> APIRouter:
v0.11.0: the body's `trust_device` flag, if true, mints a
fresh device-trust row and sets the long-lived cookie. Same
opt-in contract as `/auth/otc/verify`."""
# v0.25.0 (audit 0026 H1): per-IP brake in front of the per-account
# passcode lockout, so fan-out across emails is throttled too.
ip = ratelimit.client_key(request)
if not ratelimit.verify_limiter.allow(ip):
raise HTTPException(429, "Too many attempts; please wait a few minutes")
result = passcode_mod.verify_passcode(body.email, body.passcode)
if result.reason == "locked":
raise HTTPException(
@@ -428,12 +387,11 @@ def _oauth_router(config) -> APIRouter:
)
if not result.ok or result.user is None:
raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid passcode")
ratelimit.verify_limiter.reset(ip)
auth.store_session(request, result.user)
if body.trust_device:
ua = request.headers.get("user-agent", "")
outcome = device_trust_mod.issue(result.user.user_id, ua)
_set_device_trust_cookie(response, outcome.cookie_value)
_set_device_trust_cookie(response, outcome.raw_token)
return {
"ok": True,
"user": {
@@ -501,7 +459,7 @@ def _oauth_router(config) -> APIRouter:
if body.trust_device:
ua = request.headers.get("user-agent", "")
outcome = device_trust_mod.issue(result.user.user_id, ua)
_set_device_trust_cookie(response, outcome.cookie_value)
_set_device_trust_cookie(response, outcome.raw_token)
# Has the user already set a passcode? (Could only happen via
# an admin pre-population path that doesn't exist yet, but
-95
View File
@@ -270,86 +270,6 @@ def fan_out_new_beta_request(
)
def fan_out_contribution_request(
*,
rfc_slug: str,
requester_user_id: int,
request_id: int,
matched_term: str,
who_i_am: str,
why: str,
use_case: str | None,
) -> list[int]:
"""Roadmap #28 Part 3: a reader asked to contribute to a pending
(super-draft) RFC. Land one actionable notification per owner and
return their ids (the caller stamps the first onto the request row as
the inbox-action handle).
Personal-direct: the owner is the named subject of the request, so the
§15.4 email gate consults `email_personal_direct` exactly as for the
other owner-facing personal events no new preference column is
needed. The request's three free-text fields ride along in the payload
so the inbox row can show the full ask inline without a second fetch.
Actor is the requester per §15.9.
"""
requester = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT display_name FROM users WHERE id = ?", (requester_user_id,)
).fetchone()
display = (requester["display_name"] if requester else None) or "Someone"
details = {
"request_id": request_id,
"matched_term": matched_term,
"requester_user_id": requester_user_id,
"requester_display": display,
"who_i_am": who_i_am,
"why": why,
"use_case": use_case or "",
}
notif_ids: list[int] = []
for recipient_id in _entry_owner_user_ids(rfc_slug):
if recipient_id == requester_user_id:
continue
notif_ids.append(
_emit_one(
recipient_user_id=recipient_id,
event_kind="contribution_request_on_pending_rfc",
category=CATEGORY_PERSONAL,
actor_user_id=requester_user_id,
rfc_slug=rfc_slug,
branch_name=None,
pr_number=None,
details=details,
)
)
return notif_ids
def notify_contribution_decided(
*,
rfc_slug: str,
requester_user_id: int,
decider_user_id: int,
request_id: int,
accepted: bool,
) -> None:
"""Roadmap #28 Part 3: tell the requester an owner accepted or declined
their contribute request. On accept the requester also receives the
#12 invitation email out-of-band; this inbox row is the in-app echo
that points them at it."""
_emit_one(
recipient_user_id=requester_user_id,
event_kind=(
"contribution_request_accepted" if accepted else "contribution_request_declined"
),
category=CATEGORY_PERSONAL,
actor_user_id=decider_user_id,
rfc_slug=rfc_slug,
branch_name=None,
pr_number=None,
details={"request_id": request_id},
)
def fan_out_chat_message(
*,
actor_user_id: int,
@@ -849,16 +769,6 @@ def render_summary(event_kind: str, actor_display: str | None, rfc_title: str |
return f"{actor} began graduating {title}."
if event_kind == "pr_conflict_with_main":
return f"{actor} started a resolution branch on {title}."
if event_kind == "contribution_request_on_pending_rfc":
# Roadmap #28 Part 3: owner-facing, actionable. The term is the
# super-draft reference that surfaced the offer; the inbox row
# renders Accept/Decline beneath this line.
term = extras.get("matched_term") or title
return f"{actor} wants to contribute to your pending RFC for '{term}'."
if event_kind == "contribution_request_accepted":
return f"{actor} accepted your request to contribute to {title} — check your email to accept the invitation."
if event_kind == "contribution_request_declined":
return f"{actor} declined your request to contribute to {title}."
if event_kind == "new_beta_request":
# v0.9.0: framework-scoped, not RFC-scoped. The actor (the
# requester) and the captured full name + email read as
@@ -974,11 +884,6 @@ def list_inbox(
"read_at": row["read_at"],
"category": extras.get("category"),
"summary": render_summary(row["event_kind"], row["actor_display"], row["rfc_title"], extras),
# The row's payload, surfaced for kinds that render inline
# detail (e.g. #28 Part 3's contribute-request who/why/use-case
# + Accept/Decline). Safe to expose: a recipient only ever sees
# their own notifications.
"extras": extras,
})
if bundled:
-76
View File
@@ -85,15 +85,6 @@ def _cooldown_seconds() -> int:
return 60
# v0.25.0 / security audit 0026 (H1): per-email OTC verify lockout,
# mirroring the passcode path (passcode.py). Five consecutive wrong codes
# for an email lock its OTC verify for 15 minutes. The per-IP limiter in
# ratelimit.py is the primary brute-force brake; this is the durable,
# passcode-parity layer.
LOCKOUT_AFTER_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = 5
LOCKOUT_DURATION_MINUTES = 15
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Code generation + hashing
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -215,61 +206,6 @@ class VerifyOutcome:
ok: bool
user: SessionUser | None
reason: str
# v0.25.0 (H1): ISO-8601 stamp when reason == 'locked'.
locked_until: str | None = None
def _verify_lockout_until(email: str) -> str | None:
"""Return the active lockout stamp for `email`, or None if not locked.
Clears an elapsed lockout (and resets the counter) as a side effect so
the next failure starts a fresh budget mirrors passcode.verify_passcode.
"""
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT failed_attempts, locked_until FROM otc_verify_state WHERE email = ?",
(email,),
).fetchone()
if row is None or not row["locked_until"]:
return None
still_locked = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT datetime(?) > datetime('now') AS locked", (row["locked_until"],),
).fetchone()["locked"]
if still_locked:
return row["locked_until"]
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE otc_verify_state SET failed_attempts = 0, locked_until = NULL WHERE email = ?",
(email,),
)
return None
def _record_verify_failure(email: str) -> None:
"""Increment the per-email failure counter; stamp a lockout once it
crosses the threshold. Mirrors the passcode lockout shape."""
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO otc_verify_state (email, failed_attempts)
VALUES (?, 1)
ON CONFLICT(email) DO UPDATE SET failed_attempts = failed_attempts + 1
""",
(email,),
)
count = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT failed_attempts FROM otc_verify_state WHERE email = ?", (email,),
).fetchone()["failed_attempts"]
if count >= LOCKOUT_AFTER_FAILED_ATTEMPTS:
db.conn().execute(
f"""
UPDATE otc_verify_state
SET locked_until = datetime('now', '+{LOCKOUT_DURATION_MINUTES} minutes')
WHERE email = ?
""",
(email,),
)
def _clear_verify_state(email: str) -> None:
db.conn().execute("DELETE FROM otc_verify_state WHERE email = ?", (email,))
def verify_code(email: str, code: str) -> VerifyOutcome:
@@ -278,13 +214,6 @@ def verify_code(email: str, code: str) -> VerifyOutcome:
if not email or not code:
return VerifyOutcome(ok=False, user=None, reason="invalid")
# v0.25.0 (H1): refuse before spending any bcrypt if this email is in
# its OTC-verify lockout window. The passcode path is unaffected — a
# locked-out OTC user can still set/use a passcode, and vice versa.
locked_until = _verify_lockout_until(email)
if locked_until:
return VerifyOutcome(ok=False, user=None, reason="locked", locked_until=locked_until)
rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT id, code_hash, expires_at, consumed_at
@@ -308,9 +237,6 @@ def verify_code(email: str, code: str) -> VerifyOutcome:
break
if matched is None:
# A genuine wrong guess against this email — the brute-force
# signal. Count it toward the lockout threshold (H1).
_record_verify_failure(email)
return VerifyOutcome(ok=False, user=None, reason="wrong")
if matched["consumed_at"] is not None:
@@ -329,8 +255,6 @@ def verify_code(email: str, code: str) -> VerifyOutcome:
"UPDATE otc_codes SET consumed_at = datetime('now') WHERE id = ?",
(matched["id"],),
)
# Success wipes the per-email failure counter (H1).
_clear_verify_state(email)
user = provision_or_link_user(email)
return VerifyOutcome(ok=True, user=user, reason="ok")
-15
View File
@@ -184,21 +184,6 @@ def load_providers(env: dict) -> dict[str, BaseProvider]:
return providers
def construct_haiku(api_key: str) -> AnthropicProvider:
"""A dedicated Claude Haiku provider, independent of the
`ENABLED_MODELS` chat-picker universe.
The §9.1 tag-suggestion surface (roadmap #27) always wants the
cheap + fast model regardless of which models the operator surfaces
in the §8.12 picker, so it constructs Haiku directly from the
operator's Anthropic key rather than going through `load_providers`.
The model id is sourced from the same `_CLAUDE_VARIANTS` table the
picker uses, so a model-string bump lands in one place.
"""
model, name = _CLAUDE_VARIANTS["claude-haiku"]
return AnthropicProvider(api_key=api_key, model=model, display_name=name)
def load_from_config(config) -> dict[str, BaseProvider]:
"""Convenience adapter so callers can pass our Config dataclass directly."""
env = {
-92
View File
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
"""In-process per-IP sliding-window rate limiter (security audit 0026, H1).
The auth verify endpoints (`/auth/otc/verify`, `/auth/passcode/verify`)
had no per-IP brake, so an attacker could fan out guesses against a
target identity bounded only by bcrypt cost. This module is the brake.
It is deliberately tiny: §4.2 says the app is a single process with a
colocated SQLite file, so an in-memory dict of `key -> deque[timestamps]`
is sufficient and needs no shared store. State resets on restart, which
fails *open* for a brief window acceptable because the per-email OTC
lockout (`otc_verify_state`) and the passcode lockout both persist in the
database and carry the durable guarantee; this limiter is the
anti-fan-out layer on top.
Chosen over a per-identity lockout *as the primary control* because a
per-IP window throttles the attacker without letting them grief a victim
by locking that victim's account (the known downside of identity
lockouts). Both layers run together.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import threading
import time
from collections import defaultdict, deque
class SlidingWindowLimiter:
"""Allow at most `max_events` per `window_seconds` per key.
`allow(key)` records an event and returns True if the key is still
within budget, False if it has exceeded it. Timestamps use a
monotonic clock so the limiter is immune to wall-clock jumps.
"""
def __init__(self, max_events: int, window_seconds: float) -> None:
self.max_events = max_events
self.window_seconds = window_seconds
self._events: dict[str, deque[float]] = defaultdict(deque)
self._lock = threading.Lock()
def allow(self, key: str) -> bool:
now = time.monotonic()
cutoff = now - self.window_seconds
with self._lock:
q = self._events[key]
while q and q[0] < cutoff:
q.popleft()
if len(q) >= self.max_events:
return False
q.append(now)
# Opportunistic cleanup so idle keys don't accumulate forever.
if not q:
self._events.pop(key, None)
return True
def reset(self, key: str) -> None:
"""Drop a key's window — e.g. after a successful sign-in so a
legitimate user who fat-fingered a few times isn't throttled."""
with self._lock:
self._events.pop(key, None)
# Module-level limiters shared across requests (one process, so module
# state is the natural home). Tunables are intentionally generous enough
# not to bother a human retyping a code, tight enough to kill fan-out:
# * verify: 10 attempts / 5 min / IP across the auth verify surfaces.
# * otc request: 5 sends / 5 min / IP (Turnstile is the primary gate;
# this is defense in depth against a solved-challenge replay loop).
verify_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(max_events=10, window_seconds=300)
otc_request_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(max_events=5, window_seconds=300)
# /auth/passcode/check is an anonymous has-passcode oracle (audit 0026 L3).
# It's a legitimate Login-flow affordance, so the budget is generous —
# enough for a human typing emails, tight enough to stop bulk scraping.
check_limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(max_events=30, window_seconds=300)
def _reset_all_for_tests() -> None:
"""Clear every module-level limiter's window. Test support only — the
limiters are process-global singletons, so without a per-test reset
one test's requests bleed into the next and later tests trip the
budget (429). Not called in production."""
for lim in (verify_limiter, otc_request_limiter, check_limiter):
with lim._lock:
lim._events.clear()
def client_key(request) -> str:
"""Best-effort client identity for limiting. Behind nginx the app is
started with `--forwarded-allow-ips 127.0.0.1`, so `request.client.host`
reflects the real client IP via Uvicorn's ProxyHeaders handling."""
client = getattr(request, "client", None)
return client.host if client and client.host else "unknown"
-333
View File
@@ -1,333 +0,0 @@
"""Roadmap #28 — scan submitted prose for RFC-shaped references.
The scanner splits a plain-text PR description / comment body into a list
of *segments* the frontend renders: plain-text runs interleaved with
typed link segments. The backend never emits HTML the frontend maps
each segment onto a React node so the surface is XSS-safe by
construction and independent of any HTML-sanitization layer.
Three buckets, one scan (Parts 13):
* ``{"type": "rfc", ...}`` Part 1. The term matches an
**accepted** (``state='active'``) RFC; renders as a link to it.
* ``{"type": "rfc-pending", ...}`` Part 3. The term matches a
**pending** RFC a super-draft (``state='super-draft'``: accepted
as an idea but not yet graduated to an active RFC) which has an
owner and a contribution surface. Renders as an "ask to contribute"
affordance carrying the owner's display name.
* ``{"type": "rfc-candidate", ...}`` Part 2. The term is a
strong-candidate that does **not** yet have a defining RFC. Renders
(for a viewer with create rights) as a "create RFC for '<term>'"
affordance that pre-fills the propose flow.
Precedence at any position is active > pending > candidate, then
longest-match-first an active link always wins over a contribute offer
which always wins over a create offer for the same span.
**Read-time enrichment, not submit-time persistence** (unchanged from
Part 1): drafts are never scanned, only submitted content on the read
paths, so links/offers track the *live* corpus. The active-RFC corpus,
super-draft corpus, and tag taxonomy are all small and cache-resident,
so building the index and scanning a 20k-char body per read is cheap.
**Matching stays conservative by design.** A reference links/offers only
when it is unlikely to be coincidental:
* ``rfc_id`` tokens (e.g. ``RFC-0001``) inherently specific.
* Multi-word titles (containing whitespace, e.g. ``Open Human Model``).
* Hyphenated slugs (containing ``-``, e.g. ``open-human-model``).
Single common-word titles/slugs are deliberately NOT matched they
would turn every prose occurrence into an affordance.
**Part 2 candidate heuristic.** A candidate term is a **multi-word tag**
from the #27 tag taxonomy (the de-facto set of tags the corpus already
carries) that has no defining RFC (no active or super-draft RFC whose
slug or title is that term). Multi-word is the same false-positive guard
the title rule uses: a single common tag word (``identity``) would be
far too noisy. Broader candidate detection capitalized multi-word
phrases mined from the text, terms repeated across recently-touched PRs,
or the #27 Haiku (``ANTHROPIC_API_KEY``) pathway — is a sanctioned but
deferred extension; the conservative tag-taxonomy heuristic is chosen
here to match Part 1's false-positive-averse philosophy.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
from typing import Any, Iterable, NamedTuple
class Term(NamedTuple):
"""One match key plus what to emit when it hits.
``key`` is the lowercase span to match (word-boundary, longest-first).
``kind`` is ``'active' | 'pending' | 'candidate'`` and selects the
emitted segment shape. ``slug``/``title`` carry the target RFC (active
+ pending); ``owner`` is the pending RFC's owner display name;
``term`` is the candidate's canonical display spelling.
"""
key: str
kind: str = "active"
slug: str = ""
title: str = ""
owner: str = ""
term: str = ""
# Lower number = higher precedence when two keys of equal length match at
# the same position. A real link beats a contribute offer beats a create
# offer.
_KIND_PRIORITY = {"active": 0, "pending": 1, "candidate": 2}
def _coerce(t: Term | tuple) -> Term:
"""Accept the legacy ``(key, slug, title)`` 3-tuple (treated as an
active term) alongside :class:`Term`, so direct unit-test callers and
older call sites keep working."""
if isinstance(t, Term):
return t
key, slug, title = t # legacy active 3-tuple
return Term(key=key, kind="active", slug=slug, title=title)
def _is_word_char(c: str) -> bool:
"""Word-boundary test. Hyphen and underscore count as word chars so a
match can't begin or end in the middle of a kebab/snake token."""
return c.isalnum() or c in ("-", "_")
def _emit(term: Term, label: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""The segment dict for a matched ``term``; ``label`` preserves source
casing."""
if term.kind == "pending":
return {
"type": "rfc-pending",
"slug": term.slug,
"label": label,
"title": term.title,
"owner": term.owner,
}
if term.kind == "candidate":
return {"type": "rfc-candidate", "label": label, "term": term.term}
return {"type": "rfc", "slug": term.slug, "label": label, "title": term.title}
def segment_text(text: str | None, terms: Iterable[Term | tuple]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Split ``text`` into text / link segments against ``terms``.
``terms`` are :class:`Term` objects (or legacy ``(key, slug, title)``
active 3-tuples). Matching is case-insensitive, respects word
boundaries on both ends, and prefers the longest key then higher
:data:`_KIND_PRIORITY` at any position.
Always returns at least one segment; for empty/None input that is a
single empty text segment, so callers can render uniformly.
"""
ordered = sorted(
(_coerce(t) for t in terms),
key=lambda t: (-len(t.key), _KIND_PRIORITY.get(t.kind, 9)),
)
if not text:
return [{"type": "text", "text": text or ""}]
out: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
buf: list[str] = []
low = text.lower()
n = len(text)
i = 0
while i < n:
match: tuple[Term, int] | None = None
for term in ordered:
klen = len(term.key)
if klen == 0 or not low.startswith(term.key, i):
continue
before = text[i - 1] if i > 0 else ""
after = text[i + klen] if i + klen < n else ""
if _is_word_char(before) or _is_word_char(after):
continue
match = (term, klen)
break
if match is not None:
term, klen = match
if buf:
out.append({"type": "text", "text": "".join(buf)})
buf = []
out.append(_emit(term, text[i:i + klen]))
i += klen
else:
buf.append(text[i])
i += 1
if buf:
out.append({"type": "text", "text": "".join(buf)})
return out
def _keys_for(slug: str, title: str, rfc_id: str | None) -> Iterable[str]:
"""The match keys an RFC contributes. See the module docstring for why
each gate exists (conservative, false-positive-averse)."""
if rfc_id:
rid = rfc_id.strip()
if len(rid) >= 2:
yield rid.lower()
if title:
t = title.strip()
# Multi-word titles only — a single common word is too noisy.
if len(t) >= 2 and (" " in t or "\t" in t):
yield t.lower()
if slug:
s = slug.strip()
# Hyphenated slugs only — a single-token slug is a bare word.
if len(s) >= 2 and "-" in s:
yield s.lower()
def _slugify(term: str) -> str:
"""Deterministic kebab-case — mirrors the propose modal's slugify so a
tag's would-be slug compares correctly against existing RFC slugs."""
return re.sub(r"-+$", "", re.sub(r"^-+", "", re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "-", term.lower().strip())))
class LinkIndex:
"""A reusable term index built once per request and applied to many
bodies (a PR's description plus every comment on it)."""
def __init__(self, terms: Iterable[Term | tuple]):
# Coerce + order once; segment_text re-sorts defensively but a
# pre-sorted list keeps the per-body cost to the scan itself.
self._terms: list[Term] = sorted(
(_coerce(t) for t in terms),
key=lambda t: (-len(t.key), _KIND_PRIORITY.get(t.kind, 9)),
)
def __bool__(self) -> bool:
return bool(self._terms)
def segment(self, text: str | None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
return segment_text(text, self._terms)
def _owner_display(conn, owners_json: str | None, proposed_by: str | None) -> str:
"""The display name to show for a pending RFC's owner. First entry of
``owners_json`` resolved to its user row's display name, falling back
to the bare login, then ``proposed_by``, then a neutral noun."""
login = None
try:
owners = json.loads(owners_json or "[]")
if isinstance(owners, list):
login = next((o for o in owners if isinstance(o, str) and o.strip()), None)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
login = None
if login:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT display_name FROM users WHERE gitea_login = ?", (login,)
).fetchone()
if row and row["display_name"]:
return row["display_name"]
return login
return (proposed_by or "").strip() or "the proposer"
def _tag_universe(conn) -> list[str]:
"""Distinct tags across the cached corpus (the #27 de-facto taxonomy),
preserving original spelling; case-deduped."""
rows = conn.execute("SELECT tags_json FROM cached_rfcs").fetchall()
out: list[str] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
for r in rows:
try:
tags = json.loads(r["tags_json"] or "[]")
except (ValueError, TypeError):
continue
if not isinstance(tags, list):
continue
for t in tags:
if not isinstance(t, str):
continue
tag = t.strip()
low = tag.lower()
if tag and low not in seen:
seen.add(low)
out.append(tag)
return out
def build_index(
conn,
*,
exclude_slug: str | None = None,
include_pending: bool = True,
include_candidates: bool = True,
) -> LinkIndex:
"""Build a :class:`LinkIndex` over the three buckets.
``exclude_slug`` drops the RFC the surrounding surface is itself scoped
to, so an RFC's own title/id/slug don't self-link (or self-offer)
inside its own PR or discussion. Precedence is enforced by insertion
order active keys are added first and a later bucket never overrides
an already-claimed key.
"""
terms: list[Term] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
def add(key: str, term: Term) -> None:
if key in seen:
return
seen.add(key)
terms.append(term)
# --- Part 1: accepted (active) RFCs. ORDER BY slug makes key
# de-duplication deterministic when two RFCs would contribute the
# same key (first slug wins). ---
active_rows = conn.execute(
"SELECT slug, title, rfc_id FROM cached_rfcs WHERE state = 'active' ORDER BY slug"
).fetchall()
# Track every slug + title that *has* a defining RFC, so Part 2 never
# offers to create one that already exists (active or pending).
defined_slugs: set[str] = set()
defined_titles: set[str] = set()
for r in active_rows:
slug = r["slug"]
defined_slugs.add((slug or "").lower())
defined_titles.add((r["title"] or "").strip().lower())
if exclude_slug is not None and slug == exclude_slug:
continue
title = r["title"] or ""
rfc_id = r["rfc_id"] if "rfc_id" in r.keys() else None
for key in _keys_for(slug, title, rfc_id):
add(key, Term(key=key, kind="active", slug=slug, title=title))
# --- Part 3: pending (super-draft) RFCs. ---
pending_rows = conn.execute(
"""
SELECT slug, title, rfc_id, owners_json, proposed_by
FROM cached_rfcs WHERE state = 'super-draft' ORDER BY slug
"""
).fetchall()
for r in pending_rows:
slug = r["slug"]
defined_slugs.add((slug or "").lower())
defined_titles.add((r["title"] or "").strip().lower())
if not include_pending:
continue
if exclude_slug is not None and slug == exclude_slug:
continue
title = r["title"] or ""
rfc_id = r["rfc_id"] if "rfc_id" in r.keys() else None
owner = _owner_display(conn, r["owners_json"], r["proposed_by"])
for key in _keys_for(slug, title, rfc_id):
add(key, Term(key=key, kind="pending", slug=slug, title=title, owner=owner))
# --- Part 2: strong-candidate terms with no defining RFC. ---
if include_candidates:
for tag in _tag_universe(conn):
low = tag.lower()
# Conservative: multi-word tags only (same guard as titles).
if " " not in tag and "\t" not in tag:
continue
if low in defined_titles or low in defined_slugs or _slugify(tag) in defined_slugs:
continue
add(low, Term(key=low, kind="candidate", term=tag))
return LinkIndex(terms)
-244
View File
@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
"""Roadmap #27 — Claude Haiku tag suggestions for the propose-RFC modal.
A cheap, fast assist: given the partial RFC draft a user is typing, ask
Claude Haiku to recommend tags drawn ONLY from the tags already in use
across the corpus. v1 has no curated tag list tags are free-form chip
input (§9.1) so "the taxonomy" is the de-facto set of distinct tags
the existing RFCs already carry. The model is constrained to that set
and MUST NOT invent new tags; taxonomy extension (letting the model
propose genuinely new tags) is a deferred follow-up per the roadmap.
Why Haiku specifically: cost. Picking a few reasonable tags from a known
set is well within Haiku's range, and the modal fires this repeatedly as
the user types, so the per-call price has to stay small.
The whole surface degrades to silence rather than error: no Anthropic
key, no provider, an empty corpus, a rate-limited caller, an empty
draft, or an unparseable model reply all yield an empty suggestion list.
The propose modal hides its suggestion row on an empty list, so the
fallback is simply the existing free-form chip input with nothing extra
shown.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import os
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from . import db
from .providers import BaseProvider, construct_haiku
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Bound the universe handed to the model so a large corpus can't blow up
# the prompt size (and the cost). The most-common tags matter most.
_UNIVERSE_CAP = 200
# How many suggestions we ever return to the modal.
DEFAULT_MAX_SUGGESTIONS = 6
@dataclass
class Draft:
"""The partial propose-RFC draft. `pitch` is the "why is this needed"
rationale; `use_case` is the #26 optional ground-truth field."""
title: str = ""
pitch: str = ""
use_case: str = ""
def is_empty(self) -> bool:
return not (self.title.strip() or self.pitch.strip() or self.use_case.strip())
def haiku_provider(config) -> BaseProvider | None:
"""Construct a dedicated Claude Haiku provider from the operator's
Anthropic key, or return None when no key is configured.
None means "suggestions unavailable" the caller returns an empty
list and the modal shows nothing. This is the seam tests monkeypatch
to inject a fake provider without a real key. There is no RFC slug at
propose time, so the §6.7 per-RFC funder path deliberately does not
apply: tag suggestion always runs on the operator's own key.
"""
key = getattr(config, "anthropic_api_key", "") or ""
if not key:
return None
return construct_haiku(key)
def gather_tag_universe(cap: int = _UNIVERSE_CAP) -> list[str]:
"""Every distinct tag in use across the cached corpus, most-common
first (ties broken alphabetically for determinism), capped.
This is the universe the model is constrained to. An empty corpus
yields an empty list, which short-circuits suggestion to silence.
"""
rows = db.conn().execute("SELECT tags_json FROM cached_rfcs").fetchall()
counts: dict[str, int] = {}
for r in rows:
try:
tags = json.loads(r["tags_json"] or "[]")
except (ValueError, TypeError):
continue
if not isinstance(tags, list):
continue
for t in tags:
if not isinstance(t, str):
continue
tag = t.strip()
if tag:
counts[tag] = counts.get(tag, 0) + 1
ranked = sorted(counts, key=lambda t: (-counts[t], t.lower()))
return ranked[:cap]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Rate limiting — in-process, per-user sliding window.
#
# Cost control, not security: the `require_contributor` gate already
# bounds callers to authenticated beta users, and the modal debounces.
# This is the backstop against a stuck/abusive client hammering the
# endpoint. In-memory is sufficient (single-process uvicorn on the VM)
# and resets on restart, which is fine for a cost guard.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_CALLS: dict[int, list[float]] = {}
def _rate_config() -> tuple[int, float]:
try:
max_calls = int(os.environ.get("TAG_SUGGEST_RATE_MAX", "30"))
except ValueError:
max_calls = 30
try:
window = float(os.environ.get("TAG_SUGGEST_RATE_WINDOW_SECONDS", "60"))
except ValueError:
window = 60.0
return max_calls, window
def rate_limit_ok(user_id: int, *, now: float | None = None) -> bool:
"""True if this call is within the per-user window; records the call.
`now` is injectable for tests (defaults to a monotonic clock)."""
max_calls, window = _rate_config()
t = time.monotonic() if now is None else now
calls = _CALLS.setdefault(user_id, [])
cutoff = t - window
calls[:] = [c for c in calls if c > cutoff]
if len(calls) >= max_calls:
return False
calls.append(t)
return True
def reset_rate_limits() -> None:
"""Test seam — clear the in-process window state."""
_CALLS.clear()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Prompt + parse.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_SYSTEM = (
"You suggest topic tags for a draft RFC — a structured proposal "
"document in a collection. You are given the draft's title, its "
"rationale, an optional use case, and the exact set of tags already "
"in use across the collection. Choose the tags from that set that "
"best fit the draft.\n"
"Rules:\n"
"- Choose ONLY from the provided tag set. Never invent a tag.\n"
"- Order best-fit first. Omit weak fits rather than padding the list.\n"
"- Return at most {max} tags.\n"
"Respond with ONLY a JSON array, no prose, of the form:\n"
'[{{"tag": "<exact tag from the set>", "confidence": <number between 0 and 1>}}]\n'
"If no tag in the set fits the draft, return []."
)
def _build_messages(draft: Draft, universe: list[str], max_suggestions: int):
system = _SYSTEM.format(max=max_suggestions)
parts: list[str] = []
if draft.title.strip():
parts.append(f"Title: {draft.title.strip()[:300]}")
if draft.pitch.strip():
parts.append(f"Why this RFC is needed:\n{draft.pitch.strip()[:4000]}")
if draft.use_case.strip():
parts.append(f"What it will be used for:\n{draft.use_case.strip()[:4000]}")
parts.append(
"Tags already in use (choose only from these):\n" + ", ".join(universe)
)
return system, [{"role": "user", "content": "\n\n".join(parts)}]
def _extract_json_array(text: str):
start = text.find("[")
end = text.rfind("]")
if start == -1 or end == -1 or end < start:
return None
try:
return json.loads(text[start : end + 1])
except ValueError:
return None
def parse_reply(text: str, universe: list[str], max_suggestions: int) -> list[dict]:
"""Parse the model reply into a clean, universe-constrained list.
Tolerant of the model returning bare strings or objects, extra prose
around the JSON, unknown/invented tags (dropped), duplicate tags
(deduped), and missing/garbage confidences (defaulted + clamped).
"""
data = _extract_json_array(text or "")
if not isinstance(data, list):
return []
# Map back to the canonical spelling in the universe, case-insensitively,
# so a model that lowercases a tag still resolves to the real one.
canonical = {t.lower(): t for t in universe}
out: list[dict] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
for item in data:
if isinstance(item, dict):
raw = item.get("tag")
conf = item.get("confidence")
elif isinstance(item, str):
raw, conf = item, None
else:
continue
if not isinstance(raw, str):
continue
tag = canonical.get(raw.strip().lower())
if tag is None or tag in seen:
continue
try:
c = float(conf) if conf is not None else 0.5
except (ValueError, TypeError):
c = 0.5
c = max(0.0, min(1.0, c))
out.append({"tag": tag, "confidence": round(c, 3)})
seen.add(tag)
if len(out) >= max_suggestions:
break
return out
def suggest(
provider: BaseProvider,
draft: Draft,
universe: list[str],
max_suggestions: int = DEFAULT_MAX_SUGGESTIONS,
) -> list[dict]:
"""Orchestrate one suggestion call. Returns [] for an empty draft or
empty universe (no model call), and for any provider/parse failure."""
if draft.is_empty() or not universe:
return []
system, history = _build_messages(draft, universe, max_suggestions)
try:
text = provider.send(system, history)
except Exception as exc: # provider/network failure → silent empty
log.warning("tag-suggest provider failed: %s", exc)
return []
return parse_reply(text, universe, max_suggestions)
+5 -23
View File
@@ -73,19 +73,6 @@ def _siteverify_url() -> str:
return os.environ.get("TURNSTILE_SITEVERIFY_URL", "").strip() or SITEVERIFY_URL
async def _siteverify_post(url: str, data: dict) -> httpx.Response:
"""Perform the siteverify POST on an `httpx.AsyncClient`.
Isolated as a narrow seam (I4, security-audit-0026): the call is
awaited so a slow CloudFlare response can't block the event loop,
and tests patch *this function* rather than the shared
`httpx.AsyncClient` (which other modules gitea, docs also
construct, so a global patch would break app boot).
"""
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
return await client.post(url, data=data)
@dataclass
class VerifyOutcome:
"""Result of a Turnstile siteverify call.
@@ -111,7 +98,7 @@ class VerifyOutcome:
reason: str
async def verify_token(token: str | None, *, client_ip: str | None = None) -> VerifyOutcome:
def verify_token(token: str | None, *, client_ip: str | None = None) -> VerifyOutcome:
"""Validate a Turnstile token against CloudFlare's siteverify endpoint.
Returns a VerifyOutcome describing whether the calling endpoint
@@ -121,14 +108,9 @@ async def verify_token(token: str | None, *, client_ip: str | None = None) -> Ve
* 'misconfigured' 500 "auth misconfigured"
* 'missing-token' / 'failed' / 'network' 400 "verification failed"
Async (I4, security-audit-0026): the siteverify call is awaited on an
`httpx.AsyncClient` so a slow CloudFlare response can't block the
event loop (the prior synchronous `httpx.post` stalled the single
worker for up to the 10s timeout). Callers must `await` it.
Tests monkeypatch `_siteverify_post` (the narrow async seam) to avoid
touching the real CloudFlare endpoint and to keep the patch off the
shared `httpx.AsyncClient`. No real keys are ever embedded in tests.
Tests monkeypatch `httpx.post` (or set `TURNSTILE_SITEVERIFY_URL`
+ a MockTransport client) to avoid touching the real CloudFlare
endpoint. No real keys are ever embedded in tests.
"""
secret = _secret()
required = _required()
@@ -151,7 +133,7 @@ async def verify_token(token: str | None, *, client_ip: str | None = None) -> Ve
data["remoteip"] = client_ip
try:
response = await _siteverify_post(_siteverify_url(), data)
response = httpx.post(_siteverify_url(), data=data, timeout=10.0)
payload = response.json()
except Exception as exc: # network, JSON parse, etc.
log.warning("Turnstile siteverify call failed: %s", exc)
+1 -33
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import logging
import os
from fastapi import APIRouter, Header, HTTPException, Request
@@ -41,27 +40,7 @@ def make_router(config: Config, gitea: Gitea) -> APIRouter:
x_gitea_signature: str = Header(default=""),
):
body = await request.body()
# v0.18.0: defense in depth. config.py refuses to start
# when the secret is empty unless `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`
# is set; this branch catches the dev-bypass case (the only
# path where `config.webhook_secret` can be empty) and surfaces
# it loudly to the client. A POST that lands here with an
# empty secret on a production deployment indicates a
# mis-configuration (somebody flipped the bypass in prod),
# and the loud 500 is the proposal's whole point.
insecure = os.environ.get("RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS", "").strip() == "1"
if not config.webhook_secret:
if not insecure:
log.error(
"webhook receiver misconfigured: GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET is empty "
"and RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1 is not set"
)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Webhook receiver misconfigured")
log.warning(
"webhook receiver running with RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1 — "
"signature verification is DISABLED. Production deployments MUST NOT set this."
)
else:
if config.webhook_secret:
if not _verify_signature(body, x_gitea_signature, config.webhook_secret):
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid signature")
@@ -89,17 +68,6 @@ def make_router(config: Config, gitea: Gitea) -> APIRouter:
slug = _slug_for_repo(repo_full)
if slug:
await cache.refresh_rfc_repo(config, gitea, slug)
else:
# v0.18.0: the proposal's "unknown-repo logging"
# gesture — a hook on a fork or a stale repo binding
# used to silently 200-OK here, hiding the
# misconfiguration. Now the operator sees it in
# the log.
log.info(
"webhook received for unknown repo: repo_full=%s event=%s "
"(no cached_rfcs row matched; hook may be on a fork or stale)",
repo_full, event,
)
except Exception:
log.exception("webhook refresh failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Refresh failed")
-177
View File
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
-- §6 / §10 / v0.16.0: owner-only invite for per-RFC contribution +
-- discussion (roadmap item #12).
--
-- Distinct from a platform-level grant (`users.permission_state`,
-- v0.8.0 / item #6). This row is per-RFC membership: the RFC's owner
-- invites a specific email to either open PRs against that RFC
-- (`role_in_rfc='contributor'`) or to participate in the RFC's PR-less
-- discussion only (`role_in_rfc='discussant'`). Non-invited users keep
-- the v0.6.0 anonymous-read contract — they can read but cannot
-- write/discuss that specific RFC.
--
-- Coordinates with item #16's parallel work this wave: that item
-- adds platform-wide invitation tokens; this one adds per-RFC
-- collaboration rows. To avoid table-name + concept collisions the
-- two surfaces are scoped distinctly — this migration owns slot 018
-- and names everything `rfc_*` (RFC-scoped); #16 will use a later
-- slot and name its tables under a different prefix (`invite_tokens`
-- or similar) at the user/platform level.
--
-- Tables in this migration:
--
-- * `rfc_invitations` — one row per (rfc, invitee_email) invite
-- issued by the RFC's owner. Carries the role-in-RFC the
-- invitation grants, the opaque token the email link encodes,
-- the lifecycle state, and the audit trail (who invited, when
-- accepted, by which user_id if any).
--
-- * `rfc_collaborators` — one row per (rfc, user_id, role_in_rfc)
-- after an invitation is accepted. This is the table the
-- write-gate consults: "is the viewer named here for this RFC?"
-- Separating the two means the invitation row carries the
-- issue/accept lifecycle while the collaborator row is the
-- compact membership-check substrate. A grant via collaborator
-- can exist independently of a live invitation (admin-only
-- direct insert is a §19.2 candidate; v0.16.0 only writes
-- collaborator rows via the accept path).
--
-- Authorization model the application layer enforces on top of these
-- rows (not encoded in SQL — the schema is just storage):
--
-- * Writes (open PR, post discussion message, open discussion
-- thread) to an RFC require ONE of:
-- (a) the viewer is named in this RFC's `rfc_collaborators`
-- with the appropriate role_in_rfc, OR
-- (b) the viewer holds a globally privileged role (admin,
-- owner of the platform) per the existing §6 helpers, OR
-- (c) the viewer is named in the RFC's frontmatter owners
-- list (the §6 RFC-owner concept, which already grants
-- the maximal per-RFC capability).
--
-- * Reads remain on the v0.6.0 anonymous-read contract — anyone
-- can read any non-withdrawn RFC. Item #12 does not narrow this.
--
-- * Only the RFC's owner (per `cached_rfcs.owners_json`) can
-- invite. App admins/owners also can (they have the maximal
-- per-RFC capability by construction).
--
-- Storage shape — `rfc_invitations`:
--
-- * `id` — surrogate key; the revoke-by-id surface addresses a
-- single row without leaking the token shape.
--
-- * `rfc_slug` — TEXT NOT NULL; the RFC the invitation scopes to.
-- We FK against `cached_rfcs(slug)` so a withdrawn/deleted RFC
-- cascades its invitations away cleanly. The §4 cache contract
-- says cached_rfcs is rebuildable from Gitea; per the same
-- contract, invitations are app-truth (no Git substrate), so
-- the cascade is the right direction.
--
-- * `inviter_user_id` — the owner who issued the invite. ON
-- DELETE SET NULL because losing the inviter's user row should
-- not cascade-delete invitations they sent (the row stays as
-- audit; the UI renders "by (deleted user)" the same way the
-- audit log does for orphaned actors).
--
-- * `invitee_email` — TEXT NOT NULL; the email the invitation
-- was sent to. Stored verbatim (case-preserved) so the email
-- body can address the invitee in their original shape; the
-- accept path matches case-insensitively.
--
-- * `role_in_rfc` — CHECK in {'contributor' | 'discussant'}.
-- `contributor` lets the user open PRs against the RFC AND
-- post in its discussion (PR-permission strictly includes
-- discussion-permission); `discussant` only lets them post
-- in discussion. Future roles (e.g., 'arbiter') would be
-- additions; v0.16.0 ships the two.
--
-- * `status` — CHECK in {'pending' | 'accepted' | 'revoked' |
-- 'expired'}. Default 'pending'. `accepted` flips on the
-- accept endpoint; `revoked` on the owner's revoke gesture;
-- `expired` lazily on read (the accept endpoint refuses a
-- row whose expires_at has passed, regardless of the column
-- value).
--
-- * `token` — opaque high-entropy string the email link
-- encodes. Stored verbatim (not hashed) because the
-- invitation token is single-use and lower-stakes than a
-- session token: it grants per-RFC role only, and is bounded
-- by expires_at. Hashing the token here is a §19.2 candidate
-- if/when the threat model demands it. UNIQUE so the accept
-- path is a single-row lookup.
--
-- * `expires_at` — TEXT timestamp. Set to `created_at + 30 days`
-- at insert time by the application layer. Accept refuses past
-- this point; the row can still be revoked or re-issued.
--
-- * `created_at` — when the invitation was issued.
--
-- * `accepted_at` — when the invitee accepted (NULL until then).
--
-- * `accepted_by_user_id` — the user row that accepted. NULL
-- until acceptance. On a fresh email (no platform user yet)
-- the accept endpoint requires the invitee to sign in first
-- via the v0.7.0 OTC path; that path provisions the user row,
-- after which the accept call lands the user_id here.
--
-- Indexing:
--
-- * UNIQUE on `token` so the accept lookup is a primary-key-shape
-- hit and accidental collisions are detectable at insert time.
-- * (rfc_slug, status) for the owner's "list pending/accepted for
-- this RFC" surface — the most frequent query.
-- * (invitee_email, status) for a future cross-RFC "show me my
-- pending invites" inbox; v0.16.0 doesn't ship that surface but
-- the index slot is cheap and aligned with the data shape.
--
-- Storage shape — `rfc_collaborators`:
--
-- * `id` — surrogate key.
-- * `rfc_slug` — TEXT NOT NULL FK cached_rfcs(slug) ON DELETE CASCADE.
-- * `user_id` — INTEGER NOT NULL FK users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE.
-- A deleted user loses every per-RFC role automatically (mirrors
-- the device_trust / passcode cascade shape).
-- * `role_in_rfc` — same CHECK as the invitation table.
-- * `invitation_id` — INTEGER FK rfc_invitations(id) ON DELETE
-- SET NULL. Audit pointer to the row that minted this
-- collaborator; NULL is allowed so a future admin-direct grant
-- path (a §19.2 candidate) can mint a collaborator with no
-- originating invitation. v0.16.0 always populates this.
-- * `created_at` — when the collaborator row was minted.
--
-- Indexing on collaborators:
-- * UNIQUE on (rfc_slug, user_id) — a single user can hold at most
-- one role per RFC. Re-accepting an invitation upgrades the row
-- (discussant → contributor) but never duplicates.
-- * (user_id) for "what RFCs am I a collaborator on?" reads.
CREATE TABLE rfc_invitations (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
rfc_slug TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES cached_rfcs(slug) ON DELETE CASCADE,
inviter_user_id INTEGER REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
invitee_email TEXT NOT NULL,
role_in_rfc TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role_in_rfc IN ('contributor', 'discussant')),
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending'
CHECK (status IN ('pending', 'accepted', 'revoked', 'expired')),
token TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
accepted_at TEXT,
accepted_by_user_id INTEGER REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_rfc_invitations_token ON rfc_invitations (token);
CREATE INDEX idx_rfc_invitations_rfc_status ON rfc_invitations (rfc_slug, status);
CREATE INDEX idx_rfc_invitations_email_status ON rfc_invitations (invitee_email, status);
CREATE TABLE rfc_collaborators (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
rfc_slug TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES cached_rfcs(slug) ON DELETE CASCADE,
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
role_in_rfc TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (role_in_rfc IN ('contributor', 'discussant')),
invitation_id INTEGER REFERENCES rfc_invitations(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_rfc_collaborators_unique ON rfc_collaborators (rfc_slug, user_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_rfc_collaborators_user ON rfc_collaborators (user_id);
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-- v0.18.0 Slice 4: outbound_emails audit table.
--
-- Per the v0.18.0 email + webhook hygiene proposal §3, every send
-- helper writes a row to this table before returning, regardless
-- of outcome. status='sent' on success, 'failed' on exception,
-- 'deferred' on the dev-fallback path (no SMTP_HOST configured).
--
-- The table is queried by `GET /api/admin/outbound-emails` to
-- answer "did this person ever get their invite?" without having
-- to grep VM logs, and by the v0.18.0 Slice 5 bounce-correlation
-- hook (which looks up message_id when a POST lands at
-- /api/webhooks/email-bounce and marks the matching row
-- status='bounced').
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS outbound_emails (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
to_address TEXT NOT NULL,
from_address TEXT NOT NULL,
subject TEXT NOT NULL,
kind TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'otc' | 'invite' | 'notification' | 'bundle' | 'digest' | 'rfc-invite'
sent_at TEXT NOT NULL, -- ISO 8601, time the send was attempted
status TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'sent' | 'failed' | 'deferred' | 'bounced'
error TEXT, -- exception class + message if status='failed'
notification_id INTEGER, -- nullable FK to notifications.id for the watcher path
message_id TEXT -- the Message-ID header value, for bounce correlation
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_outbound_emails_to ON outbound_emails(to_address);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_outbound_emails_sent_at ON outbound_emails(sent_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_outbound_emails_message ON outbound_emails(message_id);
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-- Roadmap #26 (rfc-app v0.22.0): the optional "What will you be using
-- this for?" capture on the two propose surfaces.
--
-- The roadmap's framing names "the rfcs table" and "the PR-metadata
-- table" for a `proposed_use_case TEXT NULL` column. In this deployment
-- those two surfaces are the cache tables `cached_rfcs` and `cached_prs`
-- (002_cache.sql). We add the nullable column to each, matching the
-- existing naming convention (no NOT NULL, no default — NULL is the
-- "left blank" sentinel the view surfaces render tastefully).
--
-- BUT: those tables are *cache*, rebuilt from Gitea by the §4.1
-- reconciler (cache.py). The reconciler's INSERT...ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE
-- sets only the columns it knows about, so an unlisted column is
-- preserved on the update path — yet a propose/open never *writes* the
-- column through the cache (the write path is endpoint -> Gitea ->
-- reconcile, and the reconciler does not carry this field). So the cache
-- column alone would always read NULL.
--
-- The durable home is therefore a dedicated app-truth table the propose
-- /open endpoints write directly (keyed by the PR number, which is the
-- stable identity for both idea PRs and rfc_branch PRs) and the view
-- endpoints read back. This is not cache — it is canonical and survives
-- any reconcile. The cache columns are added too for parity with the
-- roadmap's literal shape and for any future reconciler that learns to
-- carry the field, but the side table is the source of truth read at
-- view time.
ALTER TABLE cached_rfcs ADD COLUMN proposed_use_case TEXT;
ALTER TABLE cached_prs ADD COLUMN proposed_use_case TEXT;
-- Canonical, reconcile-proof store. One row per propose/open that
-- supplied a use case. `scope` distinguishes the propose-RFC surface
-- ('rfc') from the propose-PR-against-an-RFC surface ('pr'); `pr_number`
-- is the join key the endpoints already have in hand. NULL/omitted use
-- cases simply never write a row here, so absence == "left blank".
CREATE TABLE proposed_use_cases (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
scope TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (scope IN ('rfc', 'pr')),
rfc_slug TEXT NOT NULL,
pr_number INTEGER NOT NULL,
use_case TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
UNIQUE (scope, pr_number)
);
CREATE INDEX idx_proposed_use_cases_lookup ON proposed_use_cases (scope, pr_number);
CREATE INDEX idx_proposed_use_cases_slug ON proposed_use_cases (scope, rfc_slug);
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-- v0.23.0 / roadmap item #29: server-side sign-in state resume.
--
-- Track each authenticated user's last-viewed route + a small bag of
-- "light" component state so that the *next* sign-in can land the user
-- back where they left off, rather than always dropping them on the
-- empty-state home view.
--
-- Storage shape (one row per user — per-user, NOT per-device, per the
-- #29 "safe default"):
--
-- * `user_id` — PRIMARY KEY and FK into users(id) with cascade on
-- delete. INTEGER to match users.id (INTEGER PRIMARY KEY
-- AUTOINCREMENT). A deleted user automatically loses their stored
-- resume state. One row per user means a later sign-in on any
-- device resumes the most-recently-recorded route — the per-user
-- model the roadmap asks for.
--
-- * `last_route` — the frontend pathname the user was last on
-- (e.g. "/rfc/open-human-model"). TEXT, nullable until the first
-- route-change POST lands. NEVER contains draft-buffer contents —
-- it is a route only. See SPEC §6.2 "Sign-in state resume
-- (privacy)".
--
-- * `last_route_state` — a JSON-encoded bag of *light* component
-- state (scroll anchors, open-tab selection, filter chips, etc.).
-- SQLite has no native JSONB; we store JSON as TEXT exactly as the
-- rest of the app stores its JSON blobs (json.dumps / json.loads,
-- cf. permission_events.details, actions.details). Nullable.
-- PRIVACY INVARIANT: this column MUST NOT carry draft-buffer text,
-- PR bodies, comment drafts, or any user-typed content — only
-- ephemeral view state safe to replay. The PUT handler is the
-- enforcement point; the column comment is the contract.
--
-- * `resume_enabled` — the per-user opt-out flag. 1 (default) means
-- "resume me where I left off"; 0 means "always land on home". The
-- PUT handler no-ops the upsert when this is 0, and the read path
-- refuses to hand back a stored route when this is 0. A
-- profile-settings toggle UI to flip this is a follow-up (the
-- column + default-on behavior ship now); see CHANGELOG v0.23.0.
--
-- * `last_updated_at` — TEXT timestamp, app convention
-- `datetime('now')`, matching device_trust.last_seen_at /
-- users.last_seen_at. Refreshed on every successful upsert.
--
-- No new env vars. The debounce interval for the frontend route-change
-- POST is a frontend constant (~1s), not a server knob.
CREATE TABLE user_session_state (
user_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
last_route TEXT,
last_route_state TEXT, -- JSON-encoded light state, nullable
resume_enabled INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
last_updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
);
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-- v0.25.0 / security audit 0026, finding H1.
--
-- The OTC verify path had no attempt-limit or lockout, unlike the
-- passcode path (015_passcode.sql gave users.passcode_failed_attempts +
-- passcode_locked_until). This table gives the OTC verify endpoint the
-- same per-identity lockout shape. It is keyed by email rather than
-- user_id because an OTC sign-in may not have a users row yet — the row
-- is provisioned only on a *successful* verify, so the lockout state has
-- to survive independently of it.
--
-- The per-IP rate limiter (app/ratelimit.py) is the primary brute-force
-- defense; this table is the parity layer that mirrors the passcode
-- lockout and persists across restarts.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS otc_verify_state (
email TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
failed_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
locked_until TEXT
);
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-- v0.29.0 / roadmap #28 Part 3 — offer-to-contribute-to-a-pending-RFC.
--
-- When the #28 scanner matches a term in submitted PR/comment text to a
-- *pending* RFC (a super-draft: accepted-as-an-idea but not yet graduated
-- to an active RFC), the reader is offered a "ask to contribute" popover.
-- Submitting it lands a row here AND a notification in each owner's §15
-- inbox; the owner can accept (which fires #12's owner-invite flow with
-- the requester as the invitee) or decline (the requester is notified and
-- the request closes).
--
-- A "pending RFC" is scoped to a super-draft (cached_rfcs.state =
-- 'super-draft'): it is in cached_rfcs (so the rfc_invitations FK that the
-- accept path reuses resolves), it carries owners (owners_json) to route
-- the request to, and it already has a discussion/contribution surface to
-- open. Pre-merge idea PRs (not yet in cached_rfcs, no contribution
-- surface) are deliberately out of scope — see backend/app/rfc_links.py.
--
-- The request row is the persistent record; the inbox notification is the
-- owner-facing actionable surface keyed back to it via `notification_id`.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS contribution_requests (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
rfc_slug TEXT NOT NULL
REFERENCES cached_rfcs(slug) ON DELETE CASCADE,
requester_user_id INTEGER NOT NULL
REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
-- The term in the PR/comment text that surfaced the offer (e.g. the
-- super-draft's title). Carried for the owner's context line and the
-- requester's "what RFC" anchor; not a foreign key.
matched_term TEXT NOT NULL,
-- The three contribute-request fields (§15 / #26 vocabulary).
-- `who_i_am` and `why` are required; `use_case` mirrors #26's
-- optional ground-truth field.
who_i_am TEXT NOT NULL,
why TEXT NOT NULL,
use_case TEXT,
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending'
CHECK (status IN ('pending', 'accepted', 'declined')),
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
decided_at TEXT,
decided_by_user_id INTEGER REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
-- The rfc_invitations row minted on accept (the #12 reuse), and the
-- owner-facing notification row that carries the Accept/Decline action.
invitation_id INTEGER REFERENCES rfc_invitations(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
notification_id INTEGER REFERENCES notifications(id) ON DELETE SET NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_contribution_requests_rfc
ON contribution_requests(rfc_slug, status);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_contribution_requests_requester
ON contribution_requests(requester_user_id, status);
-- At most one open (pending) request per (RFC, requester): a second ask
-- while one is still pending is a 409, not a duplicate row. A decided
-- request (accepted/declined) does not block a fresh ask later.
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_contribution_requests_one_open
ON contribution_requests(rfc_slug, requester_user_id)
WHERE status = 'pending';
-19
View File
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
"""Shared pytest fixtures for the backend suite.
Added in v0.27.0 (security audit 0026) alongside the new per-IP rate
limiter. The limiters in `app.ratelimit` are process-global singletons,
so their state survives across tests within a run; without a reset, the
accumulated requests from earlier tests exhaust the budget and later
tests see spurious 429s. This autouse fixture gives every test a clean
limiter window.
"""
import pytest
from app import ratelimit
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _reset_rate_limiters():
ratelimit._reset_all_for_tests()
yield
ratelimit._reset_all_for_tests()
@@ -647,82 +647,3 @@ def test_pending_invites_listing_admin_only(app_with_fake_gitea):
)
r = client.get("/api/admin/users/invites")
assert r.status_code == 403
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.18.0: invite-envelope header shape — Slice 2
#
# Invite mail goes through `build_envelope` and MUST land Date,
# Message-ID, Auto-Submitted, AND a `List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:…>`
# (no URL — the invitee isn't a user yet, so no per-user opt-out
# row exists). The mailto: target is the operator's `EMAIL_FROM`
# by default; the operator can override via `EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO`.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _provision_admin_and_send_invite(client, app_with_fake_gitea_fixture, *, to: str = "headers@ex.co"):
provision_user_row(user_id=400, login="adminH", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=400, gitea_login="adminH",
display_name="Admin H", role="admin",
email="adminh@test",
)
_reset_outbound()
r = client.post(
"/api/admin/users",
json={
"email": to,
"first_name": "Header",
"last_name": "Test",
"role": "contributor",
"custom_message": "",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
return _outbound_invite_envelopes(to)[-1]
def test_invite_envelope_sets_date_messageid_autosubmitted(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
env = _provision_admin_and_send_invite(client, (app, _fake))
msg = env["message"]
assert parsedate_to_datetime(msg["Date"]) is not None
assert msg["Message-ID"].startswith("<") and msg["Message-ID"].endswith(">")
assert msg["Auto-Submitted"] == "auto-generated"
def test_invite_envelope_has_mailto_list_unsubscribe_only(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The invitee isn't a user yet — no per-user opt-out URL is
available. The `List-Unsubscribe` MUST be a mailto: form, and
the `List-Unsubscribe-Post` header MUST be absent (the
one-click semantic requires a URL the MUA can POST to)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
env = _provision_admin_and_send_invite(client, (app, _fake))
msg = env["message"]
lu = msg["List-Unsubscribe"]
assert lu is not None and lu.startswith("<mailto:")
# No URL part — invite is mailto-only.
assert "https://" not in lu and "http://" not in lu
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] is None
def test_invite_envelope_respects_email_unsubscribe_mailto_override(app_with_fake_gitea, monkeypatch):
"""When `EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO` is set, the mailto: target on
`List-Unsubscribe` honors it (lets a deployment route opt-outs
to a humans-monitored mailbox distinct from the no-reply
sender)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
monkeypatch.setenv("EMAIL_UNSUBSCRIBE_MAILTO", "ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove")
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
env = _provision_admin_and_send_invite(client, (app, _fake))
msg = env["message"]
assert "ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove" in msg["List-Unsubscribe"]
@@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
"""v0.29.0 / roadmap #28 Parts 2 & 3 — create-RFC offers + contribute-to-
pending requests.
Two layers, mirroring test_rfc_links_vertical.py:
* The PR-view scanner surfaces `rfc-pending` (Part 3) and `rfc-candidate`
(Part 2) segments alongside Part 1's `rfc` links.
* The contribute-request flow end-to-end: a non-owner asks, each owner
gets an actionable §15 notification, accept fires #12's invite flow,
decline notifies the requester.
Reuses the FakeGitea + seed/session helpers from the existing suites.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
)
from test_rfc_view_vertical import SEED_BODY, seed_active_rfc
from test_super_draft_vertical import seed_super_draft
from test_rfc_links_vertical import _open_pr_on
def _set_owner(slug: str, login: str) -> None:
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE cached_rfcs SET owners_json = ? WHERE slug = ?",
(json.dumps([login]), slug),
)
def _set_tags(slug: str, tags: list[str]) -> None:
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE cached_rfcs SET tags_json = ? WHERE slug = ?",
(json.dumps(tags), slug),
)
def _segs(segments, kind):
return [s for s in segments if s["type"] == kind]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Part 2 + Part 3 — scanner surfaces on the PR view
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_pending_and_candidate_segments_on_pr(app_with_fake_gitea):
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
# Host active RFC (OHM — single word, contributes no keys itself)
# carrying a multi-word tag with no defining RFC: the Part 2
# candidate. And a pending super-draft owned by alice: the Part 3
# contribute target.
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
_set_tags("ohm", ["memory model", "identity"])
seed_super_draft(fake, slug="open-human-model", title="Open Human Model",
pitch="A framework for representing humans.", proposed_by="alice")
_set_owner("open-human-model", "alice")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
pr_number = _open_pr_on(
client, fake, host_slug="ohm",
description="This builds on the Open Human Model and the memory model.",
)
pr = client.get(f"/api/rfcs/ohm/prs/{pr_number}").json()
segs = pr["description_segments"]
pending = _segs(segs, "rfc-pending")
assert len(pending) == 1
assert pending[0]["slug"] == "open-human-model"
assert pending[0]["label"] == "Open Human Model"
assert pending[0]["owner"] == "Alice" # display_name of the owner
candidate = _segs(segs, "rfc-candidate")
assert len(candidate) == 1
assert candidate[0]["term"] == "memory model"
# "identity" is a single-word tag — deliberately NOT a candidate.
assert all("identity" not in s.get("term", "") for s in candidate)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Part 3 — the contribute-request flow
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _seed_pending_owned_by_alice(fake):
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=3, login="bob", role="contributor")
seed_super_draft(fake, slug="open-human-model", title="Open Human Model",
pitch="A framework.", proposed_by="alice")
_set_owner("open-human-model", "alice")
_REQUEST = {
"matched_term": "Open Human Model",
"who_i_am": "Bob, a researcher",
"why": "I have relevant prior work to bring.",
"use_case": "Building an identity tool.",
}
def test_request_accept_invites_and_notifies(app_with_fake_gitea):
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_seed_pending_owned_by_alice(fake)
# Bob asks to contribute.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="bob", display_name="Bob",
role="contributor", email="bob@test")
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-requests", json=_REQUEST)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
request_id = r.json()["id"]
assert r.json()["status"] == "pending"
# A second ask while pending is a 409, not a duplicate row.
assert client.post("/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-requests",
json=_REQUEST).status_code == 409
# Alice (owner) sees the actionable notification with full detail.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice",
role="contributor", email="alice@test")
inbox = client.get("/api/notifications").json()
reqs = [i for i in inbox["items"]
if i["event_kind"] == "contribution_request_on_pending_rfc"]
assert len(reqs) == 1
assert "wants to contribute" in reqs[0]["summary"]
assert reqs[0]["extras"]["who_i_am"] == "Bob, a researcher"
assert reqs[0]["extras"]["request_id"] == request_id
# Alice accepts → #12 invitation minted for bob's email.
acc = client.post(f"/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-requests/{request_id}/accept")
assert acc.status_code == 200, acc.text
assert acc.json()["status"] == "accepted"
assert acc.json()["invitation_id"]
inv = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT invitee_email, role_in_rfc, status FROM rfc_invitations "
"WHERE rfc_slug = 'open-human-model'"
).fetchone()
assert inv["invitee_email"] == "bob@test"
assert inv["role_in_rfc"] == "contributor"
assert inv["status"] == "pending"
# The request is settled — re-accepting is a 409.
assert client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-requests/{request_id}/accept"
).status_code == 409
# Bob gets the accepted echo in his inbox.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="bob", display_name="Bob",
role="contributor", email="bob@test")
bob_kinds = [i["event_kind"] for i in client.get("/api/notifications").json()["items"]]
assert "contribution_request_accepted" in bob_kinds
def test_decline_notifies_requester(app_with_fake_gitea):
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_seed_pending_owned_by_alice(fake)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="bob", display_name="Bob",
role="contributor", email="bob@test")
request_id = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-requests", json=_REQUEST
).json()["id"]
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice",
role="contributor", email="alice@test")
dec = client.post(f"/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-requests/{request_id}/decline")
assert dec.status_code == 200, dec.text
assert dec.json()["status"] == "declined"
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT status FROM contribution_requests WHERE id = ?", (request_id,)
).fetchone()
assert row["status"] == "declined"
sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="bob", display_name="Bob",
role="contributor", email="bob@test")
bob_kinds = [i["event_kind"] for i in client.get("/api/notifications").json()["items"]]
assert "contribution_request_declined" in bob_kinds
def test_owner_cannot_request_own_rfc(app_with_fake_gitea):
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_seed_pending_owned_by_alice(fake)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice",
role="contributor", email="alice@test")
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-requests", json=_REQUEST)
assert r.status_code == 409
assert "own" in r.json()["detail"].lower()
def test_request_on_active_rfc_rejected(app_with_fake_gitea):
# The contribute offer only exists for pending super-drafts; an active
# RFC uses the Part-1 link instead.
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=3, login="bob", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="bob", display_name="Bob",
role="contributor", email="bob@test")
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/ohm/contribution-requests", json=_REQUEST)
assert r.status_code == 409
def test_contribution_target_eligibility(app_with_fake_gitea):
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_seed_pending_owned_by_alice(fake)
# Anonymous: not eligible, told to sign in.
t = client.get("/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-target").json()
assert t["eligible"] is False
assert "sign in" in (t["reason"] or "").lower()
assert t["owner"] == "Alice"
# Bob: eligible until he has a pending ask, then not.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="bob", display_name="Bob",
role="contributor", email="bob@test")
assert client.get("/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-target").json()["eligible"] is True
client.post("/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-requests", json=_REQUEST)
after = client.get("/api/rfcs/open-human-model/contribution-target").json()
assert after["already_requested"] is True
assert after["eligible"] is False
@@ -1,379 +0,0 @@
"""v0.19.0 / roadmap item #30 — `/api/docs/sessions/*` endpoints.
The framework mediates reads against the public
`wiggleverse/ohm-session-history` gitea repo so the rendered
`/docs/sessions/*` surface inherits the same chrome as `/docs/user-guide`.
This test suite covers the four endpoints + the in-process TTL cache,
mocking the upstream HTTP via `httpx.MockTransport` (the same shape the
rest of the test suite uses for Gitea).
The tests do NOT spin up the full FakeGitea they only need to mock
the gitea raw URL surface (and the contents API for the session-index
endpoint). Each test owns its mock transport so we can dial in 200 /
404 / 5xx / timeout responses per case.
Path-validation tests intentionally bypass the network a malformed
`nnnn` or `filename` MUST be rejected at the route layer before any
upstream call is made.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import httpx
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import docs_sessions
# Reuse the proven app-construction fixtures from the proposal vertical
# (same shape every test file in this repo uses).
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
app_with_fake_gitea,
tmp_env,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Test scaffolding
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class _UpstreamHandler:
"""Records every URL the docs_sessions module fetched and returns
canned responses keyed by URL substring. Allows the test to assert
on call count (for cache verification) without needing a full Gitea
simulator.
`calls` tracks only URLs that hit the session-history host (the
`OHM_SESSION_HISTORY_*` bases) so reconciler/Gitea-side calls which
also pass through this handler because `httpx.AsyncClient` is a
shared attribute the gitea-side fixture also monkeypatches don't
inflate the count we use for cache-hit assertions.
"""
_SESSION_HOST_MARKERS = ("ohm-session-history", "wiggleverse/ohm-session-history")
def __init__(self, responses: dict[str, tuple[int, str]]):
self.responses = responses
self.calls: list[str] = []
def __call__(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
url = str(request.url)
if any(m in url for m in self._SESSION_HOST_MARKERS):
self.calls.append(url)
for key, (status, body) in self.responses.items():
if key in url:
return httpx.Response(status, text=body)
# Default: 404. Lets tests skip declaring "the rest is 404".
return httpx.Response(404, text="not found")
@pytest.fixture
def patched_httpx(monkeypatch):
"""Provide a hook the test can call to install a MockTransport.
Returns a closure: `install(handler)` patches
`app.docs_sessions.httpx.AsyncClient` so every constructed client
uses the handler's transport.
NB: the upstream `app_with_fake_gitea` fixture also patches
`httpx.AsyncClient` (to route gitea calls to a FakeGitea handler),
and because `httpx` is a single shared module, that patch mutates
the *same* `AsyncClient` attribute we're about to overwrite. We
therefore import the unpatched class directly from the
`httpx._client` module so our install path can construct a fresh
real client around our MockTransport without going through the
FakeGitea wrapper.
"""
from httpx._client import AsyncClient as RealAsyncClient
def install(handler):
def patched(*args, **kwargs):
kwargs["transport"] = httpx.MockTransport(handler)
return RealAsyncClient(*args, **kwargs)
monkeypatch.setattr("app.docs_sessions.httpx.AsyncClient", patched)
return handler
yield install
@pytest.fixture
def app(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Wrap the shared app fixture, resetting the docs-sessions cache so
cross-test state can't leak. Returns just the FastAPI app — the
fake-Gitea handle is irrelevant for the docs-sessions surface.
"""
docs_sessions.reset_cache()
fastapi_app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
return fastapi_app
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Manifest endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_manifest_happy_path(app, patched_httpx):
manifest_body = json.dumps(
{
"0001": {"title": "Bootstrap"},
"0014": {"title": "Wave 7 driver"},
}
)
patched_httpx(
_UpstreamHandler({"sessions.json": (200, manifest_body)})
)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/manifest")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
payload = r.json()
assert payload == {
"0001": {"title": "Bootstrap"},
"0014": {"title": "Wave 7 driver"},
}
def test_manifest_empty_state(app, patched_httpx):
"""A 404 from gitea means the manifest hasn't been published yet.
The endpoint returns HTTP 200 + `{}` so the frontend can render the
no-sessions-yet state without an error banner.
"""
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({"sessions.json": (404, "not found")}))
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/manifest")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
assert r.json() == {}
def test_manifest_upstream_5xx_returns_502(app, patched_httpx):
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({"sessions.json": (500, "internal")}))
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/manifest")
assert r.status_code == 502, r.text
body = r.json()
assert body["detail"]["error"] == "session-history fetch failed"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# About endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_about_happy_path(app, patched_httpx):
readme = "# OHM session history\n\nWelcome.\n"
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({"README.md": (200, readme)}))
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/about")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
assert "text/markdown" in r.headers["content-type"]
assert r.text == readme
def test_about_404(app, patched_httpx):
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({"README.md": (404, "")}))
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/about")
assert r.status_code == 404, r.text
def test_about_upstream_5xx_returns_502(app, patched_httpx):
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({"README.md": (503, "down")}))
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/about")
assert r.status_code == 502, r.text
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Transcript endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_transcript_happy_path(app, patched_httpx):
body = "# Session 0017.1 — Transcript\n\nbody.\n"
fname = "SESSION-0017.1-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T08-50--2026-05-28T11-20.md"
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({fname: (200, body)}))
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get(f"/api/docs/sessions/0017/{fname}")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
assert "text/markdown" in r.headers["content-type"]
assert r.text == body
def test_transcript_404(app, patched_httpx):
fname = "SESSION-9999.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-01-01T00-00--2026-01-01T00-01.md"
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({})) # everything 404s
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get(f"/api/docs/sessions/9999/{fname}")
assert r.status_code == 404, r.text
def test_transcript_rejects_invalid_session_dir(app, patched_httpx):
"""`nnnn` must be exactly 4 digits. `abcd` fails before any
network call.
"""
handler = _UpstreamHandler({})
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get(
"/api/docs/sessions/abcd/"
"SESSION-0001.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-01-01T00-00--2026-01-01T00-01.md"
)
assert r.status_code == 400, r.text
assert handler.calls == [], "rejected path must not hit the network"
def test_transcript_rejects_path_traversal(app, patched_httpx):
"""A filename that doesn't match the SESSION-NNNN.M-TRANSCRIPT regex
is rejected. `../etc/passwd` doesn't match; neither does the legacy
flat-root `SESSION-A-TRANSCRIPT.md`.
"""
handler = _UpstreamHandler({})
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
# Path traversal — but FastAPI normalizes `..` in the path before
# routing, so this resolves to /api/docs/sessions/0001/etc/passwd
# which routes to the same handler with filename=etc/passwd, and
# gets rejected as an invalid transcript filename. Even if the
# normalization didn't apply (some intermediary), the regex
# check rejects anything not matching the SESSION- prefix.
r = client.get(
"/api/docs/sessions/0001/etc%2Fpasswd"
)
# 400 (filename validation) or 404 (path didn't match the
# route); both reject before any network call. Either is
# acceptable — what matters is that we never fetched it.
assert r.status_code in (400, 404), r.text
assert handler.calls == [], "rejected path must not hit the network"
def test_transcript_rejects_legacy_flat_filename(app, patched_httpx):
"""Legacy `SESSION-A-TRANSCRIPT.md` (letter form) doesn't match the
numeric regex by design, since post-#23 transcripts live in
`NNNN/` folders with numeric names. Reject 400.
"""
handler = _UpstreamHandler({})
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/0001/SESSION-A-TRANSCRIPT.md")
assert r.status_code == 400, r.text
assert handler.calls == [], "rejected path must not hit the network"
def test_transcript_upstream_5xx_returns_502(app, patched_httpx):
fname = "SESSION-0001.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-01-01T00-00--2026-01-01T00-01.md"
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({fname: (502, "bad gateway")}))
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get(f"/api/docs/sessions/0001/{fname}")
assert r.status_code == 502, r.text
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Session-index endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_session_index_happy_path(app, patched_httpx):
"""The contents API returns a JSON list of file entries. The
endpoint filters to entries that match the transcript regex and
sorts them.
"""
# Two transcripts (driver + subagent) + a non-transcript sibling
# that must be filtered out.
listing = json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "SESSION-0017.0-TRANSCRIPT-"
"2026-05-28T08-30--2026-05-28T12-00.md",
"type": "file",
},
{
"name": "SESSION-0017.1-TRANSCRIPT-"
"2026-05-28T08-50--2026-05-28T11-20.md",
"type": "file",
},
{"name": "notes.md", "type": "file"}, # not a transcript
{"name": "attached-dir", "type": "dir"}, # not a file
]
)
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({"/contents/0017": (200, listing)}))
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/0017/index")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
files = r.json()["files"]
assert files == [
"SESSION-0017.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T08-30--2026-05-28T12-00.md",
"SESSION-0017.1-TRANSCRIPT-2026-05-28T08-50--2026-05-28T11-20.md",
]
def test_session_index_404(app, patched_httpx):
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({})) # everything 404s
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/9999/index")
assert r.status_code == 404, r.text
def test_session_index_rejects_invalid_session_dir(app, patched_httpx):
handler = _UpstreamHandler({})
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/abc/index")
assert r.status_code == 400, r.text
assert handler.calls == [], "rejected path must not hit the network"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Cache behavior
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_manifest_cache_hits_within_ttl(app, patched_httpx, monkeypatch):
"""Two consecutive manifest calls within the TTL window should
issue exactly one HTTP request to gitea.
"""
# Generous TTL so the test never races.
monkeypatch.setenv("OHM_DOCS_SESSIONS_MANIFEST_TTL_SEC", "60")
handler = _UpstreamHandler(
{"sessions.json": (200, json.dumps({"0001": {"title": "x"}}))}
)
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r1 = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/manifest")
r2 = client.get("/api/docs/sessions/manifest")
assert r1.status_code == 200
assert r2.status_code == 200
assert len(handler.calls) == 1, (
f"expected one upstream call, got {handler.calls}"
)
def test_transcript_cache_hits_within_ttl(app, patched_httpx, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("OHM_DOCS_SESSIONS_CONTENT_TTL_SEC", "300")
fname = "SESSION-0001.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-01-01T00-00--2026-01-01T00-01.md"
handler = _UpstreamHandler({fname: (200, "# body\n")})
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r1 = client.get(f"/api/docs/sessions/0001/{fname}")
r2 = client.get(f"/api/docs/sessions/0001/{fname}")
assert r1.status_code == 200
assert r2.status_code == 200
assert len(handler.calls) == 1
def test_transcript_404_is_cached(app, patched_httpx, monkeypatch):
"""Negative caching: a 404 result is cached at the content TTL so a
deployment with no published transcripts doesn't hammer gitea on
every navigation. Documented in `docs_sessions.fetch_transcript`.
"""
monkeypatch.setenv("OHM_DOCS_SESSIONS_CONTENT_TTL_SEC", "300")
fname = "SESSION-9999.0-TRANSCRIPT-2026-01-01T00-00--2026-01-01T00-01.md"
handler = _UpstreamHandler({}) # everything 404s
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r1 = client.get(f"/api/docs/sessions/9999/{fname}")
r2 = client.get(f"/api/docs/sessions/9999/{fname}")
assert r1.status_code == 404
assert r2.status_code == 404
assert len(handler.calls) == 1, "negative caching should suppress the 2nd call"
-469
View File
@@ -1,469 +0,0 @@
"""v0.20.0 — `/api/docs/specs/*` endpoints.
Sibling of `test_docs_sessions_vertical.py`. The framework mediates
reads of the configured framework-spec URLs (default: rfc-app's own
SPEC.md + flotilla's SPEC.md on `git.wiggleverse.org`) so the
`/docs/specs/*` surface inherits the same chrome as
`/docs/user-guide` and `/docs/sessions/*`.
This file covers:
- The manifest endpoint with the framework default
- The manifest endpoint with an overridden `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` JSON value
- Slug validation at the route layer (rejects `..`, `/`, `~`,
uppercase, whitespace, path traversal attempts)
- Gitea 200 / 404 / 5xx response mapping
- Negative caching (404 is cached, not re-fetched within TTL)
- Malformed `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` fallback to the default + a logged
warning (asserted by caplog)
- A manifest entry that fails per-entry validation (bad slug,
missing field) is dropped, with the rest of the list retained
Mocking approach: same as docs_sessions `httpx.MockTransport`
substituted into `app.docs_specs.httpx.AsyncClient` via a fixture.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import httpx
import pytest
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import docs_specs
# Reuse the proven app-construction fixtures from the proposal vertical
# (same shape every test file in this repo uses).
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
app_with_fake_gitea,
tmp_env,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Test scaffolding
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class _UpstreamHandler:
"""Records every URL the docs_specs module fetched and returns
canned responses keyed by URL substring. Lets the test assert on
call count (for cache verification) without booting a full upstream
simulator.
`calls` tracks only URLs that hit a host configured in the spec
manifest under test so unrelated httpx clients (gitea-side
fixtures, etc.) don't inflate the count we use for cache-hit
assertions. We marker-match on substrings the manifest carries.
"""
def __init__(
self,
responses: dict[str, tuple[int, str]],
host_markers: tuple[str, ...] = ("rfc-app", "flotilla", "specs.example"),
):
self.responses = responses
self.host_markers = host_markers
self.calls: list[str] = []
def __call__(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
url = str(request.url)
if any(m in url for m in self.host_markers):
self.calls.append(url)
for key, (status, body) in self.responses.items():
if key in url:
return httpx.Response(status, text=body)
# Default: 404. Lets tests skip declaring "the rest is 404".
return httpx.Response(404, text="not found")
@pytest.fixture
def patched_httpx(monkeypatch):
"""Provide a hook the test can call to install a MockTransport.
Same shape as the docs_sessions fixture `app_with_fake_gitea`
monkeypatches `httpx.AsyncClient` for the gitea side, so we
construct from the unpatched class directly to avoid the
FakeGitea wrapper.
"""
from httpx._client import AsyncClient as RealAsyncClient
def install(handler):
def patched(*args, **kwargs):
kwargs["transport"] = httpx.MockTransport(handler)
return RealAsyncClient(*args, **kwargs)
monkeypatch.setattr("app.docs_specs.httpx.AsyncClient", patched)
return handler
yield install
@pytest.fixture
def app(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Reset the docs-specs cache so cross-test state can't leak."""
docs_specs.reset_cache()
fastapi_app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
return fastapi_app
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Manifest endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_manifest_default(app, monkeypatch):
"""With `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` unset, the manifest endpoint returns the
framework default (rfc-app + flotilla).
"""
monkeypatch.delenv("OHM_DOCS_SPECS", raising=False)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/manifest")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
payload = r.json()
assert "specs" in payload
names = [s["name"] for s in payload["specs"]]
assert names == ["rfc-app", "flotilla"]
# The default URLs point at the OHM-canonical gitea raw paths.
assert all("git.wiggleverse.org" in s["url"] for s in payload["specs"])
def test_manifest_overridden(app, monkeypatch):
"""A deployment overriding `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` gets its custom list.
The manifest is parsed per-request from the env var (no startup
binding) so a runtime overlay change is visible without a
restart same shape as the docs_sessions env knobs.
"""
custom = json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "custom-spec",
"title": "Custom Spec",
"url": "https://specs.example.org/CUSTOM.md",
}
]
)
monkeypatch.setenv("OHM_DOCS_SPECS", custom)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/manifest")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
payload = r.json()
assert payload == {
"specs": [
{
"name": "custom-spec",
"title": "Custom Spec",
"url": "https://specs.example.org/CUSTOM.md",
}
]
}
def test_manifest_malformed_json_falls_back(app, monkeypatch, caplog):
"""A non-JSON value in `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` logs a warning and the
endpoint falls back to the framework default. Startup is
unaffected the deployment continues to render the spec surface
rather than crashing on the typo.
"""
monkeypatch.setenv("OHM_DOCS_SPECS", "{not-json")
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="app.docs_specs"):
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/manifest")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
payload = r.json()
names = [s["name"] for s in payload["specs"]]
assert names == ["rfc-app", "flotilla"]
assert any(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS is not valid JSON" in rec.message
for rec in caplog.records
), f"expected a logged warning; got {[r.message for r in caplog.records]}"
def test_manifest_non_list_falls_back(app, monkeypatch, caplog):
"""`OHM_DOCS_SPECS` must be a JSON array. A JSON object (or any
non-list value) falls back to the default + logs a warning.
"""
monkeypatch.setenv("OHM_DOCS_SPECS", json.dumps({"name": "not-a-list"}))
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="app.docs_specs"):
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/manifest")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
names = [s["name"] for s in r.json()["specs"]]
assert names == ["rfc-app", "flotilla"]
assert any(
"must be a JSON array" in rec.message for rec in caplog.records
)
def test_manifest_drops_invalid_entry_keeps_valid(app, monkeypatch, caplog):
"""Per-entry validation: an entry with a bad slug or missing field
is dropped; valid entries in the same list are retained.
"""
custom = json.dumps(
[
{"name": "Bad Slug", "title": "Bad", "url": "https://x"}, # uppercase + space
{"name": "..", "title": "Traversal", "url": "https://x"}, # path traversal
{"name": "missing-url", "title": "Missing URL"}, # no url
{
"name": "good-spec",
"title": "Good",
"url": "https://specs.example.org/GOOD.md",
},
]
)
monkeypatch.setenv("OHM_DOCS_SPECS", custom)
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="app.docs_specs"):
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/manifest")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
names = [s["name"] for s in r.json()["specs"]]
assert names == ["good-spec"]
# Three drop warnings (one per bad entry).
drops = [r for r in caplog.records if "failed validation" in r.message]
assert len(drops) == 3
def test_manifest_all_invalid_falls_back(app, monkeypatch, caplog):
"""If every entry is dropped, the framework default applies (the
surface never goes empty due to a bad overlay).
"""
monkeypatch.setenv(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS",
json.dumps([{"name": "BAD"}, {"name": "..", "title": "x", "url": "y"}]),
)
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="app.docs_specs"):
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/manifest")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
names = [s["name"] for s in r.json()["specs"]]
assert names == ["rfc-app", "flotilla"]
assert any(
"yielded no valid entries" in rec.message for rec in caplog.records
)
def test_manifest_drops_duplicate_names(app, monkeypatch, caplog):
"""A duplicate `name` is dropped (the first occurrence wins). The
route layer's `/api/docs/specs/{name}` path lookup is by name, so
duplicates would otherwise be ambiguous.
"""
custom = json.dumps(
[
{"name": "x", "title": "First", "url": "https://specs.example/1"},
{"name": "x", "title": "Second", "url": "https://specs.example/2"},
]
)
monkeypatch.setenv("OHM_DOCS_SPECS", custom)
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="app.docs_specs"):
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/manifest")
payload = r.json()
assert [s["title"] for s in payload["specs"]] == ["First"]
assert any("duplicate name" in rec.message for rec in caplog.records)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Spec endpoint — happy + error paths
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_spec_happy_path(app, patched_httpx, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS",
json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "rfc-app",
"title": "rfc-app SPEC",
"url": "https://specs.example.org/rfc-app/SPEC.md",
}
]
),
)
body = "# rfc-app SPEC\n\nSection 1...\n"
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({"rfc-app/SPEC.md": (200, body)}))
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/rfc-app")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
assert "text/markdown" in r.headers["content-type"]
assert r.text == body
def test_spec_upstream_404(app, patched_httpx, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS",
json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "missing-spec",
"title": "Missing",
"url": "https://specs.example.org/missing.md",
}
]
),
)
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({})) # everything 404s
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/missing-spec")
assert r.status_code == 404, r.text
def test_spec_upstream_5xx_returns_502(app, patched_httpx, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS",
json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "broken-spec",
"title": "Broken",
"url": "https://specs.example.org/broken.md",
}
]
),
)
patched_httpx(_UpstreamHandler({"broken.md": (500, "internal")}))
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/broken-spec")
assert r.status_code == 502, r.text
body = r.json()
assert body["detail"]["error"] == "specs fetch failed"
def test_spec_unknown_name_returns_404(app, patched_httpx, monkeypatch):
"""A name that doesn't appear in the manifest returns 404 without
touching the network. The handler treats "no such configured spec"
and "upstream 404" as the same outcome both render the same
"spec not found" empty state on the frontend.
"""
monkeypatch.setenv(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS",
json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "rfc-app",
"title": "rfc-app",
"url": "https://specs.example.org/x.md",
}
]
),
)
handler = _UpstreamHandler({})
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/does-not-exist")
assert r.status_code == 404, r.text
assert handler.calls == [], "unknown-name lookup must not hit the network"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Spec endpoint — slug validation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"raw_name",
[
"UPPER", # uppercase
"spaces here", # whitespace (post-decoding)
"with~tilde", # tilde
"with.dot", # dot
"with_under", # underscore (not allowed by [a-z0-9-]+)
],
)
def test_spec_rejects_invalid_name(app, patched_httpx, raw_name):
"""Names that don't match `^[a-z0-9-]+$` are rejected with 400 at
the route layer before any network or cache work.
Note: `..` is intentionally not in this list because the URL-
parsing layer collapses `/api/docs/specs/..` to `/api/docs/specs`
before the handler is reached the path-traversal protection is
therefore framework-level (httpx/urllib's path normalizer) rather
than route-layer. The slug-validation guard still rejects any
`..` that *would* reach the handler (e.g. via an env-configured
manifest entry); see `test_manifest_drops_invalid_entry_keeps_valid`
for that path.
"""
handler = _UpstreamHandler({})
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
from urllib.parse import quote
r = client.get(f"/api/docs/specs/{quote(raw_name, safe='')}")
assert r.status_code == 400, r.text
assert handler.calls == [], "rejected name must not hit the network"
def test_spec_rejects_slash_in_name(app, patched_httpx):
"""A literal `/` in the path can't make it through the path
parameter FastAPI routes it as a separate segment. The check
here is that the request never reaches an upstream fetch.
"""
handler = _UpstreamHandler({})
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
# `/api/docs/specs/sub/path` — the second segment makes this
# not match the `/{name}` route at all; FastAPI returns 404.
r = client.get("/api/docs/specs/sub/path")
assert r.status_code == 404, r.text
assert handler.calls == [], "non-matching path must not hit the network"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Cache behavior
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_spec_cache_hits_within_ttl(app, patched_httpx, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("OHM_DOCS_SPECS_CONTENT_TTL_SEC", "300")
monkeypatch.setenv(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS",
json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "rfc-app",
"title": "rfc-app",
"url": "https://specs.example.org/rfc-app/SPEC.md",
}
]
),
)
handler = _UpstreamHandler({"rfc-app/SPEC.md": (200, "# body\n")})
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r1 = client.get("/api/docs/specs/rfc-app")
r2 = client.get("/api/docs/specs/rfc-app")
assert r1.status_code == 200
assert r2.status_code == 200
assert len(handler.calls) == 1, (
f"expected one upstream call, got {handler.calls}"
)
def test_spec_404_is_cached(app, patched_httpx, monkeypatch):
"""Negative caching: a 404 result is cached at the content TTL so
a deployment with a misconfigured spec URL doesn't hammer the
upstream on every navigation.
"""
monkeypatch.setenv("OHM_DOCS_SPECS_CONTENT_TTL_SEC", "300")
monkeypatch.setenv(
"OHM_DOCS_SPECS",
json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "missing-spec",
"title": "Missing",
"url": "https://specs.example.org/missing.md",
}
]
),
)
handler = _UpstreamHandler({}) # everything 404s
patched_httpx(handler)
with TestClient(app) as client:
r1 = client.get("/api/docs/specs/missing-spec")
r2 = client.get("/api/docs/specs/missing-spec")
assert r1.status_code == 404
assert r2.status_code == 404
assert len(handler.calls) == 1, "negative caching should suppress the 2nd call"
+1 -11
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import pytest
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
grant_rfc_collaborator,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
@@ -132,11 +131,6 @@ def test_full_user_lifecycle_propose_through_hygiene(app_with_fake_gitea):
assert d["repo"] == "wiggleverse/rfc-0001-ohm"
# --- 8. Alice opens a PR on the now-active RFC's per-RFC repo. ---
# v0.16.0 (item #12): ben is the RFC owner now; alice needs a
# per-RFC contributor invitation to cut a branch. In the
# production flow, ben would invite her via /invitations and
# she'd accept; we shortcut to the same end-state.
grant_rfc_collaborator(user_id=2, rfc_slug="ohm", role_in_rfc="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor", email="alice@test")
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/ohm/branches/main/promote-to-branch", json={})
@@ -231,17 +225,13 @@ def test_bounce_webhook_refuses_unsigned_when_secret_configured(app_with_fake_gi
# With the right header, the call passes the guard. (No matching
# user exists, so we get {matched: False} — that's the v1 contract.)
# v0.18.0 Slice 5: the response now includes `correlated_id`
# (the outbound_emails row id that matched the bounce's
# `message_id`, if one was supplied). The body didn't pass a
# message_id, so correlated_id is None.
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/email-bounce",
json={"email": "stranger@example.com", "kind": "hard"},
headers={"X-Webhook-Secret": "shhh"},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
assert r.json() == {"ok": True, "matched": False, "correlated_id": None}
assert r.json() == {"ok": True, "matched": False}
def test_bounce_webhook_open_when_secret_unset(app_with_fake_gitea):
-179
View File
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
"""Unit tests for `app.email_envelope.build_envelope` (v0.18.0 Slice 1).
These tests don't spin up the FastAPI app or touch the DB — they
exercise the helper directly. The integration tests in
test_otc_vertical / test_admin_create_user_invite_vertical /
test_notifications_vertical exercise the helper's *use* via the
shared `_SENT` buffer (the send path appends the envelope dict
before invoking the helper).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
import pytest
from app.email_envelope import build_envelope
def _base_kwargs(**overrides):
base = dict(
to_address="recipient@example.com",
from_address="notifications@ohm.wiggleverse.org",
from_name="OHM",
subject="A test subject",
body_plain="Hello, world.\n",
)
base.update(overrides)
return base
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Always-present headers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_envelope_sets_from_to_subject():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
assert msg["To"] == "recipient@example.com"
assert msg["Subject"] == "A test subject"
# `From` is the display-form: "OHM <notifications@ohm.wiggleverse.org>".
assert "OHM" in msg["From"]
assert "<notifications@ohm.wiggleverse.org>" in msg["From"]
def test_envelope_sets_date_header_parseable():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
raw = msg["Date"]
assert raw, "Date header must be set"
# parsedate_to_datetime raises ValueError on malformed input.
dt = parsedate_to_datetime(raw)
assert dt is not None
def test_envelope_sets_message_id_with_from_domain_by_default():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
mid = msg["Message-ID"]
assert mid, "Message-ID must be set"
# Shape per RFC 5322 / make_msgid: <random@domain>
assert mid.startswith("<") and mid.endswith(">")
assert "@ohm.wiggleverse.org>" in mid
def test_envelope_message_id_domain_override():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(msgid_domain="example.test"))
assert "@example.test>" in msg["Message-ID"]
def test_envelope_message_id_falls_back_to_localhost_if_from_has_no_at():
# Defensive: a malformed from_address shouldn't crash the helper.
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(from_address="bare-no-at-sign"))
assert "@localhost>" in msg["Message-ID"]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Auto-Submitted (RFC 3834)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_envelope_sets_auto_submitted_for_transactional_default():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
assert msg["Auto-Submitted"] == "auto-generated"
def test_envelope_omits_auto_submitted_when_transactional_is_false():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(is_transactional=False))
assert msg["Auto-Submitted"] is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Reply-To
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_envelope_sets_reply_to_when_provided():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(reply_to="ohm@wiggleverse.org"))
assert msg["Reply-To"] == "ohm@wiggleverse.org"
def test_envelope_omits_reply_to_when_absent():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
assert msg["Reply-To"] is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# List-Unsubscribe (the headers RFC 8058 / Gmail-Yahoo care about)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_envelope_no_list_unsubscribe_when_neither_given():
"""OTC mail: the recipient explicitly requested the code; no
unsubscribe semantics. The header MUST be absent (presence would
imply OHM has the recipient on a list, which it doesn't)."""
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe"] is None
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] is None
def test_envelope_mailto_only_list_unsubscribe():
"""Admin invite / per-RFC invite: `mailto:` form only, no URL.
The recipient isn't a user yet, so there's no per-user opt-out
URL to flip; the operator handles ad-hoc opt-outs manually."""
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(
unsubscribe_mailto="ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove",
))
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe"] == "<mailto:ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove>"
# NO List-Unsubscribe-Post when only a mailto is present — the
# one-click semantic requires a URL the MUA can POST to.
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] is None
def test_envelope_full_one_click_list_unsubscribe():
"""Watcher notification / bundle: `mailto:` + signed-URL +
`List-Unsubscribe-Post: List-Unsubscribe=One-Click`. Gmail and
Yahoo enforce this for bulk-adjacent mail per RFC 8058."""
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(
unsubscribe_mailto="ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove",
unsubscribe_url="https://ohm.wiggleverse.org/api/email/unsubscribe?t=abc",
))
lu = msg["List-Unsubscribe"]
assert "<mailto:ohm@wiggleverse.org?subject=remove>" in lu
assert "<https://ohm.wiggleverse.org/api/email/unsubscribe?t=abc>" in lu
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] == "List-Unsubscribe=One-Click"
def test_envelope_url_only_list_unsubscribe_still_sets_post():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(
unsubscribe_url="https://ohm.wiggleverse.org/api/email/unsubscribe?t=abc",
))
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe"] == "<https://ohm.wiggleverse.org/api/email/unsubscribe?t=abc>"
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] == "List-Unsubscribe=One-Click"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Body shape — plain-only vs multipart/alternative
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_envelope_plain_only_body_is_text_plain():
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs())
# No HTML alternative -> single-part text/plain.
assert msg.get_content_type() == "text/plain"
assert msg.get_content().strip() == "Hello, world."
def test_envelope_html_body_is_guarded_not_enabled():
# I3 (security-audit-0026): the HTML/multipart-alternative path is
# intentionally not enabled — passing body_html must fail loudly so
# a future caller can't silently ship unescaped user HTML (the C1
# stored-XSS class in the mail channel). When HTML mail is enabled
# deliberately, this test flips to assert the multipart shape.
with pytest.raises(NotImplementedError):
build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(body_html="<p>Hello, <b>world</b>.</p>"))
def test_envelope_html_none_is_plain_only():
# The guard keys on `is not None`, so the default (None) stays the
# live plain-text path — exercised here to lock the boundary.
msg = build_envelope(**_base_kwargs(body_html=None))
assert msg.get_content_type() == "text/plain"
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ import pytest
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
grant_rfc_collaborator,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
@@ -249,9 +248,6 @@ def test_graduate_refuses_when_body_edit_pr_open(app_with_fake_gitea):
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_owned_super_draft(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM",
pitch=PITCH, owners=["ben"])
# v0.16.0 (item #12): ben is the RFC owner; alice needs a per-RFC
# contributor invitation to cut an edit branch on the super-draft.
grant_rfc_collaborator(user_id=2, rfc_slug="ohm", role_in_rfc="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
@@ -501,8 +497,6 @@ def test_pre_graduation_history_surfaces_edit_branch_threads(app_with_fake_gitea
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_owned_super_draft(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM",
pitch=PITCH, owners=["ben"])
# v0.16.0 (item #12): alice needs per-RFC contributor access.
grant_rfc_collaborator(user_id=2, rfc_slug="ohm", role_in_rfc="contributor")
# Alice cuts an edit branch and starts chatting on it.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice",
@@ -612,127 +612,3 @@ def test_explicit_watch_set_overrides_auto(app_with_fake_gitea):
# the user put them.
assert row["set_by"] == "explicit"
assert row["state"] == "following"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.18.0 — envelope headers + RFC 8058 one-click POST endpoint
#
# Watcher notifications are bulk-adjacent (a busy RFC can produce
# dozens of structural events); per the proposal, they MUST carry
# `Date`, `Message-ID`, `Auto-Submitted`, full `List-Unsubscribe`
# (mailto + signed URL), AND `List-Unsubscribe-Post:
# List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` per RFC 8058. Gmail and Yahoo
# enforce this for senders at OHM's volume tier.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_notification_envelope_carries_full_one_click_headers(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""A `proposal_merged` event lands a watcher notification email
with the full one-click unsubscribe shape."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="ben", role="owner")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor", email="alice@test")
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/propose", json={"title": "OHM", "slug": "ohm", "pitch": PITCH, "tags": []})
assert r.status_code == 200
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="ben", display_name="Ben", role="owner", email="ben@test")
merge_r = client.post(f"/api/proposals/{r.json()['pr_number']}/merge")
assert merge_r.status_code == 200, merge_r.text
envelopes = [e for e in email_mod.sent_envelopes() if e["to"] == "alice@test"]
assert envelopes, "watcher notification did not fire"
msg = envelopes[-1]["message"]
# Always-present headers from the helper.
assert parsedate_to_datetime(msg["Date"]) is not None
assert msg["Message-ID"].startswith("<") and msg["Message-ID"].endswith(">")
assert msg["Auto-Submitted"] == "auto-generated"
# Full one-click unsubscribe.
lu = msg["List-Unsubscribe"]
assert lu is not None
assert "<mailto:" in lu
# URL part carries the signed token per make_unsubscribe_url.
assert "/api/email/unsubscribe?t=" in lu
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] == "List-Unsubscribe=One-Click"
def test_email_unsubscribe_post_one_click_flips_category_off(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""RFC 8058: Gmail/Yahoo POST `List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` to the
URL in the List-Unsubscribe header. The endpoint MUST accept POST
+ the same token shape as the GET handler + return 200 + flip the
flag."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
token = email_mod.make_unsubscribe_url(2, "personal-direct").split("t=", 1)[1]
r = client.post(
f"/api/email/unsubscribe?t={token}",
data={"List-Unsubscribe": "One-Click"},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
body = r.json()
assert body["ok"] is True
assert body["category"] == "personal-direct"
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email_personal_direct FROM users WHERE id = 2"
).fetchone()
assert row["email_personal_direct"] == 0
def test_email_unsubscribe_post_all_sets_global_opt_out(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The v0.18.0 `all` synthetic category (used by the bundle +
digest paths) MUST set `email_opt_out_all = 1`."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
token = email_mod.make_unsubscribe_url(2, "all").split("t=", 1)[1]
r = client.post(f"/api/email/unsubscribe?t={token}")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json() == {"ok": True, "category": "all"}
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email_opt_out_all FROM users WHERE id = 2"
).fetchone()
assert row["email_opt_out_all"] == 1
def test_email_unsubscribe_get_all_sets_global_opt_out(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""GET handler also accepts the `all` category and lands the
global opt-out (so an MUA that doesn't honor RFC 8058 POST and
just opens the URL in a browser still works)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
token = email_mod.make_unsubscribe_url(2, "all").split("t=", 1)[1]
r = client.get(f"/api/email/unsubscribe?t={token}")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert "Unsubscribed" in r.text
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email_opt_out_all FROM users WHERE id = 2"
).fetchone()
assert row["email_opt_out_all"] == 1
def test_email_unsubscribe_post_refuses_invalid_token(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.post("/api/email/unsubscribe?t=not-a-valid-token")
assert r.status_code == 400
-50
View File
@@ -347,53 +347,3 @@ def test_otc_re_request_invalidates_prior_unused_code(app_with_fake_gitea, monke
# The new code still works.
r = client.post("/auth/otc/verify", json={"email": "alice@example.com", "code": second})
assert r.status_code == 200
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.18.0: envelope headers — Slice 2
#
# OTC mail goes through `build_envelope` and MUST land Date,
# Message-ID, and Auto-Submitted but MUST NOT carry a
# List-Unsubscribe header (the recipient explicitly requested the
# code; advertising a list semantic would be wrong).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _last_otc_envelope():
from app import email as email_mod
otc = [e for e in email_mod.sent_envelopes() if e.get("kind") == "otc"]
assert otc, "no OTC envelope in the buffer"
return otc[-1]
def test_otc_envelope_sets_date_messageid_autosubmitted(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "headers@example.com"})
msg = _last_otc_envelope()["message"]
# Date is RFC 5322 parseable.
assert parsedate_to_datetime(msg["Date"]) is not None
# Message-ID is bracketed and carries the From-address @-domain.
mid = msg["Message-ID"]
assert mid.startswith("<") and mid.endswith(">")
# Auto-Submitted prevents auto-responder loops.
assert msg["Auto-Submitted"] == "auto-generated"
def test_otc_envelope_has_no_list_unsubscribe(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The recipient explicitly typed their email and asked for a
code; the framework MUST NOT advertise a list semantic on this
mail. Per the v0.18.0 proposal's tradeoff discussion."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "headers@example.com"})
msg = _last_otc_envelope()["message"]
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe"] is None
assert msg["List-Unsubscribe-Post"] is None
@@ -1,368 +0,0 @@
"""End-to-end integration tests for the v0.18.0 Slice 4
outbound_emails audit table + admin endpoint.
The release adds:
* `backend/migrations/020_outbound_emails.sql` the audit table.
* `record_outbound()` in `email.py` the write helper every send
path calls before returning, capturing status='sent' / 'failed'
/ 'deferred' (the dev-fallback path when SMTP_HOST is unset).
* `GET /api/admin/outbound-emails` admin-only listing, filterable
by kind / status / to_address.
These tests prove:
* Sending OTC / invite / notification mail writes one row per send
(status='deferred' under tests since SMTP_HOST is unset).
* The Message-ID on the row matches the envelope's Message-ID
header (the seam Slice 5 uses for bounce correlation).
* `kind` is populated per send path.
* `GET /api/admin/outbound-emails` lists rows newest-first,
accepts filters, refuses non-admins.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Write-on-send wiring
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_otc_send_writes_outbound_row_with_message_id(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
r = client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "newcomer@ex.co"})
assert r.status_code == 200
# Audit row landed.
rows = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id, to_address, kind, status, message_id, error "
"FROM outbound_emails WHERE to_address = 'newcomer@ex.co'"
).fetchall()
assert len(rows) == 1
row = rows[0]
assert row["kind"] == "otc"
# No SMTP_HOST in tests -> 'deferred', not 'sent'.
assert row["status"] == "deferred"
assert row["error"] is None
# Message-ID matches the envelope's header (the seam Slice 5 uses).
envelopes = [e for e in email_mod.sent_envelopes() if e.get("kind") == "otc"]
assert envelopes
envelope_mid = envelopes[-1]["message"]["Message-ID"]
assert row["message_id"] == envelope_mid
def test_invite_send_writes_outbound_row(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=500, login="adminQ", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=500, gitea_login="adminQ",
display_name="Admin Q", role="admin",
email="adminq@test",
)
r = client.post(
"/api/admin/users",
json={
"email": "invitee@ex.co",
"first_name": "Inv", "last_name": "Itee",
"role": "contributor", "custom_message": "",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
rows = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT kind, status, message_id FROM outbound_emails "
"WHERE to_address = 'invitee@ex.co'"
).fetchall()
assert len(rows) == 1
assert rows[0]["kind"] == "invite"
assert rows[0]["status"] == "deferred"
assert rows[0]["message_id"] is not None
def test_notification_send_writes_outbound_row_with_notification_id(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Watcher notifications carry a `notification_id` FK so the
admin can join through to the notifications table to see what
triggered the send."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
from test_notifications_vertical import PITCH
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="ben", role="owner")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor", email="alice@test",
)
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/propose", json={
"title": "OHM", "slug": "ohm", "pitch": PITCH, "tags": [],
})
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
# Wipe pre-merge audit rows so the assertion below is unambiguous.
db.conn().execute("DELETE FROM outbound_emails")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=1, gitea_login="ben",
display_name="Ben", role="owner", email="ben@test",
)
merge_r = client.post(f"/api/proposals/{r.json()['pr_number']}/merge")
assert merge_r.status_code == 200, merge_r.text
rows = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT kind, status, notification_id, message_id "
"FROM outbound_emails WHERE to_address = 'alice@test'"
).fetchall()
assert rows, "no outbound_emails row for alice@test"
# At least one notification kind, with a populated FK.
notif_rows = [r for r in rows if r["kind"] == "notification"]
assert notif_rows
for nr in notif_rows:
assert nr["status"] == "deferred"
assert nr["notification_id"] is not None
assert nr["message_id"] is not None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Admin endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_admin_outbound_emails_lists_rows(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
# Generate a few rows.
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "one@ex.co"})
provision_user_row(user_id=600, login="adminR", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=600, gitea_login="adminR",
display_name="Admin R", role="admin", email="adminr@test",
)
client.post("/api/admin/users", json={
"email": "two@ex.co", "first_name": "T", "last_name": "Wo",
"role": "contributor", "custom_message": "",
})
r = client.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
items = r.json()["items"]
kinds = {it["kind"] for it in items}
assert "otc" in kinds
assert "invite" in kinds
# Newest-first.
ids = [it["id"] for it in items]
assert ids == sorted(ids, reverse=True)
def test_admin_outbound_emails_filters_by_kind(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "filter1@ex.co"})
provision_user_row(user_id=601, login="adminS", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=601, gitea_login="adminS",
display_name="Admin S", role="admin", email="admins@test",
)
client.post("/api/admin/users", json={
"email": "filter2@ex.co", "first_name": "F", "last_name": "Two",
"role": "contributor", "custom_message": "",
})
r = client.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails?kind=otc")
assert r.status_code == 200
items = r.json()["items"]
assert items
assert all(it["kind"] == "otc" for it in items)
def test_admin_outbound_emails_filters_by_to_address(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "TARGET@ex.co"})
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "other@ex.co"})
provision_user_row(user_id=602, login="adminT", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=602, gitea_login="adminT",
display_name="Admin T", role="admin", email="admint@test",
)
# to_address filter is case-insensitive.
r = client.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails?to_address=target@ex.co")
assert r.status_code == 200
items = r.json()["items"]
assert items
assert all(it["to_address"].lower() == "target@ex.co" for it in items)
def test_admin_outbound_emails_refuses_non_admin(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=700, login="contribU", role="contributor")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=700, gitea_login="contribU",
display_name="Contrib U", role="contributor",
)
r = client.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails")
assert r.status_code == 403
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# v0.18.0 Slice 5: bounce correlation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_bounce_with_message_id_marks_outbound_row_bounced(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""When the bounce body includes the original `message_id`, the
framework looks it up in outbound_emails and stamps
status='bounced' on the matching row. The hard-bounce ->
global-opt-out logic still fires."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=800, login="bouncey", role="contributor")
db.conn().execute("UPDATE users SET email = 'bouncey@ex.co' WHERE id = 800")
# Send something to bouncey to land an outbound_emails row.
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "bouncey@ex.co"})
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id, message_id, status FROM outbound_emails "
"WHERE to_address = 'bouncey@ex.co'"
).fetchone()
assert row is not None
original_id = row["id"]
message_id = row["message_id"]
assert row["status"] == "deferred" # pre-bounce baseline
# Bounce comes in carrying that message_id.
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/email-bounce",
json={
"email": "bouncey@ex.co",
"kind": "hard",
"message_id": message_id,
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["matched"] is True
assert body["correlated_id"] == original_id
# Audit row stamped.
post = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT status, error FROM outbound_emails WHERE id = ?",
(original_id,),
).fetchone()
assert post["status"] == "bounced"
assert "bounce (hard)" in (post["error"] or "")
# Hard-bounce global opt-out still fires.
urow = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email_opt_out_all FROM users WHERE id = 800"
).fetchone()
assert urow["email_opt_out_all"] == 1
def test_bounce_with_unknown_message_id_does_not_crash(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""A message_id the framework doesn't recognize logs but does
NOT 5xx bounce providers replay old bounces, and the
framework can't refuse just because the row was pruned."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/email-bounce",
json={
"email": "nobody@ex.co",
"kind": "hard",
"message_id": "<not-in-our-db@ex.co>",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json()["correlated_id"] is None
def test_bounce_without_message_id_still_flips_opt_out(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Backward compat: providers that don't surface Message-ID
still get the legacy v1 behavior match by email + flip the
global opt-out."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=801, login="legacybounce", role="contributor")
db.conn().execute("UPDATE users SET email = 'legacy@ex.co' WHERE id = 801")
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/email-bounce",
json={"email": "legacy@ex.co", "kind": "hard"},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["matched"] is True
assert body["correlated_id"] is None
urow = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email_opt_out_all FROM users WHERE id = 801"
).fetchone()
assert urow["email_opt_out_all"] == 1
def test_bounced_rows_show_in_admin_endpoint(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The admin endpoint surfaces bounced rows alongside the rest;
filtering by `status=bounced` isolates them."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db, email as email_mod
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=802, login="adminB", role="admin")
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=802, gitea_login="adminB",
display_name="Admin B", role="admin", email="adminb@test",
)
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "willbounce@ex.co"})
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT message_id FROM outbound_emails WHERE to_address = 'willbounce@ex.co'"
).fetchone()
client.post(
"/api/webhooks/email-bounce",
json={"email": "willbounce@ex.co", "kind": "hard", "message_id": row["message_id"]},
)
r = client.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails?status=bounced")
assert r.status_code == 200
items = r.json()["items"]
assert items
assert all(it["status"] == "bounced" for it in items)
assert any(it["to_address"] == "willbounce@ex.co" for it in items)
-11
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import pytest
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
grant_rfc_collaborator,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
@@ -141,9 +140,6 @@ def test_get_pr_returns_three_column_payload(app_with_fake_gitea):
provision_user_row(user_id=3, login="bob", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
# Bob is the non-arbiter contributor — alice is seeded as an RFC owner.
# v0.16.0 (item #12): bob needs an accepted per-RFC contributor
# invitation to cut branches and open PRs on alice's RFC.
grant_rfc_collaborator(user_id=3, rfc_slug="ohm", role_in_rfc="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="bob", display_name="Bob", role="contributor")
branch, _ = _cut_branch_and_accept_change(
client, fake, slug="ohm",
@@ -296,9 +292,6 @@ def test_merge_by_arbiter_advances_main_and_marks_pr_merged(app_with_fake_gitea)
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="ben", role="owner")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
# Bob is neither owner nor arbiter — the non-merge baseline.
# v0.16.0 (item #12): bob still needs an accepted contributor
# invitation to cut the branch + open the PR.
grant_rfc_collaborator(user_id=3, rfc_slug="ohm", role_in_rfc="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="bob", display_name="Bob", role="contributor")
branch, _ = _cut_branch_and_accept_change(
client, fake, slug="ohm",
@@ -371,10 +364,6 @@ def test_resolution_branch_replays_clean_and_supersedes_on_merge(app_with_fake_g
provision_user_row(user_id=3, login="bob", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="ben", role="owner")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
# v0.16.0 (item #12): bob (a non-owner contributor) needs an
# accepted per-RFC invitation to cut a branch on alice's RFC.
# Alice is the seeded RFC owner so she doesn't need one.
grant_rfc_collaborator(user_id=3, rfc_slug="ohm", role_in_rfc="contributor")
# Alice cuts a branch and accepts a change on it.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
+1 -39
View File
@@ -395,28 +395,6 @@ def provision_user_row(*, user_id: int, login: str, role: str) -> None:
)
def grant_rfc_collaborator(*, user_id: int, rfc_slug: str, role_in_rfc: str = "contributor") -> None:
"""v0.16.0 / item #12 test seam: directly insert an accepted-
invitation collaborator row so a non-owner contributor can pass
the per-RFC write gate without going through the email round-trip.
Equivalent in effect to the invitationaccept dance the production
code drives; lets v0.5.0/v0.6.0/v0.8.0 era tests preserve their
"alice owns OHM, bob contributes" shape without rewriting the
setup. The invitation_id is left NULL collaborators minted via
a direct admin gesture (a §19.2 candidate) carry the same shape.
"""
from app import db
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT OR REPLACE INTO rfc_collaborators
(rfc_slug, user_id, role_in_rfc, invitation_id)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, NULL)
""",
(rfc_slug, user_id, role_in_rfc),
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fixtures
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -438,24 +416,8 @@ def tmp_env(monkeypatch):
"SECRET_KEY": "test-secret-key-for-cookies",
"DATABASE_PATH": str(db_path),
"OWNER_GITEA_LOGIN": "ben",
# v0.18.0: `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is now mandatory at startup
# per the email + webhook hygiene proposal. Tests bind a fake
# value so the framework boots; tests that want to exercise
# the dev-bypass path monkeypatch `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`.
"GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET": "test-webhook-secret-for-signature-verification",
"GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET": "",
"ENABLED_MODELS": "claude",
# v0.27.0 (audit 0026 M4): the session cookie now defaults to
# Secure. The TestClient talks plain http://testserver, so a
# Secure cookie is never sent back and every authenticated flow
# would fail. Tests opt out explicitly, exactly as a dev box on
# plain http does.
"SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE": "false",
# v0.27.0 (audit 0026 M5): the bounce webhook fails closed (503)
# when its secret is unset. Tests exercise the legacy behavioral
# path via the documented dev opt-in, mirroring the
# RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS bypass above. Tests that assert the
# fail-closed default delenv this key themselves.
"RFC_APP_INSECURE_BOUNCE_WEBHOOK": "1",
}
for k, v in env.items():
monkeypatch.setenv(k, v)
@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
"""End-to-end vertical for roadmap #26 (rfc-app v0.22.0): the optional
"What will you be using this for?" capture on the two propose surfaces.
Reuses the FakeGitea + session helpers from test_propose_vertical.py and
the active-RFC seed from test_rfc_view_vertical.py. Proves:
(a) propose-RFC persists and returns `proposed_use_case` when supplied,
and the value survives onto the merged super-draft's RFC view;
(b) propose-RFC accepts a NULL / omitted use case ("left blank");
(c) propose-PR persists and returns `proposed_use_case` when supplied,
and accepts a NULL / omitted one.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
)
from test_pr_flow_vertical import _cut_branch_and_accept_change
from test_rfc_view_vertical import SEED_BODY, seed_active_rfc
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# propose-RFC
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_propose_rfc_persists_and_returns_use_case(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="ben", role="owner")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor", email="alice@test")
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/propose", json={
"title": "Open Human Model",
"slug": "open-human-model",
"pitch": "A shared definition of what we mean by *human*.",
"tags": ["identity"],
"proposed_use_case": "Wiring OHM into the OpenXML consent surface.",
})
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
pr_number = r.json()["pr_number"]
# The pending-idea list carries the use case.
items = client.get("/api/proposals").json()["items"]
assert items[0]["proposed_use_case"] == "Wiring OHM into the OpenXML consent surface."
# The pending-idea detail view carries it too.
proposal = client.get(f"/api/proposals/{pr_number}").json()
assert proposal["proposed_use_case"] == "Wiring OHM into the OpenXML consent surface."
# Merge as owner; the use case survives onto the RFC view (looked
# up by slug from the canonical side table, since the idea PR
# closes on merge).
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="ben", display_name="Ben", role="owner", email="ben@test")
r = client.post(f"/api/proposals/{pr_number}/merge")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
view = client.get("/api/rfcs/open-human-model").json()
assert view["proposed_use_case"] == "Wiring OHM into the OpenXML consent surface."
def test_propose_rfc_use_case_optional(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=3, login="carol", role="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="carol", display_name="Carol", role="contributor")
# Omitted entirely.
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/propose", json={
"title": "No Use Case", "slug": "no-use-case", "pitch": "p", "tags": [],
})
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
pr_a = r.json()["pr_number"]
# Explicit null.
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/propose", json={
"title": "Null Use Case", "slug": "null-use-case", "pitch": "p",
"tags": [], "proposed_use_case": None,
})
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
pr_b = r.json()["pr_number"]
# Blank/whitespace — treated as "left blank", no row written.
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/propose", json={
"title": "Blank Use Case", "slug": "blank-use-case", "pitch": "p",
"tags": [], "proposed_use_case": " ",
})
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
pr_c = r.json()["pr_number"]
for pr in (pr_a, pr_b, pr_c):
assert client.get(f"/api/proposals/{pr}").json()["proposed_use_case"] is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# propose-PR (against an active RFC)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_propose_pr_persists_and_returns_use_case(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
branch, _ = _cut_branch_and_accept_change(
client, fake, slug="ohm",
original="Open Human Model is a framework for representing humans.",
proposed="Open Human Model is a framework for representing humans across systems.",
)
r = client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/ohm/branches/{branch}/open-pr",
json={
"title": "Tighten the opening",
"description": "Scope to systems.",
"proposed_use_case": "Building a cross-system consent registry.",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
pr_number = r.json()["pr_number"]
pr = client.get(f"/api/rfcs/ohm/prs/{pr_number}").json()
assert pr["proposed_use_case"] == "Building a cross-system consent registry."
def test_propose_pr_use_case_optional(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
branch, _ = _cut_branch_and_accept_change(
client, fake, slug="ohm",
original="It defines consent, trait, and agency in compatible terms.",
proposed="It defines consent, trait, harm, and agency in compatible terms.",
)
# No proposed_use_case key at all.
r = client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/ohm/branches/{branch}/open-pr",
json={"title": "Add harm", "description": "Name harm explicitly."},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
pr_number = r.json()["pr_number"]
pr = client.get(f"/api/rfcs/ohm/prs/{pr_number}").json()
assert pr["proposed_use_case"] is None
@@ -1,658 +0,0 @@
"""End-to-end integration tests for v0.16.0's owner-only invite for
per-RFC PR or PR-less discussion (roadmap item #12, §6 / §10).
The release lands a per-RFC membership layer:
* `rfc_invitations` issued by the RFC's owner, addressed to an
email, granting one of two roles ('contributor' or 'discussant').
* `rfc_collaborators` the accepted-invitation substrate; the
table the per-RFC write gate consults.
The tests prove:
* Only the RFC's owner (or a platform admin/owner) can invite —
a platform-granted but non-owner user gets 403.
* Creating an invitation lands a row, mints a token, and queues
an envelope on the SMTP buffer.
* Re-inviting the same (email, role) on the same RFC returns 409.
* The accept endpoint requires the accepting user's email to match
the invitee_email (case-insensitive).
* Acceptance lands a rfc_collaborators row and flips the
invitation to 'accepted'.
* Re-accepting the same invitation is idempotent (200, changed=false).
* An expired invitation refuses 409 even if the row's column status
is still 'pending'.
* A revoked invitation refuses 409.
* The owner's listing carries pending + accepted in one response.
* The per-RFC discussion-write gate refuses a non-invited
platform-granted user 403 (was previously 200 before v0.16.0).
* The same gate admits a user who holds an accepted 'discussant'
invitation.
* The same gate admits a user who holds an accepted 'contributor'
invitation (contributor strictly includes discussion).
* The platform admin/owner is admitted regardless of per-RFC
membership (the platform-level capability path).
* The /api/admin/users listing carries `rfc_invitations` per-user
after an acceptance the §17 admin surface hook.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
# Reuse fixtures and helpers from the propose / RFC-view harnesses.
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401 — fixtures land via import
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
)
from test_rfc_view_vertical import seed_active_rfc, SEED_BODY
def _reset_outbound():
from app import email as email_mod
email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
def _invitation_envelopes(to_address: str | None = None) -> list[dict]:
"""Pluck v0.16.0 invitation envelopes out of the shared _SENT buffer.
Same access pattern as the OTC tests use for `kind='otc'`."""
from app import email as email_mod
out = []
for env in email_mod.sent_envelopes():
if env.get("kind") != "rfc_invitation":
continue
if to_address is not None and env["to"] != to_address:
continue
out.append(env)
return out
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Create / list / revoke (owner-side)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_owner_can_invite_creates_row_and_sends_email(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The end-to-end create gesture: RFC owner posts an invitation,
a row lands, the token comes back in the response, and an
`rfc_invitation`-kind envelope hits the SMTP buffer."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
# The frontmatter owner of the seeded RFC is "alice" (per
# seed_active_rfc's default), so we sign in as that user.
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor",
)
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "newperson@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "contributor"},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
body = r.json()
assert body["rfc_slug"] == "ohm"
assert body["invitee_email"] == "newperson@example.com"
assert body["role_in_rfc"] == "contributor"
assert body["status"] == "pending"
assert body["token"] and len(body["token"]) > 16
# Row landed.
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT * FROM rfc_invitations WHERE id = ?", (body["id"],),
).fetchone()
assert row["rfc_slug"] == "ohm"
assert row["invitee_email"] == "newperson@example.com"
assert row["inviter_user_id"] == 1
assert row["status"] == "pending"
# Email envelope went out.
envs = _invitation_envelopes("newperson@example.com")
assert len(envs) == 1
assert "OHM" in envs[0]["subject"]
assert body["token"] in envs[0]["body"]
def test_non_owner_cannot_invite(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""A platform-granted user who isn't in the RFC's frontmatter
owners list cannot invite 403. Distinct from the
require_contributor gate (which would be 401 for anonymous)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
# alice is the RFC owner per the seed; bob is a regular
# platform-granted contributor with no per-RFC role.
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="bob", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=2, gitea_login="bob",
display_name="Bob", role="contributor",
)
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "ignored@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
assert r.status_code == 403
def test_platform_admin_can_invite_to_any_rfc(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Per §6.1 the platform admin/owner role carries the maximal
per-RFC capability, so admins can invite on any RFC even if
they're not in its owners list."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=99, login="adminzero", role="admin")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=99, gitea_login="adminzero",
display_name="Admin Zero", role="admin",
)
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "another@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
def test_anonymous_cannot_invite(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "x@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
assert r.status_code == 401
def test_re_invite_same_email_and_role_returns_409(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Refuse a duplicate pending invitation for the same (email, role)
on the same RFC. A different role on the same email is allowed
(the owner may want to upgrade discussant contributor)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor",
)
r1 = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "dup@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
assert r1.status_code == 200
r2 = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "dup@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
assert r2.status_code == 409
# Same email, different role is allowed.
r3 = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "dup@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "contributor"},
)
assert r3.status_code == 200
def test_owner_can_list_invitations(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor",
)
client.post("/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "a@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"})
client.post("/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "b@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "contributor"})
r = client.get("/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
items = r.json()["items"]
emails = sorted(i["invitee_email"] for i in items)
assert emails == ["a@example.com", "b@example.com"]
assert all(i["status"] == "pending" for i in items)
# The inviter is named.
assert all(i["inviter_login"] == "alice" for i in items)
def test_revoke_pending_invitation_works_already_accepted_refuses(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Revoke flips a pending invitation to 'revoked'. An already-
accepted invitation refuses 409 accepted membership is removed
via a different (future) surface; the v0.16.0 revoke only lifts
the pending link."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor",
)
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "revokee@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
invitation_id = r.json()["id"]
r = client.post(f"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations/{invitation_id}/revoke")
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json()["status"] == "revoked"
# Re-revoke refuses 409.
r2 = client.post(f"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations/{invitation_id}/revoke")
assert r2.status_code == 409
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT status FROM rfc_invitations WHERE id = ?", (invitation_id,),
).fetchone()
assert row["status"] == "revoked"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Accept (invitee-side)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_accept_invitation_lands_collaborator_row(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The end-to-end accept gesture: the invitee signs in, posts the
token, and an rfc_collaborators row lands at the issued role."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
# provision_user_row sets the email to "<login>@test", so the
# invitee row we'll create needs the same email shape.
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="newbie", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
# alice (owner) invites newbie@test.
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor",
)
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "newbie@test", "role_in_rfc": "contributor"},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
token = r.json()["token"]
# Switch to newbie, accept.
sign_in_as(
client, user_id=2, gitea_login="newbie",
display_name="Newbie", role="contributor",
email="newbie@test",
)
r = client.post("/api/invitations/accept", json={"token": token})
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
body = r.json()
assert body["ok"] is True
assert body["changed"] is True
assert body["rfc_slug"] == "ohm"
assert body["role_in_rfc"] == "contributor"
# Collaborator row landed; invitation flipped.
collab = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT role_in_rfc FROM rfc_collaborators WHERE rfc_slug = 'ohm' AND user_id = 2",
).fetchone()
assert collab is not None
assert collab["role_in_rfc"] == "contributor"
inv = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT status, accepted_by_user_id FROM rfc_invitations WHERE token = ?",
(token,),
).fetchone()
assert inv["status"] == "accepted"
assert inv["accepted_by_user_id"] == 2
def test_accept_refuses_when_email_does_not_match(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The accepting user's email must match the invitation's
invitee_email (case-insensitive)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="mallory", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "intended@example.com", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
token = r.json()["token"]
# mallory's email is "mallory@test", not "intended@example.com".
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="mallory",
display_name="Mallory", role="contributor",
email="mallory@test")
r = client.post("/api/invitations/accept", json={"token": token})
assert r.status_code == 403
def test_accept_refuses_revoked_invitation(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="newbie", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "newbie@test", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
invitation_id = r.json()["id"]
token = r.json()["token"]
client.post(f"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations/{invitation_id}/revoke")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="newbie",
display_name="Newbie", role="contributor",
email="newbie@test")
r = client.post("/api/invitations/accept", json={"token": token})
assert r.status_code == 409
def test_accept_refuses_expired_invitation(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""An invitation past its `expires_at` is refused 409 even if
the row's column status is still 'pending'. We backdate the
expires_at directly to model the elapsed-window state."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="newbie", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "newbie@test", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
token = r.json()["token"]
invitation_id = r.json()["id"]
# Backdate.
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE rfc_invitations SET expires_at = datetime('now', '-1 day') WHERE id = ?",
(invitation_id,),
)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="newbie",
display_name="Newbie", role="contributor",
email="newbie@test")
r = client.post("/api/invitations/accept", json={"token": token})
assert r.status_code == 409
def test_accept_is_idempotent_on_re_accept(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Re-accepting the same already-accepted invitation reads as a
200 no-op with `changed=false`. The collaborator row is unchanged."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="newbie", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "newbie@test", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
token = r.json()["token"]
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="newbie",
display_name="Newbie", role="contributor",
email="newbie@test")
r1 = client.post("/api/invitations/accept", json={"token": token})
assert r1.status_code == 200
assert r1.json()["changed"] is True
r2 = client.post("/api/invitations/accept", json={"token": token})
assert r2.status_code == 200
assert r2.json()["changed"] is False
# Still exactly one collaborator row.
rows = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM rfc_collaborators WHERE rfc_slug = 'ohm' AND user_id = 2"
).fetchone()
assert rows["n"] == 1
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Discussion-write gate enforcement
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_non_invited_user_cannot_post_to_discussion(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""v0.16.0 narrows the discussion-write gate: a platform-granted
user with no per-RFC role gets 403 when posting to the
discussion. (v0.6.0 left the gate at require_contributor only;
item #12 layers can_discuss_rfc on top.)"""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="bob", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
# bob is platform-granted but not in OHM's owners list and has
# no invitation. The thread-create surface refuses 403.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="bob",
display_name="Bob", role="contributor")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads",
json={"label": "Question", "message": "Should I be allowed?"},
)
assert r.status_code == 403
def test_invited_discussant_can_post_to_discussion(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="newbie", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
# alice invites newbie as a discussant.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "newbie@test", "role_in_rfc": "discussant"},
)
token = r.json()["token"]
# newbie accepts.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="newbie",
display_name="Newbie", role="contributor",
email="newbie@test")
client.post("/api/invitations/accept", json={"token": token})
# newbie can now post to the discussion.
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads",
json={"label": "Question", "message": "Now I can speak."},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
def test_contributor_role_includes_discussion(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""A 'contributor' per-RFC role strictly includes discussion
permission accepting a contributor invitation admits the user
to the discussion endpoint too."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="newbie", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "newbie@test", "role_in_rfc": "contributor"},
)
token = r.json()["token"]
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="newbie",
display_name="Newbie", role="contributor",
email="newbie@test")
client.post("/api/invitations/accept", json={"token": token})
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads",
json={"label": "Q", "message": "Hello."},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
def test_platform_admin_can_post_to_discussion_without_invitation(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Per §6.1 / item #12's permission shape: platform admins/owners
can write to any RFC's discussion regardless of per-RFC
membership."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=99, login="adminzero", role="admin")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=99, gitea_login="adminzero",
display_name="Admin Zero", role="admin")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads",
json={"label": "Admin chime", "message": "Drive-by from admin."},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
def test_rfc_owner_can_post_to_discussion(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The frontmatter RFC owner is admitted by virtue of being on
the owners list they don't need to invite themselves."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads",
json={"label": "Owner thought", "message": "Kicking off the conversation."},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Admin-page hook (additive on /api/admin/users)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_admin_users_listing_surfaces_per_rfc_invitations(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""v0.16.0 hook into the v0.9.0 admin user-management surface:
each user row carries an `rfc_invitations` array listing the
per-RFC roles they hold. Empty array for users without any."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
_reset_outbound()
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="newbie", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=99, login="adminzero", role="admin")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
# alice invites newbie; newbie accepts.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=1, gitea_login="alice",
display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/invitations",
json={"invitee_email": "newbie@test", "role_in_rfc": "contributor"},
)
token = r.json()["token"]
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="newbie",
display_name="Newbie", role="contributor",
email="newbie@test")
client.post("/api/invitations/accept", json={"token": token})
# Admin lists.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=99, gitea_login="adminzero",
display_name="Admin Zero", role="admin")
r = client.get("/api/admin/users")
assert r.status_code == 200
items = r.json()["items"]
newbie_row = next(i for i in items if i["gitea_login"] == "newbie")
assert isinstance(newbie_row["rfc_invitations"], list)
assert len(newbie_row["rfc_invitations"]) == 1
invite = newbie_row["rfc_invitations"][0]
assert invite["rfc_slug"] == "ohm"
assert invite["role_in_rfc"] == "contributor"
assert invite["inviter_login"] == "alice"
# Users with no invitations carry an empty array, not null.
alice_row = next(i for i in items if i["gitea_login"] == "alice")
assert alice_row["rfc_invitations"] == []
-273
View File
@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
"""Roadmap #28 Part 1 — auto-link RFC references in PR text + comments.
Two layers:
* Unit tests over the pure scanner (`rfc_links.segment_text` /
`_keys_for` / `LinkIndex`) the matching rules and their
false-positive guards, no DB.
* End-to-end tests that the PR description, PR review comments, and
PR-less discussion comments all surface `*_segments` enriched against
the live accepted-RFC corpus, with self-references suppressed.
Reuses the FakeGitea + session helpers from test_propose_vertical.py and
the active-RFC seed from test_rfc_view_vertical.py.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from app import rfc_links
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
grant_rfc_collaborator,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
)
from test_rfc_view_vertical import SEED_BODY, seed_active_rfc
from test_pr_flow_vertical import _cut_branch_and_accept_change
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Unit — the pure scanner
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _idx(*terms):
"""Build a LinkIndex from raw (key, slug, title) tuples (keys lower)."""
return rfc_links.LinkIndex(list(terms))
def test_empty_text_is_single_empty_segment():
assert rfc_links.segment_text("", []) == [{"type": "text", "text": ""}]
assert rfc_links.segment_text(None, []) == [{"type": "text", "text": ""}]
def test_no_terms_returns_plain_text():
out = rfc_links.segment_text("hello world", [])
assert out == [{"type": "text", "text": "hello world"}]
def test_multiword_title_links_and_preserves_casing():
idx = _idx(("open human model", "open-human-model", "Open Human Model"))
out = idx.segment("See the Open Human Model for details.")
assert out == [
{"type": "text", "text": "See the "},
{"type": "rfc", "slug": "open-human-model", "label": "Open Human Model",
"title": "Open Human Model"},
{"type": "text", "text": " for details."},
]
def test_match_is_case_insensitive():
idx = _idx(("open human model", "open-human-model", "Open Human Model"))
out = idx.segment("see the OPEN HUMAN MODEL")
assert out[-1] == {"type": "rfc", "slug": "open-human-model",
"label": "OPEN HUMAN MODEL", "title": "Open Human Model"}
def test_word_boundary_prevents_substring_match():
# "harm" must not match inside "charming" / "harmless".
idx = _idx(("rfc-0001", "open-human-model", "Open Human Model"))
out = idx.segment("a charming rfc-00012 not real")
# rfc-0001 is a prefix of rfc-00012 but the trailing '2' is a word char,
# so no match — the whole string stays plain text.
assert out == [{"type": "text", "text": "a charming rfc-00012 not real"}]
def test_rfc_id_token_links():
idx = _idx(("rfc-0001", "open-human-model", "Open Human Model"))
out = idx.segment("as established in RFC-0001.")
assert out[1] == {"type": "rfc", "slug": "open-human-model",
"label": "RFC-0001", "title": "Open Human Model"}
def test_longest_match_wins():
# A bare "Open" term and the full title both present; the full title
# (longer) must win at the position.
idx = _idx(
("open", "open", "Open"),
("open human model", "open-human-model", "Open Human Model"),
)
out = idx.segment("the Open Human Model")
assert out[-1]["slug"] == "open-human-model"
assert out[-1]["label"] == "Open Human Model"
def test_pending_term_emits_contribute_segment():
# Part 3: a super-draft match is an `rfc-pending` segment carrying the
# owner display name, not a plain link.
idx = rfc_links.LinkIndex([
rfc_links.Term(key="open human model", kind="pending",
slug="open-human-model", title="Open Human Model", owner="Alice"),
])
out = idx.segment("see Open Human Model please")
assert out[1] == {
"type": "rfc-pending", "slug": "open-human-model",
"label": "Open Human Model", "title": "Open Human Model", "owner": "Alice",
}
def test_candidate_term_emits_create_segment():
# Part 2: a candidate term carries its canonical spelling for the
# propose pre-fill; no slug (no RFC exists yet).
idx = rfc_links.LinkIndex([
rfc_links.Term(key="memory model", kind="candidate", term="Memory Model"),
])
out = idx.segment("the memory model is unspecified")
assert out[1] == {"type": "rfc-candidate", "label": "memory model", "term": "Memory Model"}
def test_kind_precedence_active_beats_pending_beats_candidate():
# All three buckets contribute the same key; the highest-precedence
# kind (active) must win at the position.
key = "open human model"
idx = rfc_links.LinkIndex([
rfc_links.Term(key=key, kind="candidate", term="Open Human Model"),
rfc_links.Term(key=key, kind="pending", slug="ohm-draft", title="Open Human Model", owner="A"),
rfc_links.Term(key=key, kind="active", slug="open-human-model", title="Open Human Model"),
])
out = idx.segment("the Open Human Model")
assert out[-1]["type"] == "rfc"
assert out[-1]["slug"] == "open-human-model"
def test_keys_for_gating():
keys = lambda **kw: set(rfc_links._keys_for(**kw))
# rfc_id always contributes.
assert "rfc-0001" in keys(slug="x", title="X", rfc_id="RFC-0001")
# multi-word title contributes; single common word does NOT.
assert "open human model" in keys(slug="ohm", title="Open Human Model", rfc_id=None)
assert keys(slug="human", title="Human", rfc_id=None) == set()
# hyphenated slug contributes; single-token slug does NOT.
assert "open-human-model" in keys(slug="open-human-model", title="X", rfc_id=None)
assert "ohm" not in keys(slug="ohm", title="OHM", rfc_id=None)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# End-to-end — enrichment surfaces on the read paths
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _open_pr_on(client, fake, *, host_slug: str, description: str):
"""Seed branch + accepted change on host_slug and open a PR. Returns
the pr_number."""
# `original` must exist verbatim in SEED_BODY or the accept is "stale".
branch, _ = _cut_branch_and_accept_change(
client, fake, slug=host_slug,
original="It defines consent, trait, and agency in compatible terms.",
proposed="It defines consent, trait, harm, and agency in compatible terms.",
)
r = client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{host_slug}/branches/{branch}/open-pr",
json={"title": "A change", "description": description},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
return r.json()["pr_number"]
def _rfc_segments(segments):
return [s for s in segments if s["type"] == "rfc"]
def test_pr_description_autolinks_other_rfc(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
# Two accepted RFCs: a host for the PR + a referenceable target.
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="open-human-model", title="Open Human Model", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
pr_number = _open_pr_on(
client, fake, host_slug="ohm",
description="This builds on the Open Human Model definition.",
)
r = client.get(f"/api/rfcs/ohm/prs/{pr_number}")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
pr = r.json()
links = _rfc_segments(pr["description_segments"])
assert len(links) == 1
assert links[0]["slug"] == "open-human-model"
assert links[0]["label"] == "Open Human Model"
# The plain text is still present for non-segment callers (the bot
# appends a §6.5 On-behalf-of trailer, so this is a containment check).
assert "This builds on the Open Human Model definition." in pr["description"]
def test_pr_review_comment_autolinked(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="open-human-model", title="Open Human Model", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
pr_number = _open_pr_on(client, fake, host_slug="ohm", description="plain.")
r = client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/ohm/prs/{pr_number}/review",
json={"text": "See Open Human Model and RFC-0001.", "anchor_payload": {}},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
pr = client.get(f"/api/rfcs/ohm/prs/{pr_number}").json()
all_msgs = [m for msgs in pr["messages_by_thread"].values() for m in msgs]
review_msgs = [m for m in all_msgs if "Open Human Model" in (m["text"] or "")]
assert review_msgs, "review comment not found in payload"
links = _rfc_segments(review_msgs[0]["text_segments"])
# Both "Open Human Model" (title) and "RFC-0001" (id) point to the
# one referenceable RFC.
assert {s["slug"] for s in links} == {"open-human-model"}
assert {s["label"] for s in links} == {"Open Human Model", "RFC-0001"}
def test_discussion_comment_autolinked(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="open-human-model", title="Open Human Model", body=SEED_BODY)
# alice is the seeded owner of ohm (owners=["alice"]); grant the
# per-RFC collaborator row explicitly so the #12 discuss gate passes.
grant_rfc_collaborator(user_id=2, rfc_slug="ohm", role_in_rfc="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads",
json={"message": "Compare with the Open Human Model."},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
thread_id = r.json()["thread_id"]
r = client.get(f"/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads/{thread_id}/messages")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
msgs = r.json()["messages"]
assert msgs and "text_segments" in msgs[0]
links = _rfc_segments(msgs[0]["text_segments"])
assert len(links) == 1
assert links[0]["slug"] == "open-human-model"
def test_self_reference_not_linked(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
# The host RFC has a multi-word title, so absent exclude_slug it
# WOULD self-link. exclude_slug must suppress it.
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="open-human-model", title="Open Human Model", body=SEED_BODY)
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
pr_number = _open_pr_on(
client, fake, host_slug="open-human-model",
description="Refines the Open Human Model definition.",
)
pr = client.get(f"/api/rfcs/open-human-model/prs/{pr_number}").json()
assert _rfc_segments(pr["description_segments"]) == []
@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
"""End-to-end integration tests for the v0.23.0 sign-in state-resume
vertical (§6.2, roadmap item #29).
New behavior: each authenticated user's last-viewed route + a small bag
of light view state is tracked server-side, so the next sign-in can land
them back where they left off rather than on the empty-state home view.
The tests below prove:
* `PUT /api/me/last-state` requires auth an anonymous client gets
401, and nothing is stored.
* An authenticated PUT upserts the route, and the stored route is
read back for that user off `GET /api/auth/me` (`last_route`).
* A second PUT overwrites (upsert, one row per user) the latest
route wins.
* `last_route_state` round-trips as decoded JSON on `/api/auth/me`.
* Per-user isolation: user A's stored route is not visible to user B.
* `resume_enabled = 0` disables resume: the PUT no-ops (does not
rewrite the stored route) and `/api/auth/me` hands back a null
`last_route` even though a stored row exists.
The fakes from `test_propose_vertical` give us a working app harness +
the `sign_in_as` / `provision_user_row` seams.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
)
def test_put_last_state_requires_auth(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
# Anonymous — no session cookie set.
r = client.put("/api/me/last-state", json={"route": "/rfc/open-human-model"})
assert r.status_code == 401
# Nothing landed in the table.
row = db.conn().execute("SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM user_session_state").fetchone()
assert row["n"] == 0
def test_put_last_state_upserts_and_reads_back(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor", email="alice@test")
# First POST stores a route + light state.
r = client.put(
"/api/me/last-state",
json={"route": "/rfc/open-human-model", "state": {"tab": "discussion", "scroll": 420}},
)
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json()["stored"] is True
# /api/auth/me hands the route + decoded state back.
me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
assert me["authenticated"] is True
assert me["user"]["resume_enabled"] is True
assert me["user"]["last_route"] == "/rfc/open-human-model"
assert me["user"]["last_route_state"] == {"tab": "discussion", "scroll": 420}
# A later POST overwrites — one row per user, latest wins.
r = client.put("/api/me/last-state", json={"route": "/proposals/7"})
assert r.status_code == 200
me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
assert me["user"]["last_route"] == "/proposals/7"
# state was omitted on the second POST → cleared to null.
assert me["user"]["last_route_state"] is None
def test_last_state_is_per_user(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
provision_user_row(user_id=3, login="bob", role="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor", email="alice@test")
client.put("/api/me/last-state", json={"route": "/rfc/alice-route"})
# Switch to bob — he has no stored route yet.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="bob", display_name="Bob", role="contributor", email="bob@test")
me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
assert me["user"]["last_route"] is None
client.put("/api/me/last-state", json={"route": "/rfc/bob-route"})
me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
assert me["user"]["last_route"] == "/rfc/bob-route"
# Back to alice — her route is untouched by bob's write.
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor", email="alice@test")
me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
assert me["user"]["last_route"] == "/rfc/alice-route"
def test_resume_disabled_no_ops_put_and_hides_route(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor", email="alice@test")
# Seed a stored row, then flip resume_enabled off directly (the
# profile-settings toggle UI to do this from the client is a
# follow-up; the column + behavior ship now).
client.put("/api/me/last-state", json={"route": "/rfc/before-disable"})
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE user_session_state SET resume_enabled = 0 WHERE user_id = ?",
(2,),
)
# /api/auth/me reports resume off and hands back a null route
# even though a stored row exists.
me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
assert me["user"]["resume_enabled"] is False
assert me["user"]["last_route"] is None
# A PUT while disabled no-ops: stored=False and the stored route
# is NOT rewritten.
r = client.put("/api/me/last-state", json={"route": "/rfc/after-disable"})
assert r.status_code == 200
assert r.json()["stored"] is False
row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT last_route FROM user_session_state WHERE user_id = ?", (2,)
).fetchone()
assert row["last_route"] == "/rfc/before-disable"
-264
View File
@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
"""Vertical + unit coverage for roadmap #27 (rfc-app v0.24.0): Claude
Haiku tag suggestions on the propose-RFC modal.
Reuses the FakeGitea + session helpers from test_propose_vertical.py.
The Anthropic call is never made for real tests monkeypatch the
`tag_suggest.haiku_provider` seam with a stub provider whose `send`
returns canned text, so the HTTP contract is exercised without a key.
Proves:
(a) the endpoint is contributor-gated (anon 401);
(b) a contributor gets suggestions, filtered to the corpus tag
universe, with invented tags dropped;
(c) no Anthropic key bound empty list, not an error;
(d) an empty corpus empty list (model is never even called);
(e) the per-user rate limit surfaces as a 429;
plus unit coverage of the universe gather, the reply parser's tolerance,
and the suggest() orchestration short-circuits.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import pytest
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class StubProvider:
"""A BaseProvider stand-in whose send() returns a fixed string (or
raises, to exercise the graceful-failure path)."""
def __init__(self, reply: str = "[]", *, raises: bool = False):
self.reply = reply
self.raises = raises
self.calls: list[tuple[str, list]] = []
def send(self, system, history):
self.calls.append((system, history))
if self.raises:
raise RuntimeError("boom")
return self.reply
def _seed_tags(slug: str, title: str, tags: list[str], state: str = "active") -> None:
from app import db
db.conn().execute(
"INSERT OR REPLACE INTO cached_rfcs (slug, title, state, tags_json) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
(slug, title, state, json.dumps(tags)),
)
def _use_provider(monkeypatch, provider) -> None:
monkeypatch.setattr("app.tag_suggest.haiku_provider", lambda config: provider)
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _reset_rate_limits():
from app import tag_suggest
tag_suggest.reset_rate_limits()
yield
tag_suggest.reset_rate_limits()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Endpoint (vertical)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_anonymous_cannot_suggest(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/suggest-tags", json={"title": "X"})
assert r.status_code == 401
def test_contributor_gets_filtered_suggestions(app_with_fake_gitea, monkeypatch):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
_seed_tags("ohm", "OHM", ["identity", "schema", "consent"])
_seed_tags("other", "Other", ["identity", "governance"])
# Model returns two real tags (one lowercased to test canonical
# mapping is exact-set anyway), plus one invented tag that MUST
# be dropped.
reply = json.dumps([
{"tag": "identity", "confidence": 0.9},
{"tag": "consent", "confidence": 0.7},
{"tag": "totally-invented", "confidence": 0.99},
])
stub = StubProvider(reply=reply)
_use_provider(monkeypatch, stub)
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/suggest-tags", json={
"title": "Consent and identity",
"pitch": "We need a shared definition of consent tied to identity.",
})
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
tags = [s["tag"] for s in r.json()["suggestions"]]
assert tags == ["identity", "consent"]
# the model was actually invoked
assert len(stub.calls) == 1
# the universe (deduped distinct tags) was handed to the model
user_msg = stub.calls[0][1][0]["content"]
assert "identity" in user_msg and "governance" in user_msg
def test_no_api_key_returns_empty(app_with_fake_gitea, monkeypatch):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
_seed_tags("ohm", "OHM", ["identity"])
# No key bound (test env has no ANTHROPIC_API_KEY) → provider None.
# (Explicitly assert the seam returns None given the test config.)
from app import tag_suggest
assert tag_suggest.haiku_provider(app.state.config) is None
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/suggest-tags", json={"title": "X", "pitch": "y"})
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
assert r.json()["suggestions"] == []
def test_empty_corpus_returns_empty_without_calling_model(app_with_fake_gitea, monkeypatch):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
stub = StubProvider(reply=json.dumps([{"tag": "x", "confidence": 1}]))
_use_provider(monkeypatch, stub)
# No cached_rfcs rows → empty universe → suggest() short-circuits.
r = client.post("/api/rfcs/suggest-tags", json={"title": "X", "pitch": "y"})
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
assert r.json()["suggestions"] == []
assert stub.calls == [] # model never invoked on an empty universe
def test_rate_limit_surfaces_429(app_with_fake_gitea, monkeypatch):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
monkeypatch.setenv("TAG_SUGGEST_RATE_MAX", "2")
monkeypatch.setenv("TAG_SUGGEST_RATE_WINDOW_SECONDS", "60")
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
_seed_tags("ohm", "OHM", ["identity"])
_use_provider(monkeypatch, StubProvider(reply="[]"))
body = {"title": "X", "pitch": "y"}
assert client.post("/api/rfcs/suggest-tags", json=body).status_code == 200
assert client.post("/api/rfcs/suggest-tags", json=body).status_code == 200
# Third call inside the window trips the limit.
assert client.post("/api/rfcs/suggest-tags", json=body).status_code == 429
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Units
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_gather_tag_universe_dedupes_and_ranks(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import tag_suggest
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
# The db is initialized in the app's lifespan; enter the client
# context so cached_rfcs exists before we seed it directly.
with TestClient(app):
_seed_tags("a", "A", ["identity", "schema"])
_seed_tags("b", "B", ["identity", " schema ", "consent", ""]) # whitespace + empty
_seed_tags("c", "C", ["identity"])
universe = tag_suggest.gather_tag_universe()
# identity (3) > schema (2) > consent (1); whitespace trimmed/merged,
# empties dropped.
assert universe == ["identity", "schema", "consent"]
def test_parse_reply_tolerates_junk():
from app import tag_suggest
universe = ["identity", "schema", "consent"]
# Prose around the JSON, an invented tag, a bare string, a dup, a
# missing confidence, and a garbage confidence.
text = (
"Sure! Here are the tags:\n"
'[{"tag": "identity", "confidence": 0.9}, '
'{"tag": "invented", "confidence": 1}, '
'"schema", '
'{"tag": "identity", "confidence": 0.5}, '
'{"tag": "consent"}, '
'{"tag": "consent", "confidence": "high"}]\n'
"Hope that helps!"
)
out = tag_suggest.parse_reply(text, universe, max_suggestions=6)
tags = [s["tag"] for s in out]
assert tags == ["identity", "schema", "consent"] # invented dropped, deduped
by_tag = {s["tag"]: s["confidence"] for s in out}
assert by_tag["identity"] == 0.9
assert by_tag["schema"] == 0.5 # bare string defaults to 0.5
assert by_tag["consent"] == 0.5 # missing/garbage confidence → 0.5
def test_parse_reply_empty_on_unparseable():
from app import tag_suggest
assert tag_suggest.parse_reply("no json here", ["a"], 6) == []
assert tag_suggest.parse_reply("", ["a"], 6) == []
assert tag_suggest.parse_reply("[]", ["a"], 6) == []
def test_parse_reply_respects_max():
from app import tag_suggest
universe = ["a", "b", "c", "d", "e"]
text = json.dumps([{"tag": t, "confidence": 0.5} for t in universe])
out = tag_suggest.parse_reply(text, universe, max_suggestions=3)
assert [s["tag"] for s in out] == ["a", "b", "c"]
def test_suggest_short_circuits_empty_draft():
from app import tag_suggest
stub = StubProvider(reply=json.dumps([{"tag": "a", "confidence": 1}]))
draft = tag_suggest.Draft(title=" ", pitch="", use_case="")
assert tag_suggest.suggest(stub, draft, ["a"]) == []
assert stub.calls == [] # never called for an empty draft
def test_suggest_returns_empty_on_provider_failure():
from app import tag_suggest
stub = StubProvider(raises=True)
draft = tag_suggest.Draft(title="Real title", pitch="a reason")
assert tag_suggest.suggest(stub, draft, ["identity"]) == []
+7 -38
View File
@@ -55,19 +55,13 @@ def _outbound_otc_envelopes(to_address: str | None = None) -> list[dict]:
def _patch_siteverify(monkeypatch, *, success: bool, error_codes: list[str] | None = None):
"""Replace `turnstile._siteverify_post` with an async stub that
"""Replace `httpx.post` inside `app.turnstile` with a stub that
returns the requested success shape. The stub does not touch the
real CloudFlare endpoint and never sees a real secret.
I4 (security-audit-0026): the siteverify call is now awaited on an
`httpx.AsyncClient`, isolated behind the `_siteverify_post` seam.
Patching that narrow function (rather than the shared
`httpx.AsyncClient`, which gitea/docs also construct) keeps app boot
intact.
"""
captured = {}
async def fake_post(url, data):
def fake_post(url, *, data=None, timeout=None, **kwargs):
captured["url"] = url
captured["data"] = data
body = {"success": bool(success)}
@@ -76,7 +70,7 @@ def _patch_siteverify(monkeypatch, *, success: bool, error_codes: list[str] | No
return SimpleNamespace(json=lambda: body)
from app import turnstile as turnstile_mod
monkeypatch.setattr(turnstile_mod, "_siteverify_post", fake_post)
monkeypatch.setattr(turnstile_mod.httpx, "post", fake_post)
return captured
@@ -176,15 +170,14 @@ def test_otc_request_admits_when_secret_unset_and_not_required(app_with_fake_git
monkeypatch.delenv("CLOUDFLARE_TURNSTILE_SECRET", raising=False)
monkeypatch.delenv("TURNSTILE_REQUIRED", raising=False)
# The siteverify call inside turnstile must not be made in this path —
# patch the seam to a sentinel that explodes if it ever runs
# (I4: the seam is now `_siteverify_post`, not module-level httpx.post).
# The httpx.post inside turnstile must not be called in this path —
# patch it to a sentinel that explodes if it ever runs.
from app import turnstile as turnstile_mod
async def must_not_be_called(*a, **kw):
def must_not_be_called(*a, **kw):
raise AssertionError("siteverify should not run when no secret is configured")
monkeypatch.setattr(turnstile_mod, "_siteverify_post", must_not_be_called)
monkeypatch.setattr(turnstile_mod.httpx, "post", must_not_be_called)
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
@@ -225,27 +218,3 @@ def test_otc_request_refuses_when_required_but_secret_unset(app_with_fake_gitea,
)
assert r.status_code == 500, r.text
assert _outbound_otc_envelopes("alice@example.com") == []
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# I4 (security-audit-0026): verify_token is a coroutine — calling it returns
# an awaitable, not a VerifyOutcome. Locks the async contract so a revert to
# the synchronous event-loop-blocking shape fails here, not just in the
# integration paths.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_verify_token_is_async_and_soft_skips_without_secret(monkeypatch):
import asyncio
from app import turnstile as turnstile_mod
monkeypatch.delenv("CLOUDFLARE_TURNSTILE_SECRET", raising=False)
monkeypatch.delenv("TURNSTILE_REQUIRED", raising=False)
coro = turnstile_mod.verify_token("any-token")
assert asyncio.iscoroutine(coro), "verify_token must be a coroutine (I4)"
outcome = asyncio.run(coro)
# No secret + not required → the gate stays open without any network call.
assert outcome.ok is True
assert outcome.reason == "skipped"
-205
View File
@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
"""End-to-end integration tests for the Gitea webhook receiver
(v0.18.0 Slice 3 webhook tightening per the email + webhook
hygiene proposal).
The release changes the receiver from "verifies the signature only
when a secret is configured; silently accepts unsigned POSTs
otherwise" to "requires the secret unless `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`
is set as an explicit dev-bypass." The startup-time check lives in
`config.load_config()`; the request-time check lives in
`webhooks.receive`.
These tests prove:
* The framework refuses to start when `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is
empty and the dev-bypass is not set.
* The dev-bypass (`RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1`) lets the
framework boot with an empty secret AND lets webhook POSTs
land without signature verification (a loud-warning log line
surfaces, but the request is accepted).
* Default path (secret bound): a POST with a valid signature
lands; a POST with an invalid signature gets 401; a POST with
no signature gets 401.
* Unknown-repo POSTs surface in the log (the "stale Gitea hook"
case the proposal targets).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import logging
import pytest
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
tmp_env,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Startup-time secret check (config.load_config)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_config_refuses_to_load_with_empty_secret_and_no_bypass(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""The framework MUST refuse to start when `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET`
is empty unless `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1` is set. This is
the v0.18.0 startup-loud-failure shape silent acceptance was
the bug."""
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "http://gitea.test")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_USER", "rfc-bot")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_TOKEN", "bot-token")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_ORG", "wiggleverse")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_ID", "cid")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "csec")
monkeypatch.setenv("SECRET_KEY", "test-secret-key")
monkeypatch.setenv("DATABASE_PATH", str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "")
monkeypatch.delenv("RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS", raising=False)
from app.config import load_config
with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET"):
load_config()
def test_config_loads_with_empty_secret_when_bypass_is_set(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""The explicit `RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS=1` opt-in lets the
framework boot with an empty webhook secret. This is the
local-dev escape hatch."""
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "http://gitea.test")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_USER", "rfc-bot")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_TOKEN", "bot-token")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_ORG", "wiggleverse")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_ID", "cid")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "csec")
monkeypatch.setenv("SECRET_KEY", "test-secret-key")
monkeypatch.setenv("DATABASE_PATH", str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "")
monkeypatch.setenv("RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS", "1")
from app.config import load_config
cfg = load_config() # MUST NOT raise
assert cfg.webhook_secret == ""
def test_config_loads_with_secret_set(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""Sanity: the happy path (secret bound, bypass not set) loads
cleanly."""
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_URL", "http://gitea.test")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_USER", "rfc-bot")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_BOT_TOKEN", "bot-token")
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_ORG", "wiggleverse")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_ID", "cid")
monkeypatch.setenv("OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", "csec")
monkeypatch.setenv("SECRET_KEY", "test-secret-key")
monkeypatch.setenv("DATABASE_PATH", str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "my-real-secret")
monkeypatch.delenv("RFC_APP_INSECURE_WEBHOOKS", raising=False)
from app.config import load_config
cfg = load_config()
assert cfg.webhook_secret == "my-real-secret"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Request-time signature verification (webhooks.receive)
#
# The default `app_with_fake_gitea` fixture binds
# `GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET=test-webhook-secret-for-signature-verification`,
# so these tests exercise the production path.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_SECRET = "test-webhook-secret-for-signature-verification"
def _sign(body: bytes) -> str:
return hmac.new(_SECRET.encode("utf-8"), body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def test_webhook_post_with_valid_signature_accepted(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
body = json.dumps({"repository": {"full_name": "wiggleverse/meta"}}).encode()
sig = _sign(body)
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/gitea",
content=body,
headers={
"X-Gitea-Event": "push",
"X-Gitea-Signature": sig,
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
def test_webhook_post_with_invalid_signature_refused_401(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
body = json.dumps({"repository": {"full_name": "wiggleverse/meta"}}).encode()
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/gitea",
content=body,
headers={
"X-Gitea-Event": "push",
"X-Gitea-Signature": "0" * 64, # wrong signature
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 401
def test_webhook_post_with_missing_signature_refused_401(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
body = json.dumps({"repository": {"full_name": "wiggleverse/meta"}}).encode()
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/gitea",
content=body,
headers={
"X-Gitea-Event": "push",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 401
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Unknown-repo logging (the "stale hook on a fork" surface)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_webhook_unknown_repo_logs_at_info(app_with_fake_gitea, caplog):
"""Per the proposal: a hook on a fork or a stale Gitea binding
used to silently 200-OK. v0.18.0 surfaces it as an INFO log."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
body = json.dumps({"repository": {"full_name": "someone-else/unrelated"}}).encode()
sig = _sign(body)
with caplog.at_level(logging.INFO, logger="app.webhooks"):
r = client.post(
"/api/webhooks/gitea",
content=body,
headers={
"X-Gitea-Event": "push",
"X-Gitea-Signature": sig,
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
)
assert r.status_code == 200 # the handler still 200s; surface is the log line
assert any(
"unknown repo" in rec.message and "someone-else/unrelated" in rec.message
for rec in caplog.records
), f"expected unknown-repo log line; got: {[r.message for r in caplog.records]}"
-50
View File
@@ -18,56 +18,6 @@ server {
listen [::]:80;
server_name ohm.wiggleverse.org;
# v0.25.0 security hardening (audit 0026 M2/L8)
#
# NOTE: certbot promotes THIS server block to the HTTPS listener
# (`listen 443 ssl`) and adds a separate port-80 → 443 redirect
# block (see the install comment above). These response headers
# therefore ride into the HTTPS server block on the VM. They use
# `add_header ... always` so they also apply to nginx-generated
# error responses (4xx/5xx), not just 200s.
#
# `server_tokens off` (L8) — suppress the nginx version in the
# Server header and on error pages so we don't advertise the
# build to scanners.
server_tokens off;
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
# Content-Security-Policy (M2). Tuned to what the SPA actually loads:
# - default-src 'self': everything not called out below is same-origin.
# - script-src 'self' + challenges.cloudflare.com: the only external
# <script> tag the app injects is the CloudFlare Turnstile widget
# (frontend/src/components/TurnstileWidget.jsx). Amplitude and
# mermaid are BUNDLED (dynamic `import()` from node_modules, served
# from 'self'), so they need no extra script origin — *.amplitude.com
# is listed defensively in case a future SDK build script-injects.
# script-src DELIBERATELY OMITS 'unsafe-inline' — no inline <script>
# is used, so we keep XSS-via-inline-script blocked.
# - style-src 'unsafe-inline' IS REQUIRED by the current build: the
# JSX uses inline `style={...}` attributes throughout and mermaid
# injects <style> blocks at render time. Removing it would break
# layout; tightening this is a future build-side change (nonce/hash).
# - img-src 'self' data: https: — markdown/RFC bodies may embed remote
# images and data: URIs; svg/mermaid output uses data: too.
# - font-src 'self' data: — bundled fonts plus data: webfonts.
# - connect-src 'self' + *.amplitude.com + challenges.cloudflare.com:
# the app's API/auth/SSE are same-origin (nginx proxy); Amplitude
# Analytics + Session Replay (shipped at sampleRate 1) POST to
# *.amplitude.com; Turnstile verifies via challenges.cloudflare.com.
# - worker-src 'self' blob: — Amplitude Session Replay spins up a
# Web Worker from a blob: URL for capture/compression; without
# blob: here session replay breaks for every consenting user.
# - frame-src challenges.cloudflare.com — the Turnstile challenge
# renders in an iframe from that origin.
# - frame-ancestors 'none' — clickjacking defense, pairs with
# X-Frame-Options DENY for older agents.
# - base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none' — lock down <base>/<object>.
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com https://*.amplitude.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https://*.amplitude.com https://challenges.cloudflare.com; worker-src 'self' blob:; frame-src https://challenges.cloudflare.com; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'" always;
# Static SPA assets live in the Vite build output. The systemd unit
# runs as user `rfc-app`; make sure nginx (usually `www-data`) can
# read this path. Either group-add www-data into rfc-app's group, or
-27
View File
@@ -42,32 +42,5 @@ ProtectHome=true
PrivateTmp=true
ReadWritePaths=/opt/rfc-app/backend/data
# v0.25.0 security hardening (audit 0026 L4) — defense-in-depth.
# The service binds 127.0.0.1:8000 and runs plain CPython
# (FastAPI/uvicorn + sqlite + bcrypt + httpx), so it needs no
# capabilities and no exotic syscalls.
CapabilityBoundingSet=
AmbientCapabilities=
PrivateDevices=true
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectKernelModules=true
ProtectKernelLogs=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX
RestrictNamespaces=true
LockPersonality=true
# MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true blocks W^X memory — safe for stock
# CPython (no JIT) and the pure-Python/C-extension stack here, but
# would break a JIT or a C-ext that mmaps W+X. Watch the first
# restart's journal for a crash; if uvicorn fails to come up,
# comment this one line out and reload.
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
RestrictRealtime=true
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
SystemCallFilter=@system-service
SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM
SystemCallArchitectures=native
UMask=0077
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
-23
View File
@@ -62,26 +62,3 @@ VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL=
# Examples:
# VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY=0x4AAAAAAA...
VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY=
# v0.15.0 / roadmap item #13: Amplitude project API key (public).
# Embedded in the frontend bundle at build time and used by the
# analytics wrapper (`frontend/src/lib/analytics.js`) — which loads
# `@amplitude/unified` (Analytics + Session Replay) when the user
# has granted analytics consent (v0.13.0 cookie banner). Provision
# an Amplitude project at app.amplitude.com → Projects → New, copy
# the API key.
#
# Public by design: Amplitude browser keys are bundle-embedded
# (visible in dev tools), same nature as VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY
# (also public; the truly-secret half of that Turnstile pair is
# CLOUDFLARE_TURNSTILE_SECRET on the backend). For deployments
# behind flotilla, bind via `flotilla overlay set <deployment>
# VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY=<key>` — NOT `flotilla secret set`. The
# vendor's installation wizard shows the key inline as a literal
# string in the init call, confirming the public framing. Leave
# unset in dev; the wrapper logs one console warning and no-ops
# (the app continues to work).
#
# Examples:
# VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY=01234567890abcdef01234567890abcd
VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY=
+10 -530
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
{
"name": "rfc-app-frontend",
"version": "0.24.0",
"version": "0.12.0",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "rfc-app-frontend",
"version": "0.24.0",
"version": "0.12.0",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/unified": "^1.1.9",
"@codemirror/commands": "^6.10.3",
"@codemirror/lang-markdown": "^6.5.0",
"@codemirror/language": "^6.12.3",
@@ -18,7 +17,6 @@
"@tiptap/pm": "^3.5.0",
"@tiptap/react": "^3.5.0",
"@tiptap/starter-kit": "^3.5.0",
"dompurify": "^3.2.4",
"marked": "^18.0.4",
"mermaid": "^11.15.0",
"react": "^19.2.6",
@@ -32,360 +30,6 @@
"vite": "^8.0.12"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/analytics-browser": {
"version": "2.42.4",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/analytics-browser/-/analytics-browser-2.42.4.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-q1XUlaKQkLq2CFx8xsVEc+uekOwHlnDYyaMBzlQDf2vcEaPaQDb7LzJ7z4CFs4Jn9FyBGDNo4w3IYjv9L6xjGA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"@amplitude/plugin-autocapture-browser": "1.27.2",
"@amplitude/plugin-custom-enrichment-browser": "0.1.9",
"@amplitude/plugin-event-property-attribution-browser": "0.2.1",
"@amplitude/plugin-network-capture-browser": "1.10.1",
"@amplitude/plugin-page-url-enrichment-browser": "0.7.11",
"@amplitude/plugin-page-view-tracking-browser": "2.11.1",
"@amplitude/plugin-web-vitals-browser": "1.1.33",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/analytics-client-common": {
"version": "2.4.48",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/analytics-client-common/-/analytics-client-common-2.4.48.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-jdRvu8ux3aIf74FvTDZuSFR1mutzdrIg1ebXYqpKizs9upXz1AJnHClkldSw9i4yu924AJ2wudxq6dccHWlNiA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-connector": "^1.4.8",
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"@amplitude/analytics-types": "2.11.1",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/analytics-connector": {
"version": "1.6.4",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/analytics-connector/-/analytics-connector-1.6.4.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-SpIv0IQMNIq6SH3UqFGiaZyGSc7PBZwRdq7lvP0pBxW8i4Ny+8zwI0pV+VMfMHQwWY3wdIbWw5WQphNjpdq1/Q==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/analytics-core": {
"version": "2.48.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/analytics-core/-/analytics-core-2.48.2.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-r9O+hsTnTsDa1p6QdyC0KbBPXupzoWz9053RQB9XQz8078LM+5KCMbCKYOrSYniH4DH/OM2kOUEdJlwdxIl/IA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-connector": "^1.6.4",
"@types/zen-observable": "0.8.3",
"safe-json-stringify": "1.2.0",
"tslib": "^2.4.1",
"zen-observable": "0.10.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/analytics-types": {
"version": "2.11.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/analytics-types/-/analytics-types-2.11.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-wFEgb0t99ly2uJKm5oZ28Lti0Kh5RecR5XBkwfUpDzn84IoCIZ8GJTsMw/nThu8FZFc7xFDA4UAt76zhZKrs9A==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/engagement-browser": {
"version": "1.0.9",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/engagement-browser/-/engagement-browser-1.0.9.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-zvPr0L5aLlOS3nG8scIkEEDMVK2y3MaMbgjYhMfYruhMpfsC/U0apov22nEc1RRrTwve2awEXruPRKf1TysqrQ==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-types": "^2.0.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/experiment-core": {
"version": "0.13.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/experiment-core/-/experiment-core-0.13.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-ZHvR0dxTltasp8MiMcQ6qKsY20mWnODoy3oebGad6qaRR1ywpUi8IuLf5AwLTM35ZwgzEUTn9TEIWKLHpDwHMw==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"js-base64": "^3.7.5"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/experiment-js-client": {
"version": "1.21.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/experiment-js-client/-/experiment-js-client-1.21.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-chE/4qQG/5Cgl93Wqj1NEdgOL5LkqySLlfk1EN0f+7bJa52HpkGFALA2FeCNYf31Z5CglEeKX6dUMgL7y33SIw==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-connector": "^1.6.4",
"@amplitude/experiment-core": "^0.13.1",
"@amplitude/ua-parser-js": "^0.7.31",
"base64-js": "1.5.1",
"unfetch": "4.1.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/plugin-autocapture-browser": {
"version": "1.27.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/plugin-autocapture-browser/-/plugin-autocapture-browser-1.27.2.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-UTA/0IDw/f2nnK+S1XILqoI5pgUgMTEZokDS6+pC4wuYtmOS9uNAgKuyajzjW12uobybMHRpv7xLjCJ5khKGAg==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/plugin-custom-enrichment-browser": {
"version": "0.1.9",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/plugin-custom-enrichment-browser/-/plugin-custom-enrichment-browser-0.1.9.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-wemh2Tw3zgQ7sa7MUNyMGz9OR6VjTG4tlAMrLlDKbQ4tVkgNI3oAwOF7+0BA8qzgeMXX6iw+CEKaE+EC/okkuQ==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/plugin-event-property-attribution-browser": {
"version": "0.2.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/plugin-event-property-attribution-browser/-/plugin-event-property-attribution-browser-0.2.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-xqBCZe0DYsKyQ1eELN2LM8adXwRE2eOi3SnvSu9SkS0GDXBYWinuPCuLqyc/3uD5hY2FLACWvakpU0tr7GDJgg==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/plugin-experiment-browser": {
"version": "1.0.0-beta.28",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/plugin-experiment-browser/-/plugin-experiment-browser-1.0.0-beta.28.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-NQz267zLi7vl2G2lx10yUrEoGOCe5K9iqcPSIjbTavGu/XGvsmqLDqBHhg+EkdEMAPwypoXnmtPEs3RMhX+1MA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"@amplitude/experiment-js-client": "^1.15.5"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/plugin-network-capture-browser": {
"version": "1.10.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/plugin-network-capture-browser/-/plugin-network-capture-browser-1.10.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-jROIAkUDPd25A/t8W5MpmsTiBat2qoJbCMoNBKKxLMNEaE8VYbheflByWLkm4enbHgWS7OveWy0i3Oc7uPCfAg==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/plugin-page-url-enrichment-browser": {
"version": "0.7.11",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/plugin-page-url-enrichment-browser/-/plugin-page-url-enrichment-browser-0.7.11.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-u9JhUP/VenJifCSbdTz2YZZiXAphs3efzd+qx1SRAIU6d1swPh0g/GVw3sTwvH+4MZtw3SwVC1OFxmz+f2QVyA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/plugin-page-view-tracking-browser": {
"version": "2.11.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/plugin-page-view-tracking-browser/-/plugin-page-view-tracking-browser-2.11.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-tfXg6Uir6X1XuWsOOXE/EgZ9NvM7i2ktDdagydSrFN6OyVkMvqdjPKUZSSUPuHtOoomboi3WaZsTUfq1jkWP3w==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/plugin-session-replay-browser": {
"version": "1.31.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/plugin-session-replay-browser/-/plugin-session-replay-browser-1.31.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-b7kyYVEdW3EMR6cPXCfld+h8nQsuAR5o6vum8Glu+ofhFDfG4wj/mTJ0ITEaNbsJCfXniKQ3kFgTe6hTtxSFGQ==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-client-common": "2.4.48",
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"@amplitude/analytics-types": "2.11.1",
"@amplitude/rrweb-plugin-console-record": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"@amplitude/rrweb-record": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"@amplitude/session-replay-browser": "1.44.0",
"idb-keyval": "^6.2.1",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/plugin-web-vitals-browser": {
"version": "1.1.33",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/plugin-web-vitals-browser/-/plugin-web-vitals-browser-1.1.33.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-33FzxMH1Lr2lhvr5DDy3xD1HHWEI4KPLQsMUXqDTldkLl/ENNeBWcsljQTTDJipmRdS32I79KJhuHRNaoXd6fg==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"tslib": "^2.4.1",
"web-vitals": "5.1.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/rrdom": {
"version": "2.1.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/rrdom/-/rrdom-2.1.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-2dAtxXL02usBV2CSOnScLd3WoVqWaeiGpxN8LuXJ0r/NpLJkW1k876v2tRKAz5NrxPwSdjihsMmwCIXHpJhHfA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/rrweb-snapshot": "^2.1.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/rrweb": {
"version": "2.1.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/rrweb/-/rrweb-2.1.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-6uA+5VE/VHumaXPXTTLGRogd/K9MDwd01jGteppeLzsX0PvqlDyY5aIi35yh9+q1iS6ciPBn/2NRg0lg4cFIlw==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/rrdom": "^2.1.0",
"@amplitude/rrweb-snapshot": "^2.1.0",
"@amplitude/rrweb-types": "^2.1.0",
"@amplitude/rrweb-utils": "^2.1.0",
"@types/css-font-loading-module": "0.0.7",
"@xstate/fsm": "^1.4.0",
"base64-arraybuffer": "^1.0.1",
"mitt": "^3.0.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/rrweb-packer": {
"version": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/rrweb-packer/-/rrweb-packer-2.0.0-alpha.40.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-Btb6b9pS1IvDMbvyYxpUdTk9NRJugSoJjRCl7R6jP/iSlPWXoveJIwHaNFAS9ZmWUEK7HhyBJ8bKGFN3giUsDg==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/rrweb-types": "^2.0.0-alpha.40",
"fflate": "^0.4.4"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/rrweb-plugin-console-record": {
"version": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/rrweb-plugin-console-record/-/rrweb-plugin-console-record-2.0.0-alpha.40.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-vtY7T/kGFl62nC1u7ZUXQvU7ulB70cZGVHPRN/SO9fzVfsY7y6rCmBfoc2jS5KmISdlgkVzMjY2r/EE2Gk9AQA==",
"license": "MIT",
"peerDependencies": {
"@amplitude/rrweb": "^2.0.0-alpha.40"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/rrweb-record": {
"version": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/rrweb-record/-/rrweb-record-2.0.0-alpha.40.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-5cJhQwzhymJWX5/XOtpWK0h2NLq9+t2YiO6ub0cdZ9F5AZizaRbsVH88int07DfX0YiXTKWbISezVuduCLqgSQ==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/rrweb": "^2.0.0-alpha.40",
"@amplitude/rrweb-types": "^2.0.0-alpha.40"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/rrweb-snapshot": {
"version": "2.1.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/rrweb-snapshot/-/rrweb-snapshot-2.1.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-xYQvOW73ig+5M7caqilA8j0S6MHWUULLeJNK+2VVvUqv8mr4FMT2DUAQiVBGCImNlb9Gu2rLUfCScMnVxn+EDg==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"postcss": "^8.4.38"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/rrweb-types": {
"version": "2.1.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/rrweb-types/-/rrweb-types-2.1.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-S73tBI/04A6HCHgnrUNeeVOvnDTEoQnNrmZGyrZncJwRlTIX+6BQSYtBFofMag8GnAy9gA+NtC0TL0CnluOWBw==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/rrweb-utils": {
"version": "2.1.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/rrweb-utils/-/rrweb-utils-2.1.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-dTCDnSiMMHZ10utYHJ8dSd/xkjFgdF67y74PkOzAPcCKW1rLxyJYcFOA3uPL2b7cIVVmoel/5NTp5eflaUaJfQ==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/session-replay-browser": {
"version": "1.44.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/session-replay-browser/-/session-replay-browser-1.44.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-8Ruep2TTDMcfVMKurSpBbVclBK/v8Lb3aSHFsYd/xOQ1E3CaKoAu39pplli28NWoUcW7unyVE7khkOa2zzn0Lw==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-client-common": "2.4.48",
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"@amplitude/analytics-types": "2.11.1",
"@amplitude/experiment-core": "0.7.2",
"@amplitude/rrweb-packer": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"@amplitude/rrweb-plugin-console-record": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"@amplitude/rrweb-record": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"@amplitude/rrweb-types": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"@amplitude/rrweb-utils": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"@amplitude/targeting": "0.2.0",
"@rollup/plugin-replace": "^6.0.1",
"idb": "8.0.0",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/session-replay-browser/node_modules/@amplitude/experiment-core": {
"version": "0.7.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/experiment-core/-/experiment-core-0.7.2.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-Wc2NWvgQ+bLJLeF0A9wBSPIaw0XuqqgkPKsoNFQrmS7r5Djd56um75In05tqmVntPJZRvGKU46pAp8o5tdf4mA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"js-base64": "^3.7.5"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/session-replay-browser/node_modules/@amplitude/rrweb-types": {
"version": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/rrweb-types/-/rrweb-types-2.0.0-alpha.40.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-rP7CBDkzXupxOA7ukvC+zDYLuCtsz54TuJKC4+5O72Jsz4YdokLznKZRG34P6zXozfhGU0261qckk87lLY6mKQ==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/session-replay-browser/node_modules/@amplitude/rrweb-utils": {
"version": "2.0.0-alpha.40",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/rrweb-utils/-/rrweb-utils-2.0.0-alpha.40.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-i1CCt6MCjlqoeNc+1Hse5bz+ZbASaWaIJ0WdJZvnQjUCHH29Xy/QFouyOuor73RZ+UWX4s2tYSrUIdmBepXk3w==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/targeting": {
"version": "0.2.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/targeting/-/targeting-0.2.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-/50ywTrC4hfcfJVBbh5DFbqMPPfaIOivZeb5Gb+OGM03QrA+lsUqdvtnKLNuWtceD4H6QQ2KFzPJ5aAJLyzVDA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-client-common": ">=1 <3",
"@amplitude/analytics-core": ">=1 <3",
"@amplitude/analytics-types": ">=1 <3",
"@amplitude/experiment-core": "0.7.2",
"idb": "^8.0.0",
"tslib": "^2.4.1"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/targeting/node_modules/@amplitude/experiment-core": {
"version": "0.7.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/experiment-core/-/experiment-core-0.7.2.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-Wc2NWvgQ+bLJLeF0A9wBSPIaw0XuqqgkPKsoNFQrmS7r5Djd56um75In05tqmVntPJZRvGKU46pAp8o5tdf4mA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"js-base64": "^3.7.5"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/ua-parser-js": {
"version": "0.7.33",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/ua-parser-js/-/ua-parser-js-0.7.33.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-wKEtVR4vXuPT9cVEIJkYWnlF++Gx3BdLatPBM+SZ1ztVIvnhdGBZR/mn9x/PzyrMcRlZmyi6L56I2J3doVBnjA==",
"funding": [
{
"type": "opencollective",
"url": "https://opencollective.com/ua-parser-js"
},
{
"type": "paypal",
"url": "https://paypal.me/faisalman"
}
],
"license": "MIT",
"engines": {
"node": "*"
}
},
"node_modules/@amplitude/unified": {
"version": "1.1.9",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@amplitude/unified/-/unified-1.1.9.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-YPgQbp/vDQ92GshHs2hfUxoeRnR3rRBWCoQ6wXgFjXQ1uiJf2tP0CBZWdrCStSDuhcpo2rsCz/Ek2LGq5J6SIQ==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/analytics-browser": "2.42.4",
"@amplitude/analytics-core": "2.48.2",
"@amplitude/engagement-browser": "^1.0.3",
"@amplitude/plugin-experiment-browser": "1.0.0-beta.28",
"@amplitude/plugin-session-replay-browser": "1.31.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@antfu/install-pkg": {
"version": "1.1.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@antfu/install-pkg/-/install-pkg-1.1.0.tgz",
@@ -620,12 +264,6 @@
"import-meta-resolve": "^4.2.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@jridgewell/sourcemap-codec": {
"version": "1.5.5",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@jridgewell/sourcemap-codec/-/sourcemap-codec-1.5.5.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-cYQ9310grqxueWbl+WuIUIaiUaDcj7WOq5fVhEljNVgRfOUhY9fy2zTvfoqWsnebh8Sl70VScFbICvJnLKB0Og==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@lezer/common": {
"version": "1.5.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@lezer/common/-/common-1.5.2.tgz",
@@ -1019,49 +657,6 @@
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@rollup/plugin-replace": {
"version": "6.0.3",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rollup/plugin-replace/-/plugin-replace-6.0.3.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-J4RZarRvQAm5IF0/LwUUg+obsm+xZhYnbMXmXROyoSE1ATJe3oXSb9L5MMppdxP2ylNSjv6zFBwKYjcKMucVfA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@rollup/pluginutils": "^5.0.1",
"magic-string": "^0.30.3"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">=14.0.0"
},
"peerDependencies": {
"rollup": "^1.20.0||^2.0.0||^3.0.0||^4.0.0"
},
"peerDependenciesMeta": {
"rollup": {
"optional": true
}
}
},
"node_modules/@rollup/pluginutils": {
"version": "5.3.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rollup/pluginutils/-/pluginutils-5.3.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-5EdhGZtnu3V88ces7s53hhfK5KSASnJZv8Lulpc04cWO3REESroJXg73DFsOmgbU2BhwV0E20bu2IDZb3VKW4Q==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@types/estree": "^1.0.0",
"estree-walker": "^2.0.2",
"picomatch": "^4.0.2"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">=14.0.0"
},
"peerDependencies": {
"rollup": "^1.20.0||^2.0.0||^3.0.0||^4.0.0"
},
"peerDependenciesMeta": {
"rollup": {
"optional": true
}
}
},
"node_modules/@tiptap/core": {
"version": "3.23.6",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@tiptap/core/-/core-3.23.6.tgz",
@@ -1514,12 +1109,6 @@
"tslib": "^2.4.0"
}
},
"node_modules/@types/css-font-loading-module": {
"version": "0.0.7",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/css-font-loading-module/-/css-font-loading-module-0.0.7.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-nl09VhutdjINdWyXxHWN/w9zlNCfr60JUqJbd24YXUuCwgeL0TpFSdElCwb6cxfB6ybE19Gjj4g0jsgkXxKv1Q==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@types/d3": {
"version": "7.4.3",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/d3/-/d3-7.4.3.tgz",
@@ -1773,12 +1362,6 @@
"@types/d3-selection": "*"
}
},
"node_modules/@types/estree": {
"version": "1.0.9",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/estree/-/estree-1.0.9.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-GhdPgy1el4/ImP05X05Uw4cw2/M93BCUmnEvWZNStlCzEKME4Fkk+YpoA5OiHNQmoS7Cafb8Xa3Pya8m1Qrzeg==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@types/geojson": {
"version": "7946.0.16",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/geojson/-/geojson-7946.0.16.tgz",
@@ -1816,12 +1399,6 @@
"integrity": "sha512-zFDAD+tlpf2r4asuHEj0XH6pY6i0g5NeAHPn+15wk3BV6JA69eERFXC1gyGThDkVa1zCyKr5jox1+2LbV/AMLg==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@types/zen-observable": {
"version": "0.8.3",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/zen-observable/-/zen-observable-0.8.3.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-fbF6oTd4sGGy0xjHPKAt+eS2CrxJ3+6gQ3FGcBoIJR2TLAyCkCyI8JqZNy+FeON0AhVgNJoUumVoZQjBFUqHkw==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/@upsetjs/venn.js": {
"version": "2.0.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@upsetjs/venn.js/-/venn.js-2.0.0.tgz",
@@ -1858,41 +1435,6 @@
}
}
},
"node_modules/@xstate/fsm": {
"version": "1.6.5",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@xstate/fsm/-/fsm-1.6.5.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-b5o1I6aLNeYlU/3CPlj/Z91ybk1gUsKT+5NAJI+2W4UjvS5KLG28K9v5UvNoFVjHV8PajVZ00RH3vnjyQO7ZAw==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/base64-arraybuffer": {
"version": "1.0.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/base64-arraybuffer/-/base64-arraybuffer-1.0.2.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-I3yl4r9QB5ZRY3XuJVEPfc2XhZO6YweFPI+UovAzn+8/hb3oJ6lnysaFcjVpkCPfVWFUDvoZ8kmVDP7WyRtYtQ==",
"license": "MIT",
"engines": {
"node": ">= 0.6.0"
}
},
"node_modules/base64-js": {
"version": "1.5.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/base64-js/-/base64-js-1.5.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-AKpaYlHn8t4SVbOHCy+b5+KKgvR4vrsD8vbvrbiQJps7fKDTkjkDry6ji0rUJjC0kzbNePLwzxq8iypo41qeWA==",
"funding": [
{
"type": "github",
"url": "https://github.com/sponsors/feross"
},
{
"type": "patreon",
"url": "https://www.patreon.com/feross"
},
{
"type": "consulting",
"url": "https://feross.org/support"
}
],
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/commander": {
"version": "7.2.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/commander/-/commander-7.2.0.tgz",
@@ -2479,12 +2021,6 @@
"benchmarks"
]
},
"node_modules/estree-walker": {
"version": "2.0.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/estree-walker/-/estree-walker-2.0.2.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-Rfkk/Mp/DL7JVje3u18FxFujQlTNR2q6QfMSMB7AvCBx91NGj/ba3kCfza0f6dVDbw7YlRf/nDrn7pQrCCyQ/w==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/fast-equals": {
"version": "5.4.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fast-equals/-/fast-equals-5.4.0.tgz",
@@ -2512,12 +2048,6 @@
}
}
},
"node_modules/fflate": {
"version": "0.4.8",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fflate/-/fflate-0.4.8.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-FJqqoDBR00Mdj9ppamLa/Y7vxm+PRmNWA67N846RvsoYVMKB4q3y/de5PA7gUmRMYK/8CMz2GDZQmCRN1wBcWA==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/fsevents": {
"version": "2.3.3",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fsevents/-/fsevents-2.3.3.tgz",
@@ -2551,18 +2081,6 @@
"node": ">=0.10.0"
}
},
"node_modules/idb": {
"version": "8.0.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/idb/-/idb-8.0.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-l//qvlAKGmQO31Qn7xdzagVPPaHTxXx199MhrAFuVBTPqydcPYBWjkrbv4Y0ktB+GmWOiwHl237UUOrLmQxLvw==",
"license": "ISC"
},
"node_modules/idb-keyval": {
"version": "6.2.4",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/idb-keyval/-/idb-keyval-6.2.4.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-D/NzHWUmYJGXi++z67aMSrnisb9A3621CyRK5G89JyTlN13C8xf0g04DLxUKMufPem3e3L2JAXR6Z00OWy183Q==",
"license": "Apache-2.0"
},
"node_modules/import-meta-resolve": {
"version": "4.2.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/import-meta-resolve/-/import-meta-resolve-4.2.0.tgz",
@@ -2582,12 +2100,6 @@
"node": ">=12"
}
},
"node_modules/js-base64": {
"version": "3.7.8",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/js-base64/-/js-base64-3.7.8.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-hNngCeKxIUQiEUN3GPJOkz4wF/YvdUdbNL9hsBcMQTkKzboD7T/q3OYOuuPZLUE6dBxSGpwhk5mwuDud7JVAow==",
"license": "BSD-3-Clause"
},
"node_modules/katex": {
"version": "0.16.47",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/katex/-/katex-0.16.47.tgz",
@@ -2909,15 +2421,6 @@
"integrity": "sha512-J8xewKD/Gk22OZbhpOVSwcs60zhd95ESDwezOFuA3/099925PdHJ7OFHNTGtajL3AlZkykD32HykiMo+BIBI8A==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/magic-string": {
"version": "0.30.21",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/magic-string/-/magic-string-0.30.21.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-vd2F4YUyEXKGcLHoq+TEyCjxueSeHnFxyyjNp80yg0XV4vUhnDer/lvvlqM/arB5bXQN5K2/3oinyCRyx8T2CQ==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@jridgewell/sourcemap-codec": "^1.5.5"
}
},
"node_modules/marked": {
"version": "18.0.4",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/marked/-/marked-18.0.4.tgz",
@@ -2971,16 +2474,11 @@
"node": ">= 20"
}
},
"node_modules/mitt": {
"version": "3.0.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/mitt/-/mitt-3.0.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-vKivATfr97l2/QBCYAkXYDbrIWPM2IIKEl7YPhjCvKlG3kE2gm+uBo6nEXK3M5/Ffh/FLpKExzOQ3JJoJGFKBw==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/nanoid": {
"version": "3.3.12",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.12.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-ZB9RH/39qpq5Vu6Y+NmUaFhQR6pp+M2Xt76XBnEwDaGcVAqhlvxrl3B2bKS5D3NH3QR76v3aSrKaF/Kiy7lEtQ==",
"dev": true,
"funding": [
{
"type": "github",
@@ -3017,12 +2515,14 @@
"version": "1.1.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/picocolors/-/picocolors-1.1.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-xceH2snhtb5M9liqDsmEw56le376mTZkEX/jEb/RxNFyegNul7eNslCXP9FDj/Lcu0X8KEyMceP2ntpaHrDEVA==",
"dev": true,
"license": "ISC"
},
"node_modules/picomatch": {
"version": "4.0.4",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/picomatch/-/picomatch-4.0.4.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-QP88BAKvMam/3NxH6vj2o21R6MjxZUAd6nlwAS/pnGvN9IVLocLHxGYIzFhg6fUQ+5th6P4dv4eW9jX3DSIj7A==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT",
"engines": {
"node": ">=12"
@@ -3051,6 +2551,7 @@
"version": "8.5.15",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/postcss/-/postcss-8.5.15.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-FfR8sjd4em2T6fb3I2MwAJU7HWVMr9zba+enmQeeWFfCbm+UOC/0X4DS8XtpUTMwWMGbjKYP7xjfNekzyGmB3A==",
"dev": true,
"funding": [
{
"type": "opencollective",
@@ -3327,12 +2828,6 @@
"integrity": "sha512-PdhdWy89SiZogBLaw42zdeqtRJ//zFd2PgQavcICDUgJT5oW10QCRKbJ6bg4r0/UY2M6BWd5tkxuGFRvCkgfHQ==",
"license": "BSD-3-Clause"
},
"node_modules/safe-json-stringify": {
"version": "1.2.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/safe-json-stringify/-/safe-json-stringify-1.2.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-gH8eh2nZudPQO6TytOvbxnuhYBOvDBBLW52tz5q6X58lJcd/tkmqFR+5Z9adS8aJtURSXWThWy/xJtJwixErvg==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/safer-buffer": {
"version": "2.1.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/safer-buffer/-/safer-buffer-2.1.2.tgz",
@@ -3355,6 +2850,7 @@
"version": "1.2.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/source-map-js/-/source-map-js-1.2.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-UXWMKhLOwVKb728IUtQPXxfYU+usdybtUrK/8uGE8CQMvrhOpwvzDBwj0QhSL7MQc7vIsISBG8VQ8+IDQxpfQA==",
"dev": true,
"license": "BSD-3-Clause",
"engines": {
"node": ">=0.10.0"
@@ -3411,13 +2907,9 @@
"version": "2.8.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tslib/-/tslib-2.8.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-oJFu94HQb+KVduSUQL7wnpmqnfmLsOA/nAh6b6EH0wCEoK0/mPeXU6c3wKDV83MkOuHPRHtSXKKU99IBazS/2w==",
"license": "0BSD"
},
"node_modules/unfetch": {
"version": "4.1.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/unfetch/-/unfetch-4.1.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-crP/n3eAPUJxZXM9T80/yv0YhkTEx2K1D3h7D1AJM6fzsWZrxdyRuLN0JH/dkZh1LNH8LxCnBzoPFCPbb2iGpg==",
"license": "MIT"
"dev": true,
"license": "0BSD",
"optional": true
},
"node_modules/use-sync-external-store": {
"version": "1.6.0",
@@ -3524,18 +3016,6 @@
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/w3c-keyname/-/w3c-keyname-2.2.8.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-dpojBhNsCNN7T82Tm7k26A6G9ML3NkhDsnw9n/eoxSRlVBB4CEtIQ/KTCLI2Fwf3ataSXRhYFkQi3SlnFwPvPQ==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/web-vitals": {
"version": "5.1.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/web-vitals/-/web-vitals-5.1.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-ArI3kx5jI0atlTtmV0fWU3fjpLmq/nD3Zr1iFFlJLaqa5wLBkUSzINwBPySCX/8jRyjlmy1Volw1kz1g9XE4Jg==",
"license": "Apache-2.0"
},
"node_modules/zen-observable": {
"version": "0.10.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/zen-observable/-/zen-observable-0.10.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-iI3lT0iojZhKwT5DaFy2Ce42n3yFcLdFyOh01G7H0flMY60P8MJuVFEoJoNwXlmAyQ45GrjL6AcZmmlv8A5rbw==",
"license": "MIT"
}
}
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"name": "rfc-app-frontend",
"private": true,
"version": "0.29.0",
"version": "0.17.0",
"type": "module",
"scripts": {
"dev": "vite",
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
"preview": "vite preview"
},
"dependencies": {
"@amplitude/unified": "^1.1.9",
"@codemirror/commands": "^6.10.3",
"@codemirror/lang-markdown": "^6.5.0",
"@codemirror/language": "^6.12.3",
@@ -19,7 +18,6 @@
"@tiptap/pm": "^3.5.0",
"@tiptap/react": "^3.5.0",
"@tiptap/starter-kit": "^3.5.0",
"dompurify": "^3.2.4",
"marked": "^18.0.4",
"mermaid": "^11.15.0",
"react": "^19.2.6",
+685 -1014
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+11 -175
View File
@@ -1,29 +1,19 @@
import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from 'react'
import { Routes, Route, Link, Navigate, useLocation, useNavigate, useSearchParams } from 'react-router-dom'
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { Routes, Route, Link, useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom'
import { getMe, subscribeToNotifications } from './api'
import { anonymize, EVENTS, identify, track } from './lib/analytics'
import { useLastState } from './lib/useLastState'
import Catalog from './components/Catalog.jsx'
import Inbox from './components/Inbox.jsx'
import RFCView from './components/RFCView.jsx'
import PRView from './components/PRView.jsx'
import ProposalView from './components/ProposalView.jsx'
import ProposeModal from './components/ProposeModal.jsx'
import ContributeRequestForm from './components/ContributeRequestForm.jsx'
import Landing from './components/Landing.jsx'
import Login from './components/Login.jsx'
import BetaPending from './components/BetaPending.jsx'
import Philosophy from './components/Philosophy.jsx'
import DocsLayout from './components/DocsLayout.jsx'
import DocsUserGuide from './components/DocsUserGuide.jsx'
import DocsSessionsAbout from './components/DocsSessionsAbout.jsx'
import DocsSessionIndex from './components/DocsSessionIndex.jsx'
import DocsSessionTranscript from './components/DocsSessionTranscript.jsx'
import DocsSpec from './components/DocsSpec.jsx'
import DocsSpecsIndex from './components/DocsSpecsIndex.jsx'
import Docs from './components/Docs.jsx'
import NotificationSettings from './components/NotificationSettings.jsx'
import Admin from './components/Admin.jsx'
import AcceptInvitation from './components/AcceptInvitation.jsx'
import InviteClaim from './components/InviteClaim.jsx'
import ToastHost, { showToast } from './components/ToastHost.jsx'
import CookieConsentBanner from './components/CookieConsentBanner.jsx'
@@ -44,87 +34,7 @@ export default function App() {
// "Privacy & cookies" tab dispatches a `rfc-app:cookie-consent-reopen`
// event that bumps this.
const [consentReopenTick, setConsentReopenTick] = useState(0)
// v0.23.0 / item #29 flips true once the #21-Part-C identify effect
// has fired (or once we've confirmed there's no authenticated user to
// identify). useLastState gates its resume redirect on this so the
// redirect always happens AFTER identify, preserving identify-then-
// track ordering.
const [identifyReady, setIdentifyReady] = useState(false)
const navigate = useNavigate()
const location = useLocation()
// #28 Parts 23: the LinkedText create/contribute affordances route via
// query params so they need no prop-threading from deep in a comment
// list. `?propose=<term>` opens the propose modal pre-filled;
// `?contribute=<slug>&term=<term>` opens the contribute-request form.
const [searchParams, setSearchParams] = useSearchParams()
const proposeParam = searchParams.get('propose')
const contributeSlug = searchParams.get('contribute')
const contributeTerm = searchParams.get('term')
const clearParams = (...keys) => {
const next = new URLSearchParams(searchParams)
keys.forEach(k => next.delete(k))
setSearchParams(next, { replace: true })
}
// v0.15.0 Page Viewed event taxonomy. We fire on every
// route change; the analytics wrapper itself decides whether
// anything ships out (consent + key check). The first fire is
// also covered because `location` is set on mount.
const lastPathRef = useRef(null)
useEffect(() => {
const path = location.pathname + (location.search || '')
if (lastPathRef.current === path) return
lastPathRef.current = path
track(EVENTS.PAGE_VIEWED, { path: location.pathname })
}, [location.pathname, location.search])
// v0.15.0 + #21 Part C bind the authenticated user id AND
// durable user properties to the analytics session when sign-in
// lands; reset on sign-out (viewer flips to null). The wrapper
// queues these calls until consent + init resolve, so the order
// is safe even on a cold load.
//
// Property bag passed to identify (set vs setOnce per #21 Part C):
// set: role, permission_state, passcode_set, device_trusted
// (these can change mid-account-life refresh each sign-in)
// setOnce: first_sign_in_at, account_created_at
// (immutable user-history markers set on the first
// sign-in that observes them, never overwritten)
//
// PII discipline: NO email, NO display_name, NO gitea_login passed
// through Amplitude only sees opaque ids + enums + timestamps +
// booleans.
const lastUserIdRef = useRef(null)
useEffect(() => {
const uid = me?.authenticated ? me.user?.id : null
const viewer = me?.authenticated ? me.user : null
if (uid != null && lastUserIdRef.current !== uid) {
lastUserIdRef.current = uid
const props = {}
if (viewer?.role != null) props.role = viewer.role
if (viewer?.permission_state != null) props.permission_state = viewer.permission_state
if (viewer?.passcode_set != null) props.passcode_set = !!viewer.passcode_set
if (viewer?.device_trusted != null) props.device_trusted = !!viewer.device_trusted
if (viewer?.first_sign_in_at) props.first_sign_in_at = ['__setOnce__', viewer.first_sign_in_at]
if (viewer?.created_at) props.account_created_at = ['__setOnce__', viewer.created_at]
identify({ user_id: String(uid), properties: props })
// v0.23.0 / item #29 identify has now fired for this sign-in;
// release useLastState's resume redirect (it waits on this).
setIdentifyReady(true)
} else if (uid == null && lastUserIdRef.current != null) {
// Sign-out edge App-level reset is handled separately by the
// sign-out gesture that fires User Signed Out. Clear our local
// memo so a fresh sign-in re-fires identify.
lastUserIdRef.current = null
}
}, [me?.authenticated, me?.user?.id, me?.user?.role, me?.user?.permission_state, me?.user?.passcode_set, me?.user?.device_trusted])
// v0.23.0 / item #29 once `me` has resolved, if there's no
// authenticated user there is nothing to identify, so release the
// resume gate immediately (anonymous boots have no resume to do, but
// the hook still needs the gate resolved to be a clean no-op).
useEffect(() => {
if (me != null && !me.authenticated) setIdentifyReady(true)
}, [me])
useEffect(() => {
const handler = () => setConsentReopenTick(t => t + 1)
@@ -139,18 +49,6 @@ export default function App() {
.finally(() => setLoading(false))
}, [])
// v0.23.0 / item #29 server-side sign-in state resume. The hook
// debounce-posts the current route for authenticated users and, once
// identify has fired, redirects a fresh sign-in (which hard-lands on
// "/") to the user's stored last route. Anonymous users: no-op.
useLastState({
authenticated: !!me?.authenticated,
pathname: location.pathname,
identifyReady,
lastRoute: me?.authenticated ? me.user?.last_route : null,
navigate,
})
// §15.3 subscribe to the live SSE stream for authenticated viewers
// so the badge counter and the toast surface stay in lockstep with
// the inbox. Tabs that miss an event because they were closed pick
@@ -213,7 +111,7 @@ export default function App() {
wonders why a conversation is public can reach the answer
in two clicks. Anonymous viewers see it too. */}
<Link to="/philosophy" className="header-about" title="Why this exists (§14)">
Philosophy
About
</Link>
<Link to="/docs" className="header-about" title="User guide">
Docs
@@ -232,17 +130,9 @@ export default function App() {
<button
className="inbox-trigger"
onClick={() => setInboxOpen(o => !o)}
aria-label="Inbox"
title="Inbox (§15.2)"
title="Notifications inbox (§15.2)"
>
<svg
width="18" height="18" viewBox="0 0 24 24"
fill="none" stroke="currentColor" strokeWidth="1.75"
strokeLinecap="round" strokeLinejoin="round" aria-hidden
>
<path d="M4 5h16a1 1 0 0 1 1 1v12a1 1 0 0 1-1 1H4a1 1 0 0 1-1-1V6a1 1 0 0 1 1-1Z" />
<path d="m3.5 6.5 8.5 6 8.5-6" />
</svg>
<span aria-hidden>📮</span>
{unreadCount > 0 && (
<span className="badge">{unreadCount > 99 ? '99+' : unreadCount}</span>
)}
@@ -252,20 +142,7 @@ export default function App() {
<>
<span className="user-name">{viewer.display_name}</span>
<span className={`user-role-badge role-${viewer.role}`}>{viewer.role}</span>
<a
className="btn-link"
href="/auth/logout"
onClick={() => {
// v0.15.0 fire the sign-out event before the
// hard nav. The wrapper's track() is sync-enqueue;
// the underlying SDK flush is best-effort across
// navigation. anonymize() clears the user binding
// so any post-nav anonymous events on the next
// page aren't attributed to the prior user.
track(EVENTS.USER_SIGNED_OUT)
anonymize()
}}
>Sign out</a>
<a className="btn-link" href="/auth/logout">Sign out</a>
</>
) : (
<Link className="btn-signin-header" to="/login" title="Private beta — only invited emails can sign in">
@@ -280,24 +157,12 @@ export default function App() {
<Route path="/welcome" element={<Landing />} />
<Route path="/login" element={<Login />} />
<Route path="/beta-pending" element={<BetaPending viewer={viewer} />} />
{/* v0.16.0 (item #12): per-RFC invitation acceptance landing.
Anonymous viewers see a sign-in prompt; signed-in users
see the preview + accept gesture. */}
<Route path="/invitations/accept" element={
<PolicyShell><AcceptInvitation viewer={viewer} /></PolicyShell>
} />
{/* v0.17.0 roadmap item #16. The claim landing page for
admin-issued invites. Anonymous-reachable; the call
itself establishes the session on success. */}
<Route path="/invites/claim" element={<InviteClaim />} />
<Route path="/philosophy" element={<PhilosophyWithSidebar viewer={viewer} />} />
{/* v0.19.0 / roadmap item #30 /docs/* is a hub with sub-nav.
The bare /docs path redirects to the user guide; sessions
browser lives at /docs/sessions/*. See DocsLayout.jsx
for the flyout shape and CHANGELOG v0.19.0 for the
upgrade path. */}
<Route path="/docs" element={<Navigate to="/docs/user-guide" replace />} />
<Route path="/docs/*" element={<DocsWithSidebar viewer={viewer} />} />
<Route path="/docs" element={<DocsWithSidebar viewer={viewer} />} />
{/* §14.5 / §14.6: cookie-consent companions to /philosophy.
Available to anonymous and authenticated viewers alike. */}
<Route path="/privacy" element={<PolicyShell><Privacy /></PolicyShell>} />
@@ -327,26 +192,17 @@ export default function App() {
} />
</Routes>
</div>
{(proposeOpen || proposeParam != null) && viewer && (
{proposeOpen && viewer && (
<ProposeModal
viewer={viewer}
initialTitle={proposeParam || ''}
onClose={() => { setProposeOpen(false); clearParams('propose') }}
onClose={() => setProposeOpen(false)}
onSubmitted={({ pr_number }) => {
setProposeOpen(false)
clearParams('propose')
setCatalogVersion(v => v + 1)
navigate(`/proposals/${pr_number}`)
}}
/>
)}
{contributeSlug && viewer && (
<ContributeRequestForm
slug={contributeSlug}
term={contributeTerm || ''}
onClose={() => clearParams('contribute', 'term')}
/>
)}
{inboxOpen && viewer && (
<Inbox onClose={() => setInboxOpen(false)} lastChangeTick={inboxTick} />
)}
@@ -376,29 +232,9 @@ function PhilosophyWithSidebar({ viewer }) {
}
function DocsWithSidebar({ viewer }) {
// v0.19.0 / roadmap item #30 the `/docs/*` surface is a flyout
// shell with sub-routes. The shell (sidebar + content area) is the
// DocsLayout outlet host; the sub-routes mount their respective
// pages into the outlet. Bare `/docs/sessions` redirects to the
// sessions about page so deep-linkers and the flyout's "Sessions"
// header both land somewhere coherent.
return (
<main className="chrome-pane">
<Routes>
<Route element={<DocsLayout authenticated={!!viewer} />}>
<Route index element={<Navigate to="user-guide" replace />} />
<Route path="user-guide" element={<DocsUserGuide />} />
<Route path="sessions" element={<Navigate to="about" replace />} />
<Route path="sessions/about" element={<DocsSessionsAbout />} />
<Route path="sessions/:nnnn" element={<DocsSessionIndex />} />
<Route path="sessions/:nnnn/:filename" element={<DocsSessionTranscript />} />
{/* v0.20.0 /docs/specs/* surface (framework spec + flotilla spec
at runtime via gitea raw). Bare /docs/specs lands on the
client-side redirect to the first configured spec. */}
<Route path="specs" element={<DocsSpecsIndex />} />
<Route path="specs/:name" element={<DocsSpec />} />
</Route>
</Routes>
<Docs authenticated={!!viewer} />
</main>
)
}
+4 -211
View File
@@ -25,25 +25,6 @@ export async function getMe() {
return jsonOrThrow(res)
}
// ── v0.23.0: sign-in state resume (§6.2, roadmap item #29) ───────────────
//
// The route-change hook (useLastState) debounce-posts the user's current
// route + a small bag of *light* view state here for authenticated users.
// The next sign-in reads `last_route` off `/api/auth/me` and redirects.
// Privacy: `state` carries ephemeral view state ONLY — never draft-buffer
// contents (see SPEC §6.2). Best-effort: callers ignore failures (an
// offline/401 POST must never disrupt navigation).
export async function putLastState(route, state) {
const body = { route }
if (state != null) body.state = state
const res = await fetch('/api/me/last-state', {
method: 'PUT',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify(body),
})
return jsonOrThrow(res)
}
// ── v0.7.0: email + one-time-code sign-in (§6.2) ─────────────────────────
//
// The legacy /auth/login → /auth/callback OAuth flow remains during the
@@ -185,81 +166,15 @@ export async function getProposal(prNumber) {
return jsonOrThrow(await fetch(`/api/proposals/${prNumber}`))
}
export async function proposeRFC({ title, slug, pitch, tags, proposedUseCase }) {
export async function proposeRFC({ title, slug, pitch, tags }) {
const res = await fetch('/api/rfcs/propose', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
// #26: proposed_use_case is optional; send null when blank so the
// backend treats it as "left blank".
body: JSON.stringify({
title,
slug,
pitch,
tags: tags || [],
proposed_use_case: proposedUseCase || null,
}),
body: JSON.stringify({ title, slug, pitch, tags: tags || [] }),
})
return jsonOrThrow(res)
}
// Roadmap #27: Claude Haiku tag suggestions for the propose-RFC modal.
// Returns a (possibly empty) array of { tag, confidence }. Deliberately
// forgiving — any non-OK response (rate limit, transient error, no key
// configured server-side) resolves to [] so the modal just shows nothing
// rather than surfacing an error for what is a best-effort assist.
export async function suggestTags({ title, pitch, useCase }) {
try {
const res = await fetch('/api/rfcs/suggest-tags', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
title: title || '',
pitch: pitch || '',
use_case: useCase || '',
}),
})
if (!res.ok) return []
const data = await res.json()
return Array.isArray(data.suggestions) ? data.suggestions : []
} catch {
return []
}
}
// Roadmap #28 Part 3: offer-to-contribute-to-a-pending-RFC.
// `contributionTarget` feeds the contribute form (RFC title, owner
// display, the viewer's eligibility); `requestContribution` submits the
// ask; accept/decline are the owner's inbox actions.
export async function contributionTarget(slug) {
return jsonOrThrow(await fetch(`/api/rfcs/${slug}/contribution-target`))
}
export async function requestContribution(slug, { matchedTerm, whoIAm, why, useCase }) {
const res = await fetch(`/api/rfcs/${slug}/contribution-requests`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
matched_term: matchedTerm,
who_i_am: whoIAm,
why,
use_case: useCase || null,
}),
})
return jsonOrThrow(res)
}
export async function acceptContributionRequest(slug, requestId) {
return jsonOrThrow(await fetch(
`/api/rfcs/${slug}/contribution-requests/${requestId}/accept`, { method: 'POST' },
))
}
export async function declineContributionRequest(slug, requestId) {
return jsonOrThrow(await fetch(
`/api/rfcs/${slug}/contribution-requests/${requestId}/decline`, { method: 'POST' },
))
}
export async function mergeProposal(prNumber) {
const res = await fetch(`/api/proposals/${prNumber}/merge`, { method: 'POST' })
return jsonOrThrow(res)
@@ -407,48 +322,6 @@ export async function resolveThread(slug, branch, threadId) {
return jsonOrThrow(res)
}
// ── v0.16.0: owner-only invite for per-RFC PR or PR-less discussion ──────
//
// roadmap item #12 / §6 / §10. The RFC's owner invites specific emails
// to one of two per-RFC roles ('contributor' or 'discussant'); the
// invitee accepts via the email-encoded token after signing in. The
// platform-level grant remains the admin's decision (per item #6 /
// v0.8.0) — these endpoints control per-RFC membership only.
export async function listRFCInvitations(slug) {
return jsonOrThrow(await fetch(`/api/rfcs/${slug}/invitations`))
}
export async function createRFCInvitation(slug, { inviteeEmail, roleInRFC }) {
const res = await fetch(`/api/rfcs/${slug}/invitations`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ invitee_email: inviteeEmail, role_in_rfc: roleInRFC }),
})
return jsonOrThrow(res)
}
export async function revokeRFCInvitation(slug, invitationId) {
const res = await fetch(`/api/rfcs/${slug}/invitations/${invitationId}/revoke`, {
method: 'POST',
})
return jsonOrThrow(res)
}
export async function previewInvitation(token) {
const params = new URLSearchParams({ token })
return jsonOrThrow(await fetch(`/api/invitations/accept?${params}`))
}
export async function acceptInvitation(token) {
const res = await fetch('/api/invitations/accept', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ token }),
})
return jsonOrThrow(res)
}
// ── v0.5.0: PR-less per-RFC discussion (§5 / §10) ────────────────────────
//
// The substrate is `threads.branch_name IS NULL` — the same threads
@@ -577,14 +450,13 @@ export async function draftPRText(slug, branch) {
return jsonOrThrow(res)
}
export async function openPR(slug, branch, { title, description, proposedUseCase }) {
export async function openPR(slug, branch, { title, description }) {
const res = await fetch(
`/api/rfcs/${slug}/branches/${encodeURIComponent(branch)}/open-pr`,
{
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
// #26: proposed_use_case is optional; null when blank.
body: JSON.stringify({ title, description, proposed_use_case: proposedUseCase || null }),
body: JSON.stringify({ title, description }),
},
)
return jsonOrThrow(res)
@@ -806,85 +678,6 @@ export async function getDocs() {
return jsonOrThrow(await fetch('/api/docs'))
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// v0.19.0 / roadmap item #30 — /api/docs/sessions/* surface
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// The framework mediates reads against the public
// `wiggleverse/ohm-session-history` gitea repo so the rendered
// `/docs/sessions/*` surface inherits the same chrome as
// `/docs/user-guide`. Three text-bearing endpoints return markdown
// (Content-Type: text/markdown) and the manifest returns JSON. We
// wrap each into a small helper.
//
// 404 from `getSessionAbout` / `getSessionTranscript` / `getSessionIndex`
// throws an Error with `.status === 404` so the UI can render its own
// empty-state. 502 (gitea unreachable) throws `.status === 502` so
// the UI can offer a retry button.
export async function getSessionsManifest() {
// Manifest 404 is mapped server-side to HTTP 200 + `{}` so this
// helper never throws on the empty-state path.
return jsonOrThrow(await fetch('/api/docs/sessions/manifest'))
}
async function _textOrThrow(res) {
if (!res.ok) {
let detail = ''
try {
const body = await res.json()
detail = body.detail || JSON.stringify(body)
} catch {
detail = await res.text()
}
const error = new Error(detail || `HTTP ${res.status}`)
error.status = res.status
throw error
}
return res.text()
}
export async function getSessionsAbout() {
return _textOrThrow(await fetch('/api/docs/sessions/about'))
}
export async function getSessionTranscript(nnnn, filename) {
return _textOrThrow(await fetch(
`/api/docs/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(nnnn)}/${encodeURIComponent(filename)}`
))
}
export async function getSessionIndex(nnnn) {
return jsonOrThrow(await fetch(
`/api/docs/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(nnnn)}/index`
))
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// v0.20.0 — /api/docs/specs/* surface
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Sibling of the docs-sessions helpers above. The framework mediates
// reads against the configured spec URLs (default: rfc-app's own
// SPEC.md + flotilla's SPEC.md on `git.wiggleverse.org`) so the
// `/docs/specs/*` route inherits the same chrome as `/docs/user-guide`
// and `/docs/sessions/*`. The manifest endpoint always returns 200 +
// {specs: [...]} — a malformed `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` env var falls back to
// the framework default at parse time on the backend.
//
// 404 from `getSpec` throws `.status === 404`; 502 throws `.status === 502`,
// matching the docs-sessions helper convention.
export async function getSpecsManifest() {
return jsonOrThrow(await fetch('/api/docs/specs/manifest'))
}
export async function getSpec(name) {
return _textOrThrow(await fetch(
`/api/docs/specs/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`
))
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Slice 7: admin neighborhood (§17 admin/* + user search for the §15.8 mute
// typeahead).
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
// AcceptInvitation.jsx v0.16.0 / roadmap item #12.
//
// The /invitations/accept?token=... landing page the invitation email
// links to. The page:
//
// 1. Reads `?token=...` from the URL.
// 2. Calls GET /api/invitations/accept?token=... to preview what the
// invitation grants (RFC title, role-in-RFC, expiry, whether the
// currently-signed-in user's email matches the invitee's).
// 3. Renders a confirmation surface name the RFC, name the role,
// and either show "Accept" (when the email matches and the
// invitation is still pending) or a refusal message (expired,
// revoked, email mismatch).
// 4. On accept, POST /api/invitations/accept lands the
// rfc_collaborators row and the page redirects to the RFC's view.
//
// For an anonymous viewer who lands here without signing in, the
// preview call 401s and the page tells them to sign in. After
// signing in (via the existing OTC/passcode surface at /login) they
// can return to the same URL the token is stable.
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { Link, useNavigate, useSearchParams } from 'react-router-dom'
import { acceptInvitation, previewInvitation } from '../api'
import { EVENTS, identify, track } from '../lib/analytics'
export default function AcceptInvitation({ viewer }) {
const [searchParams] = useSearchParams()
const navigate = useNavigate()
const token = searchParams.get('token') || ''
const [preview, setPreview] = useState(null)
const [previewError, setPreviewError] = useState(null)
const [accepting, setAccepting] = useState(false)
const [acceptError, setAcceptError] = useState(null)
useEffect(() => {
if (!token) {
setPreviewError('No invitation token in the URL.')
return
}
if (!viewer) {
// Not signed in the preview endpoint will 401. We surface a
// sign-in prompt without making the request.
return
}
previewInvitation(token)
.then(setPreview)
.catch(err => setPreviewError(err.message || 'Could not load invitation.'))
}, [token, viewer])
async function handleAccept() {
setAccepting(true)
setAcceptError(null)
try {
const result = await acceptInvitation(token)
// v0.16.0 + #21 Part C re-identify with per-RFC invite
// properties on accept, BEFORE the track event fires, so the
// Amplitude user record carries the invite context from the
// moment of acceptance. setOnce on invited_at preserves the
// first-accepted timestamp if the same user accepts multiple
// RFC invitations.
if (viewer?.id != null) {
identify({
user_id: String(viewer.id),
properties: {
invited_at: ['__setOnce__', new Date().toISOString()],
last_invited_to_rfc: result.rfc_slug,
last_invite_role_in_rfc: result.role_in_rfc || preview?.role_in_rfc,
claim_method: 'rfc-invite',
},
})
}
track(EVENTS.INVITATION_ACCEPTED, {
rfc_slug: result.rfc_slug,
role_in_rfc: result.role_in_rfc || preview?.role_in_rfc,
})
navigate(`/rfc/${result.rfc_slug}`)
} catch (err) {
setAcceptError(err.message || 'Could not accept invitation.')
} finally {
setAccepting(false)
}
}
if (!token) {
return (
<div className="accept-invitation">
<h1>Invitation link is malformed</h1>
<p>No <code>token</code> parameter was found. Ask the person who
invited you to re-send the link.</p>
<p><Link to="/">Return to the catalog</Link></p>
</div>
)
}
if (!viewer) {
return (
<div className="accept-invitation">
<h1>Sign in to accept your invitation</h1>
<p>
You've been invited to collaborate on an RFC. Sign in first so we
can attach the membership to your account, then return to this
link.
</p>
<p>
<Link to="/login" className="btn-primary">Sign in</Link>
</p>
</div>
)
}
if (previewError) {
return (
<div className="accept-invitation">
<h1>Invitation unavailable</h1>
<p>{previewError}</p>
<p><Link to="/">Return to the catalog</Link></p>
</div>
)
}
if (!preview) {
return <div className="accept-invitation">Loading invitation</div>
}
const { rfc_title, rfc_slug, role_in_rfc, status, invitee_email, email_matches_you } = preview
if (status === 'revoked') {
return (
<div className="accept-invitation">
<h1>Invitation revoked</h1>
<p>
The owner of <strong>{rfc_title}</strong> revoked this invitation.
Ask them to re-issue it if you should still have access.
</p>
<p><Link to={`/rfc/${rfc_slug}`}>Read the RFC anyway</Link></p>
</div>
)
}
if (status === 'expired') {
return (
<div className="accept-invitation">
<h1>Invitation expired</h1>
<p>
This invitation to <strong>{rfc_title}</strong> has expired. Ask
the RFC's owner to issue a fresh one.
</p>
<p><Link to={`/rfc/${rfc_slug}`}>Read the RFC anyway</Link></p>
</div>
)
}
if (status === 'accepted') {
return (
<div className="accept-invitation">
<h1>Already accepted</h1>
<p>
You've already accepted this invitation. You can{' '}
<Link to={`/rfc/${rfc_slug}`}>open {rfc_title}</Link> now.
</p>
</div>
)
}
if (!email_matches_you) {
return (
<div className="accept-invitation">
<h1>This invitation is for a different account</h1>
<p>
This invitation was sent to <strong>{invitee_email}</strong>. You're
currently signed in as <strong>{viewer.email || viewer.gitea_login}</strong>.
Sign out and sign back in with the invited address to accept.
</p>
<p><a className="btn-link" href="/auth/logout">Sign out</a></p>
</div>
)
}
return (
<div className="accept-invitation">
<h1>Join {rfc_title}</h1>
<p>
You've been invited to <strong>{rfc_title}</strong> as a{' '}
<strong>{role_in_rfc}</strong>.
</p>
<p style={{ color: '#666' }}>
{role_in_rfc === 'contributor'
? 'Contributors can open PRs against this RFC and join its discussion.'
: 'Discussants can post in this RFC\'s discussion.'}
</p>
{acceptError && <div className="error-banner">{acceptError}</div>}
<p>
<button
type="button"
className="btn-primary"
onClick={handleAccept}
disabled={accepting}
>
{accepting ? 'Accepting…' : `Accept and open ${rfc_title}`}
</button>
</p>
<p>
<Link to={`/rfc/${rfc_slug}`}>or just read the RFC without accepting</Link>
</p>
</div>
)
}
-18
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ import {
removeAllowlistEmail,
createUserInvite,
} from '../api.js'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics.js'
// v0.17.0 roadmap item #16. The max length the backend enforces
// (Pydantic body bound + `invites.CUSTOM_MESSAGE_MAX_LENGTH`); kept
@@ -145,12 +144,6 @@ function UsersTab() {
setError(null)
try {
await setUserPermission(userId, state)
// v0.15.0 analytics: fire on a successful §6.1 grant/revoke.
// action collapses the {pending granted, revoked granted}
// edges onto `grant`, and `granted revoked` onto `revoke`,
// matching the roadmap's two-arm taxonomy.
const action = state === 'granted' ? 'grant' : 'revoke'
track(EVENTS.ADMIN_PERMISSION_DECISION, { action, target_user_id: String(userId) })
// Refresh the full row so permission_decided_{at,by_*} update too.
await refresh()
} catch (e) {
@@ -416,17 +409,6 @@ function CreateUserInviteModal({ onClose, onSuccess }) {
role,
custom_message: customMessage,
})
// v0.17.0 + #21 Part C Amplitude wiring. target_user_id is
// the OHM user id the invite-create gesture provisioned;
// initial_role is what the invitee inherits on claim.
// custom_message_chars is a coarse signal of admin effort
// (0 = template-only, 1+ = personalized). No PII.
track(EVENTS.USER_INVITED, {
target_user_id: result.invited_user_id != null
? String(result.invited_user_id) : null,
initial_role: result.role,
custom_message_chars: (customMessage || '').length,
})
setSuccess(`Invite sent to ${result.email} (${result.role}).`)
// Brief delay so the admin sees the success state, then close
// and let the parent refresh the listing.
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
// ContributeRequestForm.jsx roadmap #28 Part 3.
//
// The "ask to contribute" popover, opened from an `rfc-pending` affordance
// in LinkedText (App reads `?contribute=<slug>&term=<term>`). It loads the
// contribution target (RFC title + owner display + the viewer's
// eligibility), shows the framing line "<owner> is working on an RFC for
// '<term>'", and collects the three #15/#26-vocabulary fields:
//
// * Who I am (required, free-text)
// * Why I'm asking (required, free-text)
// * What I'd use it for (optional, mirrors #26)
//
// Submitting POSTs the request, which lands in each owner's §15 inbox.
// When the viewer isn't eligible (anonymous, already a collaborator, or
// has a pending ask) the form shows the backend's reason instead.
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { contributionTarget, requestContribution } from '../api'
export default function ContributeRequestForm({ slug, term, onClose }) {
const [target, setTarget] = useState(null)
const [loadError, setLoadError] = useState(null)
const [whoIAm, setWhoIAm] = useState('')
const [why, setWhy] = useState('')
const [useCase, setUseCase] = useState('')
const [submitting, setSubmitting] = useState(false)
const [error, setError] = useState(null)
const [done, setDone] = useState(false)
useEffect(() => {
let live = true
contributionTarget(slug)
.then(t => { if (live) setTarget(t) })
.catch(err => { if (live) setLoadError(err.message || 'Could not load this RFC.') })
return () => { live = false }
}, [slug])
async function handleSubmit(e) {
e.preventDefault()
if (!whoIAm.trim() || !why.trim()) return
setSubmitting(true)
setError(null)
try {
await requestContribution(slug, {
matchedTerm: term || target?.title || slug,
whoIAm: whoIAm.trim(),
why: why.trim(),
useCase: useCase.trim() || null,
})
setDone(true)
} catch (err) {
setError(err.message || 'Could not send your request.')
} finally {
setSubmitting(false)
}
}
const owner = target?.owner || 'The owner'
const label = term || target?.title || slug
return (
<div className="modal-overlay" onClick={e => { if (e.target === e.currentTarget) onClose() }}>
<div className="modal">
<div className="modal-header">
<h2>Ask to contribute</h2>
<button className="modal-close" onClick={onClose}>×</button>
</div>
{loadError && (
<div className="modal-body"><p className="field-error">{loadError}</p></div>
)}
{!loadError && done && (
<>
<div className="modal-body">
<p>
Your request has been sent to <strong>{owner}</strong>. You'll hear back
in your inbox; if it's accepted you'll get an invitation by email to
join the RFC.
</p>
</div>
<div className="modal-actions">
<button type="button" className="btn-primary" onClick={onClose}>Done</button>
</div>
</>
)}
{!loadError && !done && target && !target.eligible && (
<>
<div className="modal-body">
<p className="field-help" style={{ marginTop: 0 }}>
{owner} is working on an RFC for <strong>'{label}'</strong>.
</p>
<p>{target.already_requested
? "You've already asked to contribute to this RFC — the owner has your request."
: (target.reason || 'You cannot ask to contribute to this RFC right now.')}</p>
</div>
<div className="modal-actions">
<button type="button" className="btn-secondary" onClick={onClose}>Close</button>
</div>
</>
)}
{!loadError && !done && target && target.eligible && (
<form onSubmit={handleSubmit}>
<div className="modal-body">
<p className="field-help" style={{ marginTop: 0 }}>
<strong>{owner}</strong> is working on an RFC for <strong>'{label}'</strong>.
Tell them a little about why you'd like to contribute.
</p>
<label htmlFor="contribute-who">Who I am</label>
<textarea
id="contribute-who"
value={whoIAm}
onChange={e => setWhoIAm(e.target.value)}
placeholder="Your name and a sentence of context."
rows={2}
autoFocus
required
/>
<label htmlFor="contribute-why">Why I'm asking to contribute</label>
<textarea
id="contribute-why"
value={why}
onChange={e => setWhy(e.target.value)}
placeholder="What you'd bring, or what draws you to this RFC."
rows={3}
required
/>
<label htmlFor="contribute-use-case">What I'd use the RFC for (optional)</label>
<textarea
id="contribute-use-case"
value={useCase}
onChange={e => setUseCase(e.target.value)}
placeholder="The concrete thing you intend to build or do with it. Optional."
rows={2}
/>
{error && <p className="field-error">{error}</p>}
</div>
<div className="modal-actions">
<button type="button" className="btn-secondary" onClick={onClose}>Cancel</button>
<button
type="submit"
className="btn-primary"
disabled={!whoIAm.trim() || !why.trim() || submitting}
>
{submitting ? 'Sending…' : 'Send request'}
</button>
</div>
</form>
)}
{!loadError && !done && !target && (
<div className="modal-body"><p className="field-help">Loading</p></div>
)}
</div>
</div>
)
}
-128
View File
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
/* Docs.css docs-surface polish scoped to v0.21.0 / roadmap item #32.
*
* This sheet owns ONLY the classes introduced by item #32 (the
* transcript metadata header and the session-root sibling list). The
* pre-existing docs classes (.docs-article, .docs-empty, .docs-error,
* .docs-source-link, .philosophy-body, .muted) live in App.css and are
* deliberately NOT touched here redefining them would race the #31
* App.css token sweep for the same selectors. Every value below reads
* a token from tokens.css so the new surfaces sit on the same
* spacing/type/color scale as the rest of the docs chrome.
*
* Imported from DocsSessionTranscript.jsx + DocsSessionIndex.jsx (the
* two components that render these elements). CSS custom properties are
* not import-order-sensitive at use time, so the import site doesn't
* matter for correctness.
*/
/* Transcript metadata header
* A compact card above the rendered transcript body: title, the
* started/ended/duration grid, an optional TL;DR, and the external
* "view source" link. */
.docs-transcript-meta {
margin: 0 0 var(--space-9);
padding: var(--space-7);
border: 1px solid var(--color-border);
border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
background: var(--color-surface-sunken);
}
.docs-transcript-meta-title {
margin: 0 0 var(--space-5);
font-size: var(--text-lg);
font-weight: var(--weight-semibold);
line-height: var(--leading-tight);
color: var(--color-text-strong);
font-family: var(--font-mono);
word-break: break-word;
}
.docs-transcript-meta-grid {
margin: 0;
display: grid;
grid-template-columns: max-content 1fr;
gap: var(--space-2) var(--space-7);
align-items: baseline;
}
.docs-transcript-meta-row {
display: contents;
}
.docs-transcript-meta-grid dt {
margin: 0;
font-size: var(--text-xs);
font-weight: var(--weight-semibold);
text-transform: uppercase;
letter-spacing: 0.04em;
color: var(--color-text-muted);
}
.docs-transcript-meta-grid dd {
margin: 0;
font-size: var(--text-base);
color: var(--color-text);
}
.docs-transcript-meta-tldr {
margin: var(--space-6) 0 0;
padding-top: var(--space-6);
border-top: 1px solid var(--color-border);
font-size: var(--text-base);
line-height: var(--leading-relaxed);
color: var(--color-text);
}
.docs-transcript-meta-source {
display: inline-block;
margin-top: var(--space-6);
}
/* Session-root sibling-transcript list
* Rendered above the inlined primary transcript when a session has
* more than one transcript (driver `.0` + subagents). The primary is
* marked "(shown below)"; the rest link to their standalone routes. */
.docs-session-siblings {
margin: 0 0 var(--space-9);
padding: var(--space-6) var(--space-7);
border: 1px solid var(--color-border);
border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
background: var(--color-surface-muted);
display: flex;
flex-wrap: wrap;
align-items: baseline;
gap: var(--space-3) var(--space-6);
}
.docs-session-siblings-label {
font-size: var(--text-xs);
font-weight: var(--weight-semibold);
text-transform: uppercase;
letter-spacing: 0.04em;
color: var(--color-text-muted);
}
.docs-session-siblings-list {
list-style: none;
margin: 0;
padding: 0;
display: flex;
flex-wrap: wrap;
gap: var(--space-2) var(--space-5);
font-family: var(--font-mono);
font-size: var(--text-base);
}
.docs-session-siblings-list a {
color: var(--color-link);
text-decoration: none;
}
.docs-session-siblings-list a:hover {
color: var(--color-accent-strong);
text-decoration: underline;
}
.docs-session-siblings-current {
color: var(--color-text-muted);
}
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
// `/docs` the user-facing guide.
//
// Sibling of Philosophy.jsx: same chrome, same data path, different
// source file. Renders DOCS.md verbatim with light chrome around it.
// Reachable anonymously, same as `/philosophy`, so a visitor can read
// the guide before deciding to sign in.
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { Link, useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom'
import MarkdownPreview from './MarkdownPreview.jsx'
import { getDocs } from '../api.js'
export default function Docs({ authenticated }) {
const [body, setBody] = useState('')
const [error, setError] = useState(null)
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true)
const navigate = useNavigate()
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
getDocs()
.then(r => { if (active) setBody(r.body || '') })
.catch(e => { if (active) setError(e.message || String(e)) })
.finally(() => { if (active) setLoading(false) })
return () => { active = false }
}, [])
return (
<div className="philosophy-page">
<header className="philosophy-header">
<button
className="philosophy-back"
onClick={() => (history.length > 1 ? navigate(-1) : navigate('/'))}
>
Back
</button>
<span className="philosophy-title">User guide</span>
{!authenticated && (
<Link className="philosophy-signin" to="/">Home</Link>
)}
</header>
<article className="philosophy-body">
{loading && <p className="muted">Loading</p>}
{error && <p className="error">Could not load the guide: {error}</p>}
{!loading && !error && (
<MarkdownPreview content={body} />
)}
</article>
</div>
)
}
-340
View File
@@ -1,340 +0,0 @@
// DocsLayout.jsx v0.20.0 (was v0.19.0 / roadmap item #30).
//
// Left-side flyout nav + content area for the `/docs/*` route tree:
//
// /docs redirect to /docs/user-guide
// /docs/user-guide DOCS.md (existing v0.14.0 content)
// /docs/specs client-side redirect to first configured spec
// /docs/specs/:name a single framework spec (v0.20.0)
// /docs/sessions redirect to /docs/sessions/about
// /docs/sessions/about README.md from the sessions repo
// /docs/sessions/:nnnn per-session overview (nav-only navigation)
// /docs/sessions/:nnnn/:file per-transcript view
//
// v0.20.0 changes (Session 0018.0):
// - Adds a "Specs" section between User Guide and Sessions, driven
// by `/api/docs/specs/manifest`.
// - Sessions render a nested tree: each session row has the
// session's transcripts nested under it as their own nav rows
// (labeled by `.N` ordinal). The transcript list is fetched per
// session via `/api/docs/sessions/:nnnn/index` (cached server-
// side, so the manifest+index fan-out is cheap on subsequent
// loads). Always-expanded; no collapse toggle (current scale is
// under twenty sessions well under the threshold where lazy
// expansion would pay).
//
// The flyout is a persistent left sidebar on desktop and a slide-out
// drawer on mobile (toggled by the icon button in the docs header).
//
// Amplitude analytics (per SPEC §21):
// - track('Doc Viewed', { section: '...' }) on each sub-route mount;
// the sub-route component owns the fire.
// - flyout buttons + links carry `aria-label` + `data-amp-track-name`
// so autocapture rows are readable rather than ":nth-child(7)".
import { useEffect, useState, useCallback } from 'react'
import { Link, useNavigate, useLocation, Outlet } from 'react-router-dom'
import { getSessionsManifest, getSessionIndex, getSpecsManifest } from '../api.js'
// Extract the `.N` ordinal from a transcript filename:
// "SESSION-0014.1-TRANSCRIPT-...md" "0014.1"
// "SESSION-0013.1.1-TRANSCRIPT-...md" "0013.1.1" (nested subagent)
// Returns the bare filename as fallback if the expected shape isn't
// matched (which shouldn't happen the backend index endpoint
// filters by the same regex).
function transcriptOrdinal(filename) {
const m = /^SESSION-(\d{4}\.\d+(?:\.\d+)*)-TRANSCRIPT/.exec(filename)
return m ? m[1] : filename
}
export default function DocsLayout({ authenticated }) {
const [manifest, setManifest] = useState(null)
const [manifestState, setManifestState] = useState('loading') // loading | ok | error
const [sessionFiles, setSessionFiles] = useState({}) // { nnnn: [filename, ...] }
const [specs, setSpecs] = useState([])
const [specsState, setSpecsState] = useState('loading') // loading | ok | error
const [drawerOpen, setDrawerOpen] = useState(false)
const [reloadTick, setReloadTick] = useState(0)
const navigate = useNavigate()
const location = useLocation()
// Manifest fetch drives the Sessions section.
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
setManifestState('loading')
getSessionsManifest()
.then(payload => {
if (!active) return
setManifest(payload || {})
setManifestState('ok')
})
.catch(() => {
if (!active) return
setManifest({})
setManifestState('error')
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [reloadTick])
// Per-session transcript lists fan out from the manifest. Always-
// expanded means we pre-fetch every session's index alongside the
// manifest, gated on the manifest having loaded successfully. The
// backend's 5-minute content TTL makes the repeat cost negligible.
useEffect(() => {
if (manifestState !== 'ok' || !manifest) return
let active = true
const nnnnList = Object.keys(manifest).sort()
Promise.all(
nnnnList.map(nnnn =>
getSessionIndex(nnnn)
.then(payload => [nnnn, (payload && payload.files) || []])
.catch(() => [nnnn, []])
)
).then(pairs => {
if (!active) return
setSessionFiles(Object.fromEntries(pairs))
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [manifest, manifestState])
// Specs fetch drives the Specs section. Independent of sessions.
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
setSpecsState('loading')
getSpecsManifest()
.then(payload => {
if (!active) return
setSpecs((payload && payload.specs) || [])
setSpecsState('ok')
})
.catch(() => {
if (!active) return
setSpecs([])
setSpecsState('error')
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [reloadTick])
// Close the mobile drawer on every navigation so a click in the nav
// doesn't strand the user on a drawer-open view.
useEffect(() => {
setDrawerOpen(false)
}, [location.pathname])
const retryManifest = useCallback(() => {
setReloadTick(t => t + 1)
}, [])
return (
<div className="docs-layout">
<header className="docs-header">
<button
className="docs-back"
onClick={() => (history.length > 1 ? navigate(-1) : navigate('/'))}
aria-label="Back to previous page"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Back"
>
Back
</button>
<button
className="docs-drawer-toggle"
onClick={() => setDrawerOpen(o => !o)}
aria-label="Toggle docs navigation"
aria-expanded={drawerOpen}
data-amp-track-name="Docs Drawer Toggle"
>
<span aria-hidden></span>
</button>
<span className="docs-title">Docs</span>
{!authenticated && (
<Link
className="docs-signin"
to="/"
aria-label="Home"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Home"
>
Home
</Link>
)}
</header>
<div className={'docs-body' + (drawerOpen ? ' docs-body--drawer-open' : '')}>
<aside className="docs-nav" aria-label="Docs navigation">
<DocsNav
manifest={manifest}
manifestState={manifestState}
sessionFiles={sessionFiles}
specs={specs}
specsState={specsState}
onRetry={retryManifest}
currentPath={location.pathname}
/>
</aside>
<main className="docs-content">
<Outlet />
</main>
</div>
{drawerOpen && (
<button
className="docs-drawer-scrim"
aria-label="Close drawer"
onClick={() => setDrawerOpen(false)}
data-amp-track-name="Docs Drawer Close"
/>
)}
</div>
)
}
function DocsNav({
manifest,
manifestState,
sessionFiles,
specs,
specsState,
onRetry,
currentPath,
}) {
const isActive = (path) => currentPath === path || currentPath.startsWith(path + '/')
const isExactly = (path) => currentPath === path
const sessionKeys = Object.keys(manifest || {}).sort()
return (
<nav className="docs-nav-inner">
<div className="docs-nav-section">
<div className="docs-nav-section-label">Docs</div>
<ul className="docs-nav-list">
<li>
<Link
to="/docs/user-guide"
className={isActive('/docs/user-guide') ? 'active' : ''}
aria-label="User Guide"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Nav User Guide"
>
User Guide
</Link>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div className="docs-nav-section">
<div className="docs-nav-section-label">Specs</div>
{specsState === 'loading' && (
<ul className="docs-nav-list docs-nav-skeleton" aria-hidden>
<li><span className="skeleton-row" /></li>
<li><span className="skeleton-row" /></li>
</ul>
)}
{specsState === 'error' && (
<div className="docs-nav-error" role="alert">
<span>Couldn't load specs.</span>
</div>
)}
{specsState === 'ok' && specs.length > 0 && (
<ul className="docs-nav-list">
{specs.map(spec => {
const to = `/docs/specs/${spec.name}`
return (
<li key={spec.name}>
<Link
to={to}
className={isExactly(to) ? 'active' : ''}
aria-label={`Spec: ${spec.title}`}
data-amp-track-name="Docs Nav Spec"
data-amp-track-spec={spec.name}
>
{spec.title}
</Link>
</li>
)
})}
</ul>
)}
</div>
<div className="docs-nav-section">
<div className="docs-nav-section-label">Sessions</div>
<ul className="docs-nav-list">
<li>
<Link
to="/docs/sessions/about"
className={isExactly('/docs/sessions/about') ? 'active' : ''}
aria-label="About sessions"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Nav Sessions About"
>
About
</Link>
</li>
</ul>
{manifestState === 'loading' && (
<ul className="docs-nav-list docs-nav-skeleton" aria-hidden>
<li><span className="skeleton-row" /></li>
<li><span className="skeleton-row" /></li>
<li><span className="skeleton-row" /></li>
</ul>
)}
{manifestState === 'error' && (
<div className="docs-nav-error" role="alert">
<span>Couldn't load session list.</span>
<button
type="button"
onClick={onRetry}
aria-label="Retry session list"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Nav Sessions Retry"
>
Try again
</button>
</div>
)}
{manifestState === 'ok' && sessionKeys.length > 0 && (
<ul className="docs-nav-list docs-nav-list--tree">
{sessionKeys.map(nnnn => {
const entry = manifest[nnnn] || {}
const title = entry.title || ''
const label = title ? `${nnnn}${title}` : nnnn
const to = `/docs/sessions/${nnnn}`
const files = sessionFiles[nnnn] || []
return (
<li key={nnnn}>
<Link
to={to}
className={isExactly(to) ? 'active' : ''}
aria-label={`Session ${nnnn}${title ? ': ' + title : ''}`}
data-amp-track-name="Docs Nav Session"
data-amp-track-session={nnnn}
>
{label}
</Link>
{files.length > 0 && (
<ul className="docs-nav-list docs-nav-list--children">
{files.map(f => {
const tTo = `/docs/sessions/${nnnn}/${f}`
return (
<li key={f}>
<Link
to={tTo}
className={isExactly(tTo) ? 'active' : ''}
aria-label={`Transcript ${transcriptOrdinal(f)}`}
data-amp-track-name="Docs Nav Transcript"
data-amp-track-session={nnnn}
data-amp-track-filename={f}
>
{transcriptOrdinal(f)}
</Link>
</li>
)
})}
</ul>
)}
</li>
)
})}
</ul>
)}
</div>
</nav>
)
}
@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
// DocsSessionIndex.jsx v0.21.0 (was v0.20.0 / roadmap item #30).
//
// Per-session landing at `/docs/sessions/:nnnn`. v0.20.0 rendered a
// dead-end "N transcript(s) in this session. Select one from the
// navigation." placeholder. v0.21.0 / roadmap item #32 collapses that:
// the session root now renders a transcript INLINE so the URL is never
// an empty stop.
//
// - Exactly one transcript render it inline at the session root.
// - Multiple transcripts render the `.0` driver transcript
// inline (fall back to the first file by
// sort order if there's no `.0`), AND
// list/link the remaining transcripts so
// the siblings are one click away.
//
// The URL stays stable to the session number this is an inline
// render, not a 301/redirect. The per-transcript route
// (`/docs/sessions/:nnnn/:filename`) still exists and is what the
// sibling links and the left-nav transcript rows point at.
//
// The transcript count + filenames come from `/api/docs/sessions/:nnnn/index`
// so the empty-state ("no transcripts yet"), not-found, and error
// paths remain meaningful when the upstream is mid-publish or
// unreachable. The metadata header + body rendering are imported from
// DocsSessionTranscript.jsx so the inline view is byte-identical to the
// standalone per-transcript view.
import { useEffect, useState, useCallback } from 'react'
import { Link, useParams } from 'react-router-dom'
import MarkdownPreview from './MarkdownPreview.jsx'
import {
getSessionsManifest,
getSessionIndex,
getSessionTranscript,
} from '../api.js'
import {
TranscriptMetaHeader,
transcriptOrdinal,
} from './DocsSessionTranscript.jsx'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
import './Docs.css'
// Pick the transcript to render inline at the session root: prefer the
// `.0` driver transcript; otherwise the first file by sort order. The
// backend already returns the file list sorted, so `files[0]` is a
// stable fallback.
function pickPrimary(files) {
if (!files || files.length === 0) return null
const driver = files.find(f => /^SESSION-\d{4}\.0-TRANSCRIPT/.test(f))
return driver || files[0]
}
export default function DocsSessionIndex() {
const { nnnn } = useParams()
const [title, setTitle] = useState('')
const [tldr, setTldr] = useState('')
const [files, setFiles] = useState([])
const [status, setStatus] = useState('loading') // loading | ok | notfound | error
const [reloadTick, setReloadTick] = useState(0)
// The inline body for the primary transcript.
const [body, setBody] = useState('')
const [bodyStatus, setBodyStatus] = useState('idle') // idle | loading | ok | notfound | error
useEffect(() => {
track(EVENTS.DOC_VIEWED, { section: `sessions/${nnnn}` })
}, [nnnn])
// Title + optional TL;DR from the manifest cheap, cached server-side.
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
getSessionsManifest()
.then(payload => {
if (!active) return
const entry = (payload && payload[nnnn]) || {}
setTitle(entry.title || '')
// `tldr` is an optional manifest field (string). Absent the
// header renders no TL;DR line (graceful degrade).
setTldr(typeof entry.tldr === 'string' ? entry.tldr : '')
})
.catch(() => {
// Title + TL;DR are decorative; the transcript list + body
// fetches below are the load-bearing ones.
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [nnnn])
// File list from the per-session index endpoint.
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
setStatus('loading')
getSessionIndex(nnnn)
.then(payload => {
if (!active) return
setFiles((payload && payload.files) || [])
setStatus('ok')
})
.catch(e => {
if (!active) return
if (e.status === 404) {
setStatus('notfound')
} else {
setStatus('error')
}
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [nnnn, reloadTick])
const primary = status === 'ok' ? pickPrimary(files) : null
// Fetch the primary transcript body once we know which file it is.
useEffect(() => {
if (!primary) {
setBody('')
setBodyStatus('idle')
return
}
let active = true
setBodyStatus('loading')
getSessionTranscript(nnnn, primary)
.then(text => {
if (!active) return
setBody(text || '')
setBodyStatus('ok')
})
.catch(e => {
if (!active) return
setBodyStatus(e.status === 404 ? 'notfound' : 'error')
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [nnnn, primary, reloadTick])
const retry = useCallback(() => setReloadTick(t => t + 1), [])
const header = title ? `${nnnn}${title}` : `Session ${nnnn}`
const siblings = primary ? files.filter(f => f !== primary) : []
return (
<article className="docs-article">
<h1 className="docs-article-title">{header}</h1>
{status === 'loading' && <p className="muted">Loading</p>}
{status === 'notfound' && (
<div className="docs-empty">
<p>
No transcripts have been published for this session yet.{' '}
<Link
to="/docs/sessions/about"
aria-label="About sessions"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Session Empty About Link"
>
About sessions
</Link>
</p>
</div>
)}
{status === 'error' && (
<div className="docs-error" role="alert">
<p>Couldn't reach the session-history repo.</p>
<button
type="button"
onClick={retry}
aria-label="Retry"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Session Index Retry"
>
Try again
</button>
</div>
)}
{status === 'ok' && files.length === 0 && (
<div className="docs-empty">
<p>This session has no transcripts published.</p>
</div>
)}
{status === 'ok' && primary && (
<>
{siblings.length > 0 && (
<nav className="docs-session-siblings" aria-label="Transcripts in this session">
<span className="docs-session-siblings-label">Transcripts</span>
<ul className="docs-session-siblings-list">
<li>
<span
className="docs-session-siblings-current"
aria-current="true"
>
{transcriptOrdinal(primary)} (shown below)
</span>
</li>
{siblings.map(f => (
<li key={f}>
<Link
to={`/docs/sessions/${nnnn}/${f}`}
aria-label={`Transcript ${transcriptOrdinal(f)}`}
data-amp-track-name="Docs Session Sibling Transcript"
data-amp-track-session={nnnn}
data-amp-track-filename={f}
>
{transcriptOrdinal(f)}
</Link>
</li>
))}
</ul>
</nav>
)}
{bodyStatus === 'loading' && <p className="muted">Loading transcript</p>}
{bodyStatus === 'notfound' && (
<div className="docs-empty">
<p>This transcript isn't published yet.</p>
</div>
)}
{bodyStatus === 'error' && (
<div className="docs-error" role="alert">
<p>Couldn't reach the session-history repo.</p>
<button
type="button"
onClick={retry}
aria-label="Retry"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Session Inline Retry"
>
Try again
</button>
</div>
)}
{bodyStatus === 'ok' && (
<>
<TranscriptMetaHeader
nnnn={nnnn}
filename={primary}
title={title}
tldr={tldr}
/>
<div className="philosophy-body">
<MarkdownPreview content={body} />
</div>
</>
)}
</>
)}
</article>
)
}
@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
// DocsSessionTranscript.jsx v0.21.0 (was v0.19.0 / roadmap item #30).
//
// Per-transcript view at `/docs/sessions/:nnnn/:filename`. Fetches the
// transcript body via the backend mediator and renders it through the
// shared MarkdownPreview.
//
// v0.21.0 / roadmap item #32:
// - A compact metadata header now sits above the rendered body
// (title, started/ended, duration, optional TL;DR, and a
// "View source on git.wiggleverse.org" external link). The parse
// + render helpers (`parseTranscriptMeta`, `TranscriptMetaHeader`,
// `gitSourceUrl`) are exported here so the session-root inline-
// collapse view (DocsSessionIndex.jsx) reuses the exact same
// rendering for the transcript(s) it inlines.
//
// Empty-state contract:
// 404 "This transcript isn't published yet" with a link back to
// the parent session index
// 502 "Couldn't reach the session-history repo" + retry button
import { useEffect, useState, useCallback } from 'react'
import { Link, useParams } from 'react-router-dom'
import MarkdownPreview from './MarkdownPreview.jsx'
import { getSessionTranscript, getSessionsManifest } from '../api.js'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
import './Docs.css'
// The canonical published-repo source URL for a transcript file, per
// SESSION-PROTOCOL.md §1's folder layout (one folder per session).
export function gitSourceUrl(nnnn, filename) {
return (
'https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history/src/branch/main/' +
`${encodeURIComponent(nnnn)}/${encodeURIComponent(filename)}`
)
}
// Extract the `.N` ordinal from a transcript filename:
// "SESSION-0014.1-TRANSCRIPT-...md" "0014.1"
// "SESSION-0013.1.1-TRANSCRIPT-...md" "0013.1.1" (nested subagent)
export function transcriptOrdinal(filename) {
const m = /^SESSION-(\d{4}\.\d+(?:\.\d+)*)-TRANSCRIPT/.exec(filename || '')
return m ? m[1] : filename || ''
}
// Parse the `<start>--<end>` ISO segment out of a transcript filename.
// Per the protocol the segment is `YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM--YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM`
// (colons replaced by dashes for filesystem portability, minute
// precision, PST implied). Legacy renamed-letter transcripts omit the
// segment entirely; in that case every derived field comes back null
// and the header degrades gracefully.
//
// Returns { ordinal, start: Date|null, end: Date|null, durationMs: number|null }.
export function parseTranscriptMeta(filename) {
const ordinal = transcriptOrdinal(filename)
const m = /-TRANSCRIPT-(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2})T(\d{2})-(\d{2})--(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2})T(\d{2})-(\d{2})\.md$/.exec(
filename || ''
)
if (!m) {
return { ordinal, start: null, end: null, durationMs: null }
}
const [, sDate, sH, sM, eDate, eH, eM] = m
// Parse as local wall-clock time. The filename carries no timezone
// (PST is implied per the protocol); we render the wall-clock value
// verbatim rather than shifting it, so we build a local Date and read
// it back with the same calendar fields. Duration is a difference of
// two local Dates, so the implied-timezone ambiguity cancels out.
const start = new Date(`${sDate}T${sH}:${sM}:00`)
const end = new Date(`${eDate}T${eH}:${eM}:00`)
const startOk = !Number.isNaN(start.getTime())
const endOk = !Number.isNaN(end.getTime())
const durationMs =
startOk && endOk && end.getTime() >= start.getTime()
? end.getTime() - start.getTime()
: null
return {
ordinal,
start: startOk ? start : null,
end: endOk ? end : null,
durationMs,
}
}
function fmtDateTime(d) {
if (!d) return null
// e.g. "May 28, 2026, 11:11 AM" human-readable, wall-clock.
try {
return d.toLocaleString(undefined, {
year: 'numeric',
month: 'short',
day: 'numeric',
hour: 'numeric',
minute: '2-digit',
})
} catch {
return d.toISOString()
}
}
function fmtDuration(ms) {
if (ms == null || ms <= 0) return null
const totalMin = Math.round(ms / 60000)
const h = Math.floor(totalMin / 60)
const m = totalMin % 60
if (h > 0 && m > 0) return `${h}h ${m}m`
if (h > 0) return `${h}h`
return `${m}m`
}
// The compact metadata block rendered above every transcript body.
// Shared between the standalone transcript route and the session-root
// inline-collapse view. `tldr` is optional absent rendered nothing
// (graceful degrade, per the manifest schema where `tldr` may be unset).
export function TranscriptMetaHeader({ nnnn, filename, title, tldr }) {
const { ordinal, start, end, durationMs } = parseTranscriptMeta(filename)
const started = fmtDateTime(start)
const ended = fmtDateTime(end)
const duration = fmtDuration(durationMs)
const heading = title ? `${ordinal}${title}` : `Session ${ordinal}`
return (
<header className="docs-transcript-meta">
<h2 className="docs-transcript-meta-title">{heading}</h2>
{(started || ended || duration) && (
<dl className="docs-transcript-meta-grid">
{started && (
<div className="docs-transcript-meta-row">
<dt>Started</dt>
<dd>{started}</dd>
</div>
)}
{ended && (
<div className="docs-transcript-meta-row">
<dt>Ended</dt>
<dd>{ended}</dd>
</div>
)}
{duration && (
<div className="docs-transcript-meta-row">
<dt>Duration</dt>
<dd>{duration}</dd>
</div>
)}
</dl>
)}
{tldr && <p className="docs-transcript-meta-tldr">{tldr}</p>}
<a
className="docs-source-link docs-transcript-meta-source"
href={gitSourceUrl(nnnn, filename)}
target="_blank"
rel="noopener noreferrer"
aria-label={`View transcript ${ordinal} source on git.wiggleverse.org`}
data-amp-track-name="Docs Transcript Source Link"
data-amp-track-session={nnnn}
data-amp-track-filename={filename}
>
View source on git.wiggleverse.org
</a>
</header>
)
}
export default function DocsSessionTranscript() {
const { nnnn, filename } = useParams()
const [body, setBody] = useState('')
const [title, setTitle] = useState('')
const [tldr, setTldr] = useState('')
const [status, setStatus] = useState('loading') // loading | ok | notfound | error
const [reloadTick, setReloadTick] = useState(0)
useEffect(() => {
track(EVENTS.DOC_VIEWED, { section: `sessions/${nnnn}/${filename}` })
}, [nnnn, filename])
// Title + optional tl;dr from the manifest decorative metadata that
// feeds the header. Failure leaves the header showing the bare NNNN
// and no TL;DR; the body fetch below is the load-bearing one.
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
getSessionsManifest()
.then(payload => {
if (!active) return
const entry = (payload && payload[nnnn]) || {}
setTitle(entry.title || '')
setTldr(typeof entry.tldr === 'string' ? entry.tldr : '')
})
.catch(() => {})
return () => { active = false }
}, [nnnn])
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
setStatus('loading')
getSessionTranscript(nnnn, filename)
.then(text => {
if (!active) return
setBody(text || '')
setStatus('ok')
})
.catch(e => {
if (!active) return
if (e.status === 404) {
setStatus('notfound')
} else {
setStatus('error')
}
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [nnnn, filename, reloadTick])
const retry = useCallback(() => setReloadTick(t => t + 1), [])
return (
<article className="docs-article">
<div className="docs-breadcrumbs">
<Link
to={`/docs/sessions/${nnnn}`}
aria-label={`Back to session ${nnnn} index`}
data-amp-track-name="Docs Transcript Back To Index"
>
Session {nnnn}
</Link>
</div>
{status === 'loading' && <p className="muted">Loading</p>}
{status === 'notfound' && (
<div className="docs-empty">
<p>This transcript isn't published yet.</p>
<p>
<Link
to={`/docs/sessions/${nnnn}`}
aria-label={`Back to session ${nnnn}`}
data-amp-track-name="Docs Transcript Back To Session"
>
Back to session {nnnn}
</Link>
</p>
</div>
)}
{status === 'error' && (
<div className="docs-error" role="alert">
<p>Couldn't reach the session-history repo.</p>
<button
type="button"
onClick={retry}
aria-label="Retry"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Transcript Retry"
>
Try again
</button>
</div>
)}
{status === 'ok' && (
<>
<TranscriptMetaHeader
nnnn={nnnn}
filename={filename}
title={title}
tldr={tldr}
/>
<div className="philosophy-body">
<MarkdownPreview content={body} />
</div>
</>
)}
</article>
)
}
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
// DocsSessionsAbout.jsx v0.19.0 / roadmap item #30.
//
// Renders the README.md of the public `wiggleverse/ohm-session-history`
// repo at `/docs/sessions/about`. The framework backend mediates the
// gitea fetch (see backend/app/docs_sessions.py); this component
// handles three response paths:
//
// 200 render the markdown via MarkdownPreview
// 404 "About not yet published" empty-state (the upstream README
// doesn't exist yet happens when a deployment hasn't
// restructured its session-history repo yet, expected at
// v0.19.0 deploy time per the CHANGELOG)
// 502 "Couldn't reach the session-history repo" with a retry
// button. The retry just re-invokes the fetch no extra
// backoff because the backend cache already smoothes
// repeated 502s.
import { useEffect, useState, useCallback } from 'react'
import MarkdownPreview from './MarkdownPreview.jsx'
import { getSessionsAbout } from '../api.js'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
export default function DocsSessionsAbout() {
const [body, setBody] = useState('')
const [status, setStatus] = useState('loading') // loading | ok | notfound | error
const [reloadTick, setReloadTick] = useState(0)
useEffect(() => {
track(EVENTS.DOC_VIEWED, { section: 'sessions/about' })
}, [])
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
setStatus('loading')
getSessionsAbout()
.then(text => {
if (!active) return
setBody(text || '')
setStatus('ok')
})
.catch(e => {
if (!active) return
if (e.status === 404) {
setStatus('notfound')
} else {
setStatus('error')
}
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [reloadTick])
const retry = useCallback(() => setReloadTick(t => t + 1), [])
return (
<article className="docs-article">
<h1 className="docs-article-title">About sessions</h1>
{status === 'loading' && <p className="muted">Loading</p>}
{status === 'notfound' && (
<div className="docs-empty">
<p>
The session-history About page isn't published yet. Sessions
are still authored once a few have shipped, this page will
render the canonical introduction.
</p>
<p>
In the meantime, browse the source repo directly at{' '}
<a
href="https://git.wiggleverse.org/wiggleverse/ohm-session-history"
target="_blank"
rel="noopener noreferrer"
aria-label="Open session-history repo on gitea"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Sessions About Repo Link"
>
wiggleverse/ohm-session-history
</a>.
</p>
</div>
)}
{status === 'error' && (
<div className="docs-error" role="alert">
<p>Couldn't reach the session-history repo.</p>
<button
type="button"
onClick={retry}
aria-label="Retry"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Sessions About Retry"
>
Try again
</button>
</div>
)}
{status === 'ok' && (
<div className="philosophy-body">
<MarkdownPreview content={body} />
</div>
)}
</article>
)
}
-134
View File
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
// DocsSpec.jsx v0.20.0.
//
// Per-spec view at `/docs/specs/:name`. Fetches a configured spec
// body via the backend mediator (which proxies the gitea raw URL)
// and renders it through the shared MarkdownPreview. The page header
// pulls the spec's `title` from the manifest so the breadcrumb-free
// page still names what you're looking at.
//
// Empty-state contract:
// 404 "This spec isn't published yet / unknown name" with a hint
// to pick a configured spec from the nav.
// 502 "Couldn't reach the spec source" + retry button.
//
// History view is intentionally absent the operator's framing for
// v0.20.0 is "current version only; git is the history surface".
// A small "View on gitea" link beside the title points at the
// upstream source URL the manifest carries so the history gesture
// remains one click away.
import { useEffect, useState, useCallback } from 'react'
import { Link, useParams } from 'react-router-dom'
import MarkdownPreview from './MarkdownPreview.jsx'
import { getSpec, getSpecsManifest } from '../api.js'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
export default function DocsSpec() {
const { name } = useParams()
const [title, setTitle] = useState('')
const [sourceUrl, setSourceUrl] = useState('')
const [body, setBody] = useState('')
const [status, setStatus] = useState('loading') // loading | ok | notfound | error
const [reloadTick, setReloadTick] = useState(0)
useEffect(() => {
track(EVENTS.DOC_VIEWED, { section: `specs/${name}` })
}, [name])
// Title + upstream URL from the manifest (cheap the manifest is
// derived from an env var on the backend, no network).
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
getSpecsManifest()
.then(payload => {
if (!active) return
const entry = (payload && payload.specs || []).find(s => s.name === name)
setTitle((entry && entry.title) || '')
setSourceUrl((entry && entry.url) || '')
})
.catch(() => {
// Title + source link are decorative; the body fetch below
// is the load-bearing one. A failed manifest fetch just
// leaves the page rendering the bare name.
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [name])
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
setStatus('loading')
getSpec(name)
.then(text => {
if (!active) return
setBody(text || '')
setStatus('ok')
})
.catch(e => {
if (!active) return
if (e.status === 404) {
setStatus('notfound')
} else {
setStatus('error')
}
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [name, reloadTick])
const retry = useCallback(() => setReloadTick(t => t + 1), [])
const header = title || `Spec: ${name}`
return (
<article className="docs-article">
<header className="docs-article-header">
<h1 className="docs-article-title">{header}</h1>
{sourceUrl && (
<a
className="docs-source-link"
href={sourceUrl}
target="_blank"
rel="noopener noreferrer"
aria-label="View spec source on gitea"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Spec Source Link"
data-amp-track-spec={name}
>
View source
</a>
)}
</header>
{status === 'loading' && <p className="muted">Loading</p>}
{status === 'notfound' && (
<div className="docs-empty">
<p>This spec isn't available.</p>
<p>
<Link
to="/docs/user-guide"
aria-label="User guide"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Spec Notfound User Guide Link"
>
Back to the user guide
</Link>
</p>
</div>
)}
{status === 'error' && (
<div className="docs-error" role="alert">
<p>Couldn't reach the spec source.</p>
<button
type="button"
onClick={retry}
aria-label="Retry"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Spec Retry"
>
Try again
</button>
</div>
)}
{status === 'ok' && (
<div className="philosophy-body">
<MarkdownPreview content={body} />
</div>
)}
</article>
)
}
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
// DocsSpecsIndex.jsx v0.20.0.
//
// Landing route at `/docs/specs`. The operator-stated body shape for
// the parallel `/docs/sessions/:nnnn` page is "no body list pick a
// transcript from the nav", and the same gesture applies here: the
// `/docs/specs` route either redirects to the first configured spec
// (the common case) or renders a "no specs configured" empty state
// (only reachable if a deployment overrides `OHM_DOCS_SPECS` to an
// empty list the framework default has two entries).
//
// The redirect is client-side because the manifest is a single API
// call away; server-side redirect would require either a backend
// route for the bare `/docs/specs` path (out of scope for v0.20.0)
// or a build-time bake of the first spec name (which couples the
// frontend bundle to the deployment overlay, which we don't do).
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { Navigate, Link } from 'react-router-dom'
import { getSpecsManifest } from '../api.js'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
export default function DocsSpecsIndex() {
const [firstName, setFirstName] = useState(null)
// Tri-state: 'loading' (waiting on manifest), 'redirect' (we have a
// name to redirect to render <Navigate>), 'empty' (no specs
// configured), or 'error' (couldn't load the manifest at all).
const [status, setStatus] = useState('loading')
useEffect(() => {
track(EVENTS.DOC_VIEWED, { section: 'specs' })
}, [])
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
getSpecsManifest()
.then(payload => {
if (!active) return
const specs = (payload && payload.specs) || []
if (specs.length === 0) {
setStatus('empty')
} else {
setFirstName(specs[0].name)
setStatus('redirect')
}
})
.catch(() => {
if (!active) return
setStatus('error')
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [])
if (status === 'redirect' && firstName) {
return <Navigate to={firstName} replace />
}
return (
<article className="docs-article">
<h1 className="docs-article-title">Specs</h1>
{status === 'loading' && <p className="muted">Loading</p>}
{status === 'empty' && (
<div className="docs-empty">
<p>No specs are configured for this deployment.</p>
<p>
<Link
to="/docs/user-guide"
aria-label="User guide"
data-amp-track-name="Docs Specs Empty User Guide Link"
>
Back to the user guide
</Link>
</p>
</div>
)}
{status === 'error' && (
<div className="docs-error" role="alert">
<p>Couldn't load the spec list.</p>
</div>
)}
</article>
)
}
-81
View File
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
// DocsUserGuide.jsx v0.19.0 / roadmap item #30.
//
// Renders DOCS.md at `/docs/user-guide`. Was `/docs` before v0.19.0
// (the v0.14.0 single-route Docs.jsx surface, now superseded). The
// content path is unchanged: backend reads `DOCS.md` from disk and
// serves it at `/api/docs`. The body is rendered via the existing
// `MarkdownPreview` (the same component the `/philosophy` route uses,
// so we don't introduce a second markdown library).
// v0.21.0 / roadmap item #31: the loading + error states are brought
// onto the same `.docs-empty` / `.docs-error` convention every other
// docs surface uses (was a bare `<p className="error">`), with a retry
// button so a transient `/api/docs` failure isn't a dead end.
import { useEffect, useState, useCallback } from 'react'
import { Link } from 'react-router-dom'
import MarkdownPreview from './MarkdownPreview.jsx'
import { getDocs } from '../api.js'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
export default function DocsUserGuide() {
const [body, setBody] = useState('')
const [status, setStatus] = useState('loading') // loading | ok | error
const [reloadTick, setReloadTick] = useState(0)
useEffect(() => {
track(EVENTS.DOC_VIEWED, { section: 'user-guide' })
}, [])
useEffect(() => {
let active = true
setStatus('loading')
getDocs()
.then(r => {
if (!active) return
setBody(r.body || '')
setStatus('ok')
})
.catch(() => {
if (!active) return
setStatus('error')
})
return () => { active = false }
}, [reloadTick])
const retry = useCallback(() => setReloadTick(t => t + 1), [])
return (
<article className="docs-article">
<h1 className="docs-article-title">User guide</h1>
{status === 'loading' && <p className="muted">Loading</p>}
{status === 'error' && (
<div className="docs-error" role="alert">
<p>Couldn't load the user guide.</p>
<button
type="button"
onClick={retry}
aria-label="Retry"
data-amp-track-name="Docs User Guide Retry"
>
Try again
</button>
<p>
<Link
to="/docs/sessions/about"
aria-label="About sessions"
data-amp-track-name="Docs User Guide Error About Link"
>
About sessions
</Link>
</p>
</div>
)}
{status === 'ok' && (
<div className="philosophy-body">
<MarkdownPreview content={body} />
</div>
)}
</article>
)
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
import { useEditor, EditorContent, Extension } from '@tiptap/react'
import StarterKit from '@tiptap/starter-kit'
import { useEffect, useRef, useCallback } from 'react'
import { renderMarkdown } from '../lib/sanitizeHtml'
import { marked } from 'marked'
import { Plugin, PluginKey } from 'prosemirror-state'
import { Decoration, DecorationSet } from 'prosemirror-view'
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ export default function Editor({
useEffect(() => {
if (!editor || content == null) return
const html = renderMarkdown(content)
const html = marked.parse(content)
editor.commands.setContent(html, false)
}, [content, editor])
-138
View File
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
/* Inbox.css §15.2 inbox panel refinements (roadmap #25, light pass).
*
* The base inbox layout/structure lives in App.css (the §15 / Slice 6
* block). This sheet is a TOKENIZED polish layer on top of it: it does
* NOT re-lay-out the panel, it sharpens the unread/read distinction,
* adds the per-row "mark read" affordance + the unread dot, and gives
* the empty/loading states real copy and spacing.
*
* Cascade note: Inbox.jsx is imported by App.jsx (line 6) BEFORE the
* App.css import (line 30), so under ESM depth-first evaluation this
* sheet is injected FIRST and App.css wins on equal specificity. Any
* rule here that must override an App.css value is therefore written
* one notch more specific (e.g. `.inbox-list .inbox-row.unread`).
* New classes that App.css doesn't define need no such guard.
*/
/* ===== Unread vs. read distinction ===== */
/* A clear left accent bar + warmer tint on unread; read rows sit calm. */
.inbox-list .inbox-row {
position: relative;
border-bottom: 1px solid var(--color-border);
transition: background var(--motion-fast) var(--ease-out);
}
.inbox-list .inbox-row.unread {
background: var(--color-warning-bg-soft, var(--c-warning-bg-soft));
box-shadow: inset 3px 0 0 var(--color-accent);
}
.inbox-list .inbox-row.read .inbox-summary {
color: var(--color-text-muted);
font-weight: var(--weight-normal);
}
.inbox-list .inbox-row.unread .inbox-summary {
color: var(--color-text);
font-weight: var(--weight-medium);
}
/* The dot is a NEW affordance: a filled accent dot for unread, hidden
* (but space-reserved) for read so summaries stay column-aligned. */
.inbox-unread-dot {
flex: 0 0 auto;
width: 8px;
height: 8px;
border-radius: var(--radius-pill);
background: var(--color-accent);
}
.inbox-row.read .inbox-unread-dot {
background: transparent;
}
/* ===== Per-row "mark read" affordance ===== */
/* The row is a flex Link followed by this button; pin the button to the
* right edge, revealed on row hover/focus and always visible on touch. */
.inbox-row {
display: flex;
align-items: center;
}
.inbox-row .inbox-row-link {
flex: 1 1 auto;
min-width: 0;
}
.inbox-row-dismiss {
flex: 0 0 auto;
display: inline-flex;
align-items: center;
justify-content: center;
width: 28px;
height: 28px;
margin-right: var(--space-5);
padding: 0;
color: var(--color-text-subtle);
background: transparent;
border: 1px solid transparent;
border-radius: var(--radius-md);
cursor: pointer;
opacity: 0;
transition:
opacity var(--motion-fast) var(--ease-out),
color var(--motion-fast) var(--ease-out),
background var(--motion-fast) var(--ease-out),
border-color var(--motion-fast) var(--ease-out);
}
.inbox-row:hover .inbox-row-dismiss,
.inbox-row:focus-within .inbox-row-dismiss,
.inbox-row-dismiss:focus-visible {
opacity: 1;
}
.inbox-row-dismiss:hover {
color: var(--color-success-fg);
background: var(--color-success-bg);
border-color: var(--color-success-bg);
}
.inbox-row-dismiss:focus-visible {
outline: 2px solid var(--color-focus-ring);
outline-offset: 1px;
}
/* Coarse pointers (touch) have no hover; keep the affordance discoverable. */
@media (hover: none) {
.inbox-row-dismiss { opacity: 1; }
}
/* ===== Mark-all-read button ===== */
.inbox-mark-all {
margin-left: auto;
}
/* ===== Empty / loading states ===== */
.inbox-state {
padding: var(--space-9) var(--space-7);
text-align: center;
}
.inbox-empty {
padding: var(--space-11) var(--space-7);
text-align: center;
}
.inbox-empty-title {
margin: 0 0 var(--space-3);
font-size: var(--text-md);
font-weight: var(--weight-semibold);
color: var(--color-text-strong);
}
.inbox-empty .muted {
margin: 0;
font-size: var(--text-base);
line-height: var(--leading-normal);
color: var(--color-text-muted);
}
/* #28 Part 3 actionable contribute-request row: the requester's
who/why/use-case detail plus an Accept/Decline pair. */
.inbox-row-action { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 8px; padding: 12px; }
.inbox-row-action .inbox-row-main { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px; }
.inbox-request-detail { margin-left: 18px; font-size: var(--text-sm); }
.inbox-request-detail p { margin: 2px 0; color: var(--color-text-muted); }
.inbox-request-detail strong { color: var(--color-text); }
.inbox-request-actions { display: flex; gap: 8px; margin-left: 18px; }
.inbox-request-outcome { margin: 0 0 0 18px; }
+11 -122
View File
@@ -11,13 +11,10 @@
import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from 'react'
import { Link } from 'react-router-dom'
import {
acceptContributionRequest,
declineContributionRequest,
listNotifications,
markNotificationRead,
markNotificationsReadByFilter,
} from '../api.js'
import './Inbox.css'
const CATEGORIES = [
{ value: '', label: 'All categories' },
@@ -59,15 +56,11 @@ export default function Inbox({ onClose, lastChangeTick }) {
return Array.from(seen.entries())
}, [items])
async function markOneRead(item) {
if (item.read_at) return
await markNotificationRead(item.id)
setItems(prev => prev.map(p => p.id === item.id ? { ...p, read_at: new Date().toISOString() } : p))
setUnreadCount(c => Math.max(0, c - 1))
}
async function handleRowClick(item) {
await markOneRead(item)
if (!item.read_at) {
await markNotificationRead(item.id)
setItems(prev => prev.map(p => p.id === item.id ? { ...p, read_at: new Date().toISOString() } : p))
}
}
async function markAllUnderFilter() {
@@ -128,36 +121,22 @@ export default function Inbox({ onClose, lastChangeTick }) {
</label>
<button
className="btn-link inbox-mark-all"
className="btn-link"
onClick={markAllUnderFilter}
disabled={items.every(i => i.read_at)}
title="Mark every notification matching the current filter as read"
>
Mark all read
Mark all read (under filter)
</button>
</div>
<div className="inbox-body">
{loading && <p className="inbox-state muted">Loading your inbox</p>}
{loading && <p className="muted">Loading</p>}
{!loading && items.length === 0 && (
<div className="inbox-empty">
<p className="inbox-empty-title">You're all caught up.</p>
<p className="muted">
{filters.unread || filters.rfcSlug || filters.category
? 'Nothing matches the current filters. Clear them to see everything.'
: 'New activity on RFCs you follow will show up here.'}
</p>
</div>
<p className="muted">No notifications match. Try a different filter, or come back later.</p>
)}
<ul className="inbox-list">
{items.map(item => (
<InboxRow
key={item.id}
item={item}
onClick={handleRowClick}
onMarkRead={markOneRead}
onClose={onClose}
/>
<InboxRow key={item.id} item={item} onClick={handleRowClick} onClose={onClose} />
))}
</ul>
</div>
@@ -166,88 +145,16 @@ export default function Inbox({ onClose, lastChangeTick }) {
)
}
// #28 Part 3: the contribute-request row is the first actionable inbox
// kind it renders the requester's who/why/use-case inline and an
// Accept/Decline pair that fire the owner's decision (accept reuses #12's
// invite flow on the backend).
function ContributionRequestRow({ item, onMarkRead }) {
const unread = !item.read_at
const x = item.extras || {}
const [outcome, setOutcome] = useState(null) // 'accepted' | 'declined'
const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
const [error, setError] = useState(null)
async function act(accept) {
if (busy || outcome) return
setBusy(true)
setError(null)
try {
if (accept) await acceptContributionRequest(item.rfc_slug, x.request_id)
else await declineContributionRequest(item.rfc_slug, x.request_id)
setOutcome(accept ? 'accepted' : 'declined')
await onMarkRead(item)
} catch (err) {
setError(err.message || 'Action failed.')
} finally {
setBusy(false)
}
}
return (
<li className={`inbox-row inbox-row-action ${unread ? 'unread' : 'read'}`}>
<div className="inbox-row-main">
<span className="inbox-unread-dot" aria-hidden />
<span className={`inbox-cat cat-${item.category || 'unknown'}`}>{item.category || '·'}</span>
<span className="inbox-summary">{item.summary}</span>
<span className="inbox-when">{formatWhen(item.created_at)}</span>
</div>
<div className="inbox-request-detail">
{x.who_i_am && <p><strong>Who:</strong> {x.who_i_am}</p>}
{x.why && <p><strong>Why:</strong> {x.why}</p>}
{x.use_case && <p><strong>Use case:</strong> {x.use_case}</p>}
</div>
{error && <p className="field-error">{error}</p>}
{outcome ? (
<p className="inbox-request-outcome muted">
{outcome === 'accepted'
? 'Accepted — an invitation has been sent.'
: 'Declined.'}
</p>
) : (
<div className="inbox-request-actions">
<button type="button" className="btn-primary" disabled={busy || !x.request_id} onClick={() => act(true)}>
Accept
</button>
<button type="button" className="btn-secondary" disabled={busy || !x.request_id} onClick={() => act(false)}>
Decline
</button>
</div>
)}
</li>
)
}
function InboxRow({ item, onClick, onMarkRead, onClose }) {
if (item.event_kind === 'contribution_request_on_pending_rfc') {
return <ContributionRequestRow item={item} onMarkRead={onMarkRead} />
}
function InboxRow({ item, onClick, onClose }) {
const unread = !item.read_at
const target = deepLink(item)
const handle = async () => {
await onClick(item)
if (target) onClose?.()
}
const handleMarkRead = async (e) => {
// Don't let the row's Link fire this affordance only marks read,
// it never navigates.
e.preventDefault()
e.stopPropagation()
await onMarkRead(item)
}
return (
<li className={`inbox-row ${unread ? 'unread' : 'read'}`}>
<li className={`inbox-row ${unread ? 'unread' : ''}`}>
<Link to={target || '#'} onClick={handle} className="inbox-row-link">
<span className="inbox-unread-dot" aria-hidden />
<span className={`inbox-cat cat-${item.category || 'unknown'}`}>{item.category || '·'}</span>
<span className="inbox-summary">{item.summary}</span>
{item.bundled_count > 1 && (
@@ -255,24 +162,6 @@ function InboxRow({ item, onClick, onMarkRead, onClose }) {
)}
<span className="inbox-when">{formatWhen(item.created_at)}</span>
</Link>
{unread && (
<button
type="button"
className="inbox-row-dismiss"
onClick={handleMarkRead}
aria-label="Mark as read"
title="Mark as read"
>
{/* check glyph — dependency-free inline SVG */}
<svg
width="14" height="14" viewBox="0 0 24 24"
fill="none" stroke="currentColor" strokeWidth="2.25"
strokeLinecap="round" strokeLinejoin="round" aria-hidden
>
<path d="m5 13 4 4 10-11" />
</svg>
</button>
)}
</li>
)
}
@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
// InvitationsModal.jsx v0.16.0 / roadmap item #12.
//
// The RFC owner's surface for issuing per-RFC invitations and watching
// who has accepted. Opens from the RFC view's header strip when the
// viewer is the RFC's owner (or a platform admin/owner). Non-owner
// viewers never see the trigger.
//
// The modal shows two stacked sections:
//
// 1. "Invite someone" email input + role picker
// (contributor | discussant) + Send. The send goes through the
// backend's POST /api/rfcs/<slug>/invitations, which both writes
// the row and dispatches the email to the invitee. Success
// refreshes the list below and clears the input.
//
// 2. "Existing invitations" every invitation (pending +
// accepted + revoked + expired) on this RFC, with revoke
// buttons on the pending ones. The status of each row is the
// effective status (the backend recomputes expired-from-pending
// at read time so an unattended cron isn't required).
//
// No custom-message field that belongs to item #16's platform-
// level surface, not here. No bulk-invite one email at a time
// keeps the gesture deliberate.
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import {
createRFCInvitation,
listRFCInvitations,
revokeRFCInvitation,
} from '../api'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
const ROLE_OPTIONS = [
{ value: 'contributor', label: 'Contributor — can open PRs and join discussion' },
{ value: 'discussant', label: 'Discussant — can join discussion only' },
]
export default function InvitationsModal({ slug, rfcTitle, onClose }) {
const [invitations, setInvitations] = useState(null)
const [loadError, setLoadError] = useState(null)
const [inviteeEmail, setInviteeEmail] = useState('')
const [roleInRFC, setRoleInRFC] = useState('contributor')
const [submitting, setSubmitting] = useState(false)
const [submitError, setSubmitError] = useState(null)
const [submitSuccess, setSubmitSuccess] = useState(null)
const [revokingId, setRevokingId] = useState(null)
async function refresh() {
setLoadError(null)
try {
const r = await listRFCInvitations(slug)
setInvitations(r.items || [])
} catch (e) {
setLoadError(e.message)
}
}
useEffect(() => { refresh() /* eslint-disable-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps */ }, [slug])
async function handleSend(e) {
e.preventDefault()
const email = inviteeEmail.trim()
if (!email) return
setSubmitting(true)
setSubmitError(null)
setSubmitSuccess(null)
try {
await createRFCInvitation(slug, { inviteeEmail: email, roleInRFC })
// v0.16.0 + #21 Part C Amplitude wiring. No PII (the email
// is the inviter's input, not the invitee's identity in our
// analytics; we record the rfc_slug + role_in_rfc so a future
// inviteaccept correlation has both halves).
track(EVENTS.INVITATION_SENT, { rfc_slug: slug, role_in_rfc: roleInRFC })
setSubmitSuccess(`Invitation sent to ${email}.`)
setInviteeEmail('')
await refresh()
} catch (err) {
setSubmitError(err.message || 'Failed to send invitation.')
} finally {
setSubmitting(false)
}
}
async function handleRevoke(invitationId) {
setRevokingId(invitationId)
try {
await revokeRFCInvitation(slug, invitationId)
await refresh()
} catch (err) {
setSubmitError(err.message || 'Failed to revoke invitation.')
} finally {
setRevokingId(null)
}
}
return (
<div className="modal-overlay" onClick={e => { if (e.target === e.currentTarget) onClose() }}>
<div className="modal" style={{ maxWidth: 640 }}>
<div className="modal-header">
<h2>Invitations {rfcTitle || slug}</h2>
<button className="modal-close" onClick={onClose}>×</button>
</div>
<div className="modal-body">
<p style={{ marginTop: 0, color: '#666' }}>
Invite people by email to contribute PRs against this RFC or to
join its discussion. Anyone with the link can read this RFC;
this surface controls who can <em>write</em>.
</p>
<form onSubmit={handleSend} className="invitations-form" style={{ marginTop: 16 }}>
<label htmlFor="invitee-email">Invitee email</label>
<input
id="invitee-email"
type="email"
value={inviteeEmail}
onChange={e => setInviteeEmail(e.target.value)}
placeholder="someone@example.com"
autoFocus
required
/>
<label htmlFor="invitee-role" style={{ marginTop: 10 }}>Role on this RFC</label>
<select
id="invitee-role"
value={roleInRFC}
onChange={e => setRoleInRFC(e.target.value)}
>
{ROLE_OPTIONS.map(opt => (
<option key={opt.value} value={opt.value}>{opt.label}</option>
))}
</select>
<div style={{ marginTop: 12, display: 'flex', gap: 8, alignItems: 'center' }}>
<button type="submit" className="btn-primary" disabled={submitting}>
{submitting ? 'Sending…' : 'Send invitation'}
</button>
{submitError && <span style={{ color: '#c33' }}>{submitError}</span>}
{submitSuccess && <span style={{ color: '#383' }}>{submitSuccess}</span>}
</div>
</form>
<hr style={{ margin: '20px 0' }} />
<h3 style={{ margin: '0 0 8px' }}>Existing invitations</h3>
{loadError && <div className="error-banner">{loadError}</div>}
{invitations === null && <div>Loading</div>}
{invitations !== null && invitations.length === 0 && (
<div style={{ color: '#666' }}>No invitations have been sent yet.</div>
)}
{invitations !== null && invitations.length > 0 && (
<table style={{ width: '100%', borderCollapse: 'collapse' }}>
<thead>
<tr>
<th style={{ textAlign: 'left', padding: 4 }}>Email</th>
<th style={{ textAlign: 'left', padding: 4 }}>Role</th>
<th style={{ textAlign: 'left', padding: 4 }}>Status</th>
<th style={{ textAlign: 'left', padding: 4 }}>Sent</th>
<th style={{ padding: 4 }}></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
{invitations.map(inv => (
<tr key={inv.id} style={{ borderTop: '1px solid #eee' }}>
<td style={{ padding: 4 }}>{inv.invitee_email}</td>
<td style={{ padding: 4 }}>{inv.role_in_rfc}</td>
<td style={{ padding: 4 }}>
<span className={`invitation-status status-${inv.status}`}>
{inv.status}
</span>
{inv.status === 'accepted' && inv.accepted_by_display && (
<span style={{ color: '#666', marginLeft: 6 }}>
by {inv.accepted_by_display}
</span>
)}
</td>
<td style={{ padding: 4, color: '#666' }}>
{inv.created_at?.slice(0, 10) || ''}
</td>
<td style={{ padding: 4, textAlign: 'right' }}>
{inv.status === 'pending' && (
<button
type="button"
className="btn-link"
onClick={() => handleRevoke(inv.id)}
disabled={revokingId === inv.id}
>
{revokingId === inv.id ? 'Revoking…' : 'Revoke'}
</button>
)}
</td>
</tr>
))}
</tbody>
</table>
)}
</div>
<div className="modal-footer">
<button type="button" className="btn-link" onClick={onClose}>Close</button>
</div>
</div>
</div>
)
}
-29
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { useLocation, useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom'
import { claimInvite } from '../api.js'
import { EVENTS, identify, track } from '../lib/analytics.js'
export default function InviteClaim() {
const location = useLocation()
@@ -51,34 +50,6 @@ export default function InviteClaim() {
const result = await claimInvite(token, { trustDevice })
setUser(result.user)
setNeedsPasscode(!!result.needs_passcode)
// v0.17.0 + #21 Part C identify the new user with their OHM
// user_id BEFORE firing any track() event, so the Amplitude
// user record is created with the OHM id from the first event
// rather than as an anonymous device that retroactively links.
// setOnce on invited_at + invited_by_admin_id + initial_role so
// these are immutable user-history markers on the Amplitude
// record.
if (result.user?.id != null) {
const setOnceProps = {
claim_method: 'admin-invite',
}
if (result.invited_at) setOnceProps.invited_at = ['__setOnce__', result.invited_at]
if (result.invited_by_admin_id != null) {
setOnceProps.invited_by_admin_id = ['__setOnce__', String(result.invited_by_admin_id)]
}
if (result.user.role) setOnceProps.initial_role = ['__setOnce__', result.user.role]
identify({
user_id: String(result.user.id),
properties: setOnceProps,
})
}
track(EVENTS.INVITE_CLAIMED, {
invited_by_admin_id: result.invited_by_admin_id != null
? String(result.invited_by_admin_id) : null,
initial_role: result.user?.role,
needs_passcode: !!result.needs_passcode,
trust_device: trustDevice,
})
setStatus('ok')
} catch (e) {
setStatus('failed')
-91
View File
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
// LinkedText.jsx roadmap #28 (Parts 13).
//
// Renders a backend-provided list of text/link segments (see
// backend/app/rfc_links.py). References in PR descriptions and comments
// arrive pre-scanned as structured segments this component maps them
// onto plain text runs, anchors, and inline affordances. It never renders
// HTML from the server (no dangerouslySetInnerHTML), so the surface is
// XSS-safe regardless of what a comment author typed.
//
// Segment types:
// * `rfc` Part 1: a link to an accepted (active) RFC.
// * `rfc-pending` Part 3: the term names a pending (super-draft)
// RFC; a signed-in viewer who isn't its owner gets
// an inline "ask to contribute" affordance routing
// to the contribute form (App reads `?contribute=`).
// * `rfc-candidate` Part 2: a strong-candidate term with no RFC yet;
// a viewer with create rights (`canCreate`) gets a
// "create RFC" affordance routing to the propose
// flow pre-filled (App reads `?propose=`).
//
// Affordances degrade to plain text when the viewer lacks the relevant
// right, so the visible prose is identical for everyone only the
// offered actions differ.
//
// `segments` is the enriched array; `text` is the raw fallback used when
// the field is absent (an older cached response, or a caller that didn't
// pass segments).
import { Link } from 'react-router-dom'
export default function LinkedText({ segments, text, viewer, canCreate }) {
if (!Array.isArray(segments) || segments.length === 0) {
return <>{text ?? ''}</>
}
// A signed-in, beta-granted viewer can ask to contribute; the backend
// re-checks ownership/collaborator status and rejects self-requests.
const canContribute = !!viewer && viewer.permission_state === 'granted'
return (
<>
{segments.map((seg, i) => {
if (seg.type === 'rfc') {
return (
<a
key={i}
className="rfc-autolink"
href={`/rfc/${seg.slug}`}
title={seg.title ? `RFC: ${seg.title}` : undefined}
>
{seg.label}
</a>
)
}
if (seg.type === 'rfc-pending') {
const who = seg.owner || 'Someone'
return (
<span key={i} className="rfc-pending">
{seg.label}
{canContribute && (
<Link
className="rfc-offer rfc-offer-contribute"
to={`?contribute=${encodeURIComponent(seg.slug)}&term=${encodeURIComponent(seg.label)}`}
title={`${who} is working on an RFC for '${seg.label}' — ask to contribute`}
>
ask to contribute
</Link>
)}
</span>
)
}
if (seg.type === 'rfc-candidate') {
const term = seg.term || seg.label
return (
<span key={i} className="rfc-candidate">
{seg.label}
{canCreate && (
<Link
className="rfc-offer rfc-offer-create"
to={`?propose=${encodeURIComponent(term)}`}
title={`Create RFC for '${term}'`}
>
+ create RFC
</Link>
)}
</span>
)
}
return <span key={i}>{seg.text}</span>
})}
</>
)
}
+1 -21
View File
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ import {
startDeviceTrust,
} from '../api'
import TurnstileWidget, { turnstileEnabled } from './TurnstileWidget'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
export default function Login() {
// Steps: 'email' 'passcode' or 'code' (on the OTC path, after
@@ -151,12 +150,7 @@ export default function Login() {
;(async () => {
try {
await startDeviceTrust()
if (!cancelled) {
// v0.15.0 analytics: device-trust cookie path is one of
// three sign-in methods the taxonomy distinguishes.
track(EVENTS.USER_SIGNED_IN, { method: 'trust-device' })
window.location.assign('/')
}
if (!cancelled) window.location.assign('/')
} catch (_) {
// No trusted device fall through to the email step.
}
@@ -212,10 +206,6 @@ export default function Login() {
setStatus('')
try {
await verifyPasscode(email.trim(), passcode.trim(), { trustDevice })
// v0.15.0 analytics: passcode is the second of three
// sign-in methods. trust-device gets credited separately when
// the cookie-driven path fires above.
track(EVENTS.USER_SIGNED_IN, { method: 'passcode' })
// Reload so App.jsx's getMe() picks up the fresh session. A
// returning passcode user is by definition already past the
// §6.1 capture step (they couldn't have set a passcode while
@@ -274,11 +264,6 @@ export default function Login() {
setStatus('')
try {
await verifyOtc(email.trim(), code.trim(), { trustDevice })
// v0.15.0 analytics: OTC is the third sign-in method.
// We fire it here regardless of whether the user then lands
// in capture-profile or offer-passcode sign-in has happened
// server-side either way.
track(EVENTS.USER_SIGNED_IN, { method: 'otc' })
// OTC verified the server has signed in the user. Fetch the
// canonical /api/auth/me to decide where to land:
// * needs_profile §6.1 capture (then /beta-pending).
@@ -335,11 +320,6 @@ export default function Login() {
last_name: ln,
beta_request_reason: why,
})
// v0.15.0 analytics: a successful capture-profile submit is
// the moment a beta-access request lands. No PII in the event
// body (no name, no reason text); the count + timestamp is
// what the funnel needs.
track(EVENTS.BETA_ACCESS_REQUESTED)
// Hard-load so App.jsx re-fetches /api/auth/me and picks up
// the captured fields. The user stays permission_state='pending'
// until an admin grants access the next thing they should
+1 -2
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
import { useEffect, useRef, useState, useCallback } from 'react'
import { Marked } from 'marked'
import { sanitizeHtml } from '../lib/sanitizeHtml'
import { decorateAcceptedChanges } from './trackedOverlay.js'
import ChangeTooltip from './ChangeTooltip.jsx'
@@ -99,7 +98,7 @@ export default function MarkdownPreview({
// synchronously with the body itself no flash of un-decorated text.
useEffect(() => {
if (!hostRef.current) return
const html = sanitizeHtml(previewMarked.parse(content || ''))
const html = previewMarked.parse(content || '')
hostRef.current.innerHTML = html
const token = ++renderTokenRef.current
// Reset memo so the new block set re-renders from scratch.
+1 -25
View File
@@ -10,13 +10,10 @@
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { draftPRText, openPR } from '../api'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
export default function PRModal({ slug, branch, branchIsPrivate, onClose, onOpened }) {
const [title, setTitle] = useState('')
const [description, setDescription] = useState('')
// #26: optional ground-truth use case for this change.
const [useCase, setUseCase] = useState('')
const [drafting, setDrafting] = useState(true)
const [submitting, setSubmitting] = useState(false)
const [confirmed, setConfirmed] = useState(!branchIsPrivate)
@@ -41,14 +38,7 @@ export default function PRModal({ slug, branch, branchIsPrivate, onClose, onOpen
setSubmitting(true)
setError(null)
try {
const { pr_number } = await openPR(slug, branch, {
title: title.trim(),
description: description.trim(),
proposedUseCase: useCase.trim() || null,
})
// v0.15.0 analytics: fire on §10.2 PR-open success. slug
// and pr_number are the join keys; title/description stay out.
track(EVENTS.PR_OPENED, { rfc_slug: slug, pr_number })
const { pr_number } = await openPR(slug, branch, { title: title.trim(), description: description.trim() })
onOpened?.(pr_number)
} catch (e) {
setError(e.message)
@@ -110,20 +100,6 @@ export default function PRModal({ slug, branch, branchIsPrivate, onClose, onOpen
what was argued, what shifted, what the arbiters are asked
to consider.
</p>
<label className="modal-label">What will you be using this change for? (optional)</label>
<textarea
className="modal-textarea"
value={useCase}
onChange={e => setUseCase(e.target.value)}
placeholder="The concrete thing this change unlocks for you. Optional."
disabled={drafting || submitting}
rows={3}
maxLength={8000}
/>
<p className="field-help">
#26: the concrete ground-truth use case distinct from "why
it's needed" above. Leave blank if you'd rather not say.
</p>
{error && <p className="field-error">{error}</p>}
</div>
<div className="modal-actions">
+2 -23
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ import {
startResolutionBranch,
withdrawPR,
} from '../api'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
import LinkedText from './LinkedText'
export default function PRView({ viewer }) {
const { slug, prNumber: prNumberParam } = useParams()
@@ -137,10 +135,6 @@ export default function PRView({ viewer }) {
anchorPayload: reviewDraft?.anchorPayload || {},
quote: reviewDraft?.quote || null,
})
// v0.15.0 analytics: fire on §10.4 review-comment success.
// surface=pr distinguishes this from RFC discussion comments.
// No body text or quote material in the event.
track(EVENTS.COMMENT_POSTED, { rfc_slug: slug, pr_number: prNumber, surface: 'pr' })
setReviewText('')
setReviewDraft(null)
await refresh()
@@ -219,21 +213,8 @@ export default function PRView({ viewer }) {
<>
<h1 className="pr-title">{pr.title}</h1>
{pr.description && (
<p className="pr-description">
<LinkedText segments={pr.description_segments} text={pr.description} viewer={viewer} canCreate={viewer?.permission_state === 'granted'} />
</p>
<p className="pr-description">{pr.description}</p>
)}
{/* #26: the optional ground-truth use case for this change,
captured when the PR was opened. Muted "left blank"
treatment when none was supplied. */}
<div className="pr-use-case" style={{ margin: '6px 0', fontSize: 13 }}>
<span style={{ fontWeight: 700, color: '#888', textTransform: 'uppercase', letterSpacing: '0.05em', fontSize: 11 }}>
Intended use case:
</span>{' '}
{pr.proposed_use_case
? <span style={{ whiteSpace: 'pre-wrap' }}>{pr.proposed_use_case}</span>
: <span style={{ color: '#999', fontStyle: 'italic' }}>left blank</span>}
</div>
{pr.capabilities?.can_edit_text && (
<button className="btn-link" onClick={startHeaderEdit}>Edit title & description</button>
)}
@@ -443,9 +424,7 @@ function PRConversation({ threads, messagesByThread, threadsByKind, seenMsgId })
{isNew && <span className="chat-msg-new-pip" title="New since your last visit"></span>}
</div>
{m.quote && <pre className="chat-msg-quote">{m.quote}</pre>}
<div className="chat-msg-body">
<LinkedText segments={m.text_segments} text={m.text} viewer={viewer} canCreate={viewer?.permission_state === 'granted'} />
</div>
<div className="chat-msg-body">{m.text}</div>
</li>
)
})}
+2 -10
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { useParams, useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom'
import { renderMarkdown } from '../lib/sanitizeHtml'
import { marked } from 'marked'
import { getProposal, mergeProposal, declineProposal, withdrawProposal } from '../api'
export default function ProposalView({ viewer, onChange }) {
@@ -161,16 +161,8 @@ export default function ProposalView({ viewer, onChange }) {
</h3>
<div
className="entry-body"
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: renderMarkdown(data.entry?.body || '') }}
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: marked.parse(data.entry?.body || '') }}
/>
{/* #26: the optional ground-truth use case the proposer supplied. */}
<h3 style={{ fontSize: 13, fontWeight: 700, color: '#888', textTransform: 'uppercase', letterSpacing: '0.05em', marginTop: 24 }}>
Intended use case
</h3>
{data.proposed_use_case
? <div className="entry-body" dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: renderMarkdown(data.proposed_use_case) }} />
: <p style={{ color: '#999', fontStyle: 'italic' }}>Left blank by the proposer.</p>}
</article>
)
}
+7 -110
View File
@@ -2,23 +2,15 @@
//
// Title (required) and pitch (required textarea), with a slug field
// that auto-fills from the title via the same deterministic kebab-case
// the backend uses. Tags are chip-input (free-form), with the §9.1
// Slice 2 AI-suggested chips (roadmap #27) wired in: as the draft fills
// in, the backend asks Claude Haiku for tags drawn from the corpus's
// existing tag set, surfaced as clickable suggestion chips. The assist
// is best-effort it stays silent when unavailable.
// the backend uses. Tags are chip-input (free-form for slice 1; the
// AI-suggested chips of §9.1 are deferred to Slice 2 when the AI surface
// is wired up).
//
// The submit button drives the §17 POST /api/rfcs/propose endpoint;
// success navigates the proposer to the pending-idea view per §9.3.
import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from 'react'
import { proposeRFC, suggestTags } from '../api'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
// How long the draft must sit unchanged before we ask for suggestions
// long enough to fire on typing pauses / field-blur, not on every
// keystroke (the backend is also per-user rate-limited as a backstop).
const SUGGEST_DEBOUNCE_MS = 700
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { proposeRFC } from '../api'
function slugify(title) {
return title
@@ -28,64 +20,26 @@ function slugify(title) {
.replace(/^-+|-+$/g, '')
}
export default function ProposeModal({ viewer, onClose, onSubmitted, initialTitle = '' }) {
// #28 Part 2: a "create RFC for '<term>'" affordance pre-fills the title
// (App passes the `?propose=<term>` value here); the slug derives from it
// via the same effect that drives manual typing.
const [title, setTitle] = useState(initialTitle)
export default function ProposeModal({ viewer, onClose, onSubmitted }) {
const [title, setTitle] = useState('')
const [slug, setSlug] = useState('')
const [slugEdited, setSlugEdited] = useState(false)
const [pitch, setPitch] = useState('')
// #26: optional ground-truth use case, sibling to the required pitch.
const [useCase, setUseCase] = useState('')
const [tagInput, setTagInput] = useState('')
const [tags, setTags] = useState([])
const [submitting, setSubmitting] = useState(false)
const [error, setError] = useState(null)
// #27: Claude Haiku tag suggestions. `suggestions` is the latest
// ranked list from the backend ({ tag, confidence }); we render the
// subset not already chosen. `suggestedOnce` gates the disclosure +
// row so they only appear after the assist has actually run.
const [suggestions, setSuggestions] = useState([])
const [suggestedOnce, setSuggestedOnce] = useState(false)
useEffect(() => {
if (!slugEdited) setSlug(slugify(title))
}, [title, slugEdited])
// #27: debounced tag-suggestion fetch. Fires after the draft sits
// unchanged for SUGGEST_DEBOUNCE_MS, only once there's something to go
// on (a title). A stale-response guard keeps an earlier in-flight
// request from clobbering a newer one.
const suggestSeq = useRef(0)
useEffect(() => {
if (!title.trim()) {
setSuggestions([])
return
}
const handle = setTimeout(async () => {
const seq = ++suggestSeq.current
const result = await suggestTags({ title, pitch, useCase })
if (seq !== suggestSeq.current) return // a newer request superseded us
setSuggestions(Array.isArray(result) ? result : [])
if (result && result.length) setSuggestedOnce(true)
}, SUGGEST_DEBOUNCE_MS)
return () => clearTimeout(handle)
}, [title, pitch, useCase])
// Suggestions the user hasn't already added.
const freshSuggestions = suggestions.filter(s => !tags.includes(s.tag))
function addTag() {
const t = tagInput.trim()
if (t && !tags.includes(t)) setTags([...tags, t])
setTagInput('')
}
function addSuggested(tag) {
if (!tags.includes(tag)) setTags([...tags, tag])
}
async function handleSubmit(e) {
e.preventDefault()
if (!title.trim() || !slug || !pitch.trim()) return
@@ -97,12 +51,7 @@ export default function ProposeModal({ viewer, onClose, onSubmitted, initialTitl
slug,
pitch: pitch.trim(),
tags,
proposedUseCase: useCase.trim() || null,
})
// v0.15.0 analytics: fire on the §9.1 propose-RFC submit.
// Slug is a stable, low-cardinality identifier (kebab-case
// ascii); title and pitch stay out of the event body.
track(EVENTS.RFC_PROPOSED, { rfc_slug: slug })
onSubmitted?.(result)
} catch (err) {
setError(err.message || 'Submission failed.')
@@ -151,19 +100,6 @@ export default function ProposeModal({ viewer, onClose, onSubmitted, initialTitl
required
/>
<label htmlFor="propose-use-case">What will you be using this RFC for? (optional)</label>
<textarea
id="propose-use-case"
value={useCase}
onChange={e => setUseCase(e.target.value)}
placeholder="The concrete thing you intend to build or do with this RFC. Optional, but it helps ground the work."
rows={3}
/>
<p className="field-help">
The concrete ground-truth use case distinct from "why it's
needed" above. Leave blank if you'd rather not say.
</p>
<label htmlFor="propose-tag">Tags (optional)</label>
<div style={{ display: 'flex', gap: 6, alignItems: 'center', marginBottom: 4 }}>
<input
@@ -195,45 +131,6 @@ export default function ProposeModal({ viewer, onClose, onSubmitted, initialTitl
</div>
)}
{/* #27: Claude Haiku suggested tags. Clickable chips that add
to the tag list; nothing auto-applies. The disclosure is
required the draft text is sent to Anthropic to generate
these so it renders whenever the suggestion row does. */}
{(freshSuggestions.length > 0 || (suggestedOnce && suggestions.length > 0)) && (
<div style={{ marginTop: 4, marginBottom: 14 }}>
{freshSuggestions.length > 0 && (
<>
<p className="field-help" style={{ marginTop: 0, marginBottom: 4 }}>
Suggested tags click to add:
</p>
<div>
{freshSuggestions.map(s => (
<button
key={s.tag}
type="button"
className="entry-tag"
onClick={() => addSuggested(s.tag)}
title={`Add "${s.tag}"`}
style={{
display: 'inline-block',
marginRight: 4,
marginBottom: 4,
border: '1px dashed var(--color-border, #ccc)',
background: 'none',
cursor: 'pointer',
}}
>+ {s.tag}</button>
))}
</div>
</>
)}
<p className="field-help" style={{ marginTop: 4, marginBottom: 0, fontStyle: 'italic' }}>
Suggestions are generated by Claude (Anthropic). The text you've
entered above is sent to Anthropic to produce them.
</p>
</div>
)}
{viewer && (
<p className="field-help" style={{ marginTop: 14, marginBottom: 0 }}>
Owner: <strong>{viewer.display_name || viewer.gitea_login}</strong> you'll be the first owner of this super-draft. Additional owners can claim later (§13.1).
+3 -11
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ import {
postDiscussionMessage,
resolveDiscussionThread,
} from '../api'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
import LinkedText from './LinkedText'
export default function RFCDiscussionPanel({ slug, viewer }) {
const [threads, setThreads] = useState([])
@@ -102,10 +100,6 @@ export default function RFCDiscussionPanel({ slug, viewer }) {
void message_id
}
setComposer('')
// v0.15.0 analytics: fire on a successful discussion post.
// surface=discussion distinguishes this from PR review comments
// which fire from PRView with surface=pr. No body text.
track(EVENTS.COMMENT_POSTED, { rfc_slug: slug, surface: 'discussion' })
} catch (err) {
setError(err.message)
} finally {
@@ -191,7 +185,7 @@ export default function RFCDiscussionPanel({ slug, viewer }) {
</div>
)}
{activeMessages.map(msg => (
<DiscussionMessage key={msg.id} message={msg} viewer={viewer} />
<DiscussionMessage key={msg.id} message={msg} />
))}
<div ref={bottomRef} />
</div>
@@ -258,7 +252,7 @@ export default function RFCDiscussionPanel({ slug, viewer }) {
)
}
function DiscussionMessage({ message, viewer }) {
function DiscussionMessage({ message }) {
const isSystem = message.role === 'system'
if (isSystem) {
return (
@@ -280,9 +274,7 @@ function DiscussionMessage({ message, viewer }) {
{message.quote && (
<div className="discussion-message-quote">"{message.quote}"</div>
)}
<div className="discussion-message-body">
<LinkedText segments={message.text_segments} text={message.text} viewer={viewer} canCreate={viewer?.permission_state === 'granted'} />
</div>
<div className="discussion-message-body">{message.text}</div>
</div>
)
}
+1 -51
View File
@@ -43,9 +43,7 @@ import RFCDiscussionPanel from './RFCDiscussionPanel.jsx'
import ChangePanel, { diffWords } from './ChangePanel.jsx'
import PRModal from './PRModal.jsx'
import GraduateDialog from './GraduateDialog.jsx'
import InvitationsModal from './InvitationsModal.jsx'
import { claimOwnership } from '../api'
import { EVENTS, track } from '../lib/analytics'
const MANUAL_IDLE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000 // §8.6 idle window; exact value is impl detail.
const MANUAL_DEBOUNCE_MS = 800
@@ -123,15 +121,7 @@ export default function RFCView({ viewer }) {
const [drawerOpen, setDrawerOpen] = useState(false)
useEffect(() => {
getRFC(slug).then(entry => {
setEntry(entry)
// v0.15.0 analytics: fire RFC Viewed once per slug load.
// We key on the slug param rather than the loaded entry so a
// re-render doesn't double-fire; the slug is the stable
// identifier. id is included for join-friendliness in the
// Amplitude dashboard.
track(EVENTS.RFC_VIEWED, { rfc_slug: slug, rfc_id: entry?.id })
}).catch(err => setError(err.message))
getRFC(slug).then(setEntry).catch(err => setError(err.message))
listModels(slug)
.then(({ models, default: def }) => {
setModels(models || [])
@@ -149,11 +139,6 @@ export default function RFCView({ viewer }) {
const [showMetadataPane, setShowMetadataPane] = useState(false)
const [showGraduateDialog, setShowGraduateDialog] = useState(false)
const [claimError, setClaimError] = useState(null)
// v0.16.0 (item #12): the per-RFC invitations modal. Visible only to
// RFC owners (frontmatter) and platform admin/owner the backend
// gates the underlying endpoints regardless, so a leaked toggle
// can't actually leak anything.
const [showInvitationsModal, setShowInvitationsModal] = useState(false)
// Load main view + branch view whenever slug/branch changes.
useEffect(() => {
@@ -639,20 +624,6 @@ export default function RFCView({ viewer }) {
Graduate to RFC repo
</button>
)}
{/* v0.16.0 (item #12): owner-only invitations affordance.
Shown when the viewer is named in the RFC's frontmatter
`owners` list or holds a platform admin/owner role.
Available on both super-drafts and active RFCs. */}
{viewer && (viewer.role === 'owner' || viewer.role === 'admin' || (entry?.owners || []).includes(viewer.gitea_login)) && (
<button
type="button"
className="btn-link"
onClick={() => setShowInvitationsModal(true)}
title="Invite collaborators to this RFC"
>
Invitations
</button>
)}
</div>
</div>
{claimError && (
@@ -669,19 +640,6 @@ export default function RFCView({ viewer }) {
: 'main is read-only — PRs are the only path to change it. Open a branch to propose edits.'}
</div>
)}
{/* #26: the optional ground-truth use case captured at propose
time. Shown on the canonical (main) view; muted "left blank"
treatment when the proposer didn't supply one. */}
{branchParam === 'main' && (
<div className="rfc-use-case" style={{ margin: '8px 0 16px', padding: '10px 14px', borderLeft: '3px solid #e0e0e0', background: '#fafafa' }}>
<div style={{ fontSize: 11, fontWeight: 700, color: '#888', textTransform: 'uppercase', letterSpacing: '0.05em', marginBottom: 4 }}>
Intended use case
</div>
{entry.proposed_use_case
? <div style={{ whiteSpace: 'pre-wrap' }}>{entry.proposed_use_case}</div>
: <span style={{ color: '#999', fontStyle: 'italic' }}>Left blank by the proposer.</span>}
</div>
)}
{inDiscuss && branchParam !== 'main' && (
<div className="discuss-mode-banner">
Discuss mode on <strong>{branchParam}</strong> chat freely;
@@ -898,14 +856,6 @@ export default function RFCView({ viewer }) {
/>
)}
{showInvitationsModal && (
<InvitationsModal
slug={slug}
rfcTitle={entry?.title}
onClose={() => setShowInvitationsModal(false)}
/>
)}
{showMetadataPane && (
<MetadataPaneModal
slug={slug}
+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
:root {
font-family: var(--font-sans);
color: var(--color-text);
background: var(--color-bg);
font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue",
Arial, sans-serif;
color: #1a1a1a;
background: #fafaf8;
-webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased;
-moz-osx-font-smoothing: grayscale;
}
-391
View File
@@ -1,391 +0,0 @@
// analytics.js — v0.15.0 / roadmap item #13.
//
// Wrapper around `@amplitude/unified` (Amplitude Analytics +
// Session Replay) that gates SDK initialization on the user's
// cookie/privacy consent (v0.13.0, `frontend/src/lib/consent.js`,
// SPEC §14.5). The wrapper presents a stable surface to the rest
// of the app:
//
// import { track, identify, anonymize } from './lib/analytics'
//
// track('RFC Viewed', { rfc_slug: 'open-human-model' })
// identify({ user_id: 'u_123' })
// anonymize() // call on sign-out
//
// At first import the wrapper:
// 1. Calls `bootstrap()` once, which reads `getConsent()` and
// subscribes to `onConsentChange()`. If consent.analytics is
// true, it lazily imports the Amplitude SDK and calls
// `amplitude.initAll(API_KEY, { analytics: { autocapture: true },
// sessionReplay: { sampleRate: 1 } })`.
// If consent.analytics is false (or undecided), the SDK is
// not loaded — no network request, no cookies, no session
// replay recording. A later consent change to `true` triggers
// init at that moment.
// 2. The wrapper queues `track()` and `identify()` calls made
// before init finishes (lazy import + consent grant), and
// drains the queue when init completes.
// 3. If the user later flips consent from granted → denied, the
// wrapper calls `amplitude.setOptOut(true)` so subsequent
// events are dropped client-side and session replay stops
// recording (the SDK is still loaded — we cannot unload a
// script — but it stops firing).
//
// Consent precedence ladder:
//
// consent.analytics === true → init + track
// consent.analytics === false → no init; or if already init,
// setOptOut(true)
// consent.recorded_at === null → treat as denied (banner is up;
// the user has not yet chosen)
//
// Session replay scope: this release ships session replay at
// `sampleRate: 1` (100% of sessions are recorded for full-DOM
// playback). That is the vendor-recommended default for new
// Amplitude deployments. The v0.13.0 consent banner's single
// "analytics" toggle gates both events and session replay together —
// a separate consent category for session-replay specifically is a
// §19.2 follow-up.
//
// API key resolution:
//
// The build-time env var `VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY` carries the
// Amplitude project's API key. When it is unset/empty, the
// wrapper logs one console warning and no-ops — every public
// function becomes a deterministic no-op so dev environments
// (and deployments that intentionally don't ship analytics)
// keep working. The deploy gesture wires the key via flotilla's
// `overlay set` verb (see CHANGELOG for the operator gesture):
// Amplitude browser keys are bundle-embedded by design (visible
// to anyone with dev tools, same nature as the v0.12.0
// `VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY`), so the binding is overlay, not
// secret.
//
// PII discipline:
//
// `identify({ user_id })` SHOULD pass only the opaque server-
// side user id (the `viewer.id` integer or string). DO NOT pass
// email, display name, IP, or any other PII through the SDK.
// Event properties SHOULD likewise stay limited to ids and
// enums; free-text fields (titles, comment bodies) MUST NOT be
// sent.
//
// Event taxonomy: defined in `EVENTS` below. Callers SHOULD use
// one of these names rather than firing arbitrary strings — that
// keeps the Amplitude dashboard coherent over time.
import { getConsent, onConsentChange } from './consent.js'
const API_KEY = import.meta.env.VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY || ''
// Public taxonomy. Keep this short and stable — new entries should
// land via a release, not ad-hoc. The strings match the Amplitude
// dashboard names exactly (Title Case, spaces, no punctuation).
export const EVENTS = Object.freeze({
PAGE_VIEWED: 'Page Viewed',
RFC_VIEWED: 'RFC Viewed',
USER_SIGNED_IN: 'User Signed In',
USER_SIGNED_OUT: 'User Signed Out',
RFC_PROPOSED: 'RFC Proposed',
PR_OPENED: 'PR Opened',
COMMENT_POSTED: 'Comment Posted',
BETA_ACCESS_REQUESTED: 'Beta Access Requested',
ADMIN_PERMISSION_DECISION: 'Admin Permission Decision',
// v0.16.0 / item #12 — per-RFC owner invites.
INVITATION_SENT: 'Invitation Sent',
INVITATION_ACCEPTED: 'Invitation Accepted',
// v0.17.0 / item #16 — admin-create user + invite email.
USER_INVITED: 'User Invited',
INVITE_CLAIMED: 'Invite Claimed',
// v0.19.0 / item #30 — `/docs/*` flyout + sessions browser. Carries
// `section`: 'user-guide' | 'sessions/about' | 'sessions/<NNNN>' |
// 'sessions/<NNNN>/<filename>' so the dashboard can answer which
// docs surfaces get read most. The transcript-section value includes
// the filename so an aggregator can group by `sessions/<NNNN>` or by
// exact transcript.
DOC_VIEWED: 'Doc Viewed',
})
// Internal state.
let _bootstrapped = false
let _amplitude = null // The dynamically imported SDK module.
let _initPromise = null // Pending init (lazy import + sdk.init).
let _initialized = false // True after sdk.init has resolved.
let _warnedNoKey = false
let _pendingUserId = null // identify() called before init resolves.
let _pendingProperties = null // identify({ properties }) or
// setUserProperties() before init.
const _queue = [] // {kind: 'track'|'identify'|'anonymize'|
// 'setUserProperties', ...}
function warnNoKey() {
if (_warnedNoKey) return
_warnedNoKey = true
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.warn(
'[analytics] VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY is unset; analytics events ' +
'and session replay will not be sent. This is expected in dev; ' +
'in production it means the operator has not yet run ' +
'`flotilla overlay set <deployment> VITE_AMPLITUDE_API_KEY=<key>`.',
)
}
function consentGranted() {
const c = getConsent()
return !!(c && c.recorded_at && c.analytics)
}
// Apply a {key: value} property bag as an Amplitude Identify event.
// Used by both `identify({ properties })` and `setUserProperties`.
function applyProperties(props) {
if (!_initialized || !_amplitude || !props) return
try {
const id = new _amplitude.Identify()
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(props)) {
if (v === undefined || v === null) continue
if (Array.isArray(v) && v.length === 2 && v[0] === '__setOnce__') {
id.setOnce(k, v[1])
} else {
id.set(k, v)
}
}
_amplitude.identify(id)
} catch (_) {
// SDK errors are non-fatal; analytics is best-effort.
}
}
// Drain the queue. Called once init resolves.
function drainQueue() {
if (!_initialized || !_amplitude) return
if (_pendingUserId != null) {
try { _amplitude.setUserId(_pendingUserId) } catch (_) {}
_pendingUserId = null
}
if (_pendingProperties != null) {
applyProperties(_pendingProperties)
_pendingProperties = null
}
while (_queue.length > 0) {
const item = _queue.shift()
try {
if (item.kind === 'track') {
_amplitude.track(item.name, item.props || {})
} else if (item.kind === 'identify') {
if (item.user_id != null) _amplitude.setUserId(item.user_id)
if (item.properties != null) applyProperties(item.properties)
} else if (item.kind === 'setUserProperties') {
applyProperties(item.properties)
} else if (item.kind === 'anonymize') {
_amplitude.reset()
}
} catch (_) {
// SDK errors are non-fatal; analytics is best-effort.
}
}
}
// Lazy import + init. Resolves once the SDK is ready to take events.
// Idempotent: subsequent calls return the same promise.
async function initSdk() {
if (_initPromise) return _initPromise
if (!API_KEY) {
warnNoKey()
// Resolve immediately with a no-op shape; the wrapper's public
// functions check API_KEY and short-circuit, so this never
// actually runs SDK code.
_initPromise = Promise.resolve(null)
return _initPromise
}
_initPromise = (async () => {
try {
const mod = await import('@amplitude/unified')
// The unified package exposes `initAll`, `track`,
// `setUserId`, `reset`, `setOptOut` as named functions.
// We hold the module so the queue drainer can call them
// by name.
_amplitude = mod
// initAll wires up both Analytics and Session Replay in one
// call. Vendor-recommended init shape from the Amplitude
// installation wizard:
// - analytics.autocapture: true — auto-instruments page
// views, session start/end, clicks, and form interactions.
// Our explicit `track('Page Viewed', …)` etc. layer on top
// for app-specific names that survive renames.
// - sessionReplay.sampleRate: 1 — record 100% of sessions
// for full-DOM playback. Gated by the v0.13.0 consent
// banner just like the rest of the SDK; never starts
// recording without explicit analytics opt-in.
const ret = mod.initAll(API_KEY, {
analytics: { autocapture: true },
sessionReplay: { sampleRate: 1 },
})
// initAll returns an AmplitudeReturn with a `.promise` accessor
// (consistent with the legacy `init`). Some unified builds
// resolve synchronously; await defensively.
if (ret && ret.promise) await ret.promise
_initialized = true
drainQueue()
} catch (err) {
// Init failure is non-fatal; keep the wrapper alive so future
// calls no-op. Log once for the operator.
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.warn('[analytics] Amplitude init failed:', err)
_initialized = false
}
return _amplitude
})()
return _initPromise
}
// Bootstrap is called lazily on first track/identify. It wires the
// consent subscription so a later flip from denied→granted triggers
// init at that moment, and granted→denied flips the opt-out.
function bootstrap() {
if (_bootstrapped) return
_bootstrapped = true
if (consentGranted()) {
// Fire-and-forget; the queue catches any events that arrive
// before init resolves.
initSdk()
}
onConsentChange(snapshot => {
const allowed = !!(snapshot && snapshot.recorded_at && snapshot.analytics)
if (allowed && !_initPromise) {
initSdk()
} else if (allowed && _initialized && _amplitude) {
// Re-enable in case we previously opted out.
try { _amplitude.setOptOut(false) } catch (_) {}
} else if (!allowed && _initialized && _amplitude) {
// Granted → denied. Stop firing. We cannot unload the script
// tag; setOptOut is the SDK's contract for "drop subsequent
// events client-side".
try { _amplitude.setOptOut(true) } catch (_) {}
}
})
}
/** Fire a track event. Safe to call before consent / init resolve;
* the call is queued and drained once both are true. Drops the
* event silently if API_KEY is empty (with a one-shot warn) or
* consent.analytics is false. */
export function track(name, props) {
if (!API_KEY) { warnNoKey(); return }
bootstrap()
if (!consentGranted()) return
if (_initialized && _amplitude) {
try { _amplitude.track(name, props || {}) } catch (_) {}
return
}
_queue.push({ kind: 'track', name, props })
}
/** Attach an authenticated user id and optional durable properties.
* Pass `{ user_id: '<opaque-id>', properties?: { role, first_sign_in_at, … } }`.
* DO NOT pass email, display name, or other PII as user_id or in
* properties. Idempotent subsequent calls with the same id are
* cheap; properties are merged into the Amplitude user record.
*
* To mark a property as setOnce (immutable after first write),
* pass `properties: { first_sign_in_at: ['__setOnce__', '2026-05-28T…'] }`.
* Bare values use Amplitude's `.set()` (mutable).
*
* Pattern (per #21 Part C):
* - On sign-in success in App.jsx: identify with viewer.id + the
* durable property bag (role, permission_state, first_sign_in_at
* setOnce, passcode_set, device_trusted_count, account_created_at
* setOnce).
* - On invite-claim success in InviteClaim.jsx / AcceptInvitation.jsx:
* identify with the new viewer.id + invitation-derived properties
* (invited_by_admin_id, invited_at setOnce, initial_role, claim_method)
* BEFORE firing any track() so the Amplitude user record is
* created with the OHM user_id from the first event, not as an
* anonymous device that retroactively links. */
export function identify({ user_id, properties } = {}) {
if (!API_KEY) { warnNoKey(); return }
if (user_id == null && properties == null) return
bootstrap()
if (!consentGranted()) {
// Hold for when consent lands; identify-on-sign-in is a common
// race with the consent banner choice.
if (user_id != null) _pendingUserId = user_id
if (properties != null) {
_pendingProperties = { ..._pendingProperties, ...properties }
}
return
}
if (_initialized && _amplitude) {
try {
if (user_id != null) _amplitude.setUserId(user_id)
if (properties != null) applyProperties(properties)
} catch (_) {}
return
}
if (user_id != null) _pendingUserId = user_id
if (properties != null) {
_pendingProperties = { ..._pendingProperties, ...properties }
}
_queue.push({ kind: 'identify', user_id, properties })
}
/** Update durable user properties on the current Amplitude user
* record mid-session for state changes that shouldn't wait for the
* next sign-in to surface (role grant/revoke, passcode set, device
* trusted, etc.). Same property shape as `identify({ properties })`.
* setOnce values use the `['__setOnce__', value]` sentinel pattern.
* Has no effect if no identify has happened yet set the user_id
* via `identify()` first.
*
* Per #21 Part C: call this from any surface where the user's
* Amplitude-relevant state changes mid-session, so the dashboard
* stays current. */
export function setUserProperties(properties) {
if (!API_KEY) { warnNoKey(); return }
if (properties == null) return
bootstrap()
if (!consentGranted()) {
_pendingProperties = { ..._pendingProperties, ...properties }
return
}
if (_initialized && _amplitude) {
applyProperties(properties)
return
}
_pendingProperties = { ..._pendingProperties, ...properties }
_queue.push({ kind: 'setUserProperties', properties })
}
/** Reset the user binding. Call this on sign-out so the next page
* navigations are attributed to a fresh anonymous device id. Has
* no effect when analytics is disabled.
*
* Per #21 Part C: clears both the user_id binding AND the pending
* property cache, so a subsequent sign-in as a different user
* starts with a fully fresh slate (no carry-over properties from
* the previous user). */
export function anonymize() {
if (!API_KEY) { warnNoKey(); return }
_pendingUserId = null
_pendingProperties = null
bootstrap()
if (!consentGranted()) return
if (_initialized && _amplitude) {
try { _amplitude.reset() } catch (_) {}
return
}
_queue.push({ kind: 'anonymize' })
}
/** Test helper exposed for unit tests, not for app code.
* Resets module-level state so a fresh bootstrap cycle can be
* exercised. */
export function __resetForTests() {
_bootstrapped = false
_amplitude = null
_initPromise = null
_initialized = false
_warnedNoKey = false
_pendingUserId = null
_pendingProperties = null
_queue.length = 0
}
-47
View File
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
// sanitizeHtml.js — the single chokepoint for turning user-authored
// markdown into DOM-bound HTML.
//
// Security audit 0026 (finding C1, Critical): every `marked.parse(...)`
// result that reaches an `innerHTML` / `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` sink was
// previously written raw. `marked` passes through embedded HTML and
// `javascript:`/event-handler attributes verbatim, so any user-authored
// document (RFC body, proposal body, proposed_use_case, transcript) was a
// stored-XSS vector — a contributor's payload executed in the session of
// whoever viewed it, including an admin/owner during review.
//
// Fix: route EVERY markdown render through `renderMarkdown` (or, for
// already-rendered HTML, `sanitizeHtml`). DOMPurify's defaults already
// strip <script>, on* event handlers, and javascript:/unsafe-data: URIs;
// we add a hook so any link opening a new tab carries rel="noopener
// noreferrer". The html profile keeps the standard markdown tag set plus
// class + data-* attributes (the latter is what MarkdownPreview's mermaid
// placeholder relies on); mermaid renders its SVG into the DOM *after*
// sanitization and is itself locked down with securityLevel:'strict'.
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify'
import { marked } from 'marked'
let _hookInstalled = false
function ensureHook() {
if (_hookInstalled) return
DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
if (node.tagName === 'A' && node.getAttribute('target') === '_blank') {
node.setAttribute('rel', 'noopener noreferrer')
}
})
_hookInstalled = true
}
// Sanitize an already-rendered HTML string. Use when the HTML did not come
// from `marked` (rare) or when a caller parses markdown with a bespoke
// `Marked` instance and only needs the sanitize step.
export function sanitizeHtml(html) {
ensureHook()
return DOMPurify.sanitize(html || '', { USE_PROFILES: { html: true } })
}
// Parse markdown with the shared `marked` and sanitize the result. This is
// the drop-in replacement for `marked.parse(src)` at any HTML sink.
export function renderMarkdown(src) {
return sanitizeHtml(marked.parse(src || ''))
}
-91
View File
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
// useLastState — v0.23.0 / roadmap item #29: server-side sign-in state
// resume. Two responsibilities, kept in one small hook so App.jsx's
// surface stays minimal:
//
// 1. Debounce-post the authenticated user's current route to
// `PUT /api/me/last-state` on every route change (~1s debounce so
// a fast click-through doesn't spray the endpoint). Anonymous
// users: no-op. Best-effort: a failed POST never disrupts nav.
//
// 2. On the first authenticated load, read the stored `last_route`
// (handed back on `/api/auth/me`) and `navigate()` to it ONCE.
// Stale routes (a withdrawn RFC, a slug the user lost rights to)
// are not special-cased here: navigating lands on whatever that
// route renders today, and the existing routing already falls
// through to the catalog/empty-state for a missing RFC. Keeping
// this dumb is deliberate (see SPEC §6.2 + the #29 scope note).
//
// Ordering with #21 Part C (Amplitude identify): App.jsx fires
// `identify` in its own effect when `me.user.id` first appears. This
// hook's resume redirect is gated on `identifyReady` — App.jsx flips it
// true only after the identify effect has run — so the redirect always
// happens AFTER identify, preserving the identify-then-track ordering
// the roadmap calls out.
import { useEffect, useRef } from 'react'
import { putLastState } from '../api'
// ~1s debounce on the route-change POST. A frontend constant, not a
// server knob — the backend takes whatever lands.
const DEBOUNCE_MS = 1000
// Routes we never want to resume *to* — auth/landing surfaces that
// would be nonsensical or hostile to drop a returning user onto. We
// still record them (cheap, and the user may legitimately be sitting on
// /docs), but the resume redirect skips them and falls through to the
// default landing. Anything not listed resumes normally.
const NON_RESUMABLE_PREFIXES = ['/login', '/welcome', '/invites/', '/invitations/']
function isResumable(route) {
if (!route || typeof route !== 'string') return false
if (route === '/') return false // "/" is already the default landing
return !NON_RESUMABLE_PREFIXES.some(p => route.startsWith(p))
}
/**
* @param {object} opts
* @param {boolean} opts.authenticated whether a viewer is signed in
* @param {string} opts.pathname current location.pathname
* @param {boolean} opts.identifyReady App flips true after identify fires
* @param {string|null} opts.lastRoute stored route from /api/auth/me
* @param {function} opts.navigate react-router navigate()
*/
export function useLastState({ authenticated, pathname, identifyReady, lastRoute, navigate }) {
// ── 1. Debounced route-change POST ────────────────────────────────
const timerRef = useRef(null)
useEffect(() => {
if (!authenticated) return undefined
if (timerRef.current) clearTimeout(timerRef.current)
timerRef.current = setTimeout(() => {
// Best-effort — swallow failures so an offline/401 POST never
// surfaces as a navigation error.
putLastState(pathname).catch(() => {})
}, DEBOUNCE_MS)
return () => {
if (timerRef.current) clearTimeout(timerRef.current)
}
}, [authenticated, pathname])
// ── 2. One-time resume redirect ───────────────────────────────────
// Fires once, after identify is ready, when there's a resumable
// stored route AND the user is currently sitting on the default
// landing ("/"). We only redirect from "/" so we never yank a user
// who deep-linked somewhere specific (or refreshed mid-RFC) back to
// their last route.
const resumedRef = useRef(false)
useEffect(() => {
if (resumedRef.current) return
if (!authenticated || !identifyReady) return
// Only resume when the app booted on the default landing — a hard
// sign-in nav lands on "/", which is exactly the case we want.
if (pathname !== '/') {
resumedRef.current = true // user deep-linked; don't resume later either
return
}
if (isResumable(lastRoute)) {
resumedRef.current = true
navigate(lastRoute, { replace: true })
} else {
resumedRef.current = true // nothing to resume to; keep default landing
}
}, [authenticated, identifyReady, lastRoute, pathname, navigate])
}
-1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import React from 'react'
import ReactDOM from 'react-dom/client'
import { BrowserRouter } from 'react-router-dom'
import App from './App.jsx'
import './styles/tokens.css'
import './index.css'
ReactDOM.createRoot(document.getElementById('root')).render(
-162
View File
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
/* tokens.css the design-token foundation for rfc-app's UI.
*
* Roadmap item #31 (comprehensive UX polish). Before this file the app
* had ~98 distinct hardcoded hex colors, font sizes scattered across 16
* values with no scale, and radii across 13 values classic prototype
* sprawl. This module establishes ONE coherent system; the App.css sweep
* (and component-scoped CSS) reference these custom properties instead of
* literal values, so "what color/size/space is this" has a single answer.
*
* Imported FIRST in main.jsx so :root is defined before any other sheet.
* Custom properties are not cascade-order-sensitive at use time, but
* importing first keeps the dependency obvious.
*
* Conventions for anyone sweeping values to these tokens:
* - Map each literal to the NEAREST semantic token, then fall back to a
* primitive ramp step. Consolidating near-duplicate grays is the point.
* - Never invent a new literal in a component; add a token here instead.
* - Spacing/radii/type use the scales below no off-scale px values.
*/
:root {
/* ===== Color primitives — neutral ramp ===== */
--c-white: #ffffff;
--c-gray-50: #fafafa;
--c-gray-100: #f3f4f6;
--c-gray-150: #f0f0ee; /* the app's warm canvas tint */
--c-gray-200: #e5e7eb;
--c-gray-300: #d1d5db;
--c-gray-400: #9ca3af;
--c-gray-500: #6b7280;
--c-gray-600: #4b5563;
--c-gray-700: #374151;
--c-gray-800: #1f2937;
--c-gray-900: #111111;
--c-ink: #1a1a1a; /* near-black used for the header + body text */
/* ===== Color primitives — accent (indigo/violet) ===== */
--c-accent: #5b5bd6;
--c-accent-strong: #4338ca;
--c-violet: #7c3aed;
/* ===== Color primitives — status ===== */
--c-success-fg: #166534;
--c-success-bg: #dcfce7;
--c-danger-fg: #991b1b;
--c-danger-fg-strong: #b91c1c;
--c-danger-bg: #fef2f2;
--c-danger-border: #fecaca;
--c-warning-fg: #92400e;
--c-warning-accent: #b45309;
--c-warning-bg: #fef3c7;
--c-warning-bg-soft:#fffbeb;
/* ===== Semantic colors ===== */
--color-bg: var(--c-gray-150);
--color-surface: var(--c-white);
--color-surface-sunken: var(--c-gray-50);
--color-surface-muted: var(--c-gray-100);
--color-header-bg: var(--c-ink);
--color-text: var(--c-ink);
--color-text-strong: var(--c-gray-900);
--color-text-muted: var(--c-gray-500);
--color-text-subtle: var(--c-gray-400);
--color-text-inverse: var(--c-white);
--color-border: var(--c-gray-200);
--color-border-strong: var(--c-gray-300);
--color-link: var(--c-accent);
--color-accent: var(--c-accent);
--color-accent-strong: var(--c-accent-strong);
--color-accent-contrast: var(--c-white);
--color-success-fg: var(--c-success-fg);
--color-success-bg: var(--c-success-bg);
--color-danger-fg: var(--c-danger-fg);
--color-danger-bg: var(--c-danger-bg);
--color-warning-fg: var(--c-warning-fg);
--color-warning-bg: var(--c-warning-bg);
/* On the dark header, translucent white is the established pattern. */
--color-on-dark-soft: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.15);
--color-on-dark-hover: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.25);
--color-on-dark-muted: #dddddd;
--color-focus-ring: rgba(91, 91, 214, 0.45);
/* ===== Type ===== */
--font-sans: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto,
Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;
--font-mono: ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, "SF Mono", Menlo, Consolas,
monospace;
--text-2xs: 10px;
--text-xs: 11px;
--text-sm: 12px;
--text-base: 13px; /* the app's dominant body size */
--text-md: 14px;
--text-lg: 16px;
--text-xl: 18px;
--text-2xl: 22px;
--text-3xl: 28px;
--leading-tight: 1.25;
--leading-normal: 1.5;
--leading-relaxed: 1.65;
--weight-normal: 400;
--weight-medium: 500;
--weight-semibold: 600;
--weight-bold: 700;
/* ===== Spacing scale (4-based, with the 2/6/10 half-steps the app
* already leans on heavily) ===== */
--space-0: 0;
--space-1: 2px;
--space-2: 4px;
--space-3: 6px;
--space-4: 8px;
--space-5: 10px;
--space-6: 12px;
--space-7: 16px;
--space-8: 20px;
--space-9: 24px;
--space-10: 32px;
--space-11: 48px;
--space-12: 64px;
/* ===== Radius ===== */
--radius-xs: 2px;
--radius-sm: 4px;
--radius-md: 6px;
--radius-lg: 8px;
--radius-xl: 12px;
--radius-pill: 999px;
/* ===== Elevation ===== */
--shadow-sm: 0 1px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.06);
--shadow-md: 0 2px 8px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.08);
--shadow-lg: 0 8px 24px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.12);
/* ===== Motion ===== */
--motion-fast: 120ms;
--motion-base: 150ms;
--motion-slow: 200ms;
--ease-out: cubic-bezier(0.16, 1, 0.3, 1);
--ease-in-out: cubic-bezier(0.4, 0, 0.2, 1);
/* ===== Layout ===== */
--header-height: 48px;
}
/* Honor reduced-motion globally any transition/animation that reads
* these duration tokens collapses to instant. */
@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce) {
:root {
--motion-fast: 0ms;
--motion-base: 0ms;
--motion-slow: 0ms;
}
}