Files
rfc-app/backend/app/api_admin.py
T
Ben Stull 49ba06e0c2 §13: make graduation's RFC number optional; add retire (soft delete)
Optional number (§13.2/§13.3): GraduateBody.rfc_id is now optional.
A blank/absent id graduates to `active` with `id: null`, leaving the
slug as the canonical identifier (§2.3). /graduate/check treats a blank
id as valid (ok:true); /graduate only validates the RFC-NNNN regex +
collision check when a number is supplied. The Graduate dialog allows an
empty number and renders number-less entries by slug (no RFC-undefined).

Retire (§3, §3.1, §13.7): new `retired` soft-delete state. An RFC's own
owners (frontmatter) and site `owner`-role holders — not app admins —
retire via POST /api/rfcs/<slug>/retire, an auto-merged meta-repo flip
PR (graduation machinery reused). Retired entries leave every browsing
surface: catalog, get_rfc (404 except site owner), discussion/branch
reads. Un-retire is site-owner-only (POST .../unretire), discoverable
via the owner-gated GET /api/admin/retired-rfcs ("Retired" admin tab).
Migration 025 widens the cached_rfcs.state CHECK to include 'retired'
(table rebuild, all columns preserved).

Tests: graduation no-number cases (active+null id by slug; check accepts
blank) added to test_graduation_vertical.py; new test_retire_vertical.py
covers perms (owner/site-owner allowed, admin/contributor 403),
catalog/read exclusion, and a graduate→retire→unretire round-trip. Full
backend suite 386 passing; frontend builds clean. SPEC §3/§3.1/§13
updated; CHANGELOG + VERSION → 0.33.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-01 22:27:46 -07:00

1038 lines
43 KiB
Python

"""§17 admin endpoints + Slice 7 user search.
The admin's repertoire grew across the prior slices without earning a
centralized home: role grants (§6.1), the §6.2 app-wide write-mute, the
§6.5 / §5 audit logs, and the §13 graduation-readiness queue. Slice 7
consolidates them behind `/api/admin/*` so the chrome can hold them in
one tabbed surface (`Admin.jsx`).
The endpoints in this module:
- `GET /api/admin/users` — list users with role + mute
- `POST /api/admin/users/<id>/role` — set role per §6.1
- `POST /api/admin/users/<id>/mute` — set the §6.2 write-mute
- `POST /api/admin/users` — v0.17.0: create user + invite
- `GET /api/admin/users/invites` — v0.17.0: pending invites
- `GET /api/admin/audit` — paged `actions` log
- `GET /api/admin/permission-events` — paged `permission_events` log
- `GET /api/admin/graduation-queue` — super-drafts ready to graduate
- `GET /api/users/search?q=…` — typeahead for §15.8 mute add
Permission gates: every `/api/admin/*` endpoint requires
`require_admin` (owner or admin); the role-change endpoint additionally
refuses any non-owner caller granting `owner`, since owner-zero is the
only owner bootstrap path per §6.1 and a downgrade from owner needs the
sitting owner's hand. The user-search endpoint is open to any
authenticated viewer — it powers the §15.8 mute typeahead and contains
no privileged information beyond what every authenticated viewer
already sees in the catalog and chat-author surfaces.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from typing import Any
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Query, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from . import auth, db, email_invite, invites
from .config import Config
from .email import EmailConfig
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Pydantic bodies
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class RoleBody(BaseModel):
role: str = Field(pattern="^(owner|admin|contributor)$")
class MuteBody(BaseModel):
muted: bool
class PermissionStateBody(BaseModel):
# v0.9.0: the admin flip from the user-management page (roadmap
# item #7). `pending` is not surfaceable from the admin UI —
# only the OTC verify path lands a row in `pending` — but we
# accept it in the pattern in case a future restore-to-queue
# gesture wants to re-pend a granted user; today the UI only
# exposes `granted` and `revoked`.
state: str = Field(pattern="^(pending|granted|revoked)$")
class AllowlistAddBody(BaseModel):
email: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=320)
note: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=200)
class CreateUserInviteBody(BaseModel):
"""v0.17.0 / roadmap item #16 — admin-create user + invite email.
The admin types these fields on the "Create user + invite" modal on
`/admin/users`. The email + role are required; first/last name and
the optional custom message round out the body.
Bounds mirror the rest of the codebase:
* `email`: 320 chars — RFC 5321 envelope limit, same as
`OtcRequestBody` / `BetaRequestBody` / `AllowlistAddBody`.
* `first_name` / `last_name`: 120 chars — same as the v0.8.0
`BetaRequestBody` capture form.
* `role`: pydantic regex pinned to the §6.1 set so an unknown
role fails at the body bound (422) instead of landing as a
CHECK constraint violation in the migration.
* `custom_message`: 500 chars — the brief calls this out as
the max. The frontend modal shows a "remaining chars"
counter to match.
"""
email: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=320)
first_name: str = Field(default="", max_length=120)
last_name: str = Field(default="", max_length=120)
role: str = Field(pattern="^(owner|admin|contributor)$")
custom_message: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Router
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
del config # unused for now; reserved for future per-deployment knobs
router = APIRouter()
# ----- User listing -----
@router.get("/api/admin/users")
async def list_users(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""v0.9.0: the user-management surface (roadmap item #7).
The listing carries every column the admin queue needs to triage
pending beta-access requests alongside the existing role/mute
affordances. Sort order surfaces pending requests first (so the
admin lands on the inbox shape), then granted, then revoked;
within a state, ownership/role and recency are the tiebreakers
so the legacy ordering (owner first, then admin, then by name)
is preserved inside the granted bucket.
`permission_decided_by_login` joins the deciding admin row so
the UI can render "granted by @ben" without a second round-trip.
v0.16.0 (roadmap item #12) additive: each user row now carries
an `rfc_invitations` array — the per-RFC invitations the user
has accepted. This is the "permission-grant requests from
invited users" hook the roadmap text calls for: when a user
accepts a per-RFC invite and they're not yet platform-granted,
the admin sees "here because @ben invited them to <RFC> as
<role>" alongside their pending row, informing (not deciding)
the platform grant. The two write surfaces remain distinct —
the RFC's owner controls per-RFC roles; the admin controls
platform-grant state.
"""
auth.require_admin(request)
rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT u.id, u.gitea_login, u.display_name, u.email, u.role, u.muted,
u.created_at, u.last_seen_at,
u.permission_state, u.first_name, u.last_name,
u.beta_request_reason,
u.permission_decided_by, u.permission_decided_at,
d.gitea_login AS decided_by_login,
d.display_name AS decided_by_display
FROM users u
LEFT JOIN users d ON d.id = u.permission_decided_by
ORDER BY
CASE u.permission_state
WHEN 'pending' THEN 0
WHEN 'granted' THEN 1
WHEN 'revoked' THEN 2
ELSE 3
END,
u.role = 'owner' DESC, u.role = 'admin' DESC,
COALESCE(u.last_seen_at, u.created_at) DESC,
u.display_name COLLATE NOCASE
"""
).fetchall()
# v0.16.0 — per-user accepted per-RFC invitations. One query
# over the full set, indexed bucket-by-user-id in Python so
# the per-row attachment below is O(1). Empty array for users
# who hold no accepted invitations.
invitation_rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT c.user_id, c.rfc_slug, c.role_in_rfc, c.created_at,
r.title AS rfc_title,
i.id AS invitation_id, i.invitee_email,
ui.gitea_login AS inviter_login,
ui.display_name AS inviter_display
FROM rfc_collaborators c
LEFT JOIN cached_rfcs r ON r.slug = c.rfc_slug
LEFT JOIN rfc_invitations i ON i.id = c.invitation_id
LEFT JOIN users ui ON ui.id = i.inviter_user_id
ORDER BY c.created_at DESC
"""
).fetchall()
per_user_invites: dict[int, list[dict]] = {}
for ir in invitation_rows:
per_user_invites.setdefault(ir["user_id"], []).append({
"rfc_slug": ir["rfc_slug"],
"rfc_title": ir["rfc_title"] or ir["rfc_slug"],
"role_in_rfc": ir["role_in_rfc"],
"invited_at": ir["created_at"],
"invitation_id": ir["invitation_id"],
"invitee_email": ir["invitee_email"],
"inviter_login": ir["inviter_login"],
"inviter_display": ir["inviter_display"],
})
# v0.17.0 / roadmap item #16: a user row whose `last_seen_at`
# is NULL is one of two things — a brand-new row that was just
# provisioned (rare, and the v0.7.0 OTC verify path stamps
# last_seen_at on the same call that creates the row), or an
# admin-created invite-pending row (v0.17.0 — created by
# `POST /api/admin/users`). We surface a `pending_invite_id`
# field by joining through `user_invite_tokens` so the
# Users tab can render a "(pending invite)" badge alongside
# the role/state controls. Filters to invites that are
# neither expired nor claimed — once the invitee clicks
# through, the badge clears (and `last_seen_at` populates).
pending_invite_rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT invited_user_id, id AS invite_id, expires_at
FROM user_invite_tokens
WHERE claimed_at IS NULL
AND datetime(expires_at) > datetime('now')
"""
).fetchall()
pending_invites = {
r["invited_user_id"]: {
"invite_id": r["invite_id"],
"expires_at": r["expires_at"],
}
for r in pending_invite_rows
}
return {
"items": [
{
"id": r["id"],
"gitea_login": r["gitea_login"],
"display_name": r["display_name"],
"email": r["email"] or "",
"role": r["role"],
"muted": bool(r["muted"]),
"created_at": r["created_at"],
"last_seen_at": r["last_seen_at"],
"permission_state": r["permission_state"] or "granted",
"first_name": r["first_name"] or "",
"last_name": r["last_name"] or "",
"beta_request_reason": r["beta_request_reason"] or "",
"permission_decided_at": r["permission_decided_at"],
"permission_decided_by_login": r["decided_by_login"],
"permission_decided_by_display": r["decided_by_display"],
# v0.16.0 additive — never null, always an array.
"rfc_invitations": per_user_invites.get(r["id"], []),
# v0.17.0: present iff the row is invited-but-not-
# claimed-yet. The frontend renders a "(pending
# invite)" badge when this is non-null.
"pending_invite": pending_invites.get(r["id"]),
}
for r in rows
]
}
# ----- Create user + invite (v0.17.0 / roadmap item #16) -----
@router.post("/api/admin/users")
async def create_user_with_invite(
body: CreateUserInviteBody, request: Request,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Provision a fresh `users` row with a pre-assigned role + send
an invite email carrying a claim link.
Refusals:
* `422` — the admin tries to invite their own email (no
self-invite; symmetric to `set_permission`'s self-flip
refusal and `set_role`'s self-downgrade refusal). Use
the existing role-change channel for self-edits.
* `422` — the admin tries to grant `owner` without being
owner themselves. §6.1: owner-zero is the only owner
bootstrap path; new owners come from a sitting owner's
hand. A 422 here matches the message shape; a 403 would
also be defensible, but staying with 422 keeps the
"your input is bad" framing.
* `409` — the email already maps to a `users` row. The
admin should use the existing role / grant gestures on
the existing user, not create a duplicate.
* `422` — pydantic-level: malformed email, role outside
the §6.1 set, custom_message over 500 chars.
On success:
1. The invitee `users` row lands with the chosen role and
`permission_state='granted'` (admin's hand is the grant)
and `last_seen_at IS NULL` (the "(pending invite)"
discriminator the listing surface joins through).
2. The `user_invite_tokens` row lands with the bcrypt-
hashed opaque token; the raw token rides only in the
email link.
3. The invite email dispatches with subject "You're
invited to <app> by <admin>" and the custom message
embedded in a clearly-delimited block if present.
4. A `permission_events` row records the admin-create
gesture so the §6.5 / `permissions` admin tab carries
the audit trail alongside the existing grant/revoke
flips.
"""
viewer = auth.require_admin(request)
email_clean = body.email.strip().lower()
if "@" not in email_clean or len(email_clean.split("@")[-1]) < 2:
raise HTTPException(422, "Email looks malformed")
# Self-invite refusal. Compare the admin's own email
# case-insensitively against the invite target.
viewer_row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT email FROM users WHERE id = ?", (viewer.user_id,)
).fetchone()
viewer_email = (viewer_row["email"] or "").strip().lower() if viewer_row else ""
if viewer_email and viewer_email == email_clean:
raise HTTPException(
422,
"You cannot invite yourself — use the role-change channel "
"if you need to edit your own row",
)
# Owner-grant refusal: §6.1 says only a sitting owner can mint
# a new owner. An admin trying to invite-as-owner is refused
# at 422; the admin should ask the owner to issue the invite,
# or invite as `admin` and let the owner promote later.
if body.role == "owner" and viewer.role != "owner":
raise HTTPException(
422,
"Only an owner can invite a new owner — invite as admin and "
"ask the owner to promote, or have the owner issue this invite",
)
# Duplicate-email refusal. A pre-existing row (regardless of
# permission_state) means the admin should use the existing
# role / grant gestures, not create a parallel user.
existing = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = ? COLLATE NOCASE LIMIT 1",
(email_clean,),
).fetchone()
if existing is not None:
raise HTTPException(409, "A user with this email already exists")
# Create the invitee row + token row + send the email.
outcome = invites.create_invite(
email=email_clean,
first_name=body.first_name,
last_name=body.last_name,
role=body.role,
custom_message=body.custom_message,
created_by_admin_id=viewer.user_id,
)
# Audit row in permission_events so the admin Permissions tab
# carries the gesture. The before-state is "n/a" (the row
# did not exist); the after-state is the granted role. We
# use a new `event_kind='user_invited'` so the existing
# grant/revoke kinds stay scoped to their flip surface.
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO permission_events
(actor_user_id, subject_user_id, event_kind, details)
VALUES (?, ?, 'user_invited', ?)
""",
(
viewer.user_id,
outcome.invited_user_id,
json.dumps({
"email": email_clean,
"role": body.role,
"invite_id": outcome.invite_id,
"custom_message_chars": len(body.custom_message or ""),
}),
),
)
# Build the claim URL using the same APP_URL the email module
# reads. The token rides as a query-string param to the
# frontend route `/invites/claim?token=…`; the frontend POSTs
# it back to `/api/invites/claim` which consumes the row.
cfg = EmailConfig.from_env()
from urllib.parse import urlencode
claim_url = f"{cfg.app_url}/invites/claim?{urlencode({'token': outcome.raw_token})}"
# Fetch the inviter display so the email body can render
# "Ben Stull (ben@example.com) has invited you to …". We
# read off the row fresh rather than trusting the session
# cookie's cached display_name.
inviter_row = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT display_name, email FROM users WHERE id = ?",
(viewer.user_id,),
).fetchone()
inviter_display = (
(inviter_row["display_name"] if inviter_row else "") or viewer.display_name or "An admin"
)
inviter_email_for_body = (inviter_row["email"] if inviter_row else "") or viewer.email or ""
email_invite.send_invite_email(
to_address=email_clean,
claim_url=claim_url,
inviter_display=inviter_display,
inviter_email=inviter_email_for_body,
custom_message=body.custom_message,
)
return {
"ok": True,
"invite_id": outcome.invite_id,
"invited_user_id": outcome.invited_user_id,
"email": email_clean,
"role": body.role,
}
@router.get("/api/admin/users/invites")
async def list_user_invites(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""List active (not claimed, not expired) admin-issued invites.
Powers the admin's "I sent these but they haven't been claimed
yet" view. The frontend uses this alongside `list_users` —
the user-listing's `pending_invite` field carries the per-row
flag; this endpoint carries the full invite shape for a
dedicated drill-in surface.
"""
auth.require_admin(request)
rows = invites.list_pending_invites()
# Join through to the admin display names so the surface can
# render "invited by @ben" without a second client call.
admin_ids = {r.created_by_admin_id for r in rows}
admin_lookup: dict[int, dict[str, str]] = {}
if admin_ids:
placeholders = ",".join("?" * len(admin_ids))
admin_rows = db.conn().execute(
f"SELECT id, gitea_login, display_name FROM users "
f"WHERE id IN ({placeholders})",
tuple(admin_ids),
).fetchall()
admin_lookup = {
ar["id"]: {
"gitea_login": ar["gitea_login"] or "",
"display_name": ar["display_name"] or "",
}
for ar in admin_rows
}
return {
"items": [
{
"id": r.id,
"email": r.email,
"role": r.role,
"first_name": r.first_name,
"last_name": r.last_name,
"custom_message": r.custom_message,
"created_at": r.created_at,
"expires_at": r.expires_at,
"invited_user_id": r.invited_user_id,
"created_by_admin_id": r.created_by_admin_id,
"created_by_login": admin_lookup.get(
r.created_by_admin_id, {}
).get("gitea_login", ""),
"created_by_display": admin_lookup.get(
r.created_by_admin_id, {}
).get("display_name", ""),
}
for r in rows
]
}
# ----- Role change (§6.1) -----
@router.post("/api/admin/users/{user_id}/role")
async def set_role(user_id: int, body: RoleBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_admin(request)
target = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id, role, gitea_login FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,)
).fetchone()
if target is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "User not found")
# §6.1: only an owner can grant `owner`, and only an owner can
# revoke an owner. Admins can flip contributor ↔ admin freely.
if body.role == "owner" and viewer.role != "owner":
raise HTTPException(403, "Only an owner can grant the owner role")
if target["role"] == "owner" and viewer.role != "owner":
raise HTTPException(403, "Only an owner can change an owner's role")
# An owner cannot demote themselves — that would orphan owner-zero
# if they are the only owner, and the role-change UI should not
# smuggle a "downgrade self" path through this endpoint.
if target["id"] == viewer.user_id and body.role != viewer.role:
raise HTTPException(403, "Use the explicit succession path to change your own role")
before = target["role"]
if before == body.role:
return {"ok": True, "role": body.role, "changed": False}
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE users SET role = ? WHERE id = ?", (body.role, user_id),
)
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO permission_events
(actor_user_id, subject_user_id, event_kind, details)
VALUES (?, ?, 'role_changed', ?)
""",
(
viewer.user_id,
user_id,
json.dumps({"before": before, "after": body.role}),
),
)
return {"ok": True, "role": body.role, "changed": True}
# ----- Permission state (§6.1, v0.9.0 roadmap item #7) -----
@router.post("/api/admin/users/{user_id}/permission")
async def set_permission(user_id: int, body: PermissionStateBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Flip a user's `permission_state` between pending/granted/revoked.
v0.8.0 wired the column shape but shipped no admin UI for it —
the grant gesture was a manual `UPDATE users` against the DB.
v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7) lands the admin user-management page;
this endpoint is its single write surface.
Audit shape: every flip writes a `permission_events` row with
event_kind in {'permission_granted', 'permission_revoked',
'permission_repended'} so §6.5's log carries the change. The
`permission_decided_by` / `permission_decided_at` columns on
the user row are co-stamped so the user listing can render
"granted by @ben at <date>" without a second join through
the audit table.
Refuses with 422 if the admin tries to flip their own row
(no self-grant / self-revoke; symmetric to set_mute's
self-mute refusal and set_role's self-downgrade refusal).
"""
viewer = auth.require_admin(request)
target = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id, role, permission_state FROM users WHERE id = ?",
(user_id,),
).fetchone()
if target is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "User not found")
if target["id"] == viewer.user_id:
raise HTTPException(422, "You cannot change your own permission state")
before = target["permission_state"] or "granted"
after = body.state
if before == after:
return {"ok": True, "permission_state": after, "changed": False}
db.conn().execute(
"""
UPDATE users
SET permission_state = ?,
permission_decided_by = ?,
permission_decided_at = datetime('now')
WHERE id = ?
""",
(after, viewer.user_id, user_id),
)
event_kind = {
"granted": "permission_granted",
"revoked": "permission_revoked",
"pending": "permission_repended",
}[after]
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO permission_events
(actor_user_id, subject_user_id, event_kind, details)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
""",
(
viewer.user_id,
user_id,
event_kind,
json.dumps({"before": before, "after": after}),
),
)
return {"ok": True, "permission_state": after, "changed": True}
# ----- Write-mute (§6.2) -----
@router.post("/api/admin/users/{user_id}/mute")
async def set_mute(user_id: int, body: MuteBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_admin(request)
target = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id, role, muted FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,)
).fetchone()
if target is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "User not found")
if target["id"] == viewer.user_id:
raise HTTPException(422, "You cannot write-mute yourself")
# §6.2 + §6.1: admins/owners are not write-mutable. The write-mute
# is a contributor-only refusal — an admin's authority is the
# role-change channel, not a mute.
if target["role"] in ("owner", "admin"):
raise HTTPException(
403,
"Owners and admins cannot be write-muted — change the role instead",
)
before = bool(target["muted"])
after = bool(body.muted)
if before == after:
return {"ok": True, "muted": after, "changed": False}
db.conn().execute(
"UPDATE users SET muted = ? WHERE id = ?", (1 if after else 0, user_id),
)
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO permission_events
(actor_user_id, subject_user_id, event_kind, details)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
""",
(
viewer.user_id,
user_id,
"muted" if after else "restored",
json.dumps({"before": before, "after": after}),
),
)
return {"ok": True, "muted": after, "changed": True}
# ----- Audit log (`actions` + `permission_events`) -----
@router.get("/api/admin/audit")
async def list_audit(
request: Request,
action_kind: str | None = None,
actor_user_id: int | None = None,
rfc_slug: str | None = None,
limit: int = Query(default=100, ge=1, le=500),
before_id: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
auth.require_admin(request)
clauses: list[str] = []
args: list[Any] = []
if action_kind:
clauses.append("a.action_kind = ?")
args.append(action_kind)
if actor_user_id is not None:
clauses.append("a.actor_user_id = ?")
args.append(actor_user_id)
if rfc_slug:
clauses.append("a.rfc_slug = ?")
args.append(rfc_slug)
if before_id is not None:
clauses.append("a.id < ?")
args.append(before_id)
where = ("WHERE " + " AND ".join(clauses)) if clauses else ""
rows = db.conn().execute(
f"""
SELECT a.id, a.actor_user_id, a.on_behalf_of, a.action_kind,
a.rfc_slug, a.branch_name, a.pr_number, a.bot_commit_sha,
a.details, a.created_at,
u.gitea_login AS actor_login, u.display_name AS actor_display
FROM actions a
LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = a.actor_user_id
{where}
ORDER BY a.id DESC
LIMIT ?
""",
(*args, limit),
).fetchall()
# The distinct-action-kinds list powers the filter chip in
# `Admin.jsx`; cheap to compute alongside the page since the
# action_kind set is bounded.
kinds = [
r["action_kind"]
for r in db.conn().execute(
"SELECT DISTINCT action_kind FROM actions ORDER BY action_kind"
)
]
return {
"items": [
{
"id": r["id"],
"action_kind": r["action_kind"],
"actor_user_id": r["actor_user_id"],
"actor_login": r["actor_login"],
"actor_display": r["actor_display"],
"on_behalf_of": r["on_behalf_of"],
"rfc_slug": r["rfc_slug"],
"branch_name": r["branch_name"],
"pr_number": r["pr_number"],
"bot_commit_sha": r["bot_commit_sha"],
"details": _safe_json(r["details"]),
"created_at": r["created_at"],
}
for r in rows
],
"action_kinds": kinds,
"has_more": len(rows) == limit,
}
@router.get("/api/admin/outbound-emails")
async def list_outbound_emails(
request: Request,
kind: str | None = None,
status: str | None = None,
to_address: str | None = None,
limit: int = Query(default=100, ge=1, le=500),
before_id: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""v0.18.0 Slice 4: read-only inspection of the
`outbound_emails` audit table.
Answers questions like "did this person ever get their
invite?" without grepping VM logs. Filterable by kind
('otc' | 'invite' | 'notification' | 'bundle' | 'digest'),
status ('sent' | 'failed' | 'deferred' | 'bounced'), and
to_address; the latter is exact-match because the audit
question is usually "the specific person who said they
didn't receive it." Per the proposal, no admin UI ships
with v0.18.0 — operator queries via curl + jq for now.
"""
auth.require_admin(request)
clauses: list[str] = []
args: list[Any] = []
if kind:
clauses.append("kind = ?")
args.append(kind)
if status:
clauses.append("status = ?")
args.append(status)
if to_address:
clauses.append("LOWER(to_address) = LOWER(?)")
args.append(to_address)
if before_id is not None:
clauses.append("id < ?")
args.append(before_id)
where = ("WHERE " + " AND ".join(clauses)) if clauses else ""
rows = db.conn().execute(
f"""
SELECT id, to_address, from_address, subject, kind, sent_at,
status, error, notification_id, message_id
FROM outbound_emails
{where}
ORDER BY id DESC
LIMIT ?
""",
(*args, limit),
).fetchall()
return {
"items": [
{
"id": r["id"],
"to_address": r["to_address"],
"from_address": r["from_address"],
"subject": r["subject"],
"kind": r["kind"],
"sent_at": r["sent_at"],
"status": r["status"],
"error": r["error"],
"notification_id": r["notification_id"],
"message_id": r["message_id"],
}
for r in rows
],
"has_more": len(rows) == limit,
}
@router.get("/api/admin/permission-events")
async def list_permission_events(
request: Request,
limit: int = Query(default=100, ge=1, le=500),
before_id: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
auth.require_admin(request)
clauses: list[str] = []
args: list[Any] = []
if before_id is not None:
clauses.append("p.id < ?")
args.append(before_id)
where = ("WHERE " + " AND ".join(clauses)) if clauses else ""
rows = db.conn().execute(
f"""
SELECT p.id, p.event_kind, p.details, p.created_at,
p.actor_user_id, p.subject_user_id,
au.gitea_login AS actor_login, au.display_name AS actor_display,
su.gitea_login AS subject_login, su.display_name AS subject_display
FROM permission_events p
LEFT JOIN users au ON au.id = p.actor_user_id
LEFT JOIN users su ON su.id = p.subject_user_id
{where}
ORDER BY p.id DESC
LIMIT ?
""",
(*args, limit),
).fetchall()
return {
"items": [
{
"id": r["id"],
"event_kind": r["event_kind"],
"actor_login": r["actor_login"],
"actor_display": r["actor_display"],
"subject_login": r["subject_login"],
"subject_display": r["subject_display"],
"details": _safe_json(r["details"]),
"created_at": r["created_at"],
}
for r in rows
],
"has_more": len(rows) == limit,
}
# ----- Graduation-readiness queue (§13.2) -----
@router.get("/api/admin/graduation-queue")
async def graduation_queue(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
auth.require_admin(request)
# §13 / §13.2: a super-draft is ready when (a) it has at least one
# owner claimed via §13.1 and (b) it has zero open meta_body_edit
# PRs. We compute both with one pass, returning the ready set and
# the not-yet-ready set so the admin sees what is gating each.
rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT slug, title, owners_json, arbiters_json, tags_json,
proposed_at, last_entry_commit_at
FROM cached_rfcs
WHERE state = 'super-draft'
ORDER BY COALESCE(last_entry_commit_at, proposed_at) DESC
"""
).fetchall()
items_ready: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
items_blocked: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for r in rows:
owners = json.loads(r["owners_json"] or "[]")
blocking = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM cached_prs
WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND state = 'open' AND pr_kind = 'meta_body_edit'
""",
(r["slug"],),
).fetchone()["n"]
payload = {
"slug": r["slug"],
"title": r["title"],
"owners": owners,
"tags": json.loads(r["tags_json"] or "[]"),
"proposed_at": r["proposed_at"],
"last_entry_commit_at": r["last_entry_commit_at"],
"blocking_prs": blocking,
"owners_set": len(owners) > 0,
}
if payload["owners_set"] and blocking == 0:
items_ready.append(payload)
else:
items_blocked.append(payload)
return {"ready": items_ready, "blocked": items_blocked}
# ----- §13.7: retired (soft-deleted) entries — site owners only -----
@router.get("/api/admin/retired-rfcs")
async def retired_rfcs(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
# Retired entries are hidden from every browsing surface (§13.7);
# this owner-gated list is how a site owner discovers them to
# un-retire. Admins do not get this surface — un-retire authority is
# site-owner-only, so neither is the list that feeds it.
viewer = auth.require_admin(request)
if viewer.role != "owner":
raise HTTPException(403, "Site owner role required")
rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT slug, title, rfc_id, owners_json, tags_json,
proposed_at, updated_at
FROM cached_rfcs
WHERE state = 'retired'
ORDER BY updated_at DESC
"""
).fetchall()
items = []
for r in rows:
# The state it would return to on un-retire, mirroring
# api_graduation._prior_state_before_retire's audit lookup.
prior = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT details FROM actions
WHERE rfc_slug = ? AND action_kind = 'retire'
ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1
""",
(r["slug"],),
).fetchone()
restored_state = None
if prior and prior["details"]:
try:
restored_state = json.loads(prior["details"]).get("prior_state")
except (ValueError, TypeError):
restored_state = None
if restored_state not in ("super-draft", "active"):
restored_state = "active" if r["rfc_id"] else "super-draft"
items.append({
"slug": r["slug"],
"title": r["title"],
"id": r["rfc_id"],
"owners": json.loads(r["owners_json"] or "[]"),
"tags": json.loads(r["tags_json"] or "[]"),
"retired_at": r["updated_at"],
"restores_to": restored_state,
})
return {"items": items}
# ----- User search (typeahead for §15.8 mute add) -----
@router.get("/api/users/search")
async def search_users(
request: Request, q: str = Query(default="", min_length=0, max_length=80),
) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_user(request)
needle = q.strip().lower()
# An empty query returns recent users; a non-empty query matches
# against gitea_login and display_name with a prefix-first
# ranking so the typeahead surfaces obvious matches early.
if not needle:
rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT id, gitea_login, display_name, role
FROM users WHERE id != ?
ORDER BY last_seen_at DESC LIMIT 10
""",
(viewer.user_id,),
).fetchall()
else:
like = f"%{needle}%"
prefix = f"{needle}%"
rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT id, gitea_login, display_name, role
FROM users
WHERE id != ?
AND (LOWER(gitea_login) LIKE ? OR LOWER(display_name) LIKE ?)
ORDER BY
CASE WHEN LOWER(gitea_login) LIKE ? THEN 0 ELSE 1 END,
LOWER(gitea_login)
LIMIT 10
""",
(viewer.user_id, like, like, prefix),
).fetchall()
return {
"items": [
{
"id": r["id"],
"gitea_login": r["gitea_login"],
"display_name": r["display_name"],
"role": r["role"],
}
for r in rows
]
}
# ----- Private-beta allowlist (`migrations/011_allowlist.sql`) -----
@router.get("/api/admin/allowlist")
async def list_allowlist(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
auth.require_admin(request)
rows = db.conn().execute(
"""
SELECT a.email, a.note, a.created_at,
u.gitea_login AS added_by_login,
u.display_name AS added_by_display
FROM allowed_emails a
LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = a.added_by_user_id
ORDER BY a.created_at DESC
"""
).fetchall()
return {
"active": len(rows) > 0,
"items": [
{
"email": r["email"],
"note": r["note"] or "",
"added_by_login": r["added_by_login"],
"added_by_display": r["added_by_display"],
"created_at": r["created_at"],
}
for r in rows
],
}
@router.post("/api/admin/allowlist")
async def add_allowlist(body: AllowlistAddBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_admin(request)
email = body.email.strip()
if "@" not in email or len(email.split("@")[-1]) < 2:
raise HTTPException(422, "Email looks malformed")
existing = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT 1 FROM allowed_emails WHERE email = ? LIMIT 1", (email,)
).fetchone()
if existing is not None:
raise HTTPException(409, "Email already on the allowlist")
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO allowed_emails (email, added_by_user_id, note)
VALUES (?, ?, ?)
""",
(email, viewer.user_id, body.note),
)
# Audit trail: when the email already maps to a known user, emit a
# permission_events row so §6.5's log stays the single place to
# look for "who let this person in." For brand-new emails the
# allowed_emails row itself carries (added_by_user_id, created_at)
# which is sufficient until the user actually signs in.
subject = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = ? COLLATE NOCASE LIMIT 1", (email,)
).fetchone()
if subject is not None:
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO permission_events
(actor_user_id, subject_user_id, event_kind, details)
VALUES (?, ?, 'allowlist_added', ?)
""",
(
viewer.user_id,
subject["id"],
json.dumps({"email": email, "note": body.note or ""}),
),
)
return {"ok": True, "email": email}
@router.delete("/api/admin/allowlist/{email}")
async def remove_allowlist(email: str, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
viewer = auth.require_admin(request)
existing = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT 1 FROM allowed_emails WHERE email = ? LIMIT 1", (email,)
).fetchone()
if existing is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "Email not on the allowlist")
db.conn().execute("DELETE FROM allowed_emails WHERE email = ?", (email,))
subject = db.conn().execute(
"SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = ? COLLATE NOCASE LIMIT 1", (email,)
).fetchone()
if subject is not None:
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO permission_events
(actor_user_id, subject_user_id, event_kind, details)
VALUES (?, ?, 'allowlist_removed', ?)
""",
(
viewer.user_id,
subject["id"],
json.dumps({"email": email}),
),
)
return {"ok": True, "email": email}
return router
def _safe_json(blob: str | None) -> Any:
if not blob:
return None
try:
return json.loads(blob)
except Exception:
return blob