# Changelog The binding policy for what each kind of version bump means and what the changelog has to carry is in [`SPEC.md` §20](./SPEC.md). The practical recipe downstream deployments follow when reading this file is in [`docs/DEPLOYMENTS.md`](./docs/DEPLOYMENTS.md). The canonical version is the `VERSION` file at the repo root; `frontend/package.json#version` mirrors it. Deployments pin to a specific framework version in their own `.rfc-app-version` file (per §20.5). While the framework is pre-1.0, minor-version bumps may introduce breaking changes; the entry below each such bump documents the upgrade steps a deployment must apply. Upgrade-steps blocks use the [RFC 2119](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119) / [RFC 8174](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174) normative- language convention per `SPEC.md` §20.4. **MUST** / **SHALL** steps are required; **SHOULD** steps are recommended (the framework's default and tested path); **MAY** steps are optional. Upgrades that skip versions are the composition of each intervening adjacent release's steps in order — no A-to-B path is pre-computed beyond that. ## 0.13.0 — 2026-05-28 **Minor — schema migration required; new optional env vars.** This release ships the cookie / privacy consent surface (roadmap item #11, SPEC §14.5 / §14.6). Every viewer — authenticated and anonymous alike — now sees a non-modal bottom-of-page banner on first visit asking which categories of cookies they allow (essential / essential + analytics / essential + analytics + other). The choice persists in `localStorage` for anonymous viewers and in a new `cookie_consent` table for authenticated viewers, with server-side overriding local on sign-in. The framework also ships default `/privacy` and `/cookies` policy pages that deployments can layer their own policy URL on top of via two new optional env vars. No analytics SDK ships in this release — the consent infrastructure is wired so item #13 (v0.15.0) can read from `frontend/src/lib/consent.js` when the SDK lands. ### Added - **Cookie consent banner** (`frontend/src/components/CookieConsentBanner.jsx`). Non-modal, bottom of viewport. Three single-select choices with inline descriptions. Visible until the user makes a choice; hides thereafter. Reachable for revision via the settings surface. - **Consent helper** (`frontend/src/lib/consent.js`). Exports `getConsent()`, `hasChosen()`, `onConsentChange(cb)`, `setConsent()`, `hydrateFromServer()`, `clearLocal()`. Cross-tab sync via the `storage` event. Item #13's analytics SDK reads consent here before importing. - **Privacy and cookies policy pages** (`frontend/src/pages/Privacy.jsx`, `frontend/src/pages/Cookies.jsx`). Default minimal policies that describe the framework's stance and list the cookies the framework sets. Deployments override via the two new env vars below; the framework's stub always renders above the link so the framework-level contract stays visible. - **"Privacy & cookies" tab** in `/settings/notifications` showing the current consent choice, the recorded-at stamp, and a "Change" button that re-opens the banner via a custom DOM event. - **`§17` endpoints** — - `GET /api/users/me/cookie-consent` — read the current consent record. - `PUT /api/users/me/cookie-consent` — write a new consent record. Upserts a single row per user, stamps `recorded_at` to now, accepts `essential` for symmetry but always persists it as true. - **Schema migration** `013_cookie_consent.sql` — new `cookie_consent` table keyed by `user_id`, three flags (`essential`, `analytics`, `other_cookies`), and `recorded_at`. (Renumbered from `012_*` during driver integration because v0.7.0 also added a `012_otc.sql` migration that landed in the integration order before this one.) - **SPEC `§14.5` Cookie / privacy consent** — settles the banner shape, the three-category single-select, the storage shape (local for anon, server row for authenticated), the precedence rule on sign-in, and the `consent.js` helper surface for downstream callers including item #13. - **SPEC `§14.6` Privacy and cookies policy pages** — settles the `/privacy` and `/cookies` routes, the framework's stub content, and the `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` / `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL` override shape. - **SPEC `§5`** — names the `cookie_consent` table in the canonical app-tables list. - **SPEC `§17`** — lists the two new cookie-consent endpoints. - **SPEC `§19.2`** — surfaces four candidates: policy content via content-repo file vs env var, GPC / DNT headers, multi-language consent text, and the item #13 analytics-SDK gating dependency. ### Changed - **`frontend/.env.example`** — documents the two new optional env vars `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` and `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL`. Unset is supported; defaults render the framework's stub. - **`backend/app/api_notifications.py`** — module docstring grew two endpoint lines; the new endpoints sit alongside the existing `/api/users/me/*` neighbors. - **`frontend/src/App.jsx`** — registers `/privacy` and `/cookies` routes (anonymous-reachable), wires `` into the global chrome, and listens for a `rfc-app:cookie-consent-reopen` custom event to re-open the banner from the settings surface. ### Upgrade steps (from 0.7.0) - You **MUST** rebuild the frontend and restart the backend after upgrading. `frontend/package.json#version` and `VERSION` both move to `0.13.0` and the build embeds the new env-var contract. - You **MUST** apply schema migration `013_cookie_consent.sql`. The migration creates a single new table keyed by `user_id` with three flag columns and a `recorded_at` stamp. The framework runs migrations automatically at process start; no manual step is required beyond restarting the backend so the migration runner picks the file up. - You **MAY** set `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` to an http(s) URL that points at your deployment's full privacy policy. The framework's `/privacy` page renders its built-in stub above a link to the configured URL. Unset is supported — the stub is sufficient for a default-config deployment. - You **MAY** set `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL` to an http(s) URL that points at your deployment's full cookies policy. Same shape as the privacy URL. - You **MAY** announce the new consent banner to your users. Existing authenticated users will see the banner on their next visit (because their `cookie_consent` row does not yet exist); their current sessions remain valid. ## 0.10.0 — 2026-05-28 **Minor — schema migration required; new auth path is additive.** This release lands user-set passcodes after OTC (roadmap item #8, SPEC §6.2). After a successful one-time-code sign-in, the user can set a passcode (4–20 characters) and use email + passcode for subsequent sign-ins. OTC remains the structural fallback: a forgotten passcode is recovered by requesting a fresh code, and five consecutive failed passcode verifies lock the passcode path for 15 minutes (HTTP 423) while leaving the OTC path open. The `/login` surface now consults a new `GET /auth/passcode/check` endpoint after the email step to decide whether to render a passcode input or an OTC code input; an "Use a code instead" link on the passcode step lets the user fall back to OTC manually. The `/settings/notifications` page grew a new "Sign-in" tab where the user can set, change, or remove their passcode. ### Upgrade steps (from 0.8.0) 1. **MUST** restart the backend so migration `015_passcode.sql` runs. The migration adds four nullable columns to the `users` table: `passcode_hash`, `passcode_set_at`, `passcode_failed_attempts` (default 0), `passcode_locked_until`. Existing rows pass through with `passcode_hash = NULL`, which the runtime treats as "no passcode set" — every existing user continues to sign in via OTC unchanged, and can opt into a passcode from the new settings tab at any time. 2. **MUST** rebuild the frontend so the v0.10.0 `/login` flow and the new settings tab ship. `frontend/package.json#version` and `VERSION` both move to `0.10.0`. 3. **SHOULD** announce the new sign-in option to users. Wording suggestion: "You can now set a passcode for faster sign-in. We'll keep emailing one-time codes as a fallback — if you forget your passcode, just request a code as usual." 4. **MAY** leave the §6.2 default lockout shape (5 attempts, 15-minute window) unchanged. v0.10.0 does not expose env tunables for these; raising or lowering them lives in §19.2 as a candidate. ### Added - **`POST /auth/passcode/set`** — authenticated. Body `{passcode}`. Validates length (4–20) and refuses obvious patterns from a small denylist (`0000`, `1234`, `aaaa`, `password`, etc.). bcrypt-hashes the passcode and writes `users.passcode_hash` plus `users.passcode_set_at`. Clears any active lockout and the failure counter (a user setting a fresh passcode is implicitly re-authenticating). Replaces any prior passcode. - **`DELETE /auth/passcode`** — authenticated. Clears the passcode hash and the set-at stamp; the user is back to OTC-only. - **`POST /auth/passcode/verify`** — unauthenticated. Body `{email, passcode}`. Returns HTTP 200 + minimal user payload on success; HTTP 423 with `locked_until` when the account is in the lockout window; HTTP 400 for every other failure (the wrong-passcode and unknown-email modes both collapse to 400 so the response does not enumerate account state). - **`GET /auth/passcode/check`** — unauthenticated. Query param `email`. Returns `{has_passcode: boolean}`. The Login.jsx flow consults this after the email step to decide whether to render a passcode input or fall back to OTC. The response carries only the boolean; lockout state, the hash, and the `passcode_set_at` stamp are not leaked. An unknown email and a known-without- passcode email both return `false`, so the endpoint is account-enumeration-safe. - **Schema migration** `015_passcode.sql` — four ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN statements on the `users` table: - `passcode_hash TEXT` (nullable) — the bcrypt hash. NULL means "no passcode set". - `passcode_set_at TEXT` (nullable) — ISO-8601 timestamp. - `passcode_failed_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0` — consecutive failure counter since last success. - `passcode_locked_until TEXT` (nullable) — lockout window expiry; verify refuses with HTTP 423 while populated and in the future. - **`backend/app/passcode.py`** — the passcode state machine: validation (length + denylist), bcrypt hashing, set/clear, status check, and the verify path with lockout management. - **`frontend/src/components/Login.jsx`** — extended to a five-step surface: email → passcode-or-code → optional post-OTC passcode-offer → optional set-passcode. The "Use a code instead" link on the passcode step re-dispatches an OTC and switches to the code step. A 423 from passcode verify auto-falls back to OTC with a visible status message. - **"Sign-in" tab** in `/settings/notifications` — shows passcode-set status, the recorded `passcode_set_at` stamp when set, and Set / Change / Remove buttons. Mirrors the §14.5 "Privacy & cookies" tab pattern. - **SPEC `§6` / `§14.1` / `§17` / `§19.2`** corrections per §19.3 rule 2: - §6 names the three current auth paths (OTC, passcode-with-OTC- fallback, OAuth-fallback-during-migration). - §14.1 documents the stepped `/login` surface and the passcode check endpoint. - §17 lists the four new `/auth/passcode/*` endpoints. - §19.2 surfaces four new candidates (passcode policy tunables via env, per-IP rate-limit on `/auth/passcode/verify`, passcode-change "old passcode" challenge, passkey/WebAuthn); the "device-trust 30d" entry's passcode cross-ref is updated; the "first-OTC profile capture" entry's roadmap cross-ref is updated. ### Changed - **`backend/app/main.py`** — registers the four new `/auth/passcode/*` routes on the existing oauth router, alongside the v0.7.0 `/auth/otc/*` routes. - **`backend/app/api.py`** — `/api/auth/me` payload now includes `has_passcode` (boolean) and `passcode_set_at` (string or null) so the settings surface can render the Set / Change / Remove affordances without a second round trip. - **`frontend/src/api.js`** — adds `checkPasscode`, `verifyPasscode`, `setPasscode`, `clearPasscode` helpers, neighboring the v0.7.0 `requestOtc` / `verifyOtc` block. - **`frontend/src/components/NotificationSettings.jsx`** — adds the `SignInSection` component between `MutesSection` and `PrivacyCookiesSection`. ### Tests - **`backend/tests/test_passcode_vertical.py`** — 17 new tests cover: set requires session; check returns false for unknown and for set-less users; check returns true after set without leaking other fields; happy-path OTC → set → verify roundtrip; wrong passcode increments the counter without locking; five consecutive failures lock with 423 and persist `passcode_locked_until`; lockout expires and the next attempt clears the counter; the OTC path is unaffected by passcode lockout; clear wipes the hash and set-at; setting a new passcode replaces the prior one and resets the lockout; `passcode_set_at` updates on every set; validation refuses too-short passcodes and denylist patterns; `/api/auth/me` carries `has_passcode` and `passcode_set_at` correctly. ### Environment variables None new. The existing `SECRET_KEY` continues to sign session cookies; passcode hashing reuses the bcrypt dependency added in v0.7.0. The lockout shape (5 attempts, 15 minutes) and the length range (4–20) are hard-coded in `backend/app/passcode.py`. See §19.2 for the env-tunable candidate. ## 0.8.0 — 2026-05-28 **Minor — schema migration required; admission semantics shift.** This release replaces the v0.3.0 / v0.7.0 `allowed_emails` admission gate with an admin-grant flow (roadmap item #6, SPEC §6.1 / §6.2 / §14.1 / §17). Anyone with a valid email can sign in via the v0.7.0 OTC flow; the OTC request endpoint no longer consults the allowlist. A fresh user lands in `permission_state='pending'` until an admin grants access. The first-OTC sign-in captures first name, last name, and a free-text "why I should be included in the beta" via a new `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request` endpoint; the captured fields populate the same `users` row alongside the OAuth-era columns. A pending user has the same read access an anonymous viewer has — the catalog, RFC bodies, the philosophy page, and every public conversation are reachable. Every write-shaped endpoint (`auth.require_contributor` floor) refuses pending users with 403. The frontend renders a thin "Your beta access request is in review" banner on every page and re-purposes the v0.3.0 `/beta-pending` page as the post-capture landing surface. Grandfathered behavior: every `users` row at migration time carries `permission_state='granted'` via the column default, so existing contributors are unaffected. The OAuth fallback at `/auth/callback` still consults the v0.3.0 allowlist (legacy path); the OTC flow does not. The `allowed_emails` table stays in the schema as a fast-path bypass — the v0.3.0 admin UI continues to manage it, but the OTC request handler no longer reads it. v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7) is expected to ship the admin user-management page that replaces the allowlist surface entirely; until then, admin grants are done by direct DB `UPDATE`. ### Upgrade steps (from 0.13.0) 1. **MUST** restart the backend so migration `014_beta_access.sql` runs. The migration adds `permission_state` (default `'granted'`, so existing rows pass through unaffected), `first_name`, `last_name`, `beta_request_reason`, `permission_decided_by`, and `permission_decided_at` to the `users` table, plus an index on `permission_state` for the pending queue. The migration is ALTER-TABLE-based (no table rebuild) — every foreign key and existing row passes through untouched. 2. **MUST** rebuild the frontend. The `Login.jsx` surface now runs a conditional third step (the capture form) on fresh OTC sign-ins; `BetaPending.jsx` carries the new "your request is in review" copy; `App.jsx` renders a thin pending-access banner. The build embeds the new `/api/auth/me/beta-request` client call. 3. **SHOULD** announce the new admission flow to existing users. Wording suggestion: "We've replaced our email-allowlist gate with an admin-review flow. Existing users are unaffected; new visitors sign in with their email, tell us a bit about themselves, and an admin reviews their request before discussion and contribution unlock." Existing sessions remain valid. 4. **SHOULD** plan the admin grant mechanism. v0.8.0 does not ship a UI for the grant — v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7) will. For the v0.8.0 window, an admin grants access via direct DB gesture: ```sql UPDATE users SET permission_state = 'granted', permission_decided_by = , permission_decided_at = datetime('now') WHERE email = ''; ``` The pending queue lives in `SELECT * FROM users WHERE permission_state = 'pending' ORDER BY created_at`. 5. **MUST** decide whether to drain the `allowed_emails` table. The OTC request handler no longer consults it; populated rows are inert at the request surface. Three operator choices, all valid: * **Leave as-is** (the framework's default behavior — the v0.3.0 admin UI continues to work, the rows stay as a fast-path bypass record). Recommended if you anticipate v0.9.0's user-management page folding the allowlist UI into its surface. * **Drain via the existing admin UI** (`/admin/allowlist`) — one row at a time, no data loss elsewhere. * **Bulk-drain via DB** — `DELETE FROM allowed_emails;` drops every row; the table stays. 6. **MAY** announce write access individually to grandfathered users you want to keep at `'granted'`. The default-`'granted'` migration means no action is required for them; this step exists only if you want to send a "you're still in" message. ### Added - **`backend/migrations/014_beta_access.sql`** — adds `permission_state` (CHECK in `('pending', 'granted', 'revoked')`, default `'granted'`), `first_name`, `last_name`, `beta_request_reason`, `permission_decided_by` (FK to users, ON DELETE SET NULL), `permission_decided_at` to the `users` table. Plus `idx_users_permission_state` for the pending queue. - **`POST /api/auth/me/beta-request`** — body `{first_name, last_name, beta_request_reason}` (all required; bounds 120 / 120 / 4000). Writes the fields to the signed-in user's row and leaves `permission_state='pending'`. Refuses HTTP 409 for already-granted / revoked users; refuses HTTP 401 for anonymous callers. - **`needs_profile` flag** on the `/auth/otc/verify` response. `true` iff the user is `permission_state='pending'` AND carries no profile fields yet (a fresh OTC sign-in). The Login.jsx surface uses the flag to gate the capture step. - **`permission_state` field** on the `/api/auth/me` response, plus `first_name`, `last_name`, `beta_request_reason`, and the same `needs_profile` flag. - **First-OTC profile capture step** in `Login.jsx`. Third step in the sign-in surface, gated by the verify response's `needs_profile` flag. - **`/beta-pending` repurpose** in `BetaPending.jsx`. The page now reads as "your request is in review" when the viewer is pending; the v0.3.0 "private beta" framing remains as the anonymous-viewer fallback. - **Thin pending-access banner** at the top of every page for `permission_state='pending'` viewers (other than `/beta-pending` itself). - **SPEC `§6` opening / `§6.1` / `§6.2` / `§14.1` / `§17` / `§19.2`** corrections per §19.3 rule-2 — the admission shift, the orthogonality of permission_state vs role / muted / notification-mutes, the new endpoints, and the newly-surfaced §19.2 candidates (admin user-management page, allowlist deprecation, admin notification on new request). - **`backend/tests/test_beta_access_vertical.py`** — 9 new tests covering: a fresh OTC user lands pending with empty profile; the capture endpoint populates the fields and keeps state pending; the capture endpoint refuses anonymous / granted / revoked callers; a pending user is refused write endpoints; an admin grant promotes pending → granted; a grandfathered user is unaffected by the migration; the OTC request endpoint accepts any email regardless of allowlist state; the `allowed_emails` table is still present in the schema. ### Changed - **`backend/app/auth.py#require_contributor`** widens its gate to refuse `permission_state != 'granted'` with HTTP 403. The §6.1 contributor capabilities (propose, branch, PR, chat, claim) all funnel through this dependency, so the widening covers them transitively. `SessionUser` now carries `permission_state` (default `'granted'` for the dataclass-default fallback path). - **`backend/app/otc.py#request_code`** drops the allowlist check from the OTC request flow. The `RequestOutcome` shape loses the `'allowlist'` reason (replaced by `'sent'` / `'cooldown'` / `'invalid'`). - **`backend/app/otc.py#provision_or_link_user`** sets `permission_state='pending'` explicitly on a fresh row. Grandfathered (link-by-email) users pass through with their existing column value. - **`backend/app/auth.py#provision_user`** (OAuth fallback) now sets `permission_state='granted'` explicitly on a fresh row. The OAuth callback still consults the `is_allowed_sign_in` allowlist check (the legacy fallback path retains its v0.3.0 admission shape during the OAuth migration window). - **`backend/tests/test_otc_vertical.py`** — the `test_otc_request_silently_drops_when_email_not_on_allowlist` test (asserted the v0.7.0 allowlist gate) is replaced by `test_otc_request_admits_emails_regardless_of_allowlist_population` which asserts the v0.8.0 open-request contract. The on-list test stays as a regression net for the rate-limit / outbound-buffer plumbing. - **`SPEC.md`** §6 opening, §6.1, §6.2, §14.1, §17, §19.2 per §19.3 rule-2. - **`VERSION`** → `0.8.0`. `frontend/package.json#version` and the lockfile mirror. ### Deferred to later releases - **Admin user-management page** at `/admin/users` (item #7, v0.9.0) — replaces the manual DB `UPDATE` gesture. - **Allowlist UI deprecation** (also v0.9.0) — once the admin user-management page lands, the `/admin/allowlist` surface and the `allowed_emails` table both retire. - **Admin email notification on new beta request** (item #7 again, v0.9.0). - **Revoke gesture in the UI** — the `permission_state='revoked'` state is wired in the schema and the auth gate; v0.9.0 ships the admin UI that flips the column. ## 0.7.0 — 2026-05-28 **Minor — schema migration required; new auth path is additive.** This release lands email + one-time-code sign-in (roadmap item #5, SPEC §6.2) as the primary human-auth gesture. Users sign in by typing their email, receiving a six-digit code via email, and entering it. The Gitea OAuth callback (`/auth/callback`) remains functional during migration — the new UI no longer points at it primarily, but a "Sign in with Gitea (fallback)" link survives on the new login surface so users with active OAuth sessions or older invite paths still have a way in. A future release retires the OAuth path entirely once every active user has signed in at least once via OTC. The migration path for existing users: first OTC sign-in matches by `users.email` (case-insensitive) to the OAuth-era row and reuses that row's `id` and `gitea_id`. New users provisioned via OTC carry `gitea_id = NULL` and `gitea_login = NULL`. The `gitea_id` linker remains the canonical handle for grandfathered users; `email` becomes the identity key for everything provisioned after v0.7.0. The Gitea **bot** user + token are still required (server-side git operations — repo reads, PR creation — still flow through it). Only the operator-facing sign-in surface moves. ### Upgrade steps (from 0.6.0) 1. **MUST** restart the backend so migration `012_otc.sql` runs. The migration rebuilds the `users` table (SQLite cannot ALTER COLUMN); existing rows pass through unchanged, but the new schema relaxes `gitea_id` / `gitea_login` to nullable (with partial unique indexes that ignore NULL) and adds a partial unique index on `email`. A new `otc_codes` table is created. 2. **MUST** confirm the SMTP overlay is set (`SMTP_HOST`, `SMTP_PORT`, `SMTP_USER`, `SMTP_PASSWORD`, `SMTP_STARTTLS`, `EMAIL_FROM`, `EMAIL_FROM_NAME`). The OHM overlay already carries these as of v0.5.0; deployments without them fall back to logging the code to stdout (dev-only path — production visitors will not receive their codes). 3. **SHOULD** announce the new email-based sign-in to existing users. Wording suggestion: "You can now sign in by entering your email and a one-time code we'll send you. Your old account is linked automatically the first time you sign in." 4. **MAY** keep the existing OAuth callback as a fallback path. The new login UI surfaces a small "Sign in with Gitea (fallback)" link beneath the primary email/code form; a deployment that prefers to hide it can override the Login component in a future framework release that exposes the link behind a feature flag. For v0.7.0, the link is hard-coded. ### New environment variables (all optional with defaults) - `OTC_TTL_MINUTES` (default `10`) — how long a one-time code is valid after issuance. Re-requesting invalidates the prior code immediately regardless of TTL. - `OTC_REQUEST_COOLDOWN_SECONDS` (default `60`) — per-email cooldown between successive `/auth/otc/request` calls. The endpoint returns HTTP 429 when the cooldown blocks a request (the loud-failure shape; the abuse path is visible rather than swallowed). No new secrets are required. The existing `SECRET_KEY` continues to sign session cookies; OTC codes are bcrypt-hashed at rest using a per-row salt the library generates. ### Added - **`POST /auth/otc/request`** — body `{email}`. Generates a six-digit code, stores its bcrypt hash with an expiry, and dispatches a plain text email via the existing SMTP layer. Returns HTTP 200 (`{ok:true}`) uniformly so allowlist state is not leaked. Returns HTTP 429 when the per-email cooldown blocks the request. - **`POST /auth/otc/verify`** — body `{email, code}`. Validates the bcrypt hash against the most-recent unconsumed non-expired row, marks the row consumed, provisions or links the `users` row by email, and stores the session cookie. Returns HTTP 200 on success, HTTP 400 on any failure (expired, consumed, wrong, unknown). - **`backend/migrations/012_otc.sql`** — creates `otc_codes` and rebuilds `users` with nullable `gitea_id` / `gitea_login` plus a partial unique index on `email`. - **`backend/app/otc.py`** — the OTC request/verify state machine and the `provision_or_link_user` linker. - **`backend/app/email_otc.py`** — outbound OTC mail composition. Reuses the SMTP plumbing from `email.py` (`EmailConfig.from_env()`) and the test buffer (`_SENT`) but writes its own envelope (no unsubscribe footer, no quiet-hours hold — OTC mail carries a credential and ignores notification preferences). - **`frontend/src/components/Login.jsx`** — two-step sign-in surface at `/login`. Step 1: enter email → request code. Step 2: enter six-digit code → verify. Cmd/Ctrl+Enter on the code field submits. The previous header "Sign in" link and the `Welcome` component's inline link now route to `/login` instead of jumping straight to the Gitea OAuth dance. - **SPEC `§6.1` / `§6.2` / `§14.1` / `§17` / `§19.2`** corrections per §19.3 rule-2 — see below. - **`backend/tests/test_otc_vertical.py`** — 11 new tests covering the happy path, expired/consumed/wrong codes, the per-email rate limit (and its per-email isolation), the allowlist gate, the migration link to OAuth-era users, fresh provisioning, and the prior-code-invalidation behavior on re-request. ### Changed - **`backend/app/auth.py#current_user`** — coerces NULL `gitea_id` and NULL `gitea_login` to `0` / `""` so the `SessionUser` shape stays stable for OTC-only users. The DB remains the source of truth for "is this user OAuth-linked" (`gitea_id IS NOT NULL`). - **`backend/requirements.txt`** — adds `bcrypt>=4.2` for OTC code hashing. Pure-Python wheels are available on every platform the deployment matrix targets; `pip install -r backend/requirements.txt` picks it up. - **`frontend/src/App.jsx`** — adds the `/login` route and replaces the header "Sign in" `` with ``. The `Welcome` component's inline sign-in link follows suit. - **`frontend/src/components/Landing.jsx`** — the `/welcome` page's primary action moves from "Sign in with Gitea" to "Sign in" pointing at `/login`. ### Deferred to later releases Per the v0.7.0 scope discipline (the foundation for items #6, #8, #9, #10), several adjacent capabilities are intentionally not in this release and surface as §19.2 candidates: - **First-OTC profile capture** (first name, last name, "why") — item #6, expected v0.8.0. - **Open beta-access request flow** replacing the allowlist gate — also item #6, v0.8.0. - **Passcodes** (a long-term reauth token alternative) — item #8, expected v0.10.0. - **Device-trust 30-day skip** — item #9, expected v0.11.0. - **Cloudflare Turnstile** on `/auth/otc/request` — item #10, expected v0.12.0. - **Removing the Gitea OAuth `/auth/callback` route entirely** — a later release after every active user has signed in via OTC. ## 0.6.0 — 2026-05-28 **Minor — no operator action required.** A sweep-the-edges hardening release (roadmap item #4, "anon discuss + contribute off-limits") that audits every write-shaped backend endpoint and asserts each one enforces an explicit `auth.require_contributor` (or stricter) gate before doing any state-changing work. v0.3.0 hid write affordances behind a sign-in CTA on the frontend; v0.5.0 added the PR-less discussion surface with its own write gate; v0.6.0 sweeps the rest and adds a regression test net so future endpoints can't quietly ship without a gate. No schema migration, no env-var changes, no new dependencies. The only behavioural change is one tightening: the `GET /api/rfcs//graduate/progress` SSE now requires `auth.require_user` since it surfaces operator-visible step detail (repo name, PR number, rollback steps) not part of the v0.3.0 anonymous-read contract for catalog/RFC bodies. ### Changed - **`backend/app/api_graduation.py`** — `GET /graduate/progress` now calls `auth.require_user(request)` as its first line. Anonymous callers receive 401 instead of being able to subscribe to a graduation's SSE. The floor is `require_user` (not `require_contributor`) so a write-muted operator can still observe the progress of a graduation they kicked off before being muted. - **SPEC `§6.1`** (`SPEC.md`) — the Anonymous role's bullet now documents the v0.6.0 audit: every write-shaped endpoint in §17 enforces an explicit gate; anonymous writes refuse 401. The list of audited write families is recorded in-line. - **SPEC `§10.10`** — the discussion-vs-contribution section now records that the v0.5.0 write gates have a regression test net (`test_anon_offlimits_vertical.py`) added in v0.6.0. - **SPEC `§17`** — the `GET /api/rfcs//graduate/progress` bullet now documents the `require_user` gate added in v0.6.0, with the rationale. ### Added (tests) - **`backend/tests/test_anon_offlimits_vertical.py`** — twelve new tests asserting that every write-shaped endpoint surveyed in the v0.6.0 audit refuses anonymous callers with 401, and that the five anonymous-read surfaces (health, philosophy, auth/me, catalog, RFC view, discussion threads, proposals) stay reachable. Sixty-six assertions in total, covering: propose; proposal merge / decline / withdraw; branch promote-to-branch / start-edit-branch / metadata / manual-flush / visibility / grants (POST + DELETE) / threads (POST) / messages (POST) / resolve / chat-seen / changes (accept / decline / reask) / chat-stream; super-draft start-edit-branch + metadata; PR pr-draft / open / seen / review / merge / withdraw / description / resolution-branch; discussion thread create + message post + resolve; admin role / mute / allowlist (POST + DELETE) plus the admin reads; notification preferences / quiet-hours / watch / mark-read / user-mute (POST + DELETE); funder credentials (POST + DELETE) + consent (POST + DELETE); graduation kickoff + claim + progress SSE; PR review page anonymous-readable. ### Anonymous-writeable allowlist Two endpoints are intentionally anonymous-by-design. They are not audit findings; they are documented here so the contract is explicit: - `GET /auth/login` and `GET /auth/callback` — the OAuth round-trip. Anonymous-by-design because they ARE the sign-in entrypoint. - `POST /api/webhooks/gitea` and `POST /api/webhooks/email-bounce` — anonymous in the session sense but authenticated by HMAC shared secret (`GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` and `WEBHOOK_EMAIL_BOUNCE_SECRET` respectively). The webhook receiver is the wrong place for an authenticated session; the shared-secret shape is correct. ### §19.2 candidates surfaced - None unique to this release. The two pre-existing candidates the audit touched — anonymous-read polish for the discussion surface (carried from v0.5.0) and the operator-visibility floor on graduation progress — were settled here as `require_user` on `/graduate/progress` rather than deferred. ### Upgrade steps (from 0.5.0) 1. The deployment **MUST** rebuild the frontend (`npm install && npm run build`) so the frontend bundle's reported version matches the backend's. No new env vars; existing `frontend/.env` is sufficient. 2. The deployment **MUST** restart the backend so the new `require_user` gate on `/graduate/progress` is enforced. No schema migration runs. 3. The deployment **MAY** announce the audit completion to operators: every write-shaped backend endpoint now enforces an explicit gate, and the `test_anon_offlimits_vertical.py` test net asserts the contract on every CI run. The audited surfaces are listed in the `Added (tests)` section above and in `SPEC.md` §6.1. 4. The deployment **MUST NOT** assume any new envelope behaviour: v0.6.0 is purely a hardening release. No schema, no env, no dependency changes; the operator's role is reduced to rebuild + restart. ## 0.5.0 — 2026-05-27 **Minor — no operator action required.** This release wires the PR-less per-RFC discussion surface (roadmap item #3, SPEC §10.10). An RFC's main view now carries a discussion panel distinct from PR comments and branch chat; contribution — proposing edits the document will land — still requires opening a PR via the §10.1 affordance. The substrate is the existing `threads` / `thread_messages` tables; rows with `threads.branch_name IS NULL` scope to the RFC's main view. No schema migration is required. ### Added - **PR-less discussion endpoints** (`backend/app/api_discussion.py`) mounted at `/api/rfcs//discussion/...`: - `GET /api/rfcs//discussion/threads` — list threads where `threads.branch_name IS NULL`. Anonymous-readable per the v0.3.0 contract; the default whole-doc chat thread is materialized lazily on first read. - `POST /api/rfcs//discussion/threads` — open a new discussion thread (`thread_kind='chat'`, `anchor_kind='whole-doc'`, `branch_name=NULL`). Body: optional `label`, optional first `message`. Requires contributor role. - `GET /api/rfcs//discussion/threads//messages` — read messages on a discussion thread. Anonymous-readable. - `POST /api/rfcs//discussion/threads//messages` — post a message. Body: `text`, optional `quote`. Requires contributor role. - `POST /api/rfcs//discussion/threads//resolve` — resolve a discussion thread. Permission per §10.10: thread creator, RFC owner / arbiter, or app admin / owner. - **`RFCDiscussionPanel.jsx`** — the right-column surface on the RFC view when the viewer is on `main`. Composer requires sign-in; Cmd/Ctrl+Enter sends. Multiple threads surface as pill-shaped tabs above the message feed. A "New thread" affordance opens a fresh thread on the same RFC. - **SPEC `§10.10` PR-less discussion vs. contribution** — settles the distinction between discussion (RFC-scoped, no PR, both anonymous-readable and contributor-writeable) and contribution (still requires a PR via §10.1). Also extends `§5`'s `threads` table commentary so the null-branch interpretation is documented as actively used rather than reserved scaffold. - **SPEC `§17`** — lists the five new `discussion/...` endpoints in the illustrative table. ### Changed - **`backend/app/chat.py`** — `_fan_out_chat` now passes `branch_name` straight through to the notify chokepoint instead of coercing `None` to `"main"`. The notifications row carries the null through, which preserves the §15.7 reconciler's keying on `(rfc_slug, branch_name)` for the eventual discussion-side chat-seen advance (deferred to a §19.2 candidate). Existing branch-scoped chat continues to pass non-null branch names; the change is invisible to that path. - **`backend/app/notify.py`** — `fan_out_chat_message`'s `branch_name` parameter is now typed `str | None` to match the v0.5.0 PR-less shape. Routing rules are unchanged; the inbox prose renders identically whether the chat lives on a branch or on the RFC's discussion surface, which is the right honest signal. - **`RFCView.jsx`** — the right-column panel is now conditional: when `branchParam === 'main'`, render `RFCDiscussionPanel` (the new PR-less surface); otherwise render the existing `ChatPanel` (branch chat unchanged). ### §19.2 candidates surfaced - PR-less discussion: range / paragraph anchors (the data model permits them; the UI is the deferred part). - PR-less discussion: distinct notification `event_kind`s (`open_rfc_discussion_thread`, etc.) if usage shows contributors want to filter discussion-vs-branch in the §15.2 inbox. - PR-less discussion: chat-seen cursor closing the §15.7 reconciliation loop for the new surface. - PR-less discussion: AI participant invocation (discussion-only, no `` block side-effects). - PR-less discussion: anonymous-read polish to match the v0.6.0 write-gate hardening (item #4). ### Upgrade steps (from 0.4.0) 1. The deployment **MUST** rebuild the frontend (`npm install && npm run build`) so `RFCDiscussionPanel.jsx` ships in the bundle. No new env vars; existing `frontend/.env` is sufficient. 2. The deployment **MUST** restart the backend so the new `api_discussion` router mounts. No schema migration runs — the `threads` table already supports `branch_name IS NULL` per §5, and the v0.5.0 build is the first to write rows in that shape. 3. The deployment **MAY** announce the new surface to its contributors: the RFC view's main page now carries a discussion panel below the document. Existing branch chat and PR review surfaces are unchanged. 4. The deployment **SHOULD NOT** expect a hardening of the anonymous-write gate in v0.5.0 — that lands in v0.6.0 (item #4). v0.5.0's write paths already refuse anonymous posts, so no pre-emptive operator action is needed. ## 0.4.0 — 2026-05-27 **Minor — no operator action required beyond rebuild + restart.** The proposer of a new RFC is now the implicit first owner of its super- draft entry, set automatically at propose time from the session user. The §13.1 claim flow remains available for *additional* owners. No schema changes, no env-var changes, no API-shape changes; only newly proposed RFCs receive the auto-owner — existing super-drafts whose `owners:` is empty are unaffected and can still be claimed via §13.1 as before. This is a §19.3 rule-2 spec correction: `SPEC.md` §9.1, §9.2, and §13.1 are updated to reflect the new shape. ### Changed - **`POST /api/rfcs/propose`** (`backend/app/api.py`) now sets `Entry.owners = [user.gitea_login]` when constructing the new super-draft entry, instead of `owners=[]`. The session's `gitea_login` is the canonical source; the endpoint never accepted an owner field from the request payload and still doesn't. - **`SPEC.md` §9.1** narrowed: the "no proposed-owner or working- group fields" sentence becomes a proposer-owner-auto / working- group-deferred split, with a §19.3 rule-2 note. - **`SPEC.md` §9.2** frontmatter shape: `owners: []` → `owners: []`, with a §19.3 rule-2 note. - **`SPEC.md` §13.1** reframed: claim flow is now a graduation-time broadening for additional owners, not a precondition for the proposer's own RFC. The §13.1 / §13.2 / §13.3 graduation pipeline itself is unchanged — the "at least one owner" precondition for graduation still holds and is now satisfied by default. ### Upgrade steps (from 0.3.0) 1. The deployment **MUST** rebuild and restart per the routine deploy steps. No `.env` changes, no schema/migration changes, no API-shape changes. 2. Operators **SHOULD** note that newly proposed RFCs after the upgrade carry the proposer in `owners:` automatically. Existing super-drafts with empty `owners:` are not migrated; they remain claimable via the §13.1 flow exactly as before. No deployment- side data action is required. 3. Deployments **MAY** communicate the UX shift to active proposers (the "Claim ownership" affordance no longer applies to your own newly proposed RFC), but the affordance simply hides on RFCs the viewer already owns, so no operator-side action is required. ## 0.3.0 — 2026-05-27 **Minor — operator action required if a deployment wants to enable the private-beta gate; no action required to stay open.** This release adds an email allowlist that, when populated, restricts OAuth sign-in to the listed emails while keeping all read paths public. Anonymous visitors now see the full app (catalog, RFC bodies, public branch conversations) in read-only mode instead of the §14.1 landing-page wall. ### Added - **`allowed_emails` table** (`backend/migrations/011_allowlist.sql`). Empty list = gate off (any successful OAuth provisions a user, as before). Any rows present = gate on (only listed emails, plus users already grandfathered by `gitea_id`, may sign in). - **Admin → Allowlist tab** at `/admin/allowlist`. Add/remove emails, see who added each row and when. Status banner shows whether the gate is currently active. - **`/beta-pending` page** shown after a rejected OAuth callback. Free- text invite-contact line is configurable via the new `VITE_BETA_CONTACT` env var (optional; falls back to a generic line). - **Beta chips** next to the Discuss/Contribute mode toggle, the Sign in link, and the header Sign-in button so anonymous viewers see immediately what is gated. - **Anonymous read mode** in the React app: the §14.1 Landing page is preserved at `/welcome` for deployments that want to link to it, but the default route now renders the full app shell with write affordances hidden behind a sign-in CTA. ### Changed - **`/auth/callback`** now consults `auth.is_allowed_sign_in()` after fetching the Gitea profile. Rejected sign-ins clear the OAuth state and redirect to `/beta-pending`; the session is not populated. - **`Catalog`** receives a `viewer` prop. Anonymous viewers see "Sign in to propose (Beta)" instead of "+ Propose New RFC". - **`PhilosophyWithSidebar`** now reads `authenticated` from the current viewer instead of hardcoded `true`. ### Fixed - **Single-finger scroll on the `/philosophy` page** (and any other `.chrome-pane`-hosted view: `/admin/*`, `/settings/notifications`) was broken on iOS Safari. The `.app` container used `height: 100vh`, which on iOS measures the URL-bar-hidden ("largest") viewport — so `.app` overflowed what's actually visible. Combined with the `body { overflow: hidden }` in `index.css`, this meant single-finger touches on the visible area were consumed by the (blocked) page- level scroll attempt rather than reaching the nested `.chrome-pane` scroll. Two-finger touches bypassed the page-level layer and one-finger then worked once the URL bar had collapsed. Switched `.app` to `height: 100dvh` (dynamic viewport — adjusts as the URL bar shows/hides), with `100vh` retained as a fallback for browsers predating iOS 15.4 / Chrome 108. ### Upgrade steps (from 0.2.3) 1. The deployment **MUST** rebuild the frontend with the new `VITE_BETA_CONTACT` env var optionally set in `frontend/.env` (it is OK to leave it blank — the `/beta-pending` page falls back to a generic line). 2. The deployment **MUST** restart the backend so migration `011_allowlist.sql` runs. No data loss; the new table starts empty, which keeps the gate off and preserves existing behavior. 3. To **enable** the private-beta gate, the deployment operator **SHOULD** sign in once (so their `users` row exists and they grandfather in by `gitea_id`), then open `/admin/allowlist` and add the first invited email. The first row added turns the gate on for any user not yet in `users`. 4. To **stay open**, do nothing — leave `allowed_emails` empty and the deployment behaves exactly as 0.2.3. 5. The deployment **MAY** customise its `/beta-pending` contact line by setting `VITE_BETA_CONTACT` (an email, a URL, or a short instruction) before the frontend build. Unset is fine. ## 0.2.3 — 2026-05-26 **Patch — no operator action required.** Rebuild and restart per the routine deploy steps; no `.env` changes, no schema changes, no behavior changes a deployment would notice in steady state beyond the new endpoint below. ### Added - **`GET /api/health`** — an unauthenticated probe returning JSON `{version, status}` for ops tooling. `version` is the running framework version (the contents of `VERSION` per §20.1, read at process start and cached as a module-level constant in `backend/app/health.py`); `status` is `"ok"` with HTTP 200 in v1. The `"degraded"` / HTTP 503 path stays reserved in the response shape so a later release can wire real degradation conditions without breaking the contract. The version-match check is the structural value — a deploy-control-panel polling the endpoint after `systemctl restart` catches the failure mode where a restart did not pick up the new code. See `SPEC.md` §17 and the §19.2 settlement. ### Upgrade steps (from 0.2.2) 1. The deployment **MAY** configure its monitoring (Pingdom, Healthchecks.io, the flotilla deploy control panel, etc.) to probe `/api/health` and compare the returned `version` against the tag last deployed. The endpoint is unauthenticated by design — no PII in the payload, no session required. ## 0.2.2 — 2026-05-26 **Patch — no operator action required.** Rebuild the frontend and restart per the routine deploy steps; no `.env` changes, no schema changes, no behavior changes a deployment would notice in steady state beyond the fix below. ### Fixed - **Mermaid blocks rendered as raw code on `/philosophy`.** `frontend/src/components/Philosophy.jsx` parsed PHILOSOPHY.md with the bare `marked` import and `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`, so ```` ```mermaid ```` fences fell through as `
` blocks rather
  than rendered diagrams. Swapped to `MarkdownPreview`, which already
  carries the lazy mermaid loader + SVG render path used by the RFC
  body view, so the philosophy surface now renders mermaid the same
  way RFC bodies do. Pre-existing gap, surfaced when a deployment
  authored a mermaid block in its `PHILOSOPHY_PATH` override.

## 0.2.1 — 2026-05-26

**Patch — no operator action required.** Rebuild the frontend and
restart per the routine deploy steps; no `.env` changes, no schema
changes, no behavior changes a deployment would notice in steady
state.

### Fixed

- **PR view blank page (React #310).** `frontend/src/components/PRView.jsx`
  declared its `threadsByKind` `useMemo` *after* the early-return
  guard for the loading state (`if (!pr) return …`). On first mount
  `pr` was null so the early return fired and 14 hooks were called;
  on the second render `pr` was populated and execution reached the
  `useMemo`, calling 15 hooks — violating the Rules of Hooks and
  unmounting the page subtree (blank screen). The `useMemo` is now
  declared above the early returns with optional-chaining on `pr`,
  keeping the hook count stable between the loading and loaded
  renders. Pre-existing bug in the post-Contribute-rewrite PR view;
  surfaced in production by 0.2.0's graduation merge race fix
  enabling the workflow that opens this code path.

## 0.2.0 — 2026-05-26

**Breaking config change.** The frontend now requires
`VITE_APP_NAME` to be set at build time. `npm run build` fails with a
clear message if it is missing. There is no default; every deployment
names itself.

### Upgrade steps (from 0.1.0)

1. The deployment **MUST** create a `frontend/.env` file before
   building. See `frontend/.env.example` for the contract.
2. The deployment **MUST** set `VITE_APP_NAME` in `frontend/.env` to
   the user-visible name it wants to ship — the string used as the
   browser tab title, the header brand, and the landing H1. The
   build will fail loudly if this is unset or blank.
3. The deployment **MUST** rebuild the frontend (`npm install && npm
   run build`) and redeploy the resulting bundle. The previous
   bundle does not read `VITE_APP_NAME`.
4. The deployment **SHOULD** verify the name appears correctly in
   the browser tab and the header after redeploy before bumping its
   `.rfc-app-version` pin to `0.2.0`.
5. The deployment **MAY**, in the same upgrade, take the opportunity
   to retire any local overrides it was using to brand the
   pre-0.2.0 hardcoded strings — those overrides are now obsolete.
6. The deployment **MUST NOT** continue to expect graduation step 4
   to fail on Gitea's "Please try again later" race; that path is
   now handled by `wait_for_mergeable` + bounded retry. Any local
   workaround retrying graduation at the deployment level is now
   redundant and **SHOULD** be removed.

### Fixed

- **Graduation merge race.** §13.3 step 4 (`merge_pr`) used to call
  Gitea's merge endpoint the instant step 3 returned, which races
  Gitea's background mergeability computation and produces the
  `405 "Please try again later"` response. Step 4 now waits for the
  `mergeable` field to become non-null (bounded by a 30s timeout) and
  retries the merge call up to three times on the transient response.
  See `backend/app/gitea.py#wait_for_mergeable` and
  `backend/app/bot.py#_merge_with_retry`.

### Changed

- `frontend/src/App.jsx` header brand reads `VITE_APP_NAME` instead of
  a hardcoded string.
- `frontend/src/components/Landing.jsx` H1 reads `VITE_APP_NAME`
  instead of a hardcoded string. The pitch / deck / attribution copy
  in this file is still deployment-specific and tracked as a follow-up
  for extraction into deployment config.
- `frontend/index.html` `` is rewritten at build time via Vite's
  HTML transform.

### Added

- `frontend/.env.example` documenting the new required variable.
- Top-level `VERSION` file and this `CHANGELOG.md` as the canonical
  release log.
- `SPEC.md` §20 (versioning and downstream deployments) as the
  binding policy for the framework/deployment relationship.
- `docs/DEPLOYMENTS.md` as the practical guide for building on
  rfc-app and upgrading existing deployments to new versions.
- `CLAUDE.md` at the repo root capturing the separation-of-concerns
  rule for working sessions.