Release 0.9.0: admin user-management page + new-request notifications

Ships DOCS.md and the /docs route — a plain-prose translation of
SPEC.md for users, distinct from the binding spec. Originating need
was the admin-vs-owner role distinction on /admin/users (§6.1);
response is a single guide that covers the framework's user-facing
surfaces end-to-end (roles, proposing, branches, PRs, graduation,
notifications). Mirrors /philosophy: markdown file at repo root +
sibling backend loader + MarkdownPreview render. No schema migration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -23,6 +23,708 @@ skip versions are the composition of each intervening adjacent
 release's steps in order — no A-to-B path is pre-computed beyond
 that.
 
+## 0.14.0 — 2026-05-28
+
+**Minor — no operator action required; new optional env var.** This
+release ships `DOCS.md` and the `/docs` route — a public-facing user
+guide that translates `SPEC.md` into plain prose for readers,
+proposers, and contributors. The originating need was the
+admin-vs-owner distinction on the `/admin/users` surface (the §6.1
+role separation was load-bearing but only documented in spec voice);
+the response was a single guide that covers the framework's user-
+facing surfaces end-to-end. Mirrors `/philosophy` end-to-end: a
+markdown file checked into the repo root, served by a sibling backend
+loader, rendered with `MarkdownPreview`. No schema migration. No
+required env-var changes. The new "Docs" header link sits alongside
+the persistent "About" link from §14.3 and is reachable by anonymous
+viewers per the same v0.3.0 anonymous-read contract.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`DOCS.md`** at the repo root — the user-facing guide. Covers
+  reading anonymously, signing in, proposing an RFC, super-drafts vs
+  active RFCs, the discussion-vs-contribution distinction (§10.10),
+  working on a branch (contribute mode, AI proposals, manual edits,
+  flags, branch visibility, contribute grants, hygiene), opening and
+  reviewing PRs, graduation (§13), withdrawal and reopening, the AI
+  participant (§6.6 / §6.7 / §18), notifications and watch states
+  (§15), and the full roles-and-permissions story (§6 in plain
+  prose: anonymous / contributor / admin / owner, per-RFC
+  owners + arbiters, per-branch contribute grants, the write-mute,
+  and the three structurally distinct "mutes"). Framework-neutral —
+  no deployment-specific names or corpus references; consistent with
+  `CLAUDE.md`'s separation-of-concerns rule.
+- **`backend/app/docs.py`** — sibling loader for `philosophy.py`.
+  Reads `DOCS.md` from the repo root with the same disk-first,
+  in-process-cached, `refresh()`-on-demand shape. Optional
+  `DOCS_PATH` env var points at an alternative source (e.g. a
+  meta-repo working-tree clone) for deployments that prefer that.
+- **`§17` endpoint** — `GET /api/docs` returns
+  `{ "body": "<DOCS.md verbatim>" }`. Anonymous-reachable, same
+  contract as `GET /api/philosophy`.
+- **`frontend/src/components/Docs.jsx`** — the `/docs` reading
+  surface. Mirrors `Philosophy.jsx`: chrome with Back / "USER GUIDE" /
+  Home affordances, body rendered through `MarkdownPreview`.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`backend/app/api.py`** — imports `docs as docs_mod` alongside
+  `philosophy` in the relative-import block; registers the new
+  `GET /api/docs` handler immediately after `GET /api/philosophy`.
+- **`frontend/src/api.js`** — exports `getDocs()` alongside
+  `getPhilosophy()`. Same fetch shape, different endpoint path.
+- **`frontend/src/App.jsx`** — imports `Docs` alongside `Philosophy`,
+  registers the `/docs` route alongside `/philosophy`, adds the
+  persistent "Docs" header link alongside "About", and adds the
+  `DocsWithSidebar` chrome wrapper alongside `PhilosophyWithSidebar`.
+
+### Upgrade steps (from 0.13.0)
+
+- You **MUST** rebuild the frontend and restart the backend after
+  upgrading so the new `/docs` route, the new endpoint, and the new
+  loader are picked up. `frontend/package.json#version` and `VERSION`
+  both move to `0.14.0`. No schema migration; the new endpoint
+  serves a checked-in file.
+- You **MAY** set `DOCS_PATH` to an absolute path if your deployment
+  hosts `DOCS.md` outside the framework's repo (e.g. as a sync target
+  from a content repo). Unset is supported — the framework's
+  `DOCS.md` at the repo root is the default, mirroring how
+  `PHILOSOPHY_PATH` works for `/api/philosophy`.
+- You **MAY** customize `DOCS.md` for your deployment if you want
+  deployment-specific phrasing layered on top of the framework's
+  guide. The file is a regular markdown source; standard `vim`/`git`
+  edits suffice. Framework upgrades that ship a new `DOCS.md` will
+  show as a normal merge in your deployment-overlay layer.
+
+## 0.13.0 — 2026-05-28
+
+**Minor — schema migration required; new optional env vars.** This
+release ships the cookie / privacy consent surface (roadmap item #11,
+SPEC §14.5 / §14.6). Every viewer — authenticated and anonymous alike —
+now sees a non-modal bottom-of-page banner on first visit asking which
+categories of cookies they allow (essential / essential + analytics /
+essential + analytics + other). The choice persists in `localStorage`
+for anonymous viewers and in a new `cookie_consent` table for
+authenticated viewers, with server-side overriding local on sign-in.
+The framework also ships default `/privacy` and `/cookies` policy pages
+that deployments can layer their own policy URL on top of via two new
+optional env vars. No analytics SDK ships in this release — the
+consent infrastructure is wired so item #13 (v0.15.0) can read from
+`frontend/src/lib/consent.js` when the SDK lands.
+
+### Added
+
+- **Cookie consent banner** (`frontend/src/components/CookieConsentBanner.jsx`).
+  Non-modal, bottom of viewport. Three single-select choices with
+  inline descriptions. Visible until the user makes a choice; hides
+  thereafter. Reachable for revision via the settings surface.
+- **Consent helper** (`frontend/src/lib/consent.js`). Exports
+  `getConsent()`, `hasChosen()`, `onConsentChange(cb)`, `setConsent()`,
+  `hydrateFromServer()`, `clearLocal()`. Cross-tab sync via the
+  `storage` event. Item #13's analytics SDK reads consent here before
+  importing.
+- **Privacy and cookies policy pages**
+  (`frontend/src/pages/Privacy.jsx`, `frontend/src/pages/Cookies.jsx`).
+  Default minimal policies that describe the framework's stance and
+  list the cookies the framework sets. Deployments override via the
+  two new env vars below; the framework's stub always renders above
+  the link so the framework-level contract stays visible.
+- **"Privacy & cookies" tab** in `/settings/notifications` showing
+  the current consent choice, the recorded-at stamp, and a "Change"
+  button that re-opens the banner via a custom DOM event.
+- **`§17` endpoints** —
+  - `GET  /api/users/me/cookie-consent` — read the current consent
+    record.
+  - `PUT  /api/users/me/cookie-consent` — write a new consent record.
+    Upserts a single row per user, stamps `recorded_at` to now,
+    accepts `essential` for symmetry but always persists it as true.
+- **Schema migration** `013_cookie_consent.sql` — new
+  `cookie_consent` table keyed by `user_id`, three flags
+  (`essential`, `analytics`, `other_cookies`), and `recorded_at`.
+  (Renumbered from `012_*` during driver integration because v0.7.0
+  also added a `012_otc.sql` migration that landed in the integration
+  order before this one.)
+- **SPEC `§14.5` Cookie / privacy consent** — settles the banner
+  shape, the three-category single-select, the storage shape (local
+  for anon, server row for authenticated), the precedence rule on
+  sign-in, and the `consent.js` helper surface for downstream
+  callers including item #13.
+- **SPEC `§14.6` Privacy and cookies policy pages** — settles the
+  `/privacy` and `/cookies` routes, the framework's stub content, and
+  the `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` / `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL` override
+  shape.
+- **SPEC `§5`** — names the `cookie_consent` table in the canonical
+  app-tables list.
+- **SPEC `§17`** — lists the two new cookie-consent endpoints.
+- **SPEC `§19.2`** — surfaces four candidates: policy content via
+  content-repo file vs env var, GPC / DNT headers, multi-language
+  consent text, and the item #13 analytics-SDK gating dependency.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`frontend/.env.example`** — documents the two new optional env
+  vars `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` and `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL`. Unset
+  is supported; defaults render the framework's stub.
+- **`backend/app/api_notifications.py`** — module docstring grew two
+  endpoint lines; the new endpoints sit alongside the existing
+  `/api/users/me/*` neighbors.
+- **`frontend/src/App.jsx`** — registers `/privacy` and `/cookies`
+  routes (anonymous-reachable), wires `<CookieConsentBanner>` into
+  the global chrome, and listens for a `rfc-app:cookie-consent-reopen`
+  custom event to re-open the banner from the settings surface.
+
+### Upgrade steps (from 0.7.0)
+
+- You **MUST** rebuild the frontend and restart the backend after
+  upgrading. `frontend/package.json#version` and `VERSION` both move
+  to `0.13.0` and the build embeds the new env-var contract.
+- You **MUST** apply schema migration `013_cookie_consent.sql`. The
+  migration creates a single new table keyed by `user_id` with three
+  flag columns and a `recorded_at` stamp. The framework runs
+  migrations automatically at process start; no manual step is
+  required beyond restarting the backend so the migration runner
+  picks the file up.
+- You **MAY** set `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` to an http(s) URL that
+  points at your deployment's full privacy policy. The framework's
+  `/privacy` page renders its built-in stub above a link to the
+  configured URL. Unset is supported — the stub is sufficient for a
+  default-config deployment.
+- You **MAY** set `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL` to an http(s) URL that
+  points at your deployment's full cookies policy. Same shape as the
+  privacy URL.
+- You **MAY** announce the new consent banner to your users. Existing
+  authenticated users will see the banner on their next visit
+  (because their `cookie_consent` row does not yet exist); their
+  current sessions remain valid.
+
+## 0.10.0 — 2026-05-28
+
+**Minor — schema migration required; new auth path is additive.**
+This release lands user-set passcodes after OTC (roadmap item #8,
+SPEC §6.2). After a successful one-time-code sign-in, the user can
+set a passcode (4–20 characters) and use email + passcode for
+subsequent sign-ins. OTC remains the structural fallback: a
+forgotten passcode is recovered by requesting a fresh code, and
+five consecutive failed passcode verifies lock the passcode path
+for 15 minutes (HTTP 423) while leaving the OTC path open. The
+`/login` surface now consults a new `GET /auth/passcode/check`
+endpoint after the email step to decide whether to render a
+passcode input or an OTC code input; an "Use a code instead" link
+on the passcode step lets the user fall back to OTC manually. The
+`/settings/notifications` page grew a new "Sign-in" tab where the
+user can set, change, or remove their passcode.
+
+### Upgrade steps (from 0.8.0)
+
+1. **MUST** restart the backend so migration `015_passcode.sql`
+   runs. The migration adds four nullable columns to the `users`
+   table: `passcode_hash`, `passcode_set_at`,
+   `passcode_failed_attempts` (default 0), `passcode_locked_until`.
+   Existing rows pass through with `passcode_hash = NULL`, which
+   the runtime treats as "no passcode set" — every existing user
+   continues to sign in via OTC unchanged, and can opt into a
+   passcode from the new settings tab at any time.
+2. **MUST** rebuild the frontend so the v0.10.0 `/login` flow and
+   the new settings tab ship. `frontend/package.json#version` and
+   `VERSION` both move to `0.10.0`.
+3. **SHOULD** announce the new sign-in option to users. Wording
+   suggestion: "You can now set a passcode for faster sign-in.
+   We'll keep emailing one-time codes as a fallback — if you
+   forget your passcode, just request a code as usual."
+4. **MAY** leave the §6.2 default lockout shape (5 attempts,
+   15-minute window) unchanged. v0.10.0 does not expose env
+   tunables for these; raising or lowering them lives in §19.2
+   as a candidate.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`POST /auth/passcode/set`** — authenticated. Body `{passcode}`.
+  Validates length (4–20) and refuses obvious patterns from a small
+  denylist (`0000`, `1234`, `aaaa`, `password`, etc.). bcrypt-hashes
+  the passcode and writes `users.passcode_hash` plus
+  `users.passcode_set_at`. Clears any active lockout and the
+  failure counter (a user setting a fresh passcode is implicitly
+  re-authenticating). Replaces any prior passcode.
+- **`DELETE /auth/passcode`** — authenticated. Clears the passcode
+  hash and the set-at stamp; the user is back to OTC-only.
+- **`POST /auth/passcode/verify`** — unauthenticated. Body
+  `{email, passcode}`. Returns HTTP 200 + minimal user payload on
+  success; HTTP 423 with `locked_until` when the account is in the
+  lockout window; HTTP 400 for every other failure (the
+  wrong-passcode and unknown-email modes both collapse to 400 so
+  the response does not enumerate account state).
+- **`GET /auth/passcode/check`** — unauthenticated. Query param
+  `email`. Returns `{has_passcode: boolean}`. The Login.jsx flow
+  consults this after the email step to decide whether to render a
+  passcode input or fall back to OTC. The response carries only
+  the boolean; lockout state, the hash, and the `passcode_set_at`
+  stamp are not leaked. An unknown email and a known-without-
+  passcode email both return `false`, so the endpoint is
+  account-enumeration-safe.
+- **Schema migration** `015_passcode.sql` — four ALTER TABLE ADD
+  COLUMN statements on the `users` table:
+  - `passcode_hash TEXT` (nullable) — the bcrypt hash. NULL means
+    "no passcode set".
+  - `passcode_set_at TEXT` (nullable) — ISO-8601 timestamp.
+  - `passcode_failed_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0` —
+    consecutive failure counter since last success.
+  - `passcode_locked_until TEXT` (nullable) — lockout window
+    expiry; verify refuses with HTTP 423 while populated and
+    in the future.
+- **`backend/app/passcode.py`** — the passcode state machine:
+  validation (length + denylist), bcrypt hashing, set/clear,
+  status check, and the verify path with lockout management.
+- **`frontend/src/components/Login.jsx`** — extended to a five-step
+  surface: email → passcode-or-code → optional post-OTC
+  passcode-offer → optional set-passcode. The "Use a code instead"
+  link on the passcode step re-dispatches an OTC and switches to
+  the code step. A 423 from passcode verify auto-falls back to OTC
+  with a visible status message.
+- **"Sign-in" tab** in `/settings/notifications` — shows
+  passcode-set status, the recorded `passcode_set_at` stamp when
+  set, and Set / Change / Remove buttons. Mirrors the §14.5
+  "Privacy & cookies" tab pattern.
+- **SPEC `§6` / `§14.1` / `§17` / `§19.2`** corrections per §19.3
+  rule 2:
+  - §6 names the three current auth paths (OTC, passcode-with-OTC-
+    fallback, OAuth-fallback-during-migration).
+  - §14.1 documents the stepped `/login` surface and the passcode
+    check endpoint.
+  - §17 lists the four new `/auth/passcode/*` endpoints.
+  - §19.2 surfaces four new candidates (passcode policy tunables
+    via env, per-IP rate-limit on `/auth/passcode/verify`,
+    passcode-change "old passcode" challenge, passkey/WebAuthn);
+    the "device-trust 30d" entry's passcode cross-ref is updated;
+    the "first-OTC profile capture" entry's roadmap cross-ref is
+    updated.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`backend/app/main.py`** — registers the four new
+  `/auth/passcode/*` routes on the existing oauth router, alongside
+  the v0.7.0 `/auth/otc/*` routes.
+- **`backend/app/api.py`** — `/api/auth/me` payload now includes
+  `has_passcode` (boolean) and `passcode_set_at` (string or null)
+  so the settings surface can render the Set / Change / Remove
+  affordances without a second round trip.
+- **`frontend/src/api.js`** — adds `checkPasscode`, `verifyPasscode`,
+  `setPasscode`, `clearPasscode` helpers, neighboring the v0.7.0
+  `requestOtc` / `verifyOtc` block.
+- **`frontend/src/components/NotificationSettings.jsx`** — adds the
+  `SignInSection` component between `MutesSection` and
+  `PrivacyCookiesSection`.
+
+### Tests
+
+- **`backend/tests/test_passcode_vertical.py`** — 17 new tests
+  cover: set requires session; check returns false for unknown and
+  for set-less users; check returns true after set without leaking
+  other fields; happy-path OTC → set → verify roundtrip; wrong
+  passcode increments the counter without locking; five consecutive
+  failures lock with 423 and persist `passcode_locked_until`;
+  lockout expires and the next attempt clears the counter; the OTC
+  path is unaffected by passcode lockout; clear wipes the hash and
+  set-at; setting a new passcode replaces the prior one and resets
+  the lockout; `passcode_set_at` updates on every set; validation
+  refuses too-short passcodes and denylist patterns; `/api/auth/me`
+  carries `has_passcode` and `passcode_set_at` correctly.
+
+### Environment variables
+
+None new. The existing `SECRET_KEY` continues to sign session
+cookies; passcode hashing reuses the bcrypt dependency added in
+v0.7.0. The lockout shape (5 attempts, 15 minutes) and the length
+range (4–20) are hard-coded in `backend/app/passcode.py`. See
+§19.2 for the env-tunable candidate.
+
+## 0.9.0 — 2026-05-28
+
+**Minor — no schema migration; reuses v0.8.0 columns and existing
+SMTP.** This release ships the admin user-management surface at
+`/admin/users` and the new-beta-request notifications that feed
+it (roadmap item #7, SPEC §6.1 / §15 / §17). The two halves
+compose: admins receive an inbox + email signal the moment a
+pending user submits the v0.8.0 capture form; clicking through
+lands on the page where they Grant or Revoke access.
+
+The page consumes the v0.8.0 schema columns
+(`permission_state`, `first_name`, `last_name`,
+`beta_request_reason`, `permission_decided_by`,
+`permission_decided_at`) without adding new ones — migration
+slot 016 stays reserved for a future release. The single new
+write endpoint, `POST /api/admin/users/<id>/permission`,
+replaces v0.8.0's documented manual `UPDATE users SET
+permission_state='granted'` gesture with an audited UI flip.
+
+Admin notifications ride the existing §15 chokepoint — the
+`new_beta_request` event_kind is added to the enum with
+category `admin-actionable`, fan-out is to every owner / admin
+minus the requester themselves, and the §15.4 email dispatch
+only reaches recipients whose `email_admin_actionable` toggle
+is on (the default for owners + admins). The event is the
+framework's first non-RFC-scoped notification — `rfc_slug` is
+NULL and the email deep-link points `/admin/users` instead of
+`/rfc/<slug>`.
+
+Decision on `/admin/allowlist`: the surface stays as a
+sibling sub-tab, not folded into `/admin/users`. The two have
+different keys (allowlist by email pre-sign-up, user list by
+user_id post-sign-up) and a union row would be confusing
+rather than clarifying. The allowlist's fast-path-bypass role
+from v0.8.0 is unchanged; retiring the table outright is
+deferred to a later session (see §19.2).
+
+### Upgrade steps (from 0.10.0)
+
+1. **MAY** rebuild the frontend. The build is the same shape
+   as v0.10.0; the lockfile pins to `0.9.0` so `npm install`
+   in `frontend/` updates it cleanly. No new env vars on the
+   frontend; the existing `VITE_APP_NAME` requirement carries
+   over.
+2. **MAY** restart the backend. No schema migration runs in
+   this release — every v0.9.0 column is from
+   `014_beta_access.sql` (v0.8.0). Restart only if you want
+   the new endpoints registered in this version's binary.
+3. **SHOULD** verify SMTP can reach the deployment's admin
+   inbox before the first pending user submits the capture
+   form. v0.9.0 reuses the v0.7.0 SMTP configuration
+   (`SMTP_HOST`, `SMTP_PORT`, `SMTP_USER`, `SMTP_PASSWORD`,
+   `SMTP_STARTTLS`, `EMAIL_FROM`, `EMAIL_FROM_NAME`); a
+   misconfigured deployment will still write the inbox row,
+   but the admin won't hear about it through email. No new
+   env var is required — the framework reuses the existing
+   admin-user list (role IN ('owner', 'admin')) as the
+   notification recipients.
+4. **SHOULD** announce the surface to existing admins. Wording
+   suggestion: "There's now a Users tab in /admin where you can
+   Grant or Revoke beta access — and you'll get an email +
+   inbox row when a fresh request lands. The manual SQL gesture
+   from v0.8.0 still works but is no longer the documented
+   path."
+5. **MAY** drain the existing pending queue through the new UI.
+   If your deployment carried pending users through the v0.8.0
+   manual-UPDATE window, the Pending bucket on `/admin/users`
+   surfaces all of them with their captured profile. Granting
+   from the UI stamps `permission_decided_by` /
+   `permission_decided_at`, which any prior manual UPDATE
+   gestures may have left NULL (no harm done — the v0.8.0
+   contract didn't require those stamps).
+
+### Added
+
+- **`POST /api/admin/users/<id>/permission`** — body
+  `{state: 'pending'|'granted'|'revoked'}`. Flips the column,
+  stamps `permission_decided_by` + `permission_decided_at`,
+  and writes a `permission_events` row with event_kind in
+  `{permission_granted, permission_revoked,
+  permission_repended}`. Refuses 422 on self-flip (symmetric
+  to `set_mute` / `set_role` self-action refusals) and 422
+  on invalid state. Returns `{ok, permission_state, changed}`
+  where `changed=false` indicates a no-op (the requested
+  state already matched).
+- **Widened `GET /api/admin/users` response** carrying
+  `permission_state`, `first_name`, `last_name`,
+  `beta_request_reason`, `created_at`,
+  `permission_decided_at`, plus joined
+  `permission_decided_by_login` /
+  `permission_decided_by_display`. Sort order surfaces
+  `pending` rows first (the admin queue), then `granted`,
+  then `revoked`; within a bucket, owners precede admins
+  precede contributors, with recency as the tiebreaker.
+- **`new_beta_request` event_kind** in the §15.1 enum. Fired
+  by `notify.fan_out_new_beta_request` from the first
+  successful `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request` (re-submits
+  from the same pending user don't re-fire — the row's
+  first-time-complete check guards against carpet-bombing).
+  Recipients: every owner + admin minus the requester
+  themselves. Category: `admin-actionable`. Deep-link:
+  `/admin/users`. Actor: the requester per §15.9.
+- **`/admin/users` page enhancements** in `Admin.jsx`. The
+  Users tab gains a state filter chip row (All / Pending /
+  Granted / Revoked with counts), a Grant / Revoke control
+  column, a Permission state badge, and an expandable
+  "why they want access" row beneath each pending user.
+  Sign-up timestamp surfaces in a new column.
+- **`frontend/src/api.js#setUserPermission`** — client for
+  the new endpoint, neighboring `setUserMute` and
+  `setUserRole`.
+- **`/beta-pending` copy update** in `BetaPending.jsx`. The
+  "your request is in review" page now honestly references
+  the admin-email signal v0.9.0 ships and admits the
+  framework does not commit to an SLA — turnaround depends
+  on operator availability, and the deployment operator is
+  the right person to ask if a wait runs long. No
+  deployment-specific text is baked in; per-deployment copy
+  lives in §13 of the deployment's repo, not in the
+  framework.
+- **`backend/tests/test_admin_users_vertical.py`** — 10 new
+  tests covering: a beta-request submission fans
+  notifications to every admin + owner (and not to the
+  requester or to contributors); the requester's profile
+  fields land in the notification payload; re-submitting
+  the capture form does not re-fan; the `admin-actionable`
+  category mapping is wired; the `/api/admin/users`
+  listing carries the v0.8.0 columns with `pending` rows
+  sorted first; the permission-flip endpoint promotes
+  pending → granted with the right audit shape; the
+  endpoint promotes granted → revoked; the endpoint
+  refuses self-flip with 422; the endpoint refuses
+  non-admin callers with 403 and anonymous callers with
+  401; the endpoint refuses invalid states with 422; a
+  state-already-matches flip returns `changed=false`
+  without writing an audit row.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`backend/app/api.py`** — the `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request`
+  handler now calls `notify.fan_out_new_beta_request` after the
+  capture UPDATE lands, gated on the row not previously having
+  all three profile fields populated (so re-submits don't
+  re-fan).
+- **`backend/app/api_admin.py`** — the `list_users` query joins
+  against `users d ON d.id = u.permission_decided_by` for the
+  deciding-admin handle. The new `set_permission` endpoint
+  lives alongside `set_role` / `set_mute`.
+- **`backend/app/notify.py`** — adds
+  `CATEGORY_ADMIN_ACTIONABLE`, the `fan_out_new_beta_request`
+  helper, and the `new_beta_request` arm in `render_summary`.
+- **`backend/app/email.py`** — the `_EVENT_TO_CATEGORY` map
+  carries `new_beta_request → admin-actionable`, and
+  `_deep_link` routes framework-scoped admin signals to
+  `/admin/users` instead of `/rfc/<slug>`.
+- **`frontend/src/components/Admin.jsx`** — the `UsersTab`
+  component is rewritten with state filter chips, a per-row
+  `UserRow` + `PermissionCell` decomposition, and a
+  `useMemo`-cached counts table. The pending-row reason
+  blockquote renders as a secondary `<tr>` beneath the user
+  row when present.
+- **`frontend/src/components/BetaPending.jsx`** — pending-state
+  copy revised to reference the admin email signal honestly.
+- **`frontend/src/App.css`** — new admin-chip / permission-badge
+  / user-row-reason rules.
+- **`SPEC.md`** §6 opening, §15.1 event-kinds enum, §17 admin
+  endpoints, §19.2 candidates list — per §19.3 rule-2.
+- **`VERSION`** → `0.9.0`. `frontend/package.json#version` and
+  the lockfile mirror.
+
+### Environment variables
+
+None new. The release reuses the v0.7.0 SMTP configuration
+(`SMTP_HOST`, `SMTP_PORT`, `SMTP_USER`, `SMTP_PASSWORD`,
+`SMTP_STARTTLS`, `EMAIL_FROM`, `EMAIL_FROM_NAME`,
+`EMAIL_ENABLED`, `EMAIL_BUNDLE_THRESHOLD`) and the existing
+admin-user list (role IN ('owner', 'admin')) as the
+notification recipients. A deployment whose SMTP is misconfigured
+will still see the inbox rows; only the email channel is muted.
+
+### Deferred to later releases
+
+- **Grant / revoke notification to the user** — symmetric
+  signal: when an admin grants or revokes access, fire a
+  `personal-direct` notification (event_kind
+  `permission_change_affecting_me`, already in the §15.1
+  enum) so the affected user sees the state change in
+  their inbox and email. v0.9.0 audits the gesture in
+  `permission_events` but does not yet escape the
+  app-internal log to the user. See §19.2.
+- **Decline-with-reason on revoke** — the current Revoke
+  gesture takes only a confirmation; a follow-up release
+  may capture a free-text reason in
+  `permission_events.details`. See §19.2.
+- **Allowlist deprecation** — the `/admin/allowlist` sub-tab
+  stays in place in v0.9.0 (the two surfaces have different
+  keys and a union row would be confusing). Retiring the
+  table outright is deferred to a session that can re-read
+  the post-v0.9.0 operator experience and decide whether
+  the fast-path-bypass role is still pulling weight. See
+  §19.2.
+
+## 0.8.0 — 2026-05-28
+
+**Minor — schema migration required; admission semantics shift.**
+This release replaces the v0.3.0 / v0.7.0 `allowed_emails` admission
+gate with an admin-grant flow (roadmap item #6, SPEC §6.1 / §6.2 /
+§14.1 / §17). Anyone with a valid email can sign in via the v0.7.0
+OTC flow; the OTC request endpoint no longer consults the
+allowlist. A fresh user lands in `permission_state='pending'` until
+an admin grants access. The first-OTC sign-in captures first name,
+last name, and a free-text "why I should be included in the beta"
+via a new `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request` endpoint; the captured
+fields populate the same `users` row alongside the OAuth-era
+columns.
+
+A pending user has the same read access an anonymous viewer has —
+the catalog, RFC bodies, the philosophy page, and every public
+conversation are reachable. Every write-shaped endpoint
+(`auth.require_contributor` floor) refuses pending users with 403.
+The frontend renders a thin "Your beta access request is in
+review" banner on every page and re-purposes the v0.3.0
+`/beta-pending` page as the post-capture landing surface.
+
+Grandfathered behavior: every `users` row at migration time
+carries `permission_state='granted'` via the column default, so
+existing contributors are unaffected. The OAuth fallback at
+`/auth/callback` still consults the v0.3.0 allowlist (legacy
+path); the OTC flow does not.
+
+The `allowed_emails` table stays in the schema as a fast-path
+bypass — the v0.3.0 admin UI continues to manage it, but the OTC
+request handler no longer reads it. v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7) is
+expected to ship the admin user-management page that replaces the
+allowlist surface entirely; until then, admin grants are done by
+direct DB `UPDATE`.
+
+### Upgrade steps (from 0.13.0)
+
+1. **MUST** restart the backend so migration `014_beta_access.sql`
+   runs. The migration adds `permission_state` (default `'granted'`,
+   so existing rows pass through unaffected), `first_name`,
+   `last_name`, `beta_request_reason`, `permission_decided_by`,
+   and `permission_decided_at` to the `users` table, plus an index
+   on `permission_state` for the pending queue. The migration is
+   ALTER-TABLE-based (no table rebuild) — every foreign key and
+   existing row passes through untouched.
+2. **MUST** rebuild the frontend. The `Login.jsx` surface now
+   runs a conditional third step (the capture form) on fresh OTC
+   sign-ins; `BetaPending.jsx` carries the new "your request is
+   in review" copy; `App.jsx` renders a thin pending-access
+   banner. The build embeds the new `/api/auth/me/beta-request`
+   client call.
+3. **SHOULD** announce the new admission flow to existing users.
+   Wording suggestion: "We've replaced our email-allowlist gate
+   with an admin-review flow. Existing users are unaffected;
+   new visitors sign in with their email, tell us a bit about
+   themselves, and an admin reviews their request before
+   discussion and contribution unlock." Existing sessions
+   remain valid.
+4. **SHOULD** plan the admin grant mechanism. v0.8.0 does not
+   ship a UI for the grant — v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7) will. For
+   the v0.8.0 window, an admin grants access via direct DB
+   gesture:
+   ```sql
+   UPDATE users
+      SET permission_state = 'granted',
+          permission_decided_by = <admin_user_id>,
+          permission_decided_at = datetime('now')
+    WHERE email = '<approved>';
+   ```
+   The pending queue lives in `SELECT * FROM users WHERE
+   permission_state = 'pending' ORDER BY created_at`.
+5. **MUST** decide whether to drain the `allowed_emails` table.
+   The OTC request handler no longer consults it; populated
+   rows are inert at the request surface. Three operator
+   choices, all valid:
+   * **Leave as-is** (the framework's default behavior — the
+     v0.3.0 admin UI continues to work, the rows stay as a
+     fast-path bypass record). Recommended if you anticipate
+     v0.9.0's user-management page folding the allowlist UI
+     into its surface.
+   * **Drain via the existing admin UI** (`/admin/allowlist`)
+     — one row at a time, no data loss elsewhere.
+   * **Bulk-drain via DB** — `DELETE FROM allowed_emails;`
+     drops every row; the table stays.
+6. **MAY** announce write access individually to grandfathered
+   users you want to keep at `'granted'`. The default-`'granted'`
+   migration means no action is required for them; this step
+   exists only if you want to send a "you're still in" message.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`backend/migrations/014_beta_access.sql`** — adds
+  `permission_state` (CHECK in `('pending', 'granted', 'revoked')`,
+  default `'granted'`), `first_name`, `last_name`,
+  `beta_request_reason`, `permission_decided_by` (FK to users,
+  ON DELETE SET NULL), `permission_decided_at` to the `users`
+  table. Plus `idx_users_permission_state` for the pending
+  queue.
+- **`POST /api/auth/me/beta-request`** — body
+  `{first_name, last_name, beta_request_reason}` (all required;
+  bounds 120 / 120 / 4000). Writes the fields to the signed-in
+  user's row and leaves `permission_state='pending'`. Refuses
+  HTTP 409 for already-granted / revoked users; refuses HTTP
+  401 for anonymous callers.
+- **`needs_profile` flag** on the `/auth/otc/verify` response.
+  `true` iff the user is `permission_state='pending'` AND
+  carries no profile fields yet (a fresh OTC sign-in). The
+  Login.jsx surface uses the flag to gate the capture step.
+- **`permission_state` field** on the `/api/auth/me` response,
+  plus `first_name`, `last_name`, `beta_request_reason`, and
+  the same `needs_profile` flag.
+- **First-OTC profile capture step** in `Login.jsx`. Third
+  step in the sign-in surface, gated by the verify response's
+  `needs_profile` flag.
+- **`/beta-pending` repurpose** in `BetaPending.jsx`. The
+  page now reads as "your request is in review" when the
+  viewer is pending; the v0.3.0 "private beta" framing
+  remains as the anonymous-viewer fallback.
+- **Thin pending-access banner** at the top of every page
+  for `permission_state='pending'` viewers (other than
+  `/beta-pending` itself).
+- **SPEC `§6` opening / `§6.1` / `§6.2` / `§14.1` / `§17` /
+  `§19.2`** corrections per §19.3 rule-2 — the admission
+  shift, the orthogonality of permission_state vs role / muted
+  / notification-mutes, the new endpoints, and the
+  newly-surfaced §19.2 candidates (admin user-management page,
+  allowlist deprecation, admin notification on new request).
+- **`backend/tests/test_beta_access_vertical.py`** — 9 new
+  tests covering: a fresh OTC user lands pending with empty
+  profile; the capture endpoint populates the fields and
+  keeps state pending; the capture endpoint refuses
+  anonymous / granted / revoked callers; a pending user is
+  refused write endpoints; an admin grant promotes pending →
+  granted; a grandfathered user is unaffected by the
+  migration; the OTC request endpoint accepts any email
+  regardless of allowlist state; the `allowed_emails` table
+  is still present in the schema.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`backend/app/auth.py#require_contributor`** widens its
+  gate to refuse `permission_state != 'granted'` with HTTP
+  403. The §6.1 contributor capabilities (propose, branch,
+  PR, chat, claim) all funnel through this dependency, so
+  the widening covers them transitively. `SessionUser` now
+  carries `permission_state` (default `'granted'` for the
+  dataclass-default fallback path).
+- **`backend/app/otc.py#request_code`** drops the allowlist
+  check from the OTC request flow. The `RequestOutcome`
+  shape loses the `'allowlist'` reason (replaced by
+  `'sent'` / `'cooldown'` / `'invalid'`).
+- **`backend/app/otc.py#provision_or_link_user`** sets
+  `permission_state='pending'` explicitly on a fresh row.
+  Grandfathered (link-by-email) users pass through with
+  their existing column value.
+- **`backend/app/auth.py#provision_user`** (OAuth fallback)
+  now sets `permission_state='granted'` explicitly on a
+  fresh row. The OAuth callback still consults the
+  `is_allowed_sign_in` allowlist check (the legacy fallback
+  path retains its v0.3.0 admission shape during the OAuth
+  migration window).
+- **`backend/tests/test_otc_vertical.py`** — the
+  `test_otc_request_silently_drops_when_email_not_on_allowlist`
+  test (asserted the v0.7.0 allowlist gate) is replaced by
+  `test_otc_request_admits_emails_regardless_of_allowlist_population`
+  which asserts the v0.8.0 open-request contract. The
+  on-list test stays as a regression net for the
+  rate-limit / outbound-buffer plumbing.
+- **`SPEC.md`** §6 opening, §6.1, §6.2, §14.1, §17, §19.2
+  per §19.3 rule-2.
+- **`VERSION`** → `0.8.0`. `frontend/package.json#version` and
+  the lockfile mirror.
+
+### Deferred to later releases
+
+- **Admin user-management page** at `/admin/users` (item #7,
+  v0.9.0) — replaces the manual DB `UPDATE` gesture.
+- **Allowlist UI deprecation** (also v0.9.0) — once the
+  admin user-management page lands, the `/admin/allowlist`
+  surface and the `allowed_emails` table both retire.
+- **Admin email notification on new beta request** (item #7
+  again, v0.9.0).
+- **Revoke gesture in the UI** — the `permission_state='revoked'`
+  state is wired in the schema and the auth gate; v0.9.0 ships
+  the admin UI that flips the column.
+
 ## 0.7.0 — 2026-05-28
 
 **Minor — schema migration required; new auth path is additive.**
@@ -257,6 +959,7 @@ explicit:
    dependency changes; the operator's role is reduced to rebuild +
    restart.
 
+
 ## 0.5.0 — 2026-05-27
 
 **Minor — no operator action required.** This release wires the
@@ -609,7 +1312,3 @@ names itself.
 - `CLAUDE.md` at the repo root capturing the separation-of-concerns
   rule for working sessions.
 
-## 0.1.0 — v1 build
-
-Initial release. See `docs/DEV.md` for the slicing plan and build
-history.

DOCS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+# Using the RFC app
+
+This is the user-facing guide to the Wiggleverse RFC framework — how to
+read what's here, propose a new RFC, contribute to one that already
+exists, and understand who is allowed to do what.
+
+This guide describes the framework. Individual deployments brand and
+configure themselves independently — the name in the header and the
+corpus the RFCs are about belong to the deployment, not to this
+document.
+
+For the *why* of the framework, read the [philosophy](/philosophy).
+For the binding technical contract, see `SPEC.md` in the repository.
+
+---
+
+## Reading without signing in
+
+You can read the catalog and every public RFC without an account.
+Anonymous visitors can:
+
+- Browse the catalog of super-drafts and active RFCs.
+- Open any RFC and read its canonical body.
+- Read any public branch — its diff and its chat thread.
+- Read any pull request — its diff, its conversation, its review
+  comments.
+- Read the discussion that has accumulated on an RFC's main view.
+
+Reading is open by design. The framework's claim is that the *argument
+behind a definition* is the evidence that the definition was earned,
+and an argument that disappears behind a sign-in wall stops carrying
+that evidence.
+
+What you cannot do without an account: chat, propose a new RFC,
+create a branch, open a PR, drop a flag, or post on a discussion
+thread. Every write affordance is replaced with a sign-in prompt.
+
+---
+
+## Signing in
+
+While the framework is in private beta, only invited email addresses
+can complete sign-in. If your email is on the allowlist, the
+"Sign in" button in the header completes the flow and lands you on
+the catalog with full read and write access. If your email is not on
+the allowlist, you'll be sent to a short "pending" page explaining
+the gate.
+
+Once you have an account, you're a **contributor** by default — the
+role that grants every write affordance the app exposes, scoped by
+the per-RFC and per-branch rules described below.
+
+---
+
+## Proposing a new RFC
+
+A new RFC begins as a proposal. The "+ Propose new RFC" button at
+the bottom of the catalog opens a small modal that collects four
+things:
+
+- **Title.** The word, concept, or topic this RFC would define.
+- **Slug.** A kebab-cased identifier derived from the title. It is
+  the entry's stable handle from this moment until it graduates;
+  collisions with existing entries or open proposals are caught
+  inline.
+- **Pitch.** One or two paragraphs answering *why this RFC is
+  needed*. This becomes the body of the entry.
+- **Tags.** Optional. The AI suggests tags from the pitch; you can
+  accept, dismiss, or type your own.
+
+Submitting the modal does one concrete thing: it opens a pull
+request against the framework's meta repository, adding one new
+file under `rfcs/`. There is no other Git artifact and no other
+side-effect. You are returned to the **pending-idea view** for the
+new proposal.
+
+A pending idea is publicly readable but not yet a super-draft. The
+catalog surfaces it in a "Pending ideas" disclosure at the bottom
+of the list. A conversation can accumulate on the pending-idea view
+before it is admitted — contributors can argue, in public, about
+whether the entry belongs in the catalog at all.
+
+Three outcomes are possible:
+
+- **Merge.** An admin or owner merges the proposal PR. The entry
+  becomes a super-draft and graduates from the "Pending ideas"
+  section into the main catalog. Any conversation that accumulated
+  on the pending-idea view migrates with it.
+- **Decline.** An admin or owner declines, attaching a written
+  comment. You see the comment on your next visit, along with a
+  one-click affordance to revise and re-propose.
+- **Withdraw.** You can withdraw your own proposal at any time. The
+  entry will not appear in any default view; the conversation that
+  accumulated stays attached to the closed PR as historical record.
+
+You are automatically the first owner of any RFC you propose. The
+claim flow described under [Roles & permissions](#roles--permissions)
+is for *other* contributors to add themselves as owners later, not
+for the proposer.
+
+---
+
+## What a super-draft is
+
+A super-draft is an entry that has been admitted to the catalog but
+does not yet have its own dedicated repository. Most of the
+argument that shapes a definition happens here. The framework
+assumes — and the philosophy explicitly invites — that many
+super-drafts will not survive the argument, and that is fine. The
+entries that do survive earn their place in the catalog by being
+defensible in public.
+
+Opening a super-draft from the catalog gives you the same surface
+an active RFC uses:
+
+- The canonical body in the centre, read-only by default.
+- A chat thread on the right where the public conversation lives.
+- A breadcrumb dropdown listing any in-flight edit branches and
+  any open body-edit PRs against this entry.
+- A "Start Contributing" affordance that cuts a fresh edit branch
+  and lands you in contribute mode.
+
+Edits to a super-draft body propagate through pull requests against
+the meta repository — there is no dedicated RFC repository yet.
+
+---
+
+## What an active RFC is
+
+An active RFC is an entry that has been **graduated**. It has its
+own dedicated repository, an integer `RFC-NNNN` identifier, and a
+canonical body file (`RFC.md`) inside that repository. The catalog
+distinguishes super-drafts and active RFCs at a glance.
+
+Opening an active RFC gives you:
+
+- `main` — the canonical body, always read-only. Changes to `main`
+  arrive exclusively through pull requests.
+- A breadcrumb listing every open branch and pull request on this
+  RFC.
+- A per-branch chat thread on the right. Each branch has its own
+  conversation, including `main` itself.
+- A "Start Contributing" affordance: on `main` it cuts a new branch
+  and lands you on it in contribute mode; on any other branch you
+  already have push access to, it flips that branch into
+  contribute mode.
+
+---
+
+## Discussion vs contribution
+
+The framework draws an explicit distinction between two surfaces
+that other tools tend to conflate:
+
+- **Discussion** is what the RFC is *for*. The chat thread on an
+  RFC's main view is the place for "what about this part?" or
+  "have we considered…?" questions that don't yet warrant proposing
+  a specific edit. Posting on a discussion thread does not create
+  any Git artifact; the conversation lives in the app database.
+- **Contribution** is how an RFC *changes*. Editing the canonical
+  body requires opening a branch and, eventually, a pull request.
+  The pull request is the place a specific proposed change is
+  reviewed and merged.
+
+Reading both surfaces is open to anonymous visitors. Posting on
+either requires a contributor account.
+
+---
+
+## Working on a branch
+
+Contribute mode flips one branch into edit-enabled. The centre
+column splits: a markdown source pane on the left, a live-rendered
+preview on the right. Fenced `mermaid` blocks render as diagrams in
+the preview.
+
+Two kinds of edits accumulate on a branch:
+
+- **AI-proposed changes.** You ask the AI a question or request a
+  revision in the branch's chat. When the AI proposes a concrete
+  edit, that edit appears as a *change card* in a panel below the
+  chat — not yet applied to the document. You can **accept**,
+  **decline**, or **edit before accepting**. Accepting produces
+  one commit on the branch with the original text, the proposed
+  text, and the AI's reason recorded in the commit body.
+- **Manual edits.** Typing directly into the source pane buffers
+  locally and flushes as a single commit on an idle window, a
+  branch switch, or an explicit "Save now" button. Manual edits
+  also appear as change cards in the same panel — same evidence
+  shape, different author.
+
+Every accepted change is one commit. The framework does not
+support squash-merges or fixup-style cleanups: the per-change
+commit granularity is the framework's evidence unit, and
+collapsing it would erase what was earned.
+
+### Discuss mode vs contribute mode
+
+A branch defaults to discuss mode — read-only, with chat enabled.
+AI proposals still appear in chat, but they are *buffered* rather
+than applied; a single CTA invites you to flip the branch into
+contribute mode if you want to act on them. The toggle is an
+*intent* affordance, not a permission one. If you don't have push
+access to the branch, the toggle is disabled with a sign-in or
+request-access path.
+
+`main` is special: contribute mode is never available there. The
+"Start Contributing" button on `main` always cuts a new branch.
+
+### Flags
+
+Anywhere you can read, you can drop a flag. A flag is the
+lightweight "I'm pointing at this, it's a problem" gesture — a
+single short declarative statement anchored to a passage. Creating
+a flag requires a contributor account but does not require push
+access to the branch: any signed-in contributor who can read a
+passage can point at it and say it's wrong.
+
+Flags don't block PR merges by design — making them a merge gate
+would re-create the failure mode where contributors hastily "resolve"
+threads to unblock a button. Flags are prominent on PR headers but
+non-blocking.
+
+### Branch visibility
+
+A new branch is publicly readable by default. The branch creator
+can flip a branch to private, in which case only the creator, any
+explicit grantees, and the RFC's per-RFC owners and arbiters can
+read it. Owners and arbiters can flip it back.
+
+**Opening a PR makes the branch fully public.** If your branch is
+currently private, the "Open PR" affordance asks you to confirm
+this before submitting. There is no concept of a private PR — the
+framework's evidence claim depends on the argument being readable.
+
+### Who can push to a branch
+
+Every branch has one of three contribute modes:
+
+- **`just-me`** (default) — only the branch creator can push.
+- **`specific`** — only the branch creator and explicitly granted
+  contributors can push.
+- **`any-contributor`** — any signed-in contributor can push.
+
+The branch creator and the RFC's per-RFC owners and arbiters can
+change this setting at any time.
+
+### Branch hygiene
+
+A branch with no associated PR auto-closes after 30 days of
+inactivity. A closed branch is deleted from the Git host 60 days
+later. Closed branches remain in the catalog under a "show closed"
+filter — closing is a state, not a censorship event. The chat
+attached to a closed or deleted branch is preserved as historical
+record.
+
+Owners and arbiters can *pin* a branch to disable the auto-close
+timer if the work is paused but legitimately ongoing.
+
+---
+
+## Opening and reviewing a pull request
+
+A pull request is the deliberate "ready for review" gesture for
+work that has accumulated on a branch. The "Open PR" affordance is
+available on any branch with at least one commit ahead of `main`.
+
+The PR creation modal collects two AI-drafted fields, both editable
+before submit:
+
+- **Title.** A one-line description of the change, in spec voice.
+- **Description.** Two to four sentences pulling from the branch
+  chat, written for an arbiter.
+
+There is no reviewer picker. The RFC's arbiters are the implicit
+reviewer set.
+
+### The PR review page
+
+The review page shows the diff, the branch's compressed chat
+(messages that produced accepted changes are expanded, the rest is
+behind a "Show full conversation" toggle), and the review-comment
+surface inline below the chat.
+
+Review comments are not a separate concept from chat — they live in
+the same thread, anchored to a range in the diff. The framework's
+claim is that the disagreement an arbiter raises about a proposed
+change is the same *kind* of thing as the disagreement that
+produced the proposed change in the first place, and the two should
+share a surface.
+
+Each PR records a per-user seen-cursor. New diff hunks and new
+conversation messages since your last visit render with a subtle
+accent. The cursor advances on view; you do not have to mark
+anything as read.
+
+### Merging a PR
+
+Per-RFC owners and arbiters can merge; app-wide admins and owners
+also retain this capability. The merge produces a no-fast-forward
+commit on `main`, preserving every per-acceptance commit as an
+individually reachable node in `main`'s history.
+
+Merge is hard-blocked **only** by Git-level conflicts with `main`.
+Open review threads, pending change-cards, unresolved chat threads,
+and open flags do not block merge by design.
+
+### Conflicts with main
+
+A conflict surfaces on the PR page as a read-only banner. A "Start
+resolution branch" affordance cuts a fresh branch off `main`'s
+current tip, replays the work into it (asking the AI to resolve
+unambiguous conflicts, surfacing the rest for you), and opens a new
+PR. The original PR auto-closes when the resolution PR merges.
+
+Fixup commits on the existing branch are not supported. Per-change
+commit granularity is the framework's evidence unit; admitting
+"fix merge conflict with main" commits would dilute it.
+
+---
+
+## Graduation: super-draft → active RFC
+
+Graduation is the moment a super-draft becomes a canonical entry
+in the catalog. It is initiated by an app-wide admin, an app-wide
+owner, or one of the RFC's per-RFC owners or arbiters from the
+super-draft's page.
+
+Two preconditions block the action:
+
+- **The super-draft must have at least one owner.** The proposer
+  is automatically the first owner; if they have stepped away, any
+  contributor can use the "Claim ownership" affordance to add
+  themselves.
+- **No open body-edit PRs against the super-draft's entry.** An
+  open body-edit PR would attempt to re-introduce a body to a
+  frontmatter-only entry after graduation runs. Merge or withdraw
+  them first.
+
+When the dialog confirms, the framework runs a transactional
+sequence: create a fresh Git repository for the RFC, seed it with
+the super-draft's body as `RFC.md`, update the meta-repo entry to
+`state: active` with the integer ID and the new repository's URL,
+auto-merge that update. If any step fails partway, the sequence
+rolls back — the half-created repository is deleted and the
+unmerged update is abandoned. The dialog shows each step in flight
+and tells you exactly what happened.
+
+The chat thread on the super-draft moves to the new repository's
+`main` chat at graduation. Edit-branch chats from the super-draft
+phase stay attached to their original branches on the meta repo
+and surface from the new RFC view under a "Pre-graduation history"
+section.
+
+Graduation is not reversible. The path forward from an active RFC
+is withdrawal, not back to super-draft.
+
+---
+
+## Withdrawing and reopening
+
+An active RFC or a super-draft can be withdrawn by the proposer
+(for a super-draft they proposed) or by an admin or owner. A
+withdrawn entry stays in the catalog as a historical record but is
+hidden from default views. The entry is filterable back in.
+
+An admin or owner can reopen a withdrawn entry back into the
+super-draft state. The history is preserved across the transition.
+
+---
+
+## AI in the chat
+
+The chat on every RFC, super-draft, branch, and PR has an AI
+participant by default. The framework treats the AI as one voice
+among many in a public argument — not an oracle, and not a
+co-author whose name lands on commits.
+
+You invoke the AI by writing into the chat composer and submitting.
+Each message can pick a model from the picker (the option list is
+configurable per RFC). The AI responds in the chat; when its
+response includes a concrete change to the document, that change
+appears as a card you can accept, decline, or edit.
+
+When you accept an AI's proposed change, the commit's
+`On-behalf-of:` trailer names *you*, not the AI. The AI's authorship
+survives only as evidence — the original proposal in the commit body
+and the message that produced it in the chat record. The framework
+is explicit about this: AI participation produces evidence; it does
+not produce authorship.
+
+Two configuration knobs scope AI participation per RFC:
+
+- **Which models are available.** The meta-repo entry's frontmatter
+  carries an optional `models:` list. Absent means the RFC inherits
+  whatever models the deployment is provisioned to run. An empty
+  list (`models: []`) opts the RFC out of AI entirely — every AI
+  surface is absent rather than disabled-but-present.
+- **Whose credentials pay.** By default the deployment operator's
+  API credentials cover AI calls on every RFC. A `funder:`
+  frontmatter field can name a single contributor whose registered
+  credentials pay for AI calls on this RFC instead. The named
+  contributor must explicitly consent from their settings page;
+  either side can revoke at any time.
+
+Per-RFC AI configuration is edited through the meta-repo PR flow
+that governs the rest of the entry's frontmatter — by the RFC's
+per-RFC owners and arbiters, or by app-wide admins or owners.
+
+---
+
+## Notifications
+
+The framework's public-async work model produces signals that
+shouldn't all reach you the same way. Five surfaces compose:
+
+- **In-app inbox.** The durable triage surface. One mental space
+  across every RFC you have any relationship to, with per-RFC and
+  per-category filters. Reachable from the inbox icon in the
+  header.
+- **Badges.** Ambient pull-ins. A single integer beside the inbox
+  icon (count of unread notifications). A small binary dot on
+  individual catalog rows for watched RFCs with unseen activity.
+  No per-row counts and no per-section counts.
+- **Toasts.** Transient mid-session signals. Used only for your own
+  actions completing, and for events arriving on the view you're
+  currently looking at.
+- **Email.** The single channel that escapes the app. Opt-in per
+  category, conservative defaults. One-click unsubscribe per
+  category.
+- **Digest.** Aggregation for activity on watched RFCs you haven't
+  triaged through any other channel.
+
+### Watch states
+
+Every RFC has one of three implicit relationship states for you:
+
+- **Watching.** You receive structural signals for the RFC.
+- **Following.** You receive only churn-grade signals (new
+  commits, new chat messages on threads you didn't participate
+  in). This is a lighter relationship than watching.
+- **Muted.** You receive no signals for the RFC. The mute is
+  per-RFC and self-imposed; it does not affect what others see
+  or what reaches you on *other* RFCs.
+
+Watch states transition automatically based on your participation,
+with explicit overrides available from each RFC's header and from
+the notification settings page.
+
+### Email categories
+
+Four categories with distinct defaults:
+
+- **Personal-direct events** — default on. Signals where you are
+  the named subject. The contract is that when your name is on the
+  action, the framework reaches out of band.
+- **Watched-RFC structural events** — default off. PR opened on a
+  watched RFC, PR merged, graduation, withdrawal. Inbox and badges
+  carry these by default; the email toggle is opt-in.
+- **Watched-RFC churn** — permanently off, by design. Per-commit
+  and per-message email is intentionally not offered. The digest
+  aggregates this activity weekly.
+- **Admin-actionable events** — default on for admins and owners,
+  unused for contributors.
+
+### Quiet hours
+
+You can set a daily window during which email notifications are
+held. Messages held during the window are released at window end —
+bundled into a single "Activity while you were away" email if a
+threshold accumulated, otherwise sent individually.
+
+---
+
+## Roles & permissions
+
+Authorization in this framework is owned by the app itself, not by
+the Git host. The Git host sees only a single bot account — every
+commit, every PR, every merge passes through it on a user's behalf
+— and the *app* decides which users are authorized to ask the bot
+to do which things.
+
+### The four app-wide roles
+
+Each role is a strict superset of the one below it.
+
+1. **Anonymous.** Anyone who has not signed in. Can read public
+   RFCs, public branches, and public PRs; cannot chat, propose,
+   create branches, or open PRs.
+
+2. **Contributor.** The default role for any authenticated
+   account. Adds everything anonymous can do, plus: propose new
+   RFCs, create branches on any RFC repository, open PRs from
+   branches they have push access to, post on chat anywhere they
+   can read, claim ownership of unclaimed super-drafts.
+
+3. **Admin.** Adds the ability to act on any RFC, anywhere in the
+   framework. Concretely: merge any PR on any RFC, graduate any
+   super-draft, set branch visibility on anyone's behalf, withdraw
+   or reopen any entry, write-mute or restore any contributor,
+   grant or revoke the **admin** role.
+
+4. **Owner.** Adds two capabilities admin does not have: grant or
+   revoke the **owner** role itself, and disable an account
+   entirely. The framework names a single "owner zero" at
+   bootstrap.
+
+The practical difference between admin and owner is narrow but
+load-bearing: admin is the operational tier — it does the day-to-
+day moderation and stewardship work; owner is the tier that
+controls the admin tier. Disabling an account and creating other
+owners are owner-only because they affect the framework's chain of
+authority itself.
+
+The app refuses to let the last owner demote themselves silently —
+losing the last owner would leave nobody able to grant the role
+back. Role changes are recorded in an append-only `permission_events`
+log; an admin's own admin/users page shows the log of who promoted,
+demoted, or muted whom.
+
+### Per-RFC delegated authority
+
+The four roles above are framework-wide. Within an individual RFC,
+the meta-repo entry's frontmatter names two additional groups:
+
+- **`owners:`** — contributors elevated for this RFC. They can
+  grant push access on any branch in the RFC, merge any PR on the
+  RFC, change branch visibility, and withdraw the RFC.
+- **`arbiters:`** — contributors with merge authority for this RFC.
+  Functionally similar to per-RFC owners for merge decisions; the
+  distinction matters in some configuration paths.
+
+Per-RFC owners and arbiters are **not** app-wide admins. Their
+elevated powers are scoped strictly to the RFC named in the
+frontmatter. This is what lets the framework distribute work
+without putting one person on the hook for every action.
+
+The proposer of an RFC is automatically the first per-RFC owner.
+Additional per-RFC owners are added through a "Claim ownership"
+PR against the meta repository; app-wide admins or owners merge
+it.
+
+### Per-branch contribute grants
+
+Within an RFC, the branch creator and the RFC's per-RFC owners
+and arbiters can grant push access to specific contributors on a
+specific branch — `specific` contribute mode, described under
+"Working on a branch."
+
+### The write-mute
+
+An app-wide admin or owner can **mute** a contributor. A muted
+account retains read access and keeps its existing branches, but
+cannot create new branches, open new PRs, propose new RFCs, or
+post chat. This is a moderation tool, distinct from removing the
+account; restoring is the reverse gesture.
+
+The write-mute applies only to contributors. Promoting a user to
+admin or owner is the way to remove a user's write-restriction in
+the structural sense; the write-mute is for *retaining* an account
+while removing its ability to act.
+
+Every mute and every restore is recorded in `permission_events`.
+
+### Three different "mutes"
+
+The word "mute" appears in three structurally distinct places.
+They share a word and nothing else.
+
+- **Write-mute.** Admin-imposed. Removes a contributor's ability
+  to post or push. Described above.
+- **Per-RFC notification mute.** Self-imposed. Sets your watch
+  state on a specific RFC to *muted* — you stop receiving signals
+  for that RFC, in inbox, badges, and email. Does not affect what
+  others see.
+- **Per-user notification mute.** Self-imposed. Suppresses
+  notifications produced by a specific other user, anywhere in
+  the framework. Notification-volume only — it does not affect
+  what you can read.
+
+A write-muted contributor continues to receive notifications
+normally, so they can triage what they can't act on, and so a
+restore lands cleanly.
+
+### Audit trail
+
+Every gesture that changes app state — role changes, mutes,
+graduations, withdrawals, grant changes — is recorded in
+append-only logs the app maintains. Git commit history is for
+code archaeology; the app's audit log is the accountability
+record. An admin's page surfaces both `permission_events` (the
+role/mute log) and `actions` (the state-transition log) for
+review.
+
+---
+
+## Where to learn more
+
+- The framework's *why* lives in [the philosophy
+  document](/philosophy).
+- The binding technical contract — section numbers (`§n.n`)
+  referenced throughout this guide — is in `SPEC.md` in the
+  framework's source repository.
+- Deployment operators have their own recipe in
+  `docs/DEPLOYMENTS.md`.

SPEC.md

@@ -332,6 +332,13 @@ and exact columns are illustrative; the implementing session can adjust.
 - `actions` — append-only audit log for every state transition, every
   graduation, every grant change. Includes the acting user, the bot
   commit hash if any, and the on-behalf-of trailer applied.
+- `cookie_consent` — per-user record of the §14.5 cookie consent
+  choice. One row per user. Columns: `user_id` (PK, FK users), three
+  flags (`essential`, `analytics`, `other_cookies`), and
+  `recorded_at`. `essential` is permanently 1; `recorded_at` is set
+  on first write and updated on every change. Absence of a row means
+  "no choice yet" — the banner shows. Anonymous viewers persist their
+  choice in `localStorage` only, with no corresponding row here.
 
 **Super-draft scoping.** For rows in `threads` and `changes` where the
 entry referenced by `rfc_slug` is in state `super-draft`, `branch_name`
@@ -349,18 +356,65 @@ merge with no data movement.
 
 Authorization is owned by the app. Gitea sees only the bot account.
 
-Authentication, as of v0.7.0, is by email + one-time-code: a visitor
+Authentication has three paths, in the order a visitor encounters
-enters their email address, receives a six-digit code via SMTP, and
+them:
-exchanges the code for a session. The Gitea OAuth callback that
+
-v0.1 used as the human sign-in path remains as a migration fallback
+1. **Email + one-time code (OTC).** The v0.7.0 primary path: a
-during the v0.7.0 window — `users.gitea_id` is preserved on existing
+   visitor enters their email address, receives a six-digit code via
-rows so a grandfathered user signing in via either path resolves to
+   SMTP, and exchanges the code for a session. Used by every visitor
-the same row — but the primary surface points at OTC. `users.email`
+   on first sign-in, and as the fallback for the other two paths.
-is the identity key for everything provisioned after v0.7.0;
+2. **Email + passcode (with OTC fallback).** Added in v0.10.0
-`users.gitea_id` is the grandfathering linker (nullable, partial-
+   (roadmap item #8). After a successful OTC sign-in, the visitor
-unique). The Gitea bot user + token are still required for server-
+   may set a user-chosen passcode (4–20 characters, bcrypt-hashed at
-side git operations (repo reads, PR creation); only the operator-
+   rest) and use email + passcode on subsequent sign-ins. Five
-facing sign-in surface moved.
+   consecutive failed verifies lock the passcode path for 15 minutes
+   (HTTP 423); during the lockout the user falls back to OTC. The
+   OTC path is unaffected by the passcode lockout, so a forgotten
+   passcode is recovered by requesting a fresh OTC — there is no
+   separate "forgot passcode" flow. The user can remove the passcode
+   at any time from the §6.2 sign-in settings tab, returning to
+   OTC-only.
+3. **Gitea OAuth fallback (migration only).** The v0.1 OAuth
+   callback remains functional during the v0.7.0 window, with a
+   small "Sign in with Gitea (fallback)" link on `/login` so users
+   with active OAuth sessions or older invite paths still have a
+   way in. Scheduled for removal in a future release per §19.2.
+
+`users.gitea_id` is preserved on existing rows so a grandfathered
+user signing in via any of the three paths resolves to the same row.
+`users.email` is the identity key for everything provisioned after
+v0.7.0; `users.gitea_id` is the grandfathering linker (nullable,
+partial-unique). The Gitea bot user + token are still required for
+server-side git operations (repo reads, PR creation); only the
+operator-facing sign-in surface moved.
+
+Admission, as of v0.8.0, is by admin grant. v0.7.0 carried the
+v0.3.0 `allowed_emails` table forward as the admission gate at the
+OTC request surface — emails not on the list got a silent drop.
+v0.8.0 (roadmap item #6) reverses that: any valid email receives an
+OTC, the fresh `users` row lands in `permission_state='pending'`,
+and an admin grant flips the column to `'granted'` before write
+endpoints accept the user. The capture-fields step (first name,
+last name, free-text "why I should be included in the beta") feeds
+the admin's triage queue. The `allowed_emails` table stays in the
+schema as a fast-path bypass — the v0.3.0 admin UI still manages
+it — but the OTC request path no longer consults it. v0.9.0
+(roadmap item #7) shipped the user-management surface that
+consumes the `permission_state` column: `/admin/users` carries
+every user with their state, profile, and sign-up reason, plus
+Grant / Revoke controls that flip the column and write a
+`permission_events` audit row. The capture-form submission also
+fans a `new_beta_request` notification out to every admin/owner
+through the §15 substrate, so the queue surfaces in the inbox +
+email channels admins already have.
+
+The `/admin/allowlist` sub-tab stays in place alongside
+`/admin/users` rather than merging: the two surfaces have
+different keys (allowlist by email pre-sign-up, user list by
+user_id post-sign-up) and a union row would be confusing rather
+than clarifying. The allowlist's role narrowed to "fast-path
+bypass for known-good emails" with the v0.8.0 admission shift;
+v0.9.0 retains that role unchanged.
 
 ### 6.1 Four roles, each a strict superset of the one below
 
@@ -378,10 +432,14 @@ facing sign-in surface moved.
    surface remain open per the v0.3.0 contract.
 2. **Contributor.** Default role for any authenticated account. A
    first OTC sign-in by a previously unknown email provisions a row
-   at this role; v0.7.0 keeps the v0.3.0 allowlist gate (`allowed_emails`)
+   at this role; v0.8.0 replaced the v0.3.0 / v0.7.0 allowlist gate
-   as the admission control, deferring the open beta-access request
+   with an admin-grant flow (roadmap item #6, see opening of §6).
-   flow to a later release. Everything anonymous can do, plus:
+   The contributor capabilities below — propose, branch, PR, chat,
-   propose new RFCs (open a PR against the meta repo), create
+   claim — are gated by `users.permission_state='granted'` as well
+   as by the role. A pending contributor (the post-OTC waiting
+   state) has the same read access as anonymous and zero write
+   capability until an admin grants. Everything anonymous can do,
+   plus: propose new RFCs (open a PR against the meta repo), create
    branches on any RFC repo, open PRs from branches they have
    contribute access to, chat on anything they can read, claim
    ownership of unclaimed super-drafts.
@@ -423,6 +481,38 @@ triage what they can't act on, and the restore lands cleanly); a
 self-DND'd contributor's own gestures continue to fire signals to
 others normally.
 
+v0.8.0 adds a fourth structurally-distinct field on the same row:
+`users.permission_state` (the admission gate the v0.8.0 release
+ships, see opening of §6 and §6.1). The four — role, muted,
+permission_state, the notification mutes — are orthogonal and the
+gate semantics compose:
+
+  * `role` answers "what scope of action is this user authorized to
+    perform if they're admitted at all?" (anonymous / contributor /
+    admin / owner).
+  * `muted` answers "is this contributor write-restricted by an
+    admin gesture against their existing grant?" (a sanctions
+    primitive — owner/admin imposed).
+  * `permission_state` answers "is this user admitted to the beta
+    at all?" (the v0.8.0 admin-grant gate — 'pending' / 'granted' /
+    'revoked'). The default for grandfathered rows at migration time
+    is `'granted'`; OTC freshly provisions `'pending'`.
+  * The notification mutes answer "does this user want to receive
+    signals about a particular RFC or from a particular other
+    user?" (self-imposed preference).
+
+The four never gate each other. A pending user with `role=owner`
+(impossible by construction in v0.8.0 — fresh OTC always provisions
+role=contributor — but the orthogonality holds at the column level)
+would still refuse write endpoints because the admission gate
+runs first; a granted contributor whose row is also muted refuses
+writes via the mute gate; a granted contributor with notification
+mutes set still passes the contributor gate and writes normally.
+v0.6.0's anon-write audit (item #4) is the structural floor for all
+four — every write-shaped endpoint funnels through
+`auth.require_contributor`, which checks all three of {authenticated,
+not muted, permission_state='granted'} in order.
+
 ### 6.3 Per-RFC delegated authority
 
 An RFC's `owners:` and `arbiters:` (from the meta-repo entry's
@@ -1978,11 +2068,48 @@ with Gitea"; v0.7.0's email/OTC surface replaced that as the primary
 gesture, with a small "Sign in with Gitea (fallback)" link surviving
 on `/login` itself for the migration window.
 
+`/login` itself is a stepped surface, driven by which auth path the
+viewer is currently on (§6):
+
+1. **Email step.** The viewer enters their email. The frontend
+   consults `GET /auth/passcode/check?email=…` to learn whether
+   this email has a passcode set. The check endpoint is
+   account-enumeration-safe — it returns `has_passcode: false` for
+   both "unknown email" and "known email without passcode", so a
+   probing client cannot distinguish the two from the response.
+2. **Either the passcode step or the OTC code step.** If the email
+   has a passcode set, the viewer is asked for it (v0.10.0).
+   Otherwise an OTC is dispatched and the viewer is asked for the
+   six-digit code from their email (v0.7.0).
+3. **Optional post-OTC passcode-offer step.** After a successful
+   OTC verify on an account with no passcode set, the surface
+   asks "Set a passcode for faster sign-in next time?" — the user
+   can dismiss the offer or set one inline. The skip-for-now path
+   redirects straight to `/`.
+
+The passcode step carries a "Use a code instead" link that
+re-dispatches an OTC and switches to the code step — the same path
+the lockout response (HTTP 423) takes automatically after five
+consecutive failed passcode verifies.
+
 This is the front door. It sets expectation before the user encounters
 the mechanics, so the mechanics (super-drafts, graduation, public
 arguments, AI participation in chat) read as load-bearing rather than
 novel.
 
+v0.8.0 (roadmap item #6) added a third sign-in step the surface
+runs conditionally — on the first OTC sign-in by a previously
+unknown email, the verify response carries `needs_profile=true`
+and the surface prompts for first name, last name, and a free-text
+"why I should be included in the beta" before bouncing the user to
+`/beta-pending`. The page displays a "your request is in review"
+message keyed on `users.permission_state='pending'` (repurposed
+from the v0.3.0 post-OAuth-rejection surface). Anonymous viewers
+and pending viewers see the same read surfaces; only the write
+affordances differ. A persistent thin "Your beta access is in
+review" banner shows on every page (other than `/beta-pending`
+itself) until an admin grants access.
+
 ### 14.2 The `/philosophy` route
 
 Authenticated and anonymous visitors alike can reach `/philosophy`,
@@ -2014,6 +2141,92 @@ The visual design of the landing page and the `/philosophy` route —
 typography, layout, illustrations if any — is deferred. The structural
 decisions above are the binding part.
 
+### 14.5 Cookie / privacy consent (v0.13.0)
+
+The framework ships a non-modal cookie consent banner reachable by
+every viewer — authenticated and anonymous alike. The banner appears
+at the bottom of the viewport on first load and stays visible until
+the user makes a choice, after which it hides and the choice is
+persisted. The `/settings/notifications` page carries a "Privacy &
+cookies" tab that surfaces the current choice and re-opens the banner
+on demand.
+
+The choice has three categories, presented as a single-select:
+
+- **Essential only** — the framework's strictly-necessary cookies
+  (sign-in session, signed payloads, the consent-choice record
+  itself). Always on; the user cannot switch this off because the
+  app cannot function without it.
+- **Essential + analytics** — adds the optional analytics layer
+  gated by this choice. As of v0.13.0 no analytics SDK ships in the
+  framework; roadmap item #13 (v0.15.0) lands one behind this gate.
+  Off by default — the user has to opt in.
+- **Essential + analytics + other** — adds third-party embeds or
+  social widgets a deployment may configure. The framework ships no
+  such cookies by default; this category exists so deployments that
+  add them have a categorized opt-in to wire them behind.
+
+Storage shape:
+
+- **Anonymous viewer** — choice persists in `localStorage` only
+  (`rfc-app.cookie-consent.v1`). The same browser carries the choice
+  forward; a different browser, or cleared storage, re-prompts.
+- **Authenticated viewer** — choice persists in the `cookie_consent`
+  row keyed by `user_id`. On sign-in, the server row (if present)
+  overrides the local snapshot; if the server has no row, the local
+  choice is uploaded.
+
+The `essential` flag is permanently true at the API surface. The
+endpoint accepts it for symmetry but never persists a false value.
+A deployment that wants strictly-necessary cookies to be optional
+must change the framework contract, not flip a flag.
+
+The framework exports a small JavaScript helper (`frontend/src/lib/
+consent.js`) for downstream surfaces:
+
+- `getConsent()` — current snapshot.
+- `hasChosen()` — true once the user has made a choice.
+- `onConsentChange(cb)` — subscribe to updates.
+- `setConsent({analytics, other})` — record a new choice locally
+  (the banner / settings surface handles server persistence on top).
+
+Roadmap item #13's analytics SDK (v0.15.0) will read from this helper:
+read consent, then conditionally `import()` the SDK module. The gate
+is wired before the SDK lands so the contract is already in place.
+
+### 14.6 Privacy and cookies policy pages
+
+The framework ships two policy routes:
+
+- `/privacy` — a minimal default privacy policy that describes the
+  framework's stance (what is stored, why, how to revoke consent,
+  how to reach the deployment operator). The page is reachable by
+  anonymous and authenticated viewers alike.
+- `/cookies` — the framework's cookies policy, listing exactly which
+  cookies the framework sets, by category. Self-documenting: a future
+  framework release that adds or removes a cookie updates this page
+  as part of the change.
+
+Each page links to the other and to the §14.5 banner. The consent
+banner links to both.
+
+Deployments override the policy content via two optional build-time
+env vars documented in `frontend/.env.example`:
+
+- `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` — an http(s) URL the `/privacy` page
+  links to as the "full deployment policy". The framework's stub
+  always renders above the link so the framework-level contract is
+  always visible; the link layers deployment-specific content on
+  top.
+- `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL` — same shape for `/cookies`.
+
+Both are optional. Unset is the supported default; the stub pages are
+sufficient for a default-config deployment that has nothing
+deployment-specific to add. The framework chose the env-var path over
+a content-repo file because it composes with the existing build-time
+config layer; the content-repo-file alternative is the §19.2
+candidate.
+
 ---
 
 ## 15. Notifications
@@ -2087,8 +2300,14 @@ signal taxonomy this section commits to. The starting set:
 `graduation_complete`, `graduation_rolled_back`, `rfc_withdrawn`,
 `rfc_reopened`, `claim_opened`, `claim_merged`,
 `permission_change_affecting_me`, `app_wide_mute_set`,
-`app_wide_mute_lifted`, `digest_emitted`. The enum is extensible; the
+`app_wide_mute_lifted`, `new_beta_request`, `digest_emitted`.
-build session adjusts as new gestures are wired in.
+The enum is extensible; the build session adjusts as new gestures
+are wired in. The `new_beta_request` event (v0.9.0, roadmap item
+#7) is framework-scoped rather than RFC-scoped — the row's
+`rfc_slug` is NULL and the deep-link points `/admin/users`
+instead of `/rfc/<slug>` — but otherwise rides the standard
+fan-out chokepoint with category `admin-actionable` so the §15.4
+email gate only reaches owners/admins.
 
 ### 15.2 The inbox
 
@@ -2533,25 +2752,77 @@ The follow-up session will refine this. A minimal starting set:
 - `POST /auth/otc/request` — unauthenticated. Body carries `email`.
   Generates a six-digit code, stores its bcrypt hash with an expiry
   (`OTC_TTL_MINUTES`, default 10), and dispatches a plain-text email
-  via the SMTP layer. Returns HTTP 200 (`{ok:true}`) uniformly so
+  via the SMTP layer. Returns HTTP 200 (`{ok:true}`) uniformly.
-  allowlist state (§6.1 / §6.2) is not leaked to callers. Returns
+  Returns HTTP 429 when the per-email cooldown
-  HTTP 429 when the per-email cooldown (`OTC_REQUEST_COOLDOWN_SECONDS`,
+  (`OTC_REQUEST_COOLDOWN_SECONDS`, default 60) blocks back-to-back
-  default 60) blocks back-to-back requests — the loud-failure shape
+  requests — the loud-failure shape for the abuse path. A re-request
-  for the abuse path. A re-request invalidates the prior unused
+  invalidates the prior unused code for the same email so only one
-  code for the same email so only one code is outstanding at a time.
+  code is outstanding at a time. v0.7.0 also dropped requests
-  Per §19.2's expected next session, this endpoint is the lead-up
+  silently if the email wasn't on the `allowed_emails` list (the
-  to the Cloudflare-Turnstile abuse-mitigation overlay.
+  v0.3.0 admission gate); v0.8.0 (item #6) removed that check —
+  admission moved to `permission_state` on the freshly-provisioned
+  `users` row, asserted at the contributor gate. Per §19.2's
+  expected next session, this endpoint is the lead-up to the
+  Cloudflare-Turnstile abuse-mitigation overlay.
 - `POST /auth/otc/verify` — unauthenticated. Body carries `email` and
   `code`. Validates the bcrypt hash against the most-recent unconsumed
   non-expired row for the email, marks the row consumed, provisions
   or links the `users` row by email (per §6.2's migration path —
   match by `users.email` case-insensitive, otherwise insert a fresh
-  contributor row with `gitea_id = NULL`), and stores the session
+  contributor row with `gitea_id = NULL` and
-  cookie. Returns HTTP 200 on success with a minimal user payload;
+  `permission_state='pending'`), and stores the session cookie.
-  HTTP 400 on any failure (expired, consumed, wrong, unknown). The
+  Returns HTTP 200 on success; the response body carries
-  failure modes collapse to a single generic message so a probing
+  `{ok, user, needs_profile}` where `needs_profile=true` iff the
-  client cannot distinguish "you got the wrong code" from "we don't
+  user is `permission_state='pending'` AND the row has no
-  know this email" — the operator logs carry the distinction.
+  first_name / last_name / beta_request_reason yet (a fresh OTC
+  sign-in). The `needs_profile` flag drives the Login.jsx surface's
+  step-3 capture form. HTTP 400 on any failure (expired, consumed,
+  wrong, unknown). The failure modes collapse to a single generic
+  message so a probing client cannot distinguish "you got the
+  wrong code" from "we don't know this email" — the operator logs
+  carry the distinction.
+- `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request` — authenticated. Body carries
+  `first_name`, `last_name`, `beta_request_reason` (all required;
+  bounded at 120 / 120 / 4000 chars). Writes the fields to the
+  signed-in user's row and leaves `permission_state='pending'`.
+  Idempotent for the same already-pending user (a re-submit
+  updates the row so the admin sees the latest text). Refuses
+  with HTTP 409 if the user is already `'granted'` or `'revoked'`.
+  v0.8.0 — the first-OTC profile-capture endpoint (roadmap item
+  #6). v0.9.0's admin user-management page consumes this column
+  set to render the request queue.
+- `GET  /auth/passcode/check` — unauthenticated. Query param `email`.
+  Returns `{has_passcode: boolean}`. The frontend's `/login` surface
+  calls this after the email step to decide whether to render a
+  passcode input or fall back to OTC. The response carries only the
+  boolean; lockout state, the bcrypt hash, and the `passcode_set_at`
+  stamp are not leaked. An unknown email and a known-without-passcode
+  email both return `false`, so the endpoint is enumeration-safe.
+- `POST /auth/passcode/set` — authenticated (any role). Body carries
+  `passcode` (4–20 characters). bcrypt-hashes the passcode, writes
+  `users.passcode_hash` + `users.passcode_set_at`, clears the failure
+  counter and any active lockout. Refuses obvious patterns (a small
+  denylist: `0000`, `1234`, `aaaa`, `password`, etc.) and length
+  violations with HTTP 422. Replaces any prior passcode. v0.10.0.
+- `DELETE /auth/passcode` — authenticated. Clears
+  `users.passcode_hash` and `users.passcode_set_at`, returning the
+  user to OTC-only on next sign-in. v0.10.0.
+- `POST /auth/passcode/verify` — unauthenticated. Body carries
+  `email` and `passcode`. Locates the user, checks the lockout
+  window, and compares via bcrypt. On success: clears the failure
+  counter, refreshes `last_seen_at`, stores the session cookie,
+  returns HTTP 200 with the minimal user payload. On failure:
+  increments `passcode_failed_attempts`. After five consecutive
+  failures, stamps `passcode_locked_until = now + 15 minutes` and
+  returns HTTP 423 with a `locked_until` field; subsequent attempts
+  inside the window are refused with the same shape. After the
+  window expires, the next attempt clears the counter and proceeds
+  normally. The OTC path (§17 above) is unaffected by the passcode
+  lockout — a locked-out user can still request and verify a fresh
+  OTC. The wrong-passcode and unknown-email failure modes both
+  return HTTP 400 with a generic message; the no-passcode-set
+  failure also collapses to 400 so the response does not enumerate
+  account state. v0.10.0.
 - `GET /api/rfcs` — list entries with state, id, title, slug, repo,
   owners, last_active_at, has_open_prs, starred-by-me. Supports
   search, sort, filter chips, and the `unclaimed` predicate.
@@ -2694,8 +2965,15 @@ The follow-up session will refine this. A minimal starting set:
 - `POST /api/rfcs/<slug>/prs/<pr_number>/withdraw` — withdraw per §10.8.
 - `POST /api/rfcs/<slug>/prs/<pr_number>/resolution-branch` — cut a
   fresh resolution branch and replay per §10.9.
-- `GET  /api/admin/users` — list users with role and write-mute state,
+- `GET  /api/admin/users` — list users for the §6 / Slice 7 admin
-  for the §6 / Slice 7 admin surface.
+  surface. v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7) widened the payload to carry
+  `permission_state`, `first_name`, `last_name`, `beta_request_reason`,
+  `created_at`, `permission_decided_at`, and the joined
+  `permission_decided_by_login` / `permission_decided_by_display`
+  for the user-management page. Sort order surfaces `pending` rows
+  first (the daily admin queue), then `granted`, then `revoked`;
+  within a bucket, owners precede admins precede contributors,
+  with recency as the tiebreaker.
 - `POST /api/admin/users/<id>/role` — set role. Only owners may grant
   or revoke `owner`; admins may flip contributor ↔ admin freely. An
   owner-self-demotion is refused on this endpoint; owner succession
@@ -2704,6 +2982,16 @@ The follow-up session will refine this. A minimal starting set:
   write-mute (not the §15.8 notification mutes). Refused on owners
   and admins — for them, the role-change channel is the right
   refusal. Writes a `permission_events` row.
+- `POST /api/admin/users/<id>/permission` — v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7).
+  Flip `permission_state` between `pending`, `granted`, and `revoked`.
+  Stamps `permission_decided_by` + `permission_decided_at` on the
+  row and writes a `permission_events` row with event_kind in
+  `{permission_granted, permission_revoked, permission_repended}`.
+  Refuses with 422 if the admin tries to flip their own row
+  (symmetric to the `set_mute` / `set_role` self-action refusals).
+  v0.8.0 shipped the column shape with no admin UI — operators ran
+  a manual `UPDATE users` to grant access; v0.9.0 retires the
+  manual gesture.
 - `GET  /api/admin/audit` — paged read of the `actions` log with
   filters `action_kind`, `actor_user_id`, `rfc_slug`, plus `before_id`
   for the page boundary. Returns the joined actor login/display so
@@ -2785,6 +3073,16 @@ The follow-up session will refine this. A minimal starting set:
   short confirmation page.
 - `POST /api/webhooks/email-bounce` — bounce and complaint receiver
   per §15.4; sets the recipient's global email opt-out.
+- `GET  /api/users/me/cookie-consent` — read the signed-in user's
+  cookie consent record per §14.5. Returns `{essential, analytics,
+  other, recorded_at}`. `recorded_at: null` means "no choice yet"
+  and the banner should be shown; the framework treats absence of a
+  row as equivalent to that. `essential` is permanently true.
+- `PUT  /api/users/me/cookie-consent` — write the signed-in user's
+  cookie consent record per §14.5. Body: `{essential, analytics,
+  other}`. The `essential` flag is accepted for symmetry but always
+  persisted as true. Upserts (a single row per user) and stamps
+  `recorded_at` to now.
 
 Plus all the chat / streaming / model-picker endpoints, scoped to
 per-RFC and per-branch threads.
@@ -3517,23 +3815,80 @@ the new §15 (Notifications, in full), and §17 (the notification
 endpoints — list, mark-read, stream, watch mutation, preferences,
 quiet-hours, per-user mute, unsubscribe, bounce webhook).
 
-- **First-OTC profile capture.** *Surfaced by v0.7.0's email/OTC
+First-OTC profile capture (formerly a v0.7.0 candidate) is settled
-  migration.* When a fresh email lands at `/auth/otc/verify` with
+and folded into §6.1 (the contributor role now requires
-  no matching `users.email` row, v0.7.0 provisions the row with
+`permission_state='granted'`), §6.2 (the orthogonality of
-  `display_name = <local part of email>` and no other identity
+permission_state vs role / muted / notification-mutes), §14.1
-  fields. A subsequent release (the roadmap item-#6 candidate)
+(the landing page's v0.8.0 first-OTC capture step), and §17
-  is expected to add a one-shot profile-capture step on the
+(the `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request` endpoint and the verify
-  first-OTC sign-in: first name, last name, and a free-text
+endpoint's new `needs_profile` flag). The structural decision
-  "why I want access" field that flows into the open beta-access
+landed as: capture is a third step on the `/login` surface
-  request queue (also item #6) that replaces the v0.3.0
+gated by `verify_response.needs_profile=true`; pending users
-  `allowed_emails` gate. The schema slot exists implicitly already
+land on `/beta-pending` after submitting and see a thin banner
-  (`users.display_name` is updateable, the audit-log + permission-
+on every other page until an admin grants. v0.8.0 (roadmap item
-  events tables carry the freeform notes); the structural decision
+#6) shipped the work.
-  is what gates the capture (modal on `/login` after verify? a
+
-  one-time redirect to `/welcome/profile`? a deferred banner on
+Candidates surfaced during v0.8.0 (open beta-access request flow,
-  the main view?) and how it interacts with the open-access
+§6.1 / §14.1, item #6):
-  request flow that replaces the allowlist. Earns its session as
+
-  the v0.8.0 design pass.
+- **Admin user-management page** (`/admin/users`). *Shipped in
+  v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7).* The listing surfaces every user with
+  permission_state, profile fields, sign-up reason, and a Grant /
+  Revoke control set; the `POST /api/admin/users/<id>/permission`
+  endpoint flips the column and writes a `permission_events` row.
+  v0.9.0 left the `/admin/allowlist` sub-tab in place rather than
+  merging (see allowlist deprecation below). The grant/revoke
+  notify-the-user surface is deferred (see the new candidate
+  below).
+- **Allowlist deprecation.** *Decision deferred past v0.9.0.*
+  v0.9.0 considered merging `/admin/allowlist` into the new
+  `/admin/users` page but kept the surface as a sibling sub-tab:
+  the two have different keys (allowlist by email pre-sign-up,
+  user list by user_id post-sign-up) and a union row would be
+  confusing rather than clarifying. The fast-path-bypass role
+  the allowlist has carried since v0.8.0 stays intact; the
+  cutover to retire the table outright is a later session.
+  Decision points unchanged from v0.8.0: drop the table outright
+  (a schema migration) or leave it as a non-functional surface
+  and remove only the UI (a frontend-only change); how to handle
+  existing `allowed_emails` rows at the cutover (probably: walk
+  them into the pending queue with `permission_state='granted'`
+  for any matching `users` row, leave unmatched rows as a no-op
+  since v0.8.0 doesn't consult them anymore). Earns its session
+  once the v0.9.0 admin queue has run long enough to confirm the
+  allowlist's bypass role is no longer pulling weight.
+- **Admin notification on new beta request.** *Shipped in v0.9.0
+  (roadmap item #7).* The `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request`
+  handler now calls `notify.fan_out_new_beta_request`, which
+  fans a `new_beta_request` event (category `admin-actionable`,
+  rfc_slug NULL) out to every owner / admin. The §15 chokepoint
+  handles the SSE broadcast and the §15.4 email dispatch; the
+  email reaches only recipients whose `email_admin_actionable`
+  toggle is on (the default for owners + admins).
+- **Grant / revoke notification to the user.** *Surfaced by
+  v0.9.0.* The new flip endpoint stamps `permission_decided_by` +
+  writes a `permission_events` row but does not yet signal the
+  affected user that their state changed. A future release could
+  fire a `personal-direct` notification (event_kind
+  `permission_change_affecting_me`, already in the §15.1 enum) so
+  a granted user sees "Your beta-access request was approved" in
+  their inbox and email, and a revoked user sees a parallel
+  refusal notice. Decision points: does revocation include a
+  reason field (probably yes — symmetric with §9.3's decline
+  comment); does grant carry a welcome message (probably no —
+  the existing welcome surfaces are sufficient); does the
+  notification escape the §15.8 mute path (probably yes — it's
+  a personal-direct admission state change). Earns its session
+  as a follow-up to the v0.9.0 page.
+- **Decline-with-reason on permission revoke.** *Surfaced by
+  v0.9.0.* The current Revoke gesture takes only a confirmation;
+  there is no audit-visible reason captured. A future release
+  could add a free-text reason input that lands in the
+  `permission_events.details` JSON column (no schema change
+  needed — the column is already JSON-shaped). This is the
+  symmetric companion to the §9.3 proposal-decline contract.
+  Earns its session alongside the grant/revoke notification
+  candidate above.
 - **Removing the Gitea OAuth fallback.** *Surfaced by v0.7.0.*
   v0.7.0 keeps `/auth/callback` functional and links to it as a
   "Sign in with Gitea (fallback)" affordance on the new `/login`
@@ -3550,16 +3905,17 @@ quiet-hours, per-user mute, unsubscribe, bounce webhook).
   its session once the OTC adoption curve flattens.
 - **Device trust (30-day skip).** *Surfaced by v0.7.0 — the
   signed-in cookie already lasts 30 days via SessionMiddleware,
-  but every sign-in still requires a fresh OTC.* The roadmap
+  but every sign-in still requires a fresh OTC or passcode.* The
-  item-#9 candidate adds a "trust this device" affordance on the
+  roadmap item-#9 candidate adds a "trust this device" affordance
-  verify step that issues a longer-lived rotating token, so
+  on the verify step that issues a longer-lived rotating token,
-  returning visitors on the same device skip the OTC step. The
+  so returning visitors on the same device skip both the OTC and
-  shape question is whether the trust is a signed cookie distinct
+  the passcode step. The shape question is whether the trust is a
-  from the session, a row in a `device_trust` table keyed by a
+  signed cookie distinct from the session, a row in a `device_trust`
-  random device-id, or a property of the session itself; and
+  table keyed by a random device-id, or a property of the session
-  whether the trust survives password-equivalent events (none
+  itself; and whether the trust survives password-equivalent events
-  exist yet — passcodes are item #8 / v0.10.0) or only survives
+  — v0.10.0's passcode-change and passcode-clear gestures are the
-  explicit logout. Earns its session as the v0.11.0 design pass.
+  v1 instances — or only survives explicit logout. Earns its
+  session as the v0.11.0 design pass.
 - **Cloudflare Turnstile (or equivalent) on `/auth/otc/request`.**
   *Surfaced by v0.7.0 — the endpoint is now the new abuse hot
   path.* Per-email cooldown stops the trivial loop; what it
@@ -3579,6 +3935,80 @@ quiet-hours, per-user mute, unsubscribe, bounce webhook).
   harness mocks the challenge. Earns its session as the v0.12.0
   design pass.
 
+Candidates surfaced during v0.10.0 (user-set passcodes, §6.2 /
+roadmap item #8):
+
+- **Passcode policy tunables via env.** v0.10.0 hard-codes the
+  lockout shape (5 consecutive failures → 15-minute lockout) and
+  the min/max passcode length (4 / 20) in
+  `backend/app/passcode.py`. The denylist of obvious patterns is
+  also hard-coded. A deployment that wants tighter or looser rules
+  has to fork the constants. Two env vars
+  (`PASSCODE_LOCKOUT_AFTER_ATTEMPTS`,
+  `PASSCODE_LOCKOUT_DURATION_MINUTES`) would let operators
+  reshape the lockout without forking; a third
+  (`PASSCODE_MIN_LENGTH`) would cover the length floor. Earns its
+  session if a deployment surfaces evidence that the v1 defaults
+  bite.
+- **Per-IP rate-limiting on `/auth/passcode/verify`.** v0.10.0's
+  lockout is per-account: 5 failures against the same email lock
+  that account for 15 minutes. A distributed attacker that knows
+  many emails can fan out across them without ever tripping any
+  one account's lockout. Adding a per-IP throttle (e.g., 30
+  passcode-verify attempts / minute / IP, returning HTTP 429) is
+  the natural pairing. Defer-able — the per-account lockout is
+  the v1 shape that closes the loud-loop case; the per-IP
+  distributed case waits on evidence. Touches §6.2 and §17.
+- **Passcode-change "still know your old passcode" challenge.**
+  v0.10.0 lets a signed-in user replace their passcode from
+  `/settings/notifications` without re-entering the old one — the
+  session is sufficient. A future hardening pass may require the
+  old passcode (or a fresh OTC verify) before accepting the
+  change, to mitigate session-hijack scenarios where the attacker
+  rotates the passcode to lock the legitimate owner out. The same
+  question applies to the clear gesture. Earns its session if
+  session-hijack becomes a real threat surface.
+- **Passkey / WebAuthn.** A much heavier next step than passcodes:
+  hardware-backed device credentials that resist phishing. The
+  v0.10.0 passcode shape is a stopgap for the "I'd rather not
+  type a code every time" ergonomic problem; passkeys are the
+  long-term answer. Out of scope for the current roadmap —
+  earns a dedicated session if/when the deployment grows enough
+  that the phishing surface justifies the integration cost.
+
+Candidates surfaced during v0.13.0 (cookie / privacy consent, §14.5
+and §14.6):
+
+- **Policy content via content-repo file vs env var.** v0.13.0
+  shipped the deployment-policy-override path as two env vars
+  (`VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL`, `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL`) that the
+  framework's stub pages link out to. The alternative — accepting
+  a markdown file path the framework renders inline, parallel to
+  `PHILOSOPHY_PATH` per §14.2 — was deferred. The two compose:
+  a deployment could carry both an inline file (rendered above
+  the fold) and an external link (rendered below). Earns its own
+  topic when a real deployment ships a policy long enough that
+  the link-out shape bites and renders the link unread.
+- **Global Privacy Control / Do-Not-Track headers.** v0.13.0
+  scoped the consent surface to the in-app banner and did not
+  honor browser-side GPC or DNT signals. The framework's stance
+  is that the in-app banner is the authoritative gesture — a
+  user who clears their consent in the banner has expressed
+  intent, and the GPC header is a coarser signal layered on top.
+  Earns its own topic if a regulatory regime emerges that treats
+  GPC as the legally-binding gesture, in which case the framework
+  would honor GPC as an automatic "essential only" choice unless
+  the user explicitly broadened it in-app.
+- **Multi-language consent text.** The banner ships English-only.
+  i18n of the framework's user-facing strings is a broader topic
+  than the consent banner; carrying the work in that future topic
+  rather than as a per-surface translation pass.
+- **Analytics SDK gating against `consent.js`.** Roadmap item #13
+  (target v0.15.0) lands the analytics SDK behind
+  `lib/consent.js`'s `getConsent().analytics` gate. The framework
+  contract is already in place; the SDK integration is the work
+  the item ships. Listed here so the dependency is documented.
+
 ### 19.3 Working agreement for the queue
 
 Pre-build sessions ran on the queue agreement from prior versions

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-0.7.0
+0.9.0

backend/app/api.py

@@ -26,10 +26,12 @@ from . import (
     api_prs,
     auth,
     db,
+    docs as docs_mod,
     entry as entry_mod,
     cache,
     funder,
     health,
+    notify,
     philosophy,
     providers as providers_mod,
 )
@@ -55,6 +57,17 @@ class FunderCredentialBody(BaseModel):
     api_key: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=2048)
 
 
+class BetaRequestBody(BaseModel):
+    # v0.8.0 — captured on the first OTC sign-in. All three fields are
+    # required so the admin queue has a coherent triage shape.
+    # The bounds match the v0.7.0 OTC body (320 chars for email-ish
+    # headers; 4000 for the free-text reason — the same upper bound
+    # DeclineBody uses elsewhere in this file).
+    first_name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
+    last_name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
+    beta_request_reason: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=4000)
+
+
 def make_router(
     config: Config,
     gitea: Gitea,
@@ -111,6 +124,17 @@ def make_router(
         payload = philosophy.load()
         return {"body": payload["body"]}
 
+    # ---------------------------------------------------------------
+    # /api/docs — DOCS.md served verbatim. Sibling of /api/philosophy:
+    # no auth gate, same disk-first load + cache shape, same intent —
+    # public read surface for a markdown file checked into the repo.
+    # ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    @router.get("/api/docs")
+    async def get_docs() -> dict[str, Any]:
+        payload = docs_mod.load()
+        return {"body": payload["body"]}
+
     # ---------------------------------------------------------------
     # Auth surface — reads role from our users table per §6.
     # ---------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -120,6 +144,29 @@ def make_router(
         user = auth.current_user(request)
         if user is None:
             return {"authenticated": False, "user": None}
+        # v0.8.0 + v0.10.0: single round-trip for everything the
+        # frontend gates UI off of — beta-access state + passcode state.
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT first_name, last_name, beta_request_reason, "
+            "passcode_hash, passcode_set_at "
+            "FROM users WHERE id = ?",
+            (user.user_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        first_name = (row["first_name"] if row else None) or ""
+        last_name = (row["last_name"] if row else None) or ""
+        beta_request_reason = (row["beta_request_reason"] if row else None) or ""
+        # "Needs profile" iff the user is pending AND hasn't yet
+        # filed their beta-request capture. Granted users never see
+        # the capture prompt; pending users who already filed see
+        # the /beta-pending page without the capture form.
+        needs_profile = (
+            user.permission_state == "pending"
+            and not first_name
+            and not last_name
+            and not beta_request_reason
+        )
+        has_passcode = bool(row and row["passcode_hash"])
+        passcode_set_at = row["passcode_set_at"] if (row and has_passcode) else None
         return {
             "authenticated": True,
             "user": {
@@ -129,9 +176,82 @@ def make_router(
                 "email": user.email,
                 "avatar_url": user.avatar_url,
                 "role": user.role,
+                "permission_state": user.permission_state,
+                "first_name": first_name,
+                "last_name": last_name,
+                "beta_request_reason": beta_request_reason,
+                "needs_profile": needs_profile,
+                "has_passcode": has_passcode,
+                "passcode_set_at": passcode_set_at,
             },
         }
 
+    # ---------------------------------------------------------------
+    # v0.8.0: /api/auth/me/beta-request — first-OTC profile capture
+    # (roadmap item #6). Lands first name, last name, and the free-
+    # text "why I should be included in the beta" on the signed-in
+    # user's row. Idempotent for the same already-pending user;
+    # refuses to overwrite a row that's already granted (so a
+    # bored already-granted user can't accidentally re-submit the
+    # form and clobber the admin's audit trail). Uses
+    # `require_user` rather than `require_contributor` because
+    # `require_contributor` already enforces `permission_state =
+    # 'granted'` and would refuse a pending user; the whole point
+    # of this endpoint is to register the request _from_ a pending
+    # user.
+    # ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    @router.post("/api/auth/me/beta-request")
+    async def submit_beta_request(body: BetaRequestBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        user = auth.require_user(request)
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT permission_state, first_name, last_name, beta_request_reason FROM users WHERE id = ?",
+            (user.user_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            # Defensive — the session pointed at a deleted row.
+            raise HTTPException(404, "User not found")
+        # Granted users have no business filing a beta request.
+        # 'revoked' likewise — the request flow is for fresh users
+        # only. Both shapes refuse with 409 (conflict) so the client
+        # can distinguish "you already have access" from
+        # "your access was revoked".
+        if row["permission_state"] == "granted":
+            raise HTTPException(409, "Your account is already granted access")
+        if row["permission_state"] == "revoked":
+            raise HTTPException(409, "Your account's access has been revoked")
+        # Re-submission from a pending user updates the row — the
+        # admin sees the latest text rather than a stale draft.
+        # The state stays 'pending'; only an admin can flip it.
+        db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            UPDATE users
+               SET first_name = ?,
+                   last_name = ?,
+                   beta_request_reason = ?
+             WHERE id = ?
+            """,
+            (
+                body.first_name.strip(),
+                body.last_name.strip(),
+                body.beta_request_reason.strip(),
+                user.user_id,
+            ),
+        )
+        # v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7): notify every admin/owner of the
+        # fresh request. Only the first submission is the
+        # "newly-pending" gesture — re-submits from the same user
+        # would otherwise carpet the admin inbox. We fire only when
+        # this is the row's first time getting all three fields
+        # populated (the prior row carried at least one NULL).
+        prior = row  # captured before the UPDATE above
+        was_already_complete = bool(
+            prior["first_name"] and prior["last_name"] and prior["beta_request_reason"]
+        )
+        if not was_already_complete:
+            notify.fan_out_new_beta_request(requester_user_id=user.user_id)
+        return {"ok": True}
+
     # ---------------------------------------------------------------
     # §7: the catalog
     # ---------------------------------------------------------------

backend/app/api_admin.py

@@ -50,6 +50,16 @@ class MuteBody(BaseModel):
     muted: bool
 
 
+class PermissionStateBody(BaseModel):
+    # v0.9.0: the admin flip from the user-management page (roadmap
+    # item #7). `pending` is not surfaceable from the admin UI —
+    # only the OTC verify path lands a row in `pending` — but we
+    # accept it in the pattern in case a future restore-to-queue
+    # gesture wants to re-pend a granted user; today the UI only
+    # exposes `granted` and `revoked`.
+    state: str = Field(pattern="^(pending|granted|revoked)$")
+
+
 class AllowlistAddBody(BaseModel):
     email: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=320)
     note: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=200)
@@ -68,13 +78,41 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
 
     @router.get("/api/admin/users")
     async def list_users(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """v0.9.0: the user-management surface (roadmap item #7).
+
+        The listing carries every column the admin queue needs to triage
+        pending beta-access requests alongside the existing role/mute
+        affordances. Sort order surfaces pending requests first (so the
+        admin lands on the inbox shape), then granted, then revoked;
+        within a state, ownership/role and recency are the tiebreakers
+        so the legacy ordering (owner first, then admin, then by name)
+        is preserved inside the granted bucket.
+
+        `permission_decided_by_login` joins the deciding admin row so
+        the UI can render "granted by @ben" without a second round-trip.
+        """
         auth.require_admin(request)
         rows = db.conn().execute(
             """
-            SELECT id, gitea_login, display_name, email, role, muted,
+            SELECT u.id, u.gitea_login, u.display_name, u.email, u.role, u.muted,
-                   created_at, last_seen_at
+                   u.created_at, u.last_seen_at,
-              FROM users
+                   u.permission_state, u.first_name, u.last_name,
-             ORDER BY role = 'owner' DESC, role = 'admin' DESC, display_name COLLATE NOCASE
+                   u.beta_request_reason,
+                   u.permission_decided_by, u.permission_decided_at,
+                   d.gitea_login AS decided_by_login,
+                   d.display_name AS decided_by_display
+              FROM users u
+         LEFT JOIN users d ON d.id = u.permission_decided_by
+             ORDER BY
+                CASE u.permission_state
+                  WHEN 'pending' THEN 0
+                  WHEN 'granted' THEN 1
+                  WHEN 'revoked' THEN 2
+                  ELSE 3
+                END,
+                u.role = 'owner' DESC, u.role = 'admin' DESC,
+                COALESCE(u.last_seen_at, u.created_at) DESC,
+                u.display_name COLLATE NOCASE
             """
         ).fetchall()
         return {
@@ -88,6 +126,13 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
                     "muted": bool(r["muted"]),
                     "created_at": r["created_at"],
                     "last_seen_at": r["last_seen_at"],
+                    "permission_state": r["permission_state"] or "granted",
+                    "first_name": r["first_name"] or "",
+                    "last_name": r["last_name"] or "",
+                    "beta_request_reason": r["beta_request_reason"] or "",
+                    "permission_decided_at": r["permission_decided_at"],
+                    "permission_decided_by_login": r["decided_by_login"],
+                    "permission_decided_by_display": r["decided_by_display"],
                 }
                 for r in rows
             ]
@@ -136,6 +181,74 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
         )
         return {"ok": True, "role": body.role, "changed": True}
 
+    # ----- Permission state (§6.1, v0.9.0 roadmap item #7) -----
+
+    @router.post("/api/admin/users/{user_id}/permission")
+    async def set_permission(user_id: int, body: PermissionStateBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """Flip a user's `permission_state` between pending/granted/revoked.
+
+        v0.8.0 wired the column shape but shipped no admin UI for it —
+        the grant gesture was a manual `UPDATE users` against the DB.
+        v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7) lands the admin user-management page;
+        this endpoint is its single write surface.
+
+        Audit shape: every flip writes a `permission_events` row with
+        event_kind in {'permission_granted', 'permission_revoked',
+        'permission_repended'} so §6.5's log carries the change. The
+        `permission_decided_by` / `permission_decided_at` columns on
+        the user row are co-stamped so the user listing can render
+        "granted by @ben at <date>" without a second join through
+        the audit table.
+
+        Refuses with 422 if the admin tries to flip their own row
+        (no self-grant / self-revoke; symmetric to set_mute's
+        self-mute refusal and set_role's self-downgrade refusal).
+        """
+        viewer = auth.require_admin(request)
+        target = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT id, role, permission_state FROM users WHERE id = ?",
+            (user_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if target is None:
+            raise HTTPException(404, "User not found")
+        if target["id"] == viewer.user_id:
+            raise HTTPException(422, "You cannot change your own permission state")
+
+        before = target["permission_state"] or "granted"
+        after = body.state
+        if before == after:
+            return {"ok": True, "permission_state": after, "changed": False}
+
+        db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            UPDATE users
+               SET permission_state = ?,
+                   permission_decided_by = ?,
+                   permission_decided_at = datetime('now')
+             WHERE id = ?
+            """,
+            (after, viewer.user_id, user_id),
+        )
+        event_kind = {
+            "granted": "permission_granted",
+            "revoked": "permission_revoked",
+            "pending": "permission_repended",
+        }[after]
+        db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            INSERT INTO permission_events
+                (actor_user_id, subject_user_id, event_kind, details)
+            VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
+            """,
+            (
+                viewer.user_id,
+                user_id,
+                event_kind,
+                json.dumps({"before": before, "after": after}),
+            ),
+        )
+        return {"ok": True, "permission_state": after, "changed": True}
+
     # ----- Write-mute (§6.2) -----
 
     @router.post("/api/admin/users/{user_id}/mute")

backend/app/api_notifications.py

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ The endpoints in this module are:
   - `POST /api/users/me/quiet-hours`                       — set / clear
   - `POST /api/users/<id>/notification-mute`               — §15.8
   - `DELETE /api/users/<id>/notification-mute`             — §15.8
+  - `GET  /api/users/me/cookie-consent`                    — §14.5
+  - `PUT  /api/users/me/cookie-consent`                    — §14.5
   - `GET  /api/email/unsubscribe`                          — §15.4 one-click
   - `POST /api/webhooks/email-bounce`                      — §15.4 receiver
 
@@ -73,6 +75,15 @@ class BounceBody(BaseModel):
     kind: str = Field(default="hard")  # 'hard' or 'complaint'
 
 
+class CookieConsentBody(BaseModel):
+    # `essential` is always true at the surface; we accept it for symmetry
+    # but never persist a false value (the framework's strictly-necessary
+    # cookies are not user-optional per SPEC §14.5).
+    essential: bool = True
+    analytics: bool = False
+    other: bool = False
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Router
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -362,6 +373,74 @@ def make_router(config: Config) -> APIRouter:
         )
         return {"ok": True}
 
+    # ----- Cookie consent (v0.13.0 / roadmap item #11; SPEC §14.5) -----
+    #
+    # The shape is intentionally small: three flags + a recorded-at stamp.
+    # The banner's local-vs-server precedence rule lives in the frontend
+    # (`consent.js`): on sign-in, the server row (if any) overrides local;
+    # otherwise local is uploaded.
+
+    @router.get("/api/users/me/cookie-consent")
+    async def get_cookie_consent(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        viewer = auth.require_user(request)
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            SELECT essential, analytics, other_cookies, recorded_at
+              FROM cookie_consent WHERE user_id = ?
+            """,
+            (viewer.user_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            return {
+                "essential": True,
+                "analytics": False,
+                "other": False,
+                "recorded_at": None,
+            }
+        return {
+            "essential": bool(row["essential"]),
+            "analytics": bool(row["analytics"]),
+            "other": bool(row["other_cookies"]),
+            "recorded_at": row["recorded_at"],
+        }
+
+    @router.put("/api/users/me/cookie-consent")
+    async def set_cookie_consent(body: CookieConsentBody, request: Request) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        viewer = auth.require_user(request)
+        # `essential` is the framework's strictly-necessary set; the
+        # surface accepts the flag for symmetry but never persists a
+        # false value. SPEC §14.5: a deployment that wants to make
+        # session-cookie storage optional must change the framework
+        # contract, not flip a flag here.
+        db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            INSERT INTO cookie_consent
+                   (user_id, essential, analytics, other_cookies, recorded_at)
+            VALUES (?, 1, ?, ?, datetime('now'))
+            ON CONFLICT(user_id) DO UPDATE SET
+                essential     = 1,
+                analytics     = excluded.analytics,
+                other_cookies = excluded.other_cookies,
+                recorded_at   = excluded.recorded_at
+            """,
+            (
+                viewer.user_id,
+                1 if body.analytics else 0,
+                1 if body.other else 0,
+            ),
+        )
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT recorded_at FROM cookie_consent WHERE user_id = ?",
+            (viewer.user_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        return {
+            "ok": True,
+            "essential": True,
+            "analytics": bool(body.analytics),
+            "other": bool(body.other),
+            "recorded_at": row["recorded_at"] if row else None,
+        }
+
     # ----- Email: one-click unsubscribe + bounce webhook -----
 
     @router.get("/api/email/unsubscribe")

backend/app/auth.py

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ class SessionUser:
     email: str
     avatar_url: str
     role: str
+    # v0.8.0 / §6.1 — admission gate. Three states: 'pending' (waiting
+    # for an admin grant), 'granted' (active contributor), 'revoked'
+    # (was granted, later removed). Existing rows at migration time
+    # default to 'granted' so grandfathered users are unaffected; OTC
+    # provisions fresh users with 'pending' (see `app/otc.py`).
+    permission_state: str = "granted"
 
     def as_actor(self) -> Actor:
         return Actor(
@@ -90,6 +96,13 @@ def allowlist_is_active() -> bool:
 def is_allowed_sign_in(profile: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
     """Decide whether a freshly-completed OAuth profile may sign in.
 
+    v0.8.0 (item #6) replaces the allowlist gate with an admin-grant
+    flow at the OTC `/request` surface, but the Gitea OAuth callback
+    in `main.py` still consults this helper so the fallback path
+    keeps the v0.3.0 admission shape during the OAuth migration
+    window. The eventual removal of the OAuth callback (§19.2)
+    retires this function alongside it.
+
     Three accept paths:
       1. The allowlist is empty (gate off).
       2. The Gitea profile's email is in `allowed_emails` (case-insensitive).
@@ -132,17 +145,27 @@ def provision_user(config: Config, profile: dict[str, Any]) -> SessionUser:
     existing = c.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE gitea_id = ?", (gitea_id,)).fetchone()
     if existing is None:
         role = "owner" if config.owner_gitea_login and login == config.owner_gitea_login else "contributor"
+        # v0.8.0: a fresh OAuth-provisioned user is also subject to
+        # the admin-grant flow. The OAuth fallback only fires for
+        # users who pass `is_allowed_sign_in` (so they're already on
+        # the legacy allowlist or are grandfathered by gitea_id);
+        # 'granted' is the right default here since the allowlist
+        # check is itself the admin gesture. A future release that
+        # retires the OAuth callback (§19.2) collapses both paths
+        # under the same gate.
         cur = c.execute(
             """
-            INSERT INTO users (gitea_id, gitea_login, email, display_name, avatar_url, role)
+            INSERT INTO users (gitea_id, gitea_login, email, display_name, avatar_url, role, permission_state)
-            VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+            VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'granted')
             """,
             (gitea_id, login, email, display, avatar, role),
         )
         user_id = cur.lastrowid
+        permission_state = "granted"
     else:
         user_id = existing["id"]
         role = existing["role"]
+        permission_state = existing["permission_state"] or "granted"
         c.execute(
             """
             UPDATE users
@@ -160,6 +183,7 @@ def provision_user(config: Config, profile: dict[str, Any]) -> SessionUser:
         email=email,
         avatar_url=avatar,
         role=role,
+        permission_state=permission_state,
     )
 
 
@@ -178,6 +202,12 @@ def store_session(request: Request, user: SessionUser) -> None:
         "email": user.email,
         "avatar_url": user.avatar_url,
         "role": user.role,
+        # v0.8.0: persist the admission state on the cookie payload so
+        # the post-cookie audit doesn't second-guess the row. The DB
+        # is re-read on every `current_user` call regardless (so an
+        # admin grant takes effect on the next request); this field
+        # is purely structural redundancy for the cookie shape.
+        "permission_state": user.permission_state,
     }
 
 
@@ -188,7 +218,7 @@ def current_user(request: Request) -> SessionUser | None:
     # Re-read the role from the database every request so role changes
     # take effect on the next API call without forcing a logout.
     row = db.conn().execute(
-        "SELECT id, gitea_id, gitea_login, email, display_name, avatar_url, role FROM users WHERE id = ?",
+        "SELECT id, gitea_id, gitea_login, email, display_name, avatar_url, role, permission_state FROM users WHERE id = ?",
         (raw["user_id"],),
     ).fetchone()
     if row is None:
@@ -199,6 +229,11 @@ def current_user(request: Request) -> SessionUser | None:
     # of which sign-in path the row came from. The DB remains the
     # source of truth for "is this an OAuth-linked user" (gitea_id IS
     # NOT NULL); the in-memory SessionUser is the per-request handle.
+    # v0.8.0: permission_state comes off the row directly. A NULL
+    # column value (shouldn't happen under the migration's
+    # NOT NULL DEFAULT, but be defensive) reads as 'granted' so the
+    # gate fails open for grandfathered surfaces rather than locking
+    # everyone out on a malformed row.
     return SessionUser(
         user_id=row["id"],
         gitea_id=row["gitea_id"] or 0,
@@ -207,6 +242,7 @@ def current_user(request: Request) -> SessionUser | None:
         email=row["email"] or "",
         avatar_url=row["avatar_url"] or "",
         role=row["role"],
+        permission_state=row["permission_state"] or "granted",
     )
 
 
@@ -218,11 +254,31 @@ def require_user(request: Request) -> SessionUser:
 
 
 def require_contributor(request: Request) -> SessionUser:
-    """§6.1: authenticated, not write-muted."""
+    """§6.1: authenticated, not write-muted, and granted by an admin.
+
+    v0.8.0 (item #6) widens this gate. A fresh OTC sign-in lands in
+    `permission_state='pending'`; the user can read everything an
+    anonymous viewer can read, but every write-shaped endpoint that
+    funnels through this dependency now refuses with 403 until an
+    admin grants them. The `pending` blast radius is the same as
+    anonymous (item #4 / v0.6.0 already audited the anon-write
+    refusal at every write site), so this widening is structurally
+    a relabel — the same surfaces that already refused 401 to
+    anonymous now also refuse 403 to pending.
+    """
     user = require_user(request)
     row = db.conn().execute("SELECT muted FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user.user_id,)).fetchone()
     if row and row["muted"]:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Your account is muted")
+    if user.permission_state != "granted":
+        # 'pending' is the post-OTC waiting state; 'revoked' is the
+        # admin-undid-the-grant state. Both refuse with the same 403
+        # shape; the client distinguishes via `/api/auth/me` which
+        # carries `permission_state` in the response.
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=403,
+            detail="Your beta access request is in review",
+        )
     return user
 
 

backend/app/docs.py

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+"""User-facing docs source.
+
+Mirrors `philosophy.py` shape. Serves `DOCS.md` from the repo root —
+the framework's plain-prose user guide to roles, contribution flow,
+and notification surfaces, distinct from the binding `SPEC.md`. Read
+from disk on first call and cached in-process; the periodic
+reconciler can call `refresh()` to pick up out-of-band edits.
+
+`DOCS_PATH` overrides the default location if a deployment hosts the
+file elsewhere (a meta-repo working-tree clone, a sync target, etc.).
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import os
+import threading
+from pathlib import Path
+
+log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+_DEFAULT_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "DOCS.md"
+
+_lock = threading.Lock()
+_cache: dict | None = None
+
+
+def _resolved_path() -> Path:
+    override = os.environ.get("DOCS_PATH", "").strip()
+    if override:
+        return Path(override).expanduser().resolve()
+    return _DEFAULT_PATH
+
+
+def load(force: bool = False) -> dict:
+    """Return the cached `{body, path, mtime}` payload, reading from disk
+    on first call or when `force=True`.
+    """
+    global _cache
+    with _lock:
+        if _cache is not None and not force:
+            return _cache
+        path = _resolved_path()
+        try:
+            text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+            mtime = path.stat().st_mtime
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            log.warning("DOCS.md not found at %s — serving placeholder", path)
+            text = (
+                "# DOCS.md not found\n\n"
+                "The deployment is missing its user guide. Set "
+                "DOCS_PATH or place DOCS.md at the project root."
+            )
+            mtime = 0.0
+        _cache = {"body": text, "path": str(path), "mtime": mtime}
+        return _cache
+
+
+def refresh() -> dict:
+    """Force-reread from disk. Returns the new payload."""
+    return load(force=True)

backend/app/email.py

@@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ _EVENT_TO_CATEGORY: dict[str, str] = {
     "graduation_complete": "personal-direct",
     "super_draft_graduation_ready": "admin-actionable",
     "claim_opened": "structural",
+    # v0.9.0: roadmap item #7. A fresh beta-access request lands as
+    # an admin-actionable signal so it consults `email_admin_actionable`
+    # and reaches owners/admins only.
+    "new_beta_request": "admin-actionable",
 }
 
 
@@ -285,6 +289,13 @@ def _deep_link(payload: dict, cfg: EmailConfig) -> str:
     slug = payload.get("rfc_slug")
     pr = payload.get("pr_number")
     branch = payload.get("branch_name")
+    event_kind = payload.get("event_kind")
+    # v0.9.0: framework-scoped admin signals link to the admin
+    # surface, not /rfc/... The `new_beta_request` event is the
+    # canonical example; future framework-scoped admin events
+    # may reuse the same branch.
+    if event_kind == "new_beta_request":
+        return f"{cfg.app_url}/admin/users"
     if slug and pr:
         return f"{cfg.app_url}/rfc/{slug}/pr/{pr}"
     if slug and branch:

backend/app/main.py

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ from . import (
     email_otc,
     hygiene,
     otc,
+    passcode as passcode_mod,
     providers as providers_mod,
     webhooks,
 )
@@ -44,6 +45,15 @@ class OtcVerifyBody(BaseModel):
     code: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=16)
 
 
+class PasscodeSetBody(BaseModel):
+    passcode: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=64)
+
+
+class PasscodeVerifyBody(BaseModel):
+    email: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=320)
+    passcode: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=64)
+
+
 @asynccontextmanager
 async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
     config = load_config()
@@ -172,6 +182,96 @@ def _oauth_router(config) -> APIRouter:
         if not result.ok or result.user is None:
             raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid or expired code")
         auth.store_session(request, result.user)
+        # v0.8.0: surface `needs_profile` so the Login.jsx surface can
+        # decide whether to advance to the first/last/why capture step
+        # or jump straight to "/". `needs_profile=true` iff the user
+        # is `permission_state='pending'` AND the row has no profile
+        # fields yet — a fresh OTC user. Grandfathered users
+        # (`permission_state='granted'`) and pending users who already
+        # captured their fields both read as false.
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT first_name, last_name, beta_request_reason FROM users WHERE id = ?",
+            (result.user.user_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        first_name = (row["first_name"] if row else None) or ""
+        last_name = (row["last_name"] if row else None) or ""
+        beta_request_reason = (row["beta_request_reason"] if row else None) or ""
+        needs_profile = (
+            result.user.permission_state == "pending"
+            and not first_name
+            and not last_name
+            and not beta_request_reason
+        )
+        return {
+            "ok": True,
+            "user": {
+                "id": result.user.user_id,
+                "display_name": result.user.display_name,
+                "email": result.user.email,
+                "role": result.user.role,
+                "permission_state": result.user.permission_state,
+            },
+            "needs_profile": needs_profile,
+        }
+
+    # ---------------------------------------------------------------
+    # v0.10.0: user-set passcodes after OTC (§6.2, roadmap item #8).
+    #
+    # After a successful OTC sign-in, a contributor may set a passcode
+    # and use email + passcode for subsequent sign-ins. OTC remains the
+    # forgot-passcode fallback — a verify failure beyond 5 consecutive
+    # attempts locks the passcode path for 15 minutes; the OTC path is
+    # unaffected by the lockout.
+    # ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    @router.get("/auth/passcode/check")
+    async def passcode_check(email: str = ""):
+        """Does this email have a passcode set? Anonymous endpoint —
+        the Login.jsx flow calls this after the user types their email
+        to decide whether to render a passcode input or fall back to
+        OTC. We surface only the boolean; lockout state, the hash, and
+        the set-at stamp are not leaked here."""
+        status = passcode_mod.passcode_status(email)
+        return {"has_passcode": status.has_passcode}
+
+    @router.post("/auth/passcode/set")
+    async def passcode_set(body: PasscodeSetBody, request: Request):
+        """Set or replace the signed-in user's passcode. Requires an
+        active session (OTC- or passcode-authenticated)."""
+        user = auth.require_user(request)
+        try:
+            passcode_mod.set_passcode(user.user_id, body.passcode)
+        except passcode_mod.PasscodeValidationError as e:
+            raise HTTPException(422, str(e))
+        return {"ok": True}
+
+    @router.delete("/auth/passcode")
+    async def passcode_delete(request: Request):
+        """Remove the signed-in user's passcode. The user is back to
+        OTC-only on next sign-in."""
+        user = auth.require_user(request)
+        passcode_mod.clear_passcode(user.user_id)
+        return {"ok": True}
+
+    @router.post("/auth/passcode/verify")
+    async def passcode_verify(body: PasscodeVerifyBody, request: Request):
+        """Sign in with email + passcode. Returns the standard session
+        payload on success; HTTP 423 with `locked_until` when the
+        account is in the lockout window; HTTP 400 for every other
+        failure (the wrong-vs-unknown distinction is intentionally
+        collapsed so a probing client cannot enumerate emails)."""
+        result = passcode_mod.verify_passcode(body.email, body.passcode)
+        if result.reason == "locked":
+            raise HTTPException(
+                423,
+                {
+                    "detail": "Too many failed attempts; sign in with a one-time code instead",
+                    "locked_until": result.locked_until,
+                },
+            )
+        if not result.ok or result.user is None:
+            raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid passcode")
+        auth.store_session(request, result.user)
         return {
             "ok": True,
             "user": {

backend/app/notify.py

@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 CATEGORY_PERSONAL = "personal-direct"
 CATEGORY_STRUCTURAL = "structural"
 CATEGORY_CHURN = "churn"
+CATEGORY_ADMIN_ACTIONABLE = "admin-actionable"
 
 # Action kinds whose actor's first interaction with a slug triggers
 # auto-watch per §15.6. The substantive-gesture list in the spec is
@@ -208,6 +209,67 @@ def fan_out_from_action(
             )
 
 
+def fan_out_new_beta_request(
+    *,
+    requester_user_id: int,
+) -> None:
+    """v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7): announce a fresh beta-access request to
+    every admin/owner.
+
+    Called from `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request` after the row's
+    first/last/why fields are populated. Fan-out shape mirrors the §15
+    chokepoint contract: one row per recipient, written via `_emit_one`
+    so the SSE broadcast + email dispatch run through the same surface
+    every other notification uses. The event has no rfc_slug (it is
+    framework-scoped, not RFC-scoped); the deep-link payload points
+    `/admin/users` instead of `/rfc/<slug>`.
+
+    Actor is the requester per §15.9 (the underlying user, never the
+    bot). Category is `admin-actionable` so the §15.4 email gate
+    consults `email_admin_actionable` (owners/admins-only by
+    construction) and the digest exclusion rules treat it identically
+    to other admin-actionable signals (graduation_ready et al).
+
+    Recipients are owners + admins minus the requester themselves
+    (a self-promotion shouldn't reach the requester's own inbox). The
+    requester is never in the role set in practice — the endpoint
+    refuses 'granted'/'revoked' callers and a fresh OTC user lands
+    `contributor`+`pending` — but we filter regardless so the call
+    is robust to future changes in the auth gate.
+    """
+    requester = db.conn().execute(
+        "SELECT first_name, last_name, email, display_name FROM users WHERE id = ?",
+        (requester_user_id,),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if requester is None:
+        return
+    first = (requester["first_name"] or "").strip()
+    last = (requester["last_name"] or "").strip()
+    email = requester["email"] or ""
+    display = requester["display_name"] or email or "a new user"
+    full_name = (f"{first} {last}").strip() or display
+    details = {
+        "requester_user_id": requester_user_id,
+        "requester_first_name": first,
+        "requester_last_name": last,
+        "requester_email": email,
+        "requester_display": full_name,
+    }
+    for recipient_id in _admin_user_ids():
+        if recipient_id == requester_user_id:
+            continue
+        _emit_one(
+            recipient_user_id=recipient_id,
+            event_kind="new_beta_request",
+            category=CATEGORY_ADMIN_ACTIONABLE,
+            actor_user_id=requester_user_id,
+            rfc_slug=None,
+            branch_name=None,
+            pr_number=None,
+            details=details,
+        )
+
+
 def fan_out_chat_message(
     *,
     actor_user_id: int,
@@ -707,6 +769,16 @@ def render_summary(event_kind: str, actor_display: str | None, rfc_title: str |
         return f"{actor} began graduating {title}."
     if event_kind == "pr_conflict_with_main":
         return f"{actor} started a resolution branch on {title}."
+    if event_kind == "new_beta_request":
+        # v0.9.0: framework-scoped, not RFC-scoped. The actor (the
+        # requester) and the captured full name + email read as
+        # one self-contained sentence; the inbox row and the email
+        # body share this text per §15.4.
+        full_name = extras.get("requester_display") or actor
+        email_addr = extras.get("requester_email") or ""
+        if email_addr:
+            return f"New beta-access request from {full_name} ({email_addr})."
+        return f"New beta-access request from {full_name}."
     return f"{event_kind} on {title}"
 
 

backend/app/otc.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""§6.2 / v0.7.0: email + one-time-code sign-in.
+"""§6.2 / v0.7.0 / v0.8.0: email + one-time-code sign-in.
 
 Replaces the Gitea OAuth gesture as the primary human-auth path. The
 Gitea bot user + token are still needed for server-side git
@@ -25,14 +25,25 @@ The shape:
     `users` row already carries `email` (case-insensitive), it is
     reused — `gitea_id` is left alone so a grandfathered OAuth-era
     user keeps the linker intact. Otherwise a fresh contributor
-    row is provisioned with `gitea_id = NULL`, `gitea_login = NULL`.
+    row is provisioned with `gitea_id = NULL`, `gitea_login = NULL`,
+    and `permission_state = 'pending'` (v0.8.0 — see below).
 
-The endpoints in `main.py` thin-wrap this module. The allowlist gate
+The endpoints in `main.py` thin-wrap this module.
-from v0.3.0 is consulted at request time — if `allowed_emails` is
+
-populated and the requested address isn't on it, the request returns
+v0.8.0 (roadmap item #6) replaces the v0.3.0 `allowed_emails` gate at
-202 as usual but no email is sent. This intentionally does not leak
+the request surface. The request handler used to silently drop OTC
-allowlist state to the caller; the §19.2 candidate for v0.8.0
+requests for emails not on the allowlist; now any valid email
-replaces this gate with an admin-grant flow.
+receives a code. The admission gate moves to `permission_state` on
+the freshly-provisioned `users` row: a fresh user lands in 'pending'
+and waits for an admin grant before write endpoints accept them.
+Read surfaces stay open (the same blast radius v0.6.0 / item #4
+already audited for anonymous viewers).
+
+The `allowed_emails` table itself stays in the schema as a
+fast-path bypass — the admin UI from v0.3.0 continues to manage it,
+and a future release (v0.9.0's admin user-management page) collapses
+the two admission surfaces into one. The OTC request path no
+longer consults the table.
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 
@@ -44,7 +55,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
 import bcrypt
 
 from . import db
-from .auth import SessionUser, allowlist_is_active
+from .auth import SessionUser
 
 log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -101,25 +112,15 @@ def _check_code(code: str, code_hash: str) -> bool:
         return False
 
 
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Allowlist gate — shared with the OAuth flow.
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _allowlist_admits(email: str) -> bool:
-    """The same allowlist v0.3.0 introduced for OAuth, applied to OTC
-    requests. If the allowlist is populated and the email is not on it,
-    we still respond 202 to the caller, but no code is sent."""
-    if not allowlist_is_active():
-        return True
-    row = db.conn().execute(
-        "SELECT 1 FROM allowed_emails WHERE email = ? LIMIT 1", (email,)
-    ).fetchone()
-    return row is not None
-
-
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Request path
+#
+# v0.8.0: the allowlist gate from v0.7.0 / v0.3.0 is removed here. Any
+# valid email receives a code; the admission gate moved to
+# `permission_state` on the freshly-provisioned `users` row (see
+# `provision_or_link_user`). The `allowed_emails` table stays in the
+# schema (admin UI from v0.3.0 still manages it); v0.9.0's admin
+# user-management page will collapse the two surfaces.
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
@@ -127,14 +128,16 @@ def _allowlist_admits(email: str) -> bool:
 class RequestOutcome:
     """The outcome of a `request_code` call.
 
-    `code` is None whenever no code was generated — either because the
+    `code` is None whenever no code was generated — the cooldown
-    allowlist denied the email or because the cooldown window blocked
+    window blocked the request or the email was syntactically
-    the request. The caller (the API endpoint) does not surface this
+    invalid. The caller (the API endpoint) does not surface the
-    distinction to the user; it returns 202 either way.
+    invalid-email shape to the user; it returns 202 either way.
+    The cooldown shape surfaces as a loud 429 per the v0.7.0
+    contract.
     """
     sent: bool
     code: str | None
-    reason: str  # 'sent' | 'allowlist' | 'cooldown' | 'invalid'
+    reason: str  # 'sent' | 'cooldown' | 'invalid'
 
 
 def request_code(email: str) -> RequestOutcome:
@@ -160,13 +163,6 @@ def request_code(email: str) -> RequestOutcome:
         if row is not None:
             return RequestOutcome(sent=False, code=None, reason="cooldown")
 
-    # Allowlist: silently drop the send if the email isn't on the list.
-    # The row is not written either — there's nothing for verify to
-    # match against, so the user-facing experience is "I never got an
-    # email", which is the intended shape for the private-beta gate.
-    if not _allowlist_admits(email):
-        return RequestOutcome(sent=False, code=None, reason="allowlist")
-
     # Invalidate prior unused codes for this email. A re-request is
     # always for the most recent code; older codes are dead.
     db.conn().execute(
@@ -275,12 +271,16 @@ def provision_or_link_user(email: str) -> SessionUser:
       1. An existing row whose email equals (case-insensitive) the
          requested email — the OAuth-era user is grandfathered in via
          this path. `gitea_id` is preserved so a future OAuth round
-         trip still resolves the same row.
+         trip still resolves the same row. `permission_state` is
+         read off the row as-is — grandfathered users come through
+         migration with 'granted' (the column default), so their
+         contributor capabilities are unaffected.
       2. Otherwise: a fresh contributor row with `gitea_id = NULL`,
-         `gitea_login = NULL`. The display name defaults to the local
+         `gitea_login = NULL`, and `permission_state = 'pending'`
-         part of the email (everything before the `@`) — users can
+         (v0.8.0). The display name defaults to the local part of
-         rename later via the §19.2 first-OTC profile-capture flow
+         the email (everything before the `@`); a separate
-         that v0.8.0 introduces.
+         `POST /auth/me/beta-request` call lands first name / last
+         name / "why I want access" on the same row.
 
     The §6.1 owner-zero bootstrap still applies: if the email matches
     the configured `OWNER_GITEA_LOGIN`-derived owner identity, the row
@@ -307,13 +307,19 @@ def provision_or_link_user(email: str) -> SessionUser:
             email=existing["email"] or email,
             avatar_url=existing["avatar_url"] or "",
             role=existing["role"],
+            permission_state=existing["permission_state"] or "granted",
         )
 
     display = email.split("@", 1)[0] or email
+    # v0.8.0: 'pending' is the explicit insert value; the migration
+    # default of 'granted' is what passes grandfathered users
+    # through. A fresh OTC user lands in 'pending' regardless of
+    # what the migration default says, so the gate engages reliably
+    # even if a future migration changes the default.
     cur = db.conn().execute(
         """
-        INSERT INTO users (gitea_id, gitea_login, email, display_name, avatar_url, role)
+        INSERT INTO users (gitea_id, gitea_login, email, display_name, avatar_url, role, permission_state)
-        VALUES (NULL, NULL, ?, ?, '', 'contributor')
+        VALUES (NULL, NULL, ?, ?, '', 'contributor', 'pending')
         """,
         (email, display),
     )
@@ -326,4 +332,5 @@ def provision_or_link_user(email: str) -> SessionUser:
         email=email,
         avatar_url="",
         role="contributor",
+        permission_state="pending",
     )

backend/app/passcode.py

@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+"""§6.2 / v0.10.0: user-set passcodes after OTC (roadmap item #8).
+
+After a successful OTC sign-in, a contributor may set a passcode and
+use email + passcode for subsequent sign-ins. OTC remains the fallback
+— a forgotten passcode is recovered by requesting a fresh OTC.
+
+This module is the state machine behind the four `/auth/passcode/*`
+endpoints (`set`, `clear`, `verify`, `check`). The endpoints in
+`main.py` thin-wrap these helpers in the same shape the OTC module
+uses (see `otc.py`).
+
+Shape:
+
+  * `set_passcode(user_id, passcode)` — bcrypt-hash the passcode and
+    write it to `users.passcode_hash` + `users.passcode_set_at`.
+    Validation (length, denylist) happens here, not at the endpoint,
+    so the rule lives in one place. Replaces any prior passcode.
+  * `clear_passcode(user_id)` — null out `passcode_hash` and
+    `passcode_set_at`. The user is back to OTC-only.
+  * `verify_passcode(email, passcode)` — locate the user by email,
+    check lockout, compare via bcrypt, manage the failure counter,
+    and return a populated `SessionUser` on success.
+  * `passcode_status(email)` — does this email have a passcode set?
+    Used by the `/auth/passcode/check` endpoint that the Login.jsx
+    flow consults after the user types their email.
+
+Lockout is a v1 shape: 5 consecutive failures sets
+`passcode_locked_until` to `now + 15 minutes`, after which a verify
+attempt that lands inside the window returns HTTP 423. The OTC path
+is unaffected by the lockout — a user can request and verify a fresh
+OTC to sign in while their passcode is locked out, and `verify_code`
+in `otc.py` does not consult these columns.
+
+The lockout window and the failure threshold are hard-coded here.
+Tuning them via env vars (or moving to per-IP rate-limiting) is a
+§19.2 candidate; see SPEC §19.2.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+import bcrypt
+
+from . import db
+from .auth import SessionUser
+
+log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Tunables — intentionally hard-coded in v0.10.0 (see module docstring).
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+LOCKOUT_AFTER_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = 5
+LOCKOUT_DURATION_MINUTES = 15
+
+PASSCODE_MIN_LENGTH = 4
+PASSCODE_MAX_LENGTH = 20
+
+# A small denylist of patterns we never want a passcode to be. The
+# rule is "no obvious patterns"; the list is deliberately small —
+# every entry here is a verbatim string match. A heavier check
+# (sequential digits, single-character runs of length >= N, etc.)
+# is a §19.2 candidate.
+PASSCODE_DENYLIST: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
+    {
+        "0000",
+        "1111",
+        "2222",
+        "3333",
+        "4444",
+        "5555",
+        "6666",
+        "7777",
+        "8888",
+        "9999",
+        "1234",
+        "12345",
+        "123456",
+        "1234567",
+        "12345678",
+        "123456789",
+        "1234567890",
+        "0123",
+        "01234",
+        "012345",
+        "0123456",
+        "01234567",
+        "012345678",
+        "0123456789",
+        "abcd",
+        "abcde",
+        "abcdef",
+        "qwer",
+        "qwerty",
+        "asdf",
+        "asdfg",
+        "asdfgh",
+        "aaaa",
+        "bbbb",
+        "cccc",
+        "password",
+        "letmein",
+    }
+)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Validation
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class PasscodeValidationError(Exception):
+    """The proposed passcode failed validation. The endpoint surface
+    maps this to HTTP 422 with the message intact."""
+
+
+def _validate(passcode: str) -> str:
+    """Return the normalized passcode (stripped) or raise.
+
+    Rules:
+      * 4-20 characters after stripping leading/trailing whitespace.
+      * Not on the small denylist of obvious patterns.
+
+    No character-class restriction beyond that — the spec says
+    "numeric PIN or short alphanumeric"; we don't refuse other
+    characters because the entropy isn't load-bearing (the per-account
+    lockout is what carries the security weight, mirroring the OTC
+    shape from v0.7.0).
+    """
+    pc = (passcode or "").strip()
+    if not pc:
+        raise PasscodeValidationError("Passcode is required")
+    if len(pc) < PASSCODE_MIN_LENGTH:
+        raise PasscodeValidationError(
+            f"Passcode must be at least {PASSCODE_MIN_LENGTH} characters"
+        )
+    if len(pc) > PASSCODE_MAX_LENGTH:
+        raise PasscodeValidationError(
+            f"Passcode must be at most {PASSCODE_MAX_LENGTH} characters"
+        )
+    if pc.lower() in PASSCODE_DENYLIST:
+        raise PasscodeValidationError("Passcode is too common; pick something less obvious")
+    return pc
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Hashing
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _hash(passcode: str) -> str:
+    return bcrypt.hashpw(passcode.encode("utf-8"), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode("ascii")
+
+
+def _check(passcode: str, passcode_hash: str) -> bool:
+    try:
+        return bcrypt.checkpw(passcode.encode("utf-8"), passcode_hash.encode("ascii"))
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Set / clear
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def set_passcode(user_id: int, passcode: str) -> None:
+    """Hash and store the passcode. Replaces any prior passcode on the
+    same row; clears the failure counter and lockout (a user setting a
+    fresh passcode is implicitly re-authenticating their account)."""
+    pc = _validate(passcode)
+    h = _hash(pc)
+    db.conn().execute(
+        """
+        UPDATE users
+           SET passcode_hash = ?,
+               passcode_set_at = datetime('now'),
+               passcode_failed_attempts = 0,
+               passcode_locked_until = NULL
+         WHERE id = ?
+        """,
+        (h, user_id),
+    )
+
+
+def clear_passcode(user_id: int) -> None:
+    """Remove the passcode. The user is back to OTC-only on next sign-in."""
+    db.conn().execute(
+        """
+        UPDATE users
+           SET passcode_hash = NULL,
+               passcode_set_at = NULL,
+               passcode_failed_attempts = 0,
+               passcode_locked_until = NULL
+         WHERE id = ?
+        """,
+        (user_id,),
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Check (status surface for the Login.jsx flow)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass
+class PasscodeStatus:
+    """The shape `/auth/passcode/check` returns.
+
+    `has_passcode` is the only signal the frontend needs to decide
+    whether to show a passcode input or an OTC request step. We do
+    not leak the hash, the set-at timestamp, or the lockout state —
+    a probing client that wants to know "is this account locked
+    out" can attempt a verify and read the 423.
+    """
+    has_passcode: bool
+
+
+def passcode_status(email: str) -> PasscodeStatus:
+    email = (email or "").strip()
+    if not email or "@" not in email:
+        return PasscodeStatus(has_passcode=False)
+    row = db.conn().execute(
+        "SELECT passcode_hash FROM users WHERE email = ? COLLATE NOCASE",
+        (email,),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if row is None:
+        return PasscodeStatus(has_passcode=False)
+    return PasscodeStatus(has_passcode=bool(row["passcode_hash"]))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Verify
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass
+class VerifyOutcome:
+    """Result of a `verify_passcode` call.
+
+    `reason` distinguishes the failure modes the endpoint surfaces as
+    distinct HTTP shapes:
+      * 'ok'        — populated `user`, HTTP 200.
+      * 'unknown'   — no user with this email, HTTP 400 (generic).
+      * 'no_passcode' — user exists but never set a passcode, HTTP 400
+        (the frontend should fall back to OTC).
+      * 'locked'    — user is currently in the lockout window, HTTP
+        423. `locked_until` carries the ISO-8601 stamp for the client.
+      * 'wrong'     — passcode didn't match. HTTP 400. If the failure
+        crossed the lockout threshold the row is now locked; the
+        endpoint surfaces this as a fresh `locked` response on the
+        next attempt rather than collapsing the two states here.
+    """
+    ok: bool
+    user: SessionUser | None
+    reason: str
+    locked_until: str | None = None
+
+
+def verify_passcode(email: str, passcode: str) -> VerifyOutcome:
+    email = (email or "").strip()
+    passcode = (passcode or "").strip()
+    if not email or not passcode:
+        return VerifyOutcome(ok=False, user=None, reason="unknown")
+
+    row = db.conn().execute(
+        """
+        SELECT id, gitea_id, gitea_login, email, display_name, avatar_url, role,
+               passcode_hash, passcode_failed_attempts, passcode_locked_until
+          FROM users
+         WHERE email = ? COLLATE NOCASE
+        """,
+        (email,),
+    ).fetchone()
+    if row is None:
+        return VerifyOutcome(ok=False, user=None, reason="unknown")
+    if not row["passcode_hash"]:
+        return VerifyOutcome(ok=False, user=None, reason="no_passcode")
+
+    # Lockout check: if `passcode_locked_until` is populated and in the
+    # future, the verify is refused without touching the hash. Once the
+    # window has elapsed we let the verify proceed; the failed-attempts
+    # counter is also reset so the user gets a fresh 5-attempt budget.
+    locked_until = row["passcode_locked_until"]
+    if locked_until:
+        still_locked = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT datetime(?) > datetime('now') AS still_locked",
+            (locked_until,),
+        ).fetchone()["still_locked"]
+        if still_locked:
+            return VerifyOutcome(
+                ok=False,
+                user=None,
+                reason="locked",
+                locked_until=locked_until,
+            )
+        # Lockout expired — clear the counter so the next failure starts
+        # from zero, and continue with the verify.
+        db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            UPDATE users
+               SET passcode_failed_attempts = 0,
+                   passcode_locked_until = NULL
+             WHERE id = ?
+            """,
+            (row["id"],),
+        )
+
+    if _check(passcode, row["passcode_hash"]):
+        # Success: clear the counter (a single success wipes the
+        # accumulated failures — the threshold tracks *consecutive*
+        # failures).
+        db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            UPDATE users
+               SET passcode_failed_attempts = 0,
+                   passcode_locked_until = NULL,
+                   last_seen_at = datetime('now')
+             WHERE id = ?
+            """,
+            (row["id"],),
+        )
+        return VerifyOutcome(
+            ok=True,
+            user=SessionUser(
+                user_id=row["id"],
+                gitea_id=row["gitea_id"] or 0,
+                gitea_login=row["gitea_login"] or "",
+                display_name=row["display_name"],
+                email=row["email"] or email,
+                avatar_url=row["avatar_url"] or "",
+                role=row["role"],
+            ),
+            reason="ok",
+        )
+
+    # Failure: increment the counter. If this push crosses the
+    # threshold, stamp the lockout. The next verify attempt against
+    # the same row returns 423 with the `locked_until` stamp.
+    next_count = (row["passcode_failed_attempts"] or 0) + 1
+    if next_count >= LOCKOUT_AFTER_FAILED_ATTEMPTS:
+        db.conn().execute(
+            f"""
+            UPDATE users
+               SET passcode_failed_attempts = ?,
+                   passcode_locked_until = datetime('now', '+{LOCKOUT_DURATION_MINUTES} minutes')
+             WHERE id = ?
+            """,
+            (next_count, row["id"]),
+        )
+        new_locked_until = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT passcode_locked_until FROM users WHERE id = ?",
+            (row["id"],),
+        ).fetchone()["passcode_locked_until"]
+        return VerifyOutcome(
+            ok=False,
+            user=None,
+            reason="locked",
+            locked_until=new_locked_until,
+        )
+    db.conn().execute(
+        "UPDATE users SET passcode_failed_attempts = ? WHERE id = ?",
+        (next_count, row["id"]),
+    )
+    return VerifyOutcome(ok=False, user=None, reason="wrong")

backend/migrations/013_cookie_consent.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-- v0.13.0 / roadmap item #11 — cookie consent.
+--
+-- The framework now ships a non-modal cookie consent banner per the
+-- privacy-and-cookies UX (SPEC §14.5 / §14.6). Authenticated viewers
+-- get their choice persisted server-side so it survives sign-out /
+-- sign-in across devices; anonymous viewers persist their choice in
+-- localStorage only.
+--
+-- Shape: a single row per user, three flags, plus a recorded-at stamp.
+-- The flags are:
+--   - essential:  the framework's strictly-necessary cookies (session,
+--                 itsdangerous-signed payloads, CSRF if any). Permanently
+--                 true at the API surface — included in the row for
+--                 symmetry with the analytics / other flags rather than
+--                 because the user can switch it off.
+--   - analytics:  reserved for the §13 analytics SDK gating that lands
+--                 in v0.15.0. Off by default; opt-in via the banner.
+--   - other:      everything else (third-party embeds, social widgets).
+--                 Off by default; opt-in via the banner.
+--
+-- A NULL recorded_at means "no choice yet" — the banner should re-prompt
+-- the next time the user signs in on a fresh device. Once recorded_at is
+-- set, the banner is hidden until the user re-opens it from the
+-- /settings/notifications "Privacy & cookies" tab.
+--
+-- The row is created lazily on first PUT. Absence of a row is equivalent
+-- to NULL recorded_at — the banner shows.
+
+CREATE TABLE cookie_consent (
+    user_id        INTEGER PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    essential      INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (essential IN (0, 1)),
+    analytics      INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 CHECK (analytics IN (0, 1)),
+    other_cookies  INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 CHECK (other_cookies IN (0, 1)),
+    recorded_at    TEXT
+);

backend/migrations/014_beta_access.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+-- §6.1 / §6.2 / §14.1 / v0.8.0: open beta-access request flow (roadmap item #6).
+--
+-- This release replaces v0.3.0's `allowed_emails` allowlist as the
+-- admission control. Anyone with a valid email can sign in via the
+-- v0.7.0 OTC flow; a fresh user lands in `permission_state='pending'`
+-- until an admin grants access. The first-OTC flow captures three
+-- profile fields (first name, last name, free-text "why I should be
+-- included in the beta") that the admin sees when triaging the
+-- request queue. The `allowed_emails` table stays in the schema as a
+-- fast-path bypass — populated rows are still readable by the
+-- existing admin UI; the OTC `/request` handler no longer consults
+-- it. v0.9.0's admin user-management page will replace the
+-- allowlist UI entirely.
+--
+-- Schema additions:
+--
+--   * `permission_state` — three-state CHECK: 'pending' | 'granted' |
+--     'revoked'. Default 'granted' so every row at migration time
+--     passes through unaffected; only newly provisioned OTC users
+--     land in 'pending' (the OTC verify path sets the column
+--     explicitly on a fresh row, per `app/otc.py`). 'revoked' is the
+--     admin gesture for an account that earned a grant then later
+--     lost it; v0.8.0 doesn't surface a revoke UI, but the schema
+--     slot is here so v0.9.0's admin user-management page can flip
+--     the column without another migration.
+--
+--   * `first_name`, `last_name` — nullable TEXT. Captured on the
+--     first OTC sign-in via `POST /auth/me/beta-request`. Existing
+--     rows (OAuth-era users, OTC users provisioned in v0.7.0) carry
+--     NULL through the migration; the admin queue treats an
+--     unpopulated capture as "auto-grandfathered" since the row's
+--     `permission_state` is already 'granted'.
+--
+--   * `beta_request_reason` — nullable TEXT. The free-text "why I
+--     should be included" from the capture form. Bounded to ~4000
+--     chars at the endpoint layer (no DB-level constraint —
+--     SQLite's TEXT is unbounded).
+--
+--   * `permission_decided_by` — nullable INTEGER. The `users.id` of
+--     the admin who flipped `permission_state` from 'pending' to
+--     'granted' (or 'granted' to 'revoked'). NULL for grandfathered
+--     rows (they were never decided — they passed through at
+--     migration). ON DELETE SET NULL because losing the admin row
+--     should not cascade-delete the user whose access they granted.
+--
+--   * `permission_decided_at` — nullable TEXT timestamp (ISO 8601,
+--     same shape as the existing `created_at` / `last_seen_at`).
+--     Co-populated with `permission_decided_by` on each decision.
+--
+-- Grandfathered-row invariant:
+--
+--   Every row that exists at migration time has
+--   `permission_state='granted'` and `permission_decided_by=NULL`
+--   (the column default + NULL preservation). v0.8.0's auth gate
+--   reads `permission_state='granted'` as the admission check, so
+--   no existing user is locked out by the upgrade. v0.7.0's OTC
+--   path is patched in the same release to set
+--   `permission_state='pending'` explicitly on a fresh row, so the
+--   gate engages only for users provisioned after the upgrade.
+
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN permission_state TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'granted'
+    CHECK (permission_state IN ('pending', 'granted', 'revoked'));
+
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN first_name TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN last_name TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN beta_request_reason TEXT;
+
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN permission_decided_by INTEGER
+    REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN permission_decided_at TEXT;
+
+-- Index for the v0.9.0 admin queue: list pending requests ordered by
+-- when the user's row was created (the implicit "request received at"
+-- timestamp, since v0.8.0 sets pending at the same moment as the row
+-- itself is inserted via the OTC verify path).
+CREATE INDEX idx_users_permission_state ON users (permission_state);

backend/migrations/015_passcode.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+-- §6.2 / v0.10.0: user-set passcodes after OTC (roadmap item #8).
+--
+-- After a successful OTC sign-in, a contributor may set a passcode
+-- (numeric PIN or short alphanumeric). Subsequent sign-ins on the same
+-- account can use email + passcode instead of email + OTC. OTC remains
+-- the structural fallback — a forgotten passcode is recovered by
+-- requesting a fresh OTC and signing in via that path. Per-account
+-- lockout after 5 consecutive verify failures redirects the user to
+-- the OTC path for 15 minutes; the OTC path itself is unaffected by
+-- the passcode lockout (a locked-out user can still receive a fresh
+-- code and sign in).
+--
+-- The columns are additive to the `users` table from `012_otc.sql`.
+-- v0.8.0's `permission_state` column (roadmap item #6) lands in the
+-- driver's integration order ahead of this migration; we do not touch
+-- that column here. v0.7.0's nullable-`gitea_id`/`gitea_login` shape
+-- is preserved verbatim.
+--
+-- Storage shape:
+--
+--   * `passcode_hash` (nullable) — bcrypt hash of the passcode.
+--     NULL means "no passcode set"; the user is OTC-only.
+--   * `passcode_set_at` (nullable) — timestamp of the most recent
+--     `passcode/set` call. Updated when a passcode is set or
+--     replaced; cleared when the passcode is removed.
+--   * `passcode_failed_attempts` — count of consecutive failed
+--     verify attempts since the last successful verify (or since
+--     the lockout cleared). Resets to 0 on success and on lockout
+--     expiry. Defaults to 0 so existing rows post-migration are
+--     not implicitly half-locked.
+--   * `passcode_locked_until` (nullable) — if populated and the
+--     timestamp is in the future, passcode verify is refused with
+--     HTTP 423. Cleared on successful verify after the window
+--     expires, or by the operator via direct DB intervention if
+--     ever needed (no admin endpoint surfaces this in v1).
+--
+-- v0.10.0 introduces no new env vars. The lockout window (5 attempts,
+-- 15 minutes) is hard-coded in `backend/app/passcode.py`; raising or
+-- lowering it is a future-§19.2 candidate. Passcode hashing reuses
+-- the bcrypt dependency added in v0.7.0 for OTC; no new secret is
+-- required (the existing `SECRET_KEY` continues to sign sessions).
+--
+-- Note on SQLite: ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN is supported, so this
+-- migration does not need the rebuild dance that `012_otc.sql`
+-- required. The runner wraps each file in a single BEGIN/COMMIT
+-- block — see `backend/app/db.py` — so either every ADD COLUMN
+-- here lands or none do.
+
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN passcode_hash TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN passcode_set_at TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN passcode_failed_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN passcode_locked_until TEXT;

backend/tests/test_admin_users_vertical.py

@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+"""End-to-end integration tests for v0.9.0's admin user-management page
+and new-beta-request notifications (roadmap item #7, §6.1 / §15).
+
+The release lands two halves of the same surface:
+
+  * **Admin notification on new beta request.** When a pending user
+    submits `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request`, every owner/admin
+    receives a `new_beta_request` notification (the §15 substrate
+    insert lands the row; the §15.4 email path dispatches subject to
+    the recipient's `email_admin_actionable` toggle).
+
+  * **Admin user-management surface** at `/admin/users`. The
+    `GET /api/admin/users` listing carries every user with their
+    permission_state, profile fields, sign-up reason, and decision
+    audit. The new `POST /api/admin/users/<id>/permission` endpoint
+    flips the column and writes a `permission_events` row.
+
+The tests prove:
+
+  * The first beta-request submission fans a `new_beta_request`
+    row out to every admin/owner (and not to the requester
+    themselves). The row carries the captured profile in
+    `payload.extras`.
+  * Re-submitting the form from the same pending user doesn't
+    re-fan (we only notify on the row's first complete state).
+  * `GET /api/admin/users` carries the v0.9.0 columns
+    (permission_state, first/last/reason, decided_by).
+  * `POST /api/admin/users/<id>/permission` flips the state,
+    stamps decided_by/at, and writes a `permission_events` row.
+  * The endpoint refuses self-flip (422) and refuses non-admin
+    callers (403).
+  * The endpoint accepts only the three valid states (422 on
+    anything else).
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from test_propose_vertical import (  # noqa: F401 — fixtures land via import
+    FakeGitea,
+    app_with_fake_gitea,
+    provision_user_row,
+    sign_in_as,
+    tmp_env,
+)
+
+
+def _reset_outbound():
+    from app import email as email_mod
+    email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
+
+
+def _outbound_otc_codes(to_address: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
+    from app import email as email_mod
+    out = []
+    for env in email_mod.sent_envelopes():
+        if env.get("kind") != "otc":
+            continue
+        if to_address is not None and env["to"] != to_address:
+            continue
+        for line in env["body"].splitlines():
+            tok = line.strip()
+            if tok.isdigit() and len(tok) == 6:
+                out.append(tok)
+                break
+    return out
+
+
+def _provision_pending_user(client, email: str) -> int:
+    """Sign in a fresh OTC user (lands `pending`) and return their user_id."""
+    from app import db
+    _reset_outbound()
+    client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": email})
+    code = _outbound_otc_codes(email)[-1]
+    client.post("/auth/otc/verify", json={"email": email, "code": code})
+    row = db.conn().execute(
+        "SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = ? COLLATE NOCASE", (email,)
+    ).fetchone()
+    return row["id"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Admin notification on beta-request submission
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_beta_request_submission_notifies_every_admin(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """First-time submission of a beta-request fans a notification out
+    to every owner and admin. The requester themselves never receives
+    a row (filtered out by user_id even if they happened to be in the
+    admin set, which they aren't in practice — fresh OTC users are
+    `contributor`+`pending`)."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        # Provision two admins and one owner so the fan-out has multiple
+        # targets. The OWNER_GITEA_LOGIN-derived ownership doesn't fire
+        # here (no OAuth round-trip in this path); we seed the role
+        # directly.
+        provision_user_row(user_id=10, login="ownerzero", role="owner")
+        provision_user_row(user_id=11, login="admin_one", role="admin")
+        provision_user_row(user_id=12, login="admin_two", role="admin")
+        provision_user_row(user_id=13, login="contrib_one", role="contributor")
+
+        # Sign in a fresh OTC user → permission_state='pending'.
+        requester_id = _provision_pending_user(client, "newbie@example.com")
+
+        # Capture-form submit.
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/auth/me/beta-request",
+            json={
+                "first_name": "Newt",
+                "last_name": "Newcomer",
+                "beta_request_reason": "I want to write the Human RFC.",
+            },
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+
+        # Every owner + admin gets a `new_beta_request` notification.
+        # The contributor (id=13) does not. The requester (whoever id
+        # they got) does not.
+        rows = db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            SELECT recipient_user_id, event_kind, actor_user_id, payload
+              FROM notifications
+             WHERE event_kind = 'new_beta_request'
+            """
+        ).fetchall()
+        recipients = sorted(r["recipient_user_id"] for r in rows)
+        assert recipients == [10, 11, 12], f"unexpected recipients: {recipients}"
+        # Actor is the requester (§15.9: never the bot).
+        for r in rows:
+            assert r["actor_user_id"] == requester_id
+            import json as _json
+            extras = _json.loads(r["payload"])
+            assert extras["requester_first_name"] == "Newt"
+            assert extras["requester_last_name"] == "Newcomer"
+            assert extras["requester_email"] == "newbie@example.com"
+
+
+def test_beta_request_resubmit_does_not_re_notify(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """Once a user has completed the capture form, re-submitting it
+    (the endpoint is idempotent for pending users) must not re-fan a
+    fresh notification to every admin — that would carpet-bomb the
+    inbox on every typo correction."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=20, login="adminzero", role="admin")
+        _provision_pending_user(client, "carpet@example.com")
+
+        body = {
+            "first_name": "Carpet",
+            "last_name": "Bomb",
+            "beta_request_reason": "first draft",
+        }
+        r1 = client.post("/api/auth/me/beta-request", json=body)
+        assert r1.status_code == 200
+
+        # Re-submit with edited reason — endpoint accepts (idempotent
+        # update), but the admin inbox stays at one row.
+        body2 = dict(body, beta_request_reason="cleaner final draft")
+        r2 = client.post("/api/auth/me/beta-request", json=body2)
+        assert r2.status_code == 200
+
+        rows = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM notifications WHERE event_kind = 'new_beta_request'"
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert rows["n"] == 1
+
+
+def test_beta_request_notification_is_admin_actionable_category(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """The §15.4 category mapping must route `new_beta_request` to the
+    admin-actionable bucket so the email gate consults
+    `email_admin_actionable` (and skips for non-admin recipients).
+    """
+    from app import email as email_mod
+
+    assert email_mod.category_for("new_beta_request", "structural") == "admin-actionable"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# /api/admin/users — listing carries the v0.9.0 columns
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_admin_users_listing_carries_permission_columns(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """The Users tab consumes this shape — confirm every required
+    column is on the response."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        # Seed an admin and a pending user with all the v0.8.0 columns
+        # populated. Direct-DB insert avoids the OTC dance (which would
+        # overwrite the cookie); the test above proves the capture
+        # pathway end-to-end and this one just exercises the listing
+        # surface's shape.
+        provision_user_row(user_id=30, login="ben", role="owner")
+        db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            INSERT INTO users (id, gitea_id, gitea_login, email,
+                               display_name, avatar_url, role,
+                               permission_state, first_name, last_name,
+                               beta_request_reason)
+            VALUES (31, NULL, NULL, 'pendinguser@example.com',
+                    'pendinguser', '', 'contributor',
+                    'pending', 'Penn', 'Ding', 'I want in.')
+            """
+        )
+
+        sign_in_as(
+            client, user_id=30, gitea_login="ben",
+            display_name="Ben", role="owner",
+        )
+
+        r = client.get("/api/admin/users")
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        items = r.json()["items"]
+        assert isinstance(items, list)
+        pending = next(
+            (i for i in items if i["email"] == "pendinguser@example.com"), None,
+        )
+        assert pending is not None
+        assert pending["permission_state"] == "pending"
+        assert pending["first_name"] == "Penn"
+        assert pending["last_name"] == "Ding"
+        assert pending["beta_request_reason"] == "I want in."
+        assert pending["permission_decided_at"] is None
+        assert pending["permission_decided_by_login"] is None
+        # Pending bucket is listed first (sort order).
+        assert items[0]["permission_state"] == "pending"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# /api/admin/users/<id>/permission — the flip endpoint
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_permission_flip_grant_promotes_pending_to_granted(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """The end-to-end gesture: a fresh OTC user lands pending, an admin
+    flips them to granted via the endpoint, the row reflects the new
+    state + decided_by/at, and a `permission_events` audit row lands."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        # Pending user.
+        pending_id = _provision_pending_user(client, "flip@example.com")
+
+        # Admin acting on them.
+        provision_user_row(user_id=40, login="adminflipper", role="admin")
+        sign_in_as(
+            client, user_id=40, gitea_login="adminflipper",
+            display_name="Admin Flipper", role="admin",
+        )
+
+        r = client.post(
+            f"/api/admin/users/{pending_id}/permission",
+            json={"state": "granted"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+        body = r.json()
+        assert body["permission_state"] == "granted"
+        assert body["changed"] is True
+
+        # Row reflects the new state + decision stamp.
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT permission_state, permission_decided_by, permission_decided_at "
+            "FROM users WHERE id = ?",
+            (pending_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["permission_state"] == "granted"
+        assert row["permission_decided_by"] == 40
+        assert row["permission_decided_at"] is not None
+
+        # Audit row landed in permission_events.
+        events = db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            SELECT actor_user_id, subject_user_id, event_kind
+              FROM permission_events
+             WHERE event_kind = 'permission_granted'
+            """
+        ).fetchall()
+        assert len(events) == 1
+        assert events[0]["actor_user_id"] == 40
+        assert events[0]["subject_user_id"] == pending_id
+
+
+def test_permission_flip_revoke_promotes_granted_to_revoked(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """Revoke is the symmetric gesture. Used when an account earned a
+    grant then later lost it (§6.1 / `revoked` state)."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=50, login="goner", role="contributor")
+        # Default permission_state is 'granted' via the column default.
+        provision_user_row(user_id=51, login="adminrevoker", role="admin")
+        sign_in_as(
+            client, user_id=51, gitea_login="adminrevoker",
+            display_name="Admin Revoker", role="admin",
+        )
+
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/admin/users/50/permission",
+            json={"state": "revoked"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT permission_state FROM users WHERE id = 50"
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["permission_state"] == "revoked"
+
+        events = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT event_kind FROM permission_events "
+            "WHERE event_kind = 'permission_revoked' AND subject_user_id = 50"
+        ).fetchall()
+        assert len(events) == 1
+
+
+def test_permission_flip_refuses_self(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """Symmetric to set_mute / set_role: an admin can't self-flip.
+    The state-change channel for one's own grant is somebody else's
+    hand."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=60, login="selfflipper", role="admin")
+        sign_in_as(
+            client, user_id=60, gitea_login="selfflipper",
+            display_name="Self Flipper", role="admin",
+        )
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/admin/users/60/permission",
+            json={"state": "revoked"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 422
+
+
+def test_permission_flip_refuses_non_admin(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """The endpoint is admin-only (§17 admin/* requires require_admin).
+    A contributor caller is refused 403; an anonymous caller 401."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=70, login="target", role="contributor")
+        provision_user_row(user_id=71, login="contrib", role="contributor")
+        sign_in_as(
+            client, user_id=71, gitea_login="contrib",
+            display_name="Contrib", role="contributor",
+        )
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/admin/users/70/permission",
+            json={"state": "granted"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 403
+
+        client.cookies.clear()
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/admin/users/70/permission",
+            json={"state": "granted"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_permission_flip_refuses_invalid_state(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """Pydantic regex pattern refuses anything outside the three
+    canonical states with 422."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=80, login="targetx", role="contributor")
+        provision_user_row(user_id=81, login="adminx", role="admin")
+        sign_in_as(
+            client, user_id=81, gitea_login="adminx",
+            display_name="Admin X", role="admin",
+        )
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/admin/users/80/permission",
+            json={"state": "banished"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 422
+
+
+def test_permission_flip_no_op_when_state_already_matches(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """An admin flipping a granted user to granted gets 200 with
+    `changed: false` — no audit row, no decided_at update."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=90, login="alreadygranted", role="contributor")
+        provision_user_row(user_id=91, login="adminN", role="admin")
+        sign_in_as(
+            client, user_id=91, gitea_login="adminN",
+            display_name="Admin N", role="admin",
+        )
+
+        before_events = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM permission_events"
+        ).fetchone()["n"]
+
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/admin/users/90/permission",
+            json={"state": "granted"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        body = r.json()
+        assert body["changed"] is False
+
+        after_events = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM permission_events"
+        ).fetchone()["n"]
+        assert after_events == before_events

backend/tests/test_beta_access_vertical.py

@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+"""End-to-end integration tests for v0.8.0's open beta-access request
+flow (§6.1 / §14.1, roadmap item #6).
+
+The release replaces v0.3.0's `allowed_emails` allowlist as the
+admission gate. Any valid email can sign in via the v0.7.0 OTC flow;
+a fresh user lands in `permission_state='pending'` until an admin
+grants access. The first-OTC flow captures first name, last name,
+and a free-text "why I should be included in the beta" via a new
+`POST /api/auth/me/beta-request` endpoint.
+
+The tests prove:
+
+  * A fresh OTC user lands `permission_state='pending'` with empty
+    profile fields, and the verify-response carries `needs_profile=true`.
+  * `POST /api/auth/me/beta-request` populates the three fields and
+    leaves the row in `pending`.
+  * A pending user is refused write endpoints (representative
+    samples: propose RFC, post discussion thread). The refusal is
+    403 (not 401 — they're authenticated, just not granted).
+  * An admin-grant flow promotes pending → granted. v0.8.0 doesn't
+    ship an admin UI for this (deferred to item #7 / v0.9.0), so
+    the test flips the column directly via DB and asserts that
+    `require_contributor` now admits the user.
+  * A grandfathered user (existing row pre-migration, default
+    `permission_state='granted'`) is unaffected — write endpoints
+    accept them.
+  * The `/auth/otc/request` endpoint accepts any email — the
+    v0.7.0 allowlist gate is gone from this path. The `allowed_emails`
+    table stays in the schema; the admin UI from v0.3.0 continues to
+    manage it for the fast-path bypass deployments may use.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from test_propose_vertical import (  # noqa: F401 — fixtures land via import
+    FakeGitea,
+    app_with_fake_gitea,
+    provision_user_row,
+    sign_in_as,
+    tmp_env,
+)
+
+
+def _reset_outbound():
+    from app import email as email_mod
+    email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
+
+
+def _outbound_otc_codes(to_address: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
+    """Pluck the code line from every OTC envelope in the test buffer."""
+    from app import email as email_mod
+    out = []
+    for env in email_mod.sent_envelopes():
+        if env.get("kind") != "otc":
+            continue
+        if to_address is not None and env["to"] != to_address:
+            continue
+        for line in env["body"].splitlines():
+            tok = line.strip()
+            if tok.isdigit() and len(tok) == 6:
+                out.append(tok)
+                break
+    return out
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fresh OTC sign-in lands pending with empty fields
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_fresh_otc_user_lands_pending_with_empty_profile(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+
+        # Request + verify the OTC.
+        r = client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "newcomer@example.com"})
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+        code = _outbound_otc_codes("newcomer@example.com")[-1]
+
+        r = client.post("/auth/otc/verify", json={"email": "newcomer@example.com", "code": code})
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+        body = r.json()
+        # The verify response carries the new fields v0.8.0 added.
+        assert body["needs_profile"] is True
+        assert body["user"]["permission_state"] == "pending"
+
+        # The row reflects the same: pending state, no profile yet.
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT permission_state, first_name, last_name, beta_request_reason FROM users WHERE email = ? COLLATE NOCASE",
+            ("newcomer@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row is not None
+        assert row["permission_state"] == "pending"
+        assert row["first_name"] is None
+        assert row["last_name"] is None
+        assert row["beta_request_reason"] is None
+
+        # /api/auth/me surfaces the same shape.
+        me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
+        assert me["authenticated"] is True
+        assert me["user"]["permission_state"] == "pending"
+        assert me["user"]["needs_profile"] is True
+        assert me["user"]["first_name"] == ""
+        assert me["user"]["last_name"] == ""
+        assert me["user"]["beta_request_reason"] == ""
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# beta-request endpoint captures the fields and leaves state pending
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_beta_request_populates_fields_keeps_state_pending(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        # Sign in the fresh user via the full OTC flow.
+        client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "alice@example.com"})
+        code = _outbound_otc_codes("alice@example.com")[-1]
+        client.post("/auth/otc/verify", json={"email": "alice@example.com", "code": code})
+
+        # Submit the capture form.
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/auth/me/beta-request",
+            json={
+                "first_name": "Alice",
+                "last_name": "Liddell",
+                "beta_request_reason": "I want to help write the RFCs.",
+            },
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+
+        # The row reflects the captured fields; state stays pending.
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT permission_state, first_name, last_name, beta_request_reason FROM users WHERE email = ? COLLATE NOCASE",
+            ("alice@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["permission_state"] == "pending"
+        assert row["first_name"] == "Alice"
+        assert row["last_name"] == "Liddell"
+        assert row["beta_request_reason"] == "I want to help write the RFCs."
+
+        # /api/auth/me now reports needs_profile=false (fields are set).
+        me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
+        assert me["user"]["permission_state"] == "pending"
+        assert me["user"]["needs_profile"] is False
+        assert me["user"]["first_name"] == "Alice"
+
+
+def test_beta_request_refuses_anonymous(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """The endpoint requires authentication — an anonymous caller can't
+    file a request without first signing in via OTC."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        client.cookies.clear()
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/auth/me/beta-request",
+            json={"first_name": "A", "last_name": "B", "beta_request_reason": "Hi"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_beta_request_refuses_granted_user(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """A grandfathered (already granted) user has no business filing a
+    beta request. The endpoint refuses with 409 so the client can
+    distinguish the failure from "we don't know you" (401)."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="grandfathered", role="contributor")
+        sign_in_as(
+            client,
+            user_id=1,
+            gitea_login="grandfathered",
+            display_name="Grandfathered",
+            role="contributor",
+        )
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/auth/me/beta-request",
+            json={"first_name": "G", "last_name": "F", "beta_request_reason": "x"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 409
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Pending user is refused write endpoints; admin grant promotes them
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_pending_user_is_refused_write_endpoints(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """A pending user can read everything anonymous can read, but every
+    write-shaped endpoint refuses with 403. The refusal shape mirrors
+    the v0.6.0 / item #4 audit's anon-401 — both are "no contributor
+    capability"; pending is the authenticated-but-ungranted variant.
+
+    Representative samples: propose RFC, post discussion thread.
+    """
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        # Sign in via fresh OTC — lands pending.
+        client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "pending@example.com"})
+        code = _outbound_otc_codes("pending@example.com")[-1]
+        client.post("/auth/otc/verify", json={"email": "pending@example.com", "code": code})
+
+        # Reads work — every anonymous surface stays reachable.
+        assert client.get("/api/health").status_code == 200
+        assert client.get("/api/rfcs").status_code == 200
+        assert client.get("/api/philosophy").status_code == 200
+
+        # Propose — write-shaped, refused with 403.
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/rfcs/propose",
+            json={"title": "T", "slug": "t", "pitch": "p", "tags": []},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 403
+        # The error body mentions the review state so a UI surface can
+        # render the right message — but the test asserts only on the
+        # status code (the body shape is the FastAPI default detail).
+
+
+def test_admin_grant_promotes_pending_to_granted(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """v0.8.0 doesn't ship an admin UI for this — it's deferred to
+    item #7 / v0.9.0. For this release, an admin gesture is an
+    `UPDATE users SET permission_state='granted' WHERE email=?`. The
+    test flips the column directly via DB and asserts the
+    `require_contributor` gate now admits the user.
+    """
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        # Sign in a fresh OTC user — lands pending.
+        client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "promoted@example.com"})
+        code = _outbound_otc_codes("promoted@example.com")[-1]
+        client.post("/auth/otc/verify", json={"email": "promoted@example.com", "code": code})
+
+        # Before the grant: propose refused with 403.
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/rfcs/propose",
+            json={"title": "T", "slug": "t-pre", "pitch": "p", "tags": []},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 403
+
+        # The admin gesture (v0.8.0 shape — direct UPDATE; v0.9.0 will
+        # ship a UI). The test stamps `permission_decided_by` and
+        # `permission_decided_at` as the v0.9.0 admin UI will, so the
+        # column population exercises the schema slot. user_id=99 is
+        # a placeholder admin row — provision it so the FK resolves.
+        provision_user_row(user_id=99, login="adminuser", role="admin")
+        db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            UPDATE users
+               SET permission_state = 'granted',
+                   permission_decided_by = 99,
+                   permission_decided_at = datetime('now')
+             WHERE email = ?
+            """,
+            ("promoted@example.com",),
+        )
+
+        # The next request reads the fresh column from the DB. The
+        # propose endpoint reaches the route body now (it then refuses
+        # for a different reason — the slug 't-prop' will fail
+        # the slug-format check or hit a mock-gitea path — but the
+        # status code is _not_ 403/401, which is the v0.8.0 assertion).
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/rfcs/propose",
+            json={"title": "Title", "slug": "tprop", "pitch": "Pitch text.", "tags": []},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code != 403, r.text
+        assert r.status_code != 401, r.text
+
+
+def test_grandfathered_user_is_unaffected_by_migration(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """An existing `users` row at migration time has
+    `permission_state='granted'` via the column default. The
+    grandfathered user passes write endpoints without filing a
+    beta request and without the admin UI. v0.6.0 (anon-write
+    audit) is the v0.6.0 contract; v0.8.0 widens the gate but
+    does not break this case.
+    """
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=5, login="oldhand", role="contributor")
+        # provision_user_row uses INSERT OR REPLACE INTO users with
+        # the column list it knows; permission_state is not in that
+        # list, so it picks up the column default ('granted') on
+        # insert. Confirm directly.
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT permission_state FROM users WHERE id = 5"
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["permission_state"] == "granted"
+
+        sign_in_as(
+            client,
+            user_id=5,
+            gitea_login="oldhand",
+            display_name="Old Hand",
+            role="contributor",
+        )
+
+        # Propose is write-shaped; the call should not refuse on
+        # the permission_state gate. (Subsequent failure modes —
+        # e.g. mock-gitea wiring — are not the v0.8.0 concern; this
+        # test asserts on the gate, not the propose body's success.)
+        r = client.post(
+            "/api/rfcs/propose",
+            json={"title": "Title", "slug": "gf-slug", "pitch": "Pitch.", "tags": []},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code != 403, r.text
+        assert r.status_code != 401, r.text
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# /auth/otc/request accepts any email — the v0.7.0 allowlist gate is gone
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_otc_request_accepts_any_email_regardless_of_allowlist(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """v0.7.0 silently dropped OTC requests for emails not on the
+    `allowed_emails` table. v0.8.0 reverses this: the request
+    endpoint sends a code to any valid email; admission gates at
+    `permission_state` post-verify instead. The `allowed_emails`
+    table stays in the schema as a fast-path bypass for
+    deployments that want to pre-mark known-good emails (the v0.9.0
+    admin user-management page will collapse the two surfaces).
+    """
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        # Populate the allowlist with one specific email so the v0.7.0
+        # gate would have engaged. v0.8.0 ignores it for the request
+        # path.
+        db.conn().execute("INSERT INTO allowed_emails (email) VALUES (?)", ("known@example.com",))
+
+        # An email NOT on the allowlist still gets a code under v0.8.0.
+        r = client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "stranger@example.com"})
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        codes = _outbound_otc_codes("stranger@example.com")
+        assert len(codes) == 1, "OTC code must be sent regardless of allowlist state"
+
+        # The row is there and the user can complete sign-in (and will
+        # land in 'pending' per the other tests).
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT 1 FROM otc_codes WHERE email = ?",
+            ("stranger@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row is not None
+
+
+def test_allowlist_table_still_present_in_schema(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """The schema migration leaves the `allowed_emails` table in
+    place — the admin UI from v0.3.0 still manages it for the
+    fast-path bypass deployments may use. This is a regression net
+    for "did the v0.8.0 cleanup accidentally drop the table"."""
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app):
+        # The table accepts inserts (i.e. it exists) — no schema check
+        # gymnastics needed.
+        db.conn().execute("INSERT INTO allowed_emails (email) VALUES (?)", ("kept@example.com",))
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT email FROM allowed_emails WHERE email = ?",
+            ("kept@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row is not None

backend/tests/test_cookie_consent_vertical.py

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+"""End-to-end tests for v0.13.0 / roadmap item #11 — cookie / privacy consent.
+
+Covers the §17 endpoints (`GET` / `PUT /api/users/me/cookie-consent`) and
+the §14.5 storage contract:
+
+  * GET on a fresh user returns no-choice-yet (recorded_at is None,
+    essential=True, analytics=False, other=False).
+  * PUT writes a row, stamps recorded_at, and the choice survives.
+  * PUT with `analytics=true, other=false` round-trips faithfully.
+  * `essential` is permanently true at the API surface — a PUT that
+    requests essential=false is still persisted with essential=true.
+  * The endpoint requires authentication (401 for anon).
+  * A second PUT updates the existing row in place (single row per
+    user, recorded_at re-stamps).
+  * Choice persists across sign-out / sign-in.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from test_propose_vertical import (  # noqa: F401
+    FakeGitea,
+    app_with_fake_gitea,
+    provision_user_row,
+    sign_in_as,
+    tmp_env,
+)
+
+
+def test_get_cookie_consent_fresh_user_has_no_choice(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
+        sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
+
+        r = client.get("/api/users/me/cookie-consent")
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+        body = r.json()
+        assert body["essential"] is True
+        assert body["analytics"] is False
+        assert body["other"] is False
+        assert body["recorded_at"] is None
+
+
+def test_put_cookie_consent_records_choice(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
+        sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
+
+        r = client.put(
+            "/api/users/me/cookie-consent",
+            json={"essential": True, "analytics": True, "other": False},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+        body = r.json()
+        assert body["ok"] is True
+        assert body["essential"] is True
+        assert body["analytics"] is True
+        assert body["other"] is False
+        assert body["recorded_at"] is not None
+
+        # Round-trip the read endpoint.
+        r = client.get("/api/users/me/cookie-consent")
+        body = r.json()
+        assert body["essential"] is True
+        assert body["analytics"] is True
+        assert body["other"] is False
+        assert body["recorded_at"] is not None
+
+
+def test_put_cookie_consent_forces_essential_true(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """§14.5: `essential` is permanently true at the API surface. A
+    request that sets it to false is accepted (for symmetry with the
+    other two flags) but persisted as true.
+    """
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
+        sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
+
+        r = client.put(
+            "/api/users/me/cookie-consent",
+            json={"essential": False, "analytics": False, "other": False},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+        assert r.json()["essential"] is True
+
+        # Confirm at the schema layer too — the persisted row has essential=1.
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT essential FROM cookie_consent WHERE user_id = ?",
+            (2,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["essential"] == 1
+
+
+def test_cookie_consent_requires_auth(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        r = client.get("/api/users/me/cookie-consent")
+        assert r.status_code == 401, r.text
+        r = client.put(
+            "/api/users/me/cookie-consent",
+            json={"essential": True, "analytics": True, "other": True},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 401, r.text
+
+
+def test_put_cookie_consent_upserts_in_place(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """A second PUT updates the existing row rather than inserting a new
+    one. Verifies the §14.5 single-row-per-user shape.
+    """
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
+        sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
+
+        client.put(
+            "/api/users/me/cookie-consent",
+            json={"essential": True, "analytics": True, "other": False},
+        )
+        client.put(
+            "/api/users/me/cookie-consent",
+            json={"essential": True, "analytics": False, "other": True},
+        )
+
+        rows = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT analytics, other_cookies FROM cookie_consent WHERE user_id = ?",
+            (2,),
+        ).fetchall()
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+        assert rows[0]["analytics"] == 0
+        assert rows[0]["other_cookies"] == 1
+
+
+def test_cookie_consent_persists_across_sign_out_in(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """§14.5 precedence: the server row survives sign-out / sign-in.
+    """
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
+        sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
+
+        client.put(
+            "/api/users/me/cookie-consent",
+            json={"essential": True, "analytics": True, "other": True},
+        )
+
+        # Simulate sign-out by clearing the session cookie.
+        client.cookies.clear()
+
+        # Anonymous viewer cannot read.
+        r = client.get("/api/users/me/cookie-consent")
+        assert r.status_code == 401
+
+        # Sign back in as Alice. The server row is still there.
+        sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
+        r = client.get("/api/users/me/cookie-consent")
+        body = r.json()
+        assert body["analytics"] is True
+        assert body["other"] is True
+        assert body["recorded_at"] is not None
+
+
+def test_two_users_have_independent_rows(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        provision_user_row(user_id=2, login="alice", role="contributor")
+        provision_user_row(user_id=3, login="bob", role="contributor")
+
+        sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
+        client.put(
+            "/api/users/me/cookie-consent",
+            json={"essential": True, "analytics": True, "other": False},
+        )
+
+        sign_in_as(client, user_id=3, gitea_login="bob", display_name="Bob", role="contributor")
+        client.put(
+            "/api/users/me/cookie-consent",
+            json={"essential": True, "analytics": False, "other": False},
+        )
+
+        # Each user reads their own row.
+        r = client.get("/api/users/me/cookie-consent").json()
+        assert r["analytics"] is False  # Bob's
+
+        sign_in_as(client, user_id=2, gitea_login="alice", display_name="Alice", role="contributor")
+        r = client.get("/api/users/me/cookie-consent").json()
+        assert r["analytics"] is True  # Alice's

backend/tests/test_otc_vertical.py

@@ -13,9 +13,13 @@ sign-in path. The tests prove:
   * Expired codes refuse with 400.
   * Already-consumed codes refuse with 400 on re-use.
   * Wrong codes refuse with 400.
-  * Allowlist gate: when `allowed_emails` is populated and the email
+  * Allowlist gate (v0.8.0 update): v0.7.0 silently dropped requests
-    isn't on it, the response is still 202 (no leak), but no email
+    for emails not on `allowed_emails`. v0.8.0 (item #6) removed
-    lands in the outbound buffer and verify finds no matching code.
+    that gate from the request path; the admission gate is now
+    `permission_state` on the freshly-provisioned `users` row,
+    asserted in test_beta_access_vertical.py. The tests below
+    confirm v0.8.0's open-request shape for both on-list and
+    off-list emails.
   * Migration link: an existing OAuth-era user (with a `users.email`
     row) is linked by email on first OTC sign-in — `gitea_id` is
     preserved.
@@ -201,33 +205,45 @@ def test_otc_request_cooldown_is_per_email_not_global(app_with_fake_gitea):
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Allowlist gate
+# Allowlist gate — v0.8.0 update
+#
+# v0.7.0 gated the OTC request endpoint on the `allowed_emails` table:
+# emails not on the list got a silent drop (still 202, but no code).
+# v0.8.0 (roadmap item #6) reverses this: the request endpoint
+# accepts any valid email and sends a code. The admission gate moves
+# to `permission_state` on the freshly-provisioned `users` row,
+# which the next-tier tests in test_beta_access_vertical.py cover.
+# The `allowed_emails` table stays in the schema as a fast-path
+# bypass for admin convenience.
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
-def test_otc_request_silently_drops_when_email_not_on_allowlist(app_with_fake_gitea):
+def test_otc_request_admits_emails_regardless_of_allowlist_population(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """v0.8.0: the OTC request path no longer consults `allowed_emails`.
+    Whether the allowlist is empty or populated, every valid email
+    receives a code; admission gates at `permission_state` post-verify.
+    """
     from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
     from app import db
 
     app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
     with TestClient(app) as client:
         _reset_outbound()
-        # Populate the allowlist so the gate turns on.
+        # Populate the allowlist with one specific email; the v0.7.0
+        # gate would have engaged here.
         db.conn().execute("INSERT INTO allowed_emails (email) VALUES (?)", ("invited@example.com",))
 
+        # The not-on-list email still gets a code under v0.8.0.
         r = client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "stranger@example.com"})
-        # Still 202 — the allowlist's state is not leaked to callers.
         assert r.status_code == 200
-        # But no email was sent, and no row landed in otc_codes.
+        assert len(_outbound_otc_codes("stranger@example.com")) == 1
-        assert _outbound_otc_codes("stranger@example.com") == []
-        row = db.conn().execute(
-            "SELECT 1 FROM otc_codes WHERE email = ?",
-            ("stranger@example.com",),
-        ).fetchone()
-        assert row is None
 
 
 def test_otc_request_admits_allowlisted_email(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    """v0.8.0: still works for emails that happen to be on the legacy
+    allowlist — the table is no longer consulted at request time but
+    populated rows are admitted alongside everyone else (since the
+    gate is now open at the request surface)."""
     from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
     from app import db
 

backend/tests/test_passcode_vertical.py

@@ -0,0 +1,532 @@
+"""End-to-end integration tests for the v0.10.0 user-set passcode
+vertical (§6.2, roadmap item #8).
+
+After a successful OTC sign-in the user can set a passcode and use
+email + passcode for subsequent sign-ins. OTC remains the structural
+fallback — these tests prove:
+
+  * `/auth/passcode/set` requires an active session.
+  * `/auth/passcode/check` returns `has_passcode` without leaking the
+    hash, the set-at stamp, or the lockout state.
+  * Happy path: OTC sign-in → set passcode → sign out → email +
+    passcode signs in (no OTC roundtrip).
+  * Wrong passcode increments the failure counter without locking.
+  * Five consecutive failures lock the passcode path (HTTP 423) and
+    persist `passcode_locked_until` on the user row.
+  * The lockout expires after `passcode_locked_until`; a verify
+    attempt past the window succeeds again and clears the counter.
+  * The OTC path is unaffected by the passcode lockout — a user
+    whose passcode is locked can still request and verify a fresh
+    OTC to sign in.
+  * Clearing the passcode wipes the hash; subsequent verify refuses
+    with the no-passcode failure shape.
+  * Setting a new passcode replaces the prior one (and resets the
+    failure counter / lockout state).
+  * `passcode_set_at` updates on every set call.
+  * The validation denylist refuses obvious patterns (e.g. `0000`,
+    `1234`).
+  * Passcode length is enforced (4-20).
+
+The fakes from `test_propose_vertical` give us a working app harness.
+The OTC envelope buffer from `test_otc_vertical` is reused for the
+OTC roundtrips this suite needs.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from test_propose_vertical import (  # noqa: F401
+    FakeGitea,
+    app_with_fake_gitea,
+    provision_user_row,
+    tmp_env,
+)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Helpers — mirror the OTC suite's outbound-buffer helpers.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _reset_outbound():
+    from app import email as email_mod
+    email_mod.reset_sent_envelopes()
+
+
+def _outbound_otc_codes(to_address: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
+    from app import email as email_mod
+    out = []
+    for env in email_mod.sent_envelopes():
+        if env.get("kind") != "otc":
+            continue
+        if to_address is not None and env["to"] != to_address:
+            continue
+        for line in env["body"].splitlines():
+            tok = line.strip()
+            if tok.isdigit() and len(tok) == 6:
+                out.append(tok)
+                break
+    return out
+
+
+def _sign_in_via_otc(client, email: str) -> None:
+    """Run an OTC request+verify so the client carries an authenticated
+    session. The cooldown is irrelevant on a fresh email; we don't
+    need to drop it."""
+    r = client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": email})
+    assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+    code = _outbound_otc_codes(email)[-1]
+    r = client.post("/auth/otc/verify", json={"email": email, "code": code})
+    assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Set passcode — auth-required, happy path
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_set_passcode_requires_session(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        r = client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+        assert r.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_set_passcode_after_otc_landing_persists_hash(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "alice@example.com")
+
+        r = client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT passcode_hash, passcode_set_at FROM users WHERE email = ? COLLATE NOCASE",
+            ("alice@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row is not None
+        assert row["passcode_hash"] is not None
+        # Not the plaintext.
+        assert row["passcode_hash"] != "secret123"
+        assert row["passcode_set_at"] is not None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Check endpoint — leak-free shape
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_check_endpoint_returns_false_for_unknown_email(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        r = client.get("/auth/passcode/check", params={"email": "nobody@example.com"})
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        assert r.json() == {"has_passcode": False}
+
+
+def test_check_endpoint_returns_false_for_user_without_passcode(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "bob@example.com")
+
+        r = client.get("/auth/passcode/check", params={"email": "bob@example.com"})
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        assert r.json() == {"has_passcode": False}
+
+
+def test_check_endpoint_returns_true_after_set(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "carol@example.com")
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "letmein9"})
+
+        # Drop the session so the check is read in the anonymous shape.
+        client.cookies.clear()
+        r = client.get("/auth/passcode/check", params={"email": "carol@example.com"})
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        assert r.json() == {"has_passcode": True}
+        # The response carries ONLY the boolean — no hash, no stamp.
+        assert set(r.json().keys()) == {"has_passcode"}
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Verify path — happy path
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_verify_passcode_signs_in_user(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "dave@example.com")
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+        client.cookies.clear()
+
+        r = client.post(
+            "/auth/passcode/verify",
+            json={"email": "dave@example.com", "passcode": "secret123"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+        me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
+        assert me["authenticated"] is True
+        assert me["user"]["email"] == "dave@example.com"
+        assert me["user"]["has_passcode"] is True
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Verify path — failure modes
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_verify_passcode_wrong_increments_counter_without_locking(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "erin@example.com")
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+        client.cookies.clear()
+
+        # Three bad attempts — under the lockout threshold.
+        for _ in range(3):
+            r = client.post(
+                "/auth/passcode/verify",
+                json={"email": "erin@example.com", "passcode": "wrongwrong"},
+            )
+            assert r.status_code == 400
+
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT passcode_failed_attempts, passcode_locked_until FROM users WHERE email = ?",
+            ("erin@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["passcode_failed_attempts"] == 3
+        assert row["passcode_locked_until"] is None
+
+
+def test_verify_passcode_locks_after_five_failures(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "frank@example.com")
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+        client.cookies.clear()
+
+        # Five bad attempts — the last crosses the threshold and the
+        # response shape flips to 423.
+        statuses = []
+        for _ in range(5):
+            r = client.post(
+                "/auth/passcode/verify",
+                json={"email": "frank@example.com", "passcode": "wrongwrong"},
+            )
+            statuses.append(r.status_code)
+        # First four are 400, the fifth (threshold-crossing) is 423.
+        assert statuses == [400, 400, 400, 400, 423]
+
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT passcode_failed_attempts, passcode_locked_until FROM users WHERE email = ?",
+            ("frank@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["passcode_failed_attempts"] >= 5
+        assert row["passcode_locked_until"] is not None
+
+        # Sixth attempt — still locked, still 423, even with the correct
+        # passcode (lockout overrides the verify).
+        r = client.post(
+            "/auth/passcode/verify",
+            json={"email": "frank@example.com", "passcode": "secret123"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 423
+
+
+def test_verify_passcode_lockout_expires(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "gina@example.com")
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+        client.cookies.clear()
+
+        for _ in range(5):
+            client.post(
+                "/auth/passcode/verify",
+                json={"email": "gina@example.com", "passcode": "wrongwrong"},
+            )
+
+        # Backdate the lockout to the past so the next attempt clears it.
+        db.conn().execute(
+            """
+            UPDATE users
+               SET passcode_locked_until = datetime('now', '-1 minute')
+             WHERE email = ?
+            """,
+            ("gina@example.com",),
+        )
+
+        r = client.post(
+            "/auth/passcode/verify",
+            json={"email": "gina@example.com", "passcode": "secret123"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+
+        # Lockout cleared, counter reset.
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT passcode_failed_attempts, passcode_locked_until FROM users WHERE email = ?",
+            ("gina@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["passcode_failed_attempts"] == 0
+        assert row["passcode_locked_until"] is None
+
+
+def test_otc_path_unaffected_by_passcode_lockout(app_with_fake_gitea, monkeypatch):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    # Drop the OTC cooldown so the second request lands without a 429.
+    # The cooldown is re-read from env on every `request_code` call so
+    # this takes effect mid-process.
+    monkeypatch.setenv("OTC_REQUEST_COOLDOWN_SECONDS", "0")
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "harvey@example.com")
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+        client.cookies.clear()
+
+        # Lock the passcode path.
+        for _ in range(5):
+            client.post(
+                "/auth/passcode/verify",
+                json={"email": "harvey@example.com", "passcode": "wrongwrong"},
+            )
+
+        # The OTC path is unaffected by the passcode lockout: the user
+        # can still request and verify a fresh code to sign in.
+        r = client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "harvey@example.com"})
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        code = _outbound_otc_codes("harvey@example.com")[-1]
+        r = client.post("/auth/otc/verify", json={"email": "harvey@example.com", "code": code})
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+
+        # The user is now signed in via OTC even though the passcode
+        # path is locked. The /api/auth/me payload reflects this.
+        me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
+        assert me["authenticated"] is True
+        assert me["user"]["email"] == "harvey@example.com"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Clear + replace
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_clear_passcode_wipes_the_hash(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "ivy@example.com")
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+
+        r = client.delete("/auth/passcode")
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT passcode_hash, passcode_set_at FROM users WHERE email = ?",
+            ("ivy@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["passcode_hash"] is None
+        assert row["passcode_set_at"] is None
+
+        # Verify against the cleared passcode refuses (no-passcode shape
+        # collapses to a generic 400).
+        client.cookies.clear()
+        r = client.post(
+            "/auth/passcode/verify",
+            json={"email": "ivy@example.com", "passcode": "secret123"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 400
+
+
+def test_setting_new_passcode_replaces_old(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "jane@example.com")
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+        # Replace.
+        r = client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "newsecret9"})
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+
+        client.cookies.clear()
+
+        # Old passcode refuses.
+        r = client.post(
+            "/auth/passcode/verify",
+            json={"email": "jane@example.com", "passcode": "secret123"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 400
+
+        # New passcode signs in.
+        r = client.post(
+            "/auth/passcode/verify",
+            json={"email": "jane@example.com", "passcode": "newsecret9"},
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+
+
+def test_setting_new_passcode_resets_lockout(app_with_fake_gitea, monkeypatch):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("OTC_REQUEST_COOLDOWN_SECONDS", "0")
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "kate@example.com")
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+
+        # Lock the passcode path with bad attempts (drop session first).
+        client.cookies.clear()
+        for _ in range(5):
+            client.post(
+                "/auth/passcode/verify",
+                json={"email": "kate@example.com", "passcode": "wrongwrong"},
+            )
+
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT passcode_locked_until FROM users WHERE email = ?",
+            ("kate@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["passcode_locked_until"] is not None
+
+        # Sign back in via OTC and reset the passcode.
+        r = client.post("/auth/otc/request", json={"email": "kate@example.com"})
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        code = _outbound_otc_codes("kate@example.com")[-1]
+        r = client.post("/auth/otc/verify", json={"email": "kate@example.com", "code": code})
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+
+        r = client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "freshcode9"})
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+
+        # Lockout cleared on set.
+        row = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT passcode_locked_until, passcode_failed_attempts FROM users WHERE email = ?",
+            ("kate@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()
+        assert row["passcode_locked_until"] is None
+        assert row["passcode_failed_attempts"] == 0
+
+
+def test_passcode_set_at_updates_on_each_set(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+    from app import db
+    import time
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "luke@example.com")
+
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+        first_stamp = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT passcode_set_at FROM users WHERE email = ?",
+            ("luke@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()["passcode_set_at"]
+        assert first_stamp is not None
+
+        # SQLite's datetime('now') has second precision; sleep so the
+        # stamp visibly advances on the next set.
+        time.sleep(1.1)
+
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "newcode99"})
+        second_stamp = db.conn().execute(
+            "SELECT passcode_set_at FROM users WHERE email = ?",
+            ("luke@example.com",),
+        ).fetchone()["passcode_set_at"]
+        assert second_stamp is not None
+        assert second_stamp >= first_stamp
+        # Lexicographic compare on ISO-8601 datetime strings works for
+        # the SQLite shape.
+        assert second_stamp > first_stamp
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Validation
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_set_passcode_refuses_too_short(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "mia@example.com")
+        r = client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "abc"})
+        assert r.status_code == 422
+
+
+def test_set_passcode_refuses_denylist_pattern(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "nick@example.com")
+        for bad in ["0000", "1234", "aaaa", "qwerty", "password"]:
+            r = client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": bad})
+            assert r.status_code == 422, f"expected 422 for {bad!r}, got {r.status_code}"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Auth me payload
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_auth_me_carries_has_passcode_flag(app_with_fake_gitea):
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
+    with TestClient(app) as client:
+        _reset_outbound()
+        _sign_in_via_otc(client, "olga@example.com")
+
+        me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
+        assert me["user"]["has_passcode"] is False
+        assert me["user"]["passcode_set_at"] is None
+
+        client.post("/auth/passcode/set", json={"passcode": "secret123"})
+        me = client.get("/api/auth/me").json()
+        assert me["user"]["has_passcode"] is True
+        assert me["user"]["passcode_set_at"] is not None

frontend/.env.example

@@ -24,3 +24,28 @@ VITE_APP_NAME=
 #   VITE_BETA_CONTACT=ben@wiggleverse.org
 #   VITE_BETA_CONTACT=DM @ben on Matrix
 VITE_BETA_CONTACT=
+
+# Optional URL to the deployment's privacy policy (v0.13.0+, SPEC §14.5).
+# The framework ships a minimal default privacy policy at `/privacy`
+# that describes the framework's stance and lists the cookies the
+# framework sets. When this var is set to an http(s) URL, the page
+# renders the framework's stub above a link to the configured URL —
+# deployments use this to layer their own policy content on top
+# without forking the framework. Unset is OK; the stub is sufficient
+# for a deployment that has nothing specific to add.
+#
+# Examples:
+#   VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL=https://wiggleverse.org/privacy
+VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL=
+
+# Optional URL to the deployment's cookies policy (v0.13.0+, SPEC §14.6).
+# Same shape as VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL. The framework's default
+# `/cookies` page lists exactly which cookies the framework sets
+# (rfc_session, the consent-choice localStorage entry); a deployment
+# that adds its own cookies (analytics SDK once #13 lands, third-party
+# embeds) points this var at a page that documents the full list.
+# Unset is OK; the stub is sufficient for a default-config deployment.
+#
+# Examples:
+#   VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL=https://wiggleverse.org/cookies
+VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL=

frontend/package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "rfc-app-frontend",
-  "version": "0.7.0",
+  "version": "0.9.0",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "rfc-app-frontend",
-      "version": "0.7.0",
+      "version": "0.9.0",
       "dependencies": {
         "@codemirror/commands": "^6.10.3",
         "@codemirror/lang-markdown": "^6.5.0",

frontend/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "rfc-app-frontend",
   "private": true,
-  "version": "0.7.0",
+  "version": "0.9.0",
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {
     "dev": "vite",

frontend/src/App.css

@@ -410,6 +410,26 @@
   cursor: pointer; padding: 0;
 }
 .otc-login .btn-link-quiet:hover { color: #1a1a1a; text-decoration: underline; }
+/* v0.8.0 — labels + textarea for the first-OTC profile capture step. */
+.otc-field-label {
+  font-size: 12px; color: #666;
+  margin: 8px 0 -4px;
+  font-weight: 600;
+}
+.otc-login textarea {
+  width: 100%;
+  padding: 10px 12px;
+  font-size: 15px;
+  border: 1px solid #ddd;
+  border-radius: 6px;
+  box-sizing: border-box;
+  font-family: inherit;
+  resize: vertical;
+}
+.otc-login textarea:focus {
+  outline: none;
+  border-color: #1a1a1a;
+}
 .otc-shortcut-hint {
   color: #888; font-size: 12px; margin: 4px 0 0;
 }
@@ -466,6 +486,22 @@
 .btn-link-quiet { color: #666; text-decoration: none; font-size: 13px; }
 .btn-link-quiet:hover { color: #1a1a1a; text-decoration: underline; }
 
+/* v0.8.0 — thin "your beta access is in review" banner. Shown on every
+   page (other than /beta-pending itself, which carries the larger
+   form of the message). Sits just under the app header so it doesn't
+   compete with the catalog rail. */
+.pending-access-banner {
+  background: #fff8e0;
+  border-bottom: 1px solid #e6dca0;
+  color: #4a3f00;
+  font-size: 13px;
+  padding: 8px 16px;
+  text-align: center;
+}
+.pending-access-banner a {
+  color: #4a3f00; text-decoration: underline;
+}
+
 /* ── §8 RFC view: three-column shape ─────────────────────────────────── */
 
 .main-pane {
@@ -1853,6 +1889,54 @@
   display: inline-flex; align-items: center; gap: 6px;
   font-size: 13px; cursor: pointer;
 }
+
+/* v0.9.0 — admin user-management surface (roadmap item #7). */
+.admin-filter-chips {
+  display: flex; gap: 6px; margin-bottom: 16px; flex-wrap: wrap;
+}
+.admin-chip {
+  display: inline-flex; align-items: center; gap: 6px;
+  background: #fff; border: 1px solid #d1d5db; border-radius: 999px;
+  padding: 4px 12px; font-size: 12px; color: #374151; cursor: pointer;
+}
+.admin-chip:hover { background: #f9fafb; }
+.admin-chip.active {
+  background: #111; color: #fff; border-color: #111;
+}
+.admin-chip-count {
+  font-size: 11px; opacity: 0.7;
+}
+.admin-users-table td { vertical-align: top; padding-top: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px; }
+.permission-cell { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 4px; }
+.permission-actions { display: flex; gap: 6px; }
+.permission-badge {
+  display: inline-block;
+  font-size: 11px; font-weight: 600;
+  padding: 2px 8px; border-radius: 999px;
+  text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.04em;
+  width: max-content;
+}
+.permission-badge-pending {
+  background: #fef3c7; color: #92400e;
+}
+.permission-badge-granted {
+  background: #dcfce7; color: #166534;
+}
+.permission-badge-revoked {
+  background: #fee2e2; color: #991b1b;
+}
+.permission-decided { font-size: 11px; }
+.user-row-reason td {
+  background: #fffbeb; border-top: none !important;
+  padding: 0 16px 12px !important;
+}
+.user-reason-block {
+  border-left: 3px solid #f59e0b;
+  padding: 8px 12px; font-size: 13px;
+  background: #fffbeb;
+}
+.user-reason-block strong { display: block; margin-bottom: 4px; color: #92400e; }
+.user-reason-block p { margin: 0; white-space: pre-wrap; color: #374151; }
 .grad-queue { list-style: none; padding: 0; margin: 8px 0 24px; }
 .grad-queue li { padding: 8px 0; border-bottom: 1px solid #f3f4f6; }
 .grad-queue-link { color: #111; text-decoration: none; font-size: 14px; }
@@ -1947,3 +2031,106 @@
 .discussion-readonly {
   font-size: 12px; color: #666; padding: 4px 0;
 }
+
+/* §14.5 — cookie consent banner (v0.13.0) */
+.cookie-consent-banner {
+  position: fixed;
+  left: 0; right: 0; bottom: 0;
+  z-index: 1000;
+  background: #fff;
+  border-top: 1px solid #d1d5db;
+  box-shadow: 0 -8px 24px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.08);
+  padding: 20px 24px;
+}
+.cookie-consent-body {
+  max-width: 880px; margin: 0 auto;
+  display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 12px;
+}
+.cookie-consent-title {
+  margin: 0; font-size: 16px; font-weight: 700; color: #111;
+}
+.cookie-consent-intro {
+  margin: 0; font-size: 13px; color: #4b5563; line-height: 1.5;
+}
+.cookie-consent-choices {
+  border: none; padding: 0; margin: 0;
+  display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 6px;
+}
+.cookie-consent-choice {
+  display: flex; gap: 10px; align-items: flex-start;
+  padding: 10px 12px; border-radius: 6px;
+  border: 1px solid #e5e7eb;
+  cursor: pointer;
+}
+.cookie-consent-choice.is-selected {
+  border-color: #111; background: #f9fafb;
+}
+.cookie-consent-choice input[type=radio] { margin-top: 3px; }
+.cookie-consent-choice-text {
+  display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 2px;
+}
+.cookie-consent-choice-label {
+  font-size: 13px; font-weight: 600; color: #111;
+}
+.cookie-consent-choice-desc {
+  font-size: 12px; color: #6b7280; line-height: 1.5;
+}
+.cookie-consent-links {
+  margin: 0; font-size: 12px; color: #6b7280;
+}
+.cookie-consent-links a { color: #111; text-decoration: underline; }
+.cookie-consent-error {
+  margin: 0; font-size: 12px; color: #b91c1c;
+}
+.cookie-consent-actions {
+  display: flex; gap: 8px; justify-content: flex-end;
+}
+.visually-hidden {
+  position: absolute; width: 1px; height: 1px;
+  padding: 0; margin: -1px; overflow: hidden;
+  clip: rect(0, 0, 0, 0); white-space: nowrap; border: 0;
+}
+
+/* §14.5 / §14.6 — privacy + cookies policy pages */
+.policy-page {
+  max-width: 720px; margin: 0 auto;
+  padding: 0 32px 80px;
+}
+.policy-header {
+  display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 12px;
+  padding: 20px 0; border-bottom: 1px solid #f3f4f6;
+  margin-bottom: 24px;
+}
+.policy-back {
+  background: none; border: none; cursor: pointer;
+  color: #6b7280; font-size: 13px; padding: 4px 8px;
+}
+.policy-back:hover { color: #111; }
+.policy-title { font-size: 13px; font-weight: 600; color: #6b7280; }
+.policy-body { line-height: 1.7; color: #111; }
+.policy-body h1 { font-size: 26px; margin: 0 0 6px; font-weight: 700; }
+.policy-body .policy-subtitle { color: #6b7280; margin: 0 0 24px; font-size: 14px; }
+.policy-body h2 { font-size: 16px; margin: 28px 0 8px; font-weight: 600; }
+.policy-body p { margin: 0 0 12px; }
+.policy-body ul { margin: 0 0 16px; padding-left: 22px; }
+.policy-body li { margin-bottom: 6px; }
+.policy-body code {
+  background: #f3f4f6; padding: 1px 5px; border-radius: 3px;
+  font-family: ui-monospace, monospace; font-size: 12px;
+}
+.policy-body .policy-footnote {
+  margin-top: 24px; font-size: 12px; color: #6b7280;
+}
+.policy-table {
+  width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;
+  font-size: 13px; margin: 8px 0 16px;
+}
+.policy-table th, .policy-table td {
+  text-align: left; padding: 8px 10px;
+  border-bottom: 1px solid #f3f4f6;
+  vertical-align: top;
+}
+.policy-table th {
+  font-size: 11px; text-transform: uppercase;
+  color: #6b7280; letter-spacing: 0.05em; font-weight: 600;
+}

frontend/src/App.jsx

@@ -11,9 +11,13 @@ import Landing from './components/Landing.jsx'
 import Login from './components/Login.jsx'
 import BetaPending from './components/BetaPending.jsx'
 import Philosophy from './components/Philosophy.jsx'
+import Docs from './components/Docs.jsx'
 import NotificationSettings from './components/NotificationSettings.jsx'
 import Admin from './components/Admin.jsx'
 import ToastHost, { showToast } from './components/ToastHost.jsx'
+import CookieConsentBanner from './components/CookieConsentBanner.jsx'
+import Privacy from './pages/Privacy.jsx'
+import Cookies from './pages/Cookies.jsx'
 import './App.css'
 
 export default function App() {
@@ -24,8 +28,19 @@ export default function App() {
   const [inboxOpen, setInboxOpen] = useState(false)
   const [unreadCount, setUnreadCount] = useState(0)
   const [inboxTick, setInboxTick] = useState(0)
+  // §14.5: a tick that, when bumped, asks <CookieConsentBanner> to
+  // re-open even if the user has already made a choice. The settings
+  // "Privacy & cookies" tab dispatches a `rfc-app:cookie-consent-reopen`
+  // event that bumps this.
+  const [consentReopenTick, setConsentReopenTick] = useState(0)
   const navigate = useNavigate()
 
+  useEffect(() => {
+    const handler = () => setConsentReopenTick(t => t + 1)
+    window.addEventListener('rfc-app:cookie-consent-reopen', handler)
+    return () => window.removeEventListener('rfc-app:cookie-consent-reopen', handler)
+  }, [])
+
   useEffect(() => {
     getMe()
       .then(setMe)
@@ -73,11 +88,15 @@ export default function App() {
   // The deployment is in private beta: anonymous visitors get the full
   // app in read-only mode (viewer = null is passed through to every
   // component), and write affordances are hidden at the component
-  // level. /beta-pending is the post-OAuth-rejection page reachable by
+  // level. v0.8.0 (§6.1 / item #6): authenticated users with
-  // anyone. The original §14.1 Landing surface is retained for the
+  // `permission_state='pending'` also pass through as `viewer` with
-  // `/welcome` URL only, in case a deployment wants to link to it.
+  // their state attached — every write-gated affordance reads the
+  // state and treats pending the same as anonymous, while reads
+  // remain open. The /beta-pending page is the home root for a
+  // pending user.
   const viewer = me?.authenticated ? me.user : null
   const isAdmin = viewer && (viewer.role === 'owner' || viewer.role === 'admin')
+  const isPending = viewer && viewer.permission_state === 'pending'
 
   return (
     <div className="app">
@@ -93,6 +112,9 @@ export default function App() {
           <Link to="/philosophy" className="header-about" title="Why this exists (§14)">
             About
           </Link>
+          <Link to="/docs" className="header-about" title="User guide">
+            Docs
+          </Link>
           {viewer && (
             <Link to="/settings/notifications" className="header-settings" title="Notification settings (§15)">
               Settings
@@ -128,12 +150,18 @@ export default function App() {
           )}
         </div>
       </header>
+      {isPending && <PendingAccessBanner />}
       <div className="app-body">
         <Routes>
           <Route path="/welcome" element={<Landing />} />
           <Route path="/login" element={<Login />} />
-          <Route path="/beta-pending" element={<BetaPending />} />
+          <Route path="/beta-pending" element={<BetaPending viewer={viewer} />} />
           <Route path="/philosophy" element={<PhilosophyWithSidebar viewer={viewer} />} />
+          <Route path="/docs" element={<DocsWithSidebar viewer={viewer} />} />
+          {/* §14.5 / §14.6: cookie-consent companions to /philosophy.
+              Available to anonymous and authenticated viewers alike. */}
+          <Route path="/privacy" element={<PolicyShell><Privacy /></PolicyShell>} />
+          <Route path="/cookies" element={<PolicyShell><Cookies /></PolicyShell>} />
           {viewer && (
             <Route path="/settings/notifications" element={<NotificationSettingsWithSidebar viewer={viewer} />} />
           )}
@@ -174,10 +202,18 @@ export default function App() {
         <Inbox onClose={() => setInboxOpen(false)} lastChangeTick={inboxTick} />
       )}
       <ToastHost />
+      <CookieConsentBanner viewer={viewer} forceOpen={consentReopenTick} />
     </div>
   )
 }
 
+function PolicyShell({ children }) {
+  // §14.5 / §14.6 policy pages reuse the chrome-pane shape so they
+  // render full-width without the catalog rail. The components inside
+  // carry their own back affordance per Philosophy.jsx's pattern.
+  return <main className="chrome-pane">{children}</main>
+}
+
 function PhilosophyWithSidebar({ viewer }) {
   // The chrome surfaces (§14.2 philosophy, §15 settings, §6/§17 admin)
   // all use the full app body — no catalog left pane, no propose modal.
@@ -190,6 +226,14 @@ function PhilosophyWithSidebar({ viewer }) {
   )
 }
 
+function DocsWithSidebar({ viewer }) {
+  return (
+    <main className="chrome-pane">
+      <Docs authenticated={!!viewer} />
+    </main>
+  )
+}
+
 function NotificationSettingsWithSidebar({ viewer }) {
   return (
     <main className="chrome-pane">
@@ -206,7 +250,26 @@ function AdminWithSidebar({ viewer }) {
   )
 }
 
+function PendingAccessBanner() {
+  // v0.8.0 — thin banner shown on every page (other than /beta-pending
+  // itself, which carries the same message in larger form) when the
+  // signed-in user's `permission_state='pending'`. Sign-out works
+  // normally via the header affordance.
+  return (
+    <div className="pending-access-banner">
+      Your beta access request is in review.{' '}
+      <Link to="/beta-pending">Learn more →</Link>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
 function Welcome({ viewer }) {
+  // v0.8.0 — a pending user landing on "/" gets the same page they'd
+  // see at /beta-pending, inline. This is the post-OTC home root for
+  // a user awaiting admin grant.
+  if (viewer && viewer.permission_state === 'pending') {
+    return <BetaPending viewer={viewer} />
+  }
   if (!viewer) {
     return (
       <div className="welcome">

frontend/src/api.js

@@ -49,6 +49,65 @@ export async function verifyOtc(email, code) {
   return jsonOrThrow(res)
 }
 
+// ── v0.8.0: open beta-access request flow (§6.1 / §14.1) ─────────────────
+//
+// On the first OTC sign-in, the user lands in `permission_state='pending'`
+// and `/api/auth/me` reports `needs_profile=true`. The Login.jsx surface
+// then prompts for first/last/why and POSTs them here. After this lands,
+// the user sees the /beta-pending page until an admin grants access.
+
+export async function submitBetaRequest({ first_name, last_name, beta_request_reason }) {
+  const res = await fetch('/api/auth/me/beta-request', {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ first_name, last_name, beta_request_reason }),
+  })
+  return jsonOrThrow(res)
+}
+
+// ── v0.10.0: user-set passcodes after OTC (§6.2, roadmap item #8) ─────────
+//
+// After a successful OTC sign-in, a contributor may set a passcode and
+// use email + passcode for subsequent sign-ins. OTC remains the
+// forgot-passcode fallback — 5 consecutive verify failures locks the
+// passcode path for 15 minutes (HTTP 423); the OTC path is unaffected.
+
+export async function checkPasscode(email) {
+  // Anonymous endpoint. Returns `{has_passcode: boolean}` so the
+  // Login.jsx flow can decide whether to render a passcode input or
+  // fall back to OTC. We URL-encode the email so addresses with '+'
+  // round-trip cleanly.
+  const params = new URLSearchParams({ email })
+  const res = await fetch(`/auth/passcode/check?${params}`)
+  return jsonOrThrow(res)
+}
+
+export async function verifyPasscode(email, passcode) {
+  const res = await fetch('/auth/passcode/verify', {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ email, passcode }),
+  })
+  return jsonOrThrow(res)
+}
+
+export async function setPasscode(passcode) {
+  // Requires an active session — the server returns 401 if not signed
+  // in. The signed-in user is the implicit subject; the body carries
+  // only the new passcode.
+  const res = await fetch('/auth/passcode/set', {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ passcode }),
+  })
+  return jsonOrThrow(res)
+}
+
+export async function clearPasscode() {
+  const res = await fetch('/auth/passcode', { method: 'DELETE' })
+  return jsonOrThrow(res)
+}
+
 export async function listRFCs() {
   return jsonOrThrow(await fetch('/api/rfcs'))
 }
@@ -532,6 +591,23 @@ export async function setQuietHours({ start, end, timezone } = {}) {
   }))
 }
 
+// v0.13.0 / roadmap item #11: cookie consent (SPEC §14.5).
+export async function getCookieConsent() {
+  return jsonOrThrow(await fetch('/api/users/me/cookie-consent'))
+}
+
+export async function setCookieConsent({ analytics, other } = {}) {
+  return jsonOrThrow(await fetch('/api/users/me/cookie-consent', {
+    method: 'PUT',
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({
+      essential: true,
+      analytics: !!analytics,
+      other: !!other,
+    }),
+  }))
+}
+
 export async function muteUser(userId) {
   return jsonOrThrow(await fetch(`/api/users/${userId}/notification-mute`, { method: 'POST' }))
 }
@@ -556,6 +632,10 @@ export async function getPhilosophy() {
   return jsonOrThrow(await fetch('/api/philosophy'))
 }
 
+export async function getDocs() {
+  return jsonOrThrow(await fetch('/api/docs'))
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Slice 7: admin neighborhood (§17 admin/* + user search for the §15.8 mute
 // typeahead).
@@ -581,6 +661,19 @@ export async function setUserMute(userId, muted) {
   }))
 }
 
+// v0.9.0 — roadmap item #7. Flip a user's permission_state between
+// 'pending', 'granted', and 'revoked'. The Users tab on the admin
+// page wires Grant / Revoke buttons against this endpoint; the
+// returned `changed` flag is false when the requested state already
+// matched the row.
+export async function setUserPermission(userId, state) {
+  return jsonOrThrow(await fetch(`/api/admin/users/${userId}/permission`, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ state }),
+  }))
+}
+
 export async function listAuditLog({ actionKind, actorUserId, rfcSlug, beforeId, limit } = {}) {
   const params = new URLSearchParams()
   if (actionKind) params.set('action_kind', actionKind)

frontend/src/components/Admin.jsx

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import {
   listAdminUsers,
   setUserRole,
   setUserMute,
+  setUserPermission,
   listAuditLog,
   listPermissionEvents,
   listGraduationQueue,
@@ -68,12 +69,26 @@ export default function Admin({ viewer }) {
   )
 }
 
-// ── Users + role + write-mute (§6.1 / §6.2) ────────────────────────────────
+// ── Users + role + write-mute + permission grant/revoke (§6.1 / §6.2) ──────
+//
+// v0.9.0 (roadmap item #7) lands the user-management surface. The table
+// shows every user with their permission_state, sign-up reason (when
+// pending), role, write-mute, and Grant / Revoke controls. State filter
+// chips above the table narrow to one bucket — the "Pending" chip is the
+// admin's daily inbox shape.
+
+const STATE_CHIPS = [
+  { value: 'all', label: 'All' },
+  { value: 'pending', label: 'Pending' },
+  { value: 'granted', label: 'Granted' },
+  { value: 'revoked', label: 'Revoked' },
+]
 
 function UsersTab() {
   const [users, setUsers] = useState(null)
   const [busy, setBusy] = useState({})
   const [error, setError] = useState(null)
+  const [stateFilter, setStateFilter] = useState('all')
 
   async function refresh() {
     setError(null)
@@ -113,42 +128,122 @@ function UsersTab() {
     }
   }
 
+  async function flipPermission(userId, state) {
+    setBusy(b => ({ ...b, [userId]: true }))
+    setError(null)
+    try {
+      await setUserPermission(userId, state)
+      // Refresh the full row so permission_decided_{at,by_*} update too.
+      await refresh()
+    } catch (e) {
+      setError(e.message)
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(b => ({ ...b, [userId]: false }))
+    }
+  }
+
+  const counts = useMemo(() => {
+    const c = { all: 0, pending: 0, granted: 0, revoked: 0 }
+    if (users) {
+      c.all = users.length
+      for (const u of users) {
+        const s = u.permission_state || 'granted'
+        if (s in c) c[s] += 1
+      }
+    }
+    return c
+  }, [users])
+
   if (users == null) return <p className="muted">Loading users…</p>
 
+  const filtered = stateFilter === 'all'
+    ? users
+    : users.filter(u => (u.permission_state || 'granted') === stateFilter)
+
   return (
     <div className="admin-tab">
       <header className="admin-tab-header">
         <h2>Users</h2>
         <p className="muted">
-          Role changes write to <code>permission_events</code>. The §6.2
+          The pending bucket is the beta-access review queue (§6.1 /
-          write-mute applies to contributors only — promote to admin to
+          v0.8.0). Grant or revoke writes to <code>permission_events</code>
-          remove a user's ability to write without silencing them.
+          and stamps <code>permission_decided_by</code> +{' '}
+          <code>permission_decided_at</code>. Role and write-mute controls
+          retain their v0.7.0 semantics — promote to admin to remove a
+          user's ability to write without silencing them.
         </p>
       </header>
       {error && <p className="settings-note warning">{error}</p>}
-      <table className="admin-table">
+
+      <div className="admin-filter-chips">
+        {STATE_CHIPS.map(chip => (
+          <button
+            key={chip.value}
+            type="button"
+            className={`admin-chip${stateFilter === chip.value ? ' active' : ''}`}
+            onClick={() => setStateFilter(chip.value)}
+          >
+            {chip.label} <span className="admin-chip-count">{counts[chip.value] ?? 0}</span>
+          </button>
+        ))}
+      </div>
+
+      {filtered.length === 0 ? (
+        <p className="muted">No users in this bucket.</p>
+      ) : (
+        <table className="admin-table admin-users-table">
           <thead>
             <tr>
               <th>User</th>
+              <th>State</th>
               <th>Role</th>
               <th>Write-muted</th>
+              <th>Signed up</th>
               <th>Last seen</th>
             </tr>
           </thead>
           <tbody>
-          {users.map(u => (
+            {filtered.map(u => (
-            <tr key={u.id}>
+              <UserRow
+                key={u.id}
+                user={u}
+                busy={!!busy[u.id]}
+                onChangeRole={role => changeRole(u.id, role)}
+                onToggleMute={muted => toggleMute(u.id, muted)}
+                onFlipPermission={state => flipPermission(u.id, state)}
+              />
+            ))}
+          </tbody>
+        </table>
+      )}
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+function UserRow({ user: u, busy, onChangeRole, onToggleMute, onFlipPermission }) {
+  const state = u.permission_state || 'granted'
+  const fullName = [u.first_name, u.last_name].filter(Boolean).join(' ').trim()
+  const handle = u.gitea_login ? `@${u.gitea_login}` : (u.email || u.display_name)
+  return (
+    <>
+      <tr>
         <td>
           <div className="user-cell">
-                  <span className="user-handle">@{u.gitea_login}</span>
+            <span className="user-handle">{handle}</span>
-                  <span className="muted">{u.display_name}</span>
+            <span className="muted">
+              {fullName || u.display_name}
+              {u.email ? ` · ${u.email}` : ''}
+            </span>
           </div>
         </td>
+        <td>
+          <PermissionCell user={u} busy={busy} onFlipPermission={onFlipPermission} />
+        </td>
         <td>
           <select
             value={u.role}
-                  onChange={e => changeRole(u.id, e.target.value)}
+            onChange={e => onChangeRole(e.target.value)}
-                  disabled={!!busy[u.id]}
+            disabled={busy}
           >
             <option value="contributor">Contributor</option>
             <option value="admin">Admin</option>
@@ -161,8 +256,8 @@ function UsersTab() {
               <input
                 type="checkbox"
                 checked={!!u.muted}
-                      onChange={e => toggleMute(u.id, e.target.checked)}
+                onChange={e => onToggleMute(e.target.checked)}
-                      disabled={!!busy[u.id]}
+                disabled={busy}
               />
               {u.muted ? 'Muted' : 'Active'}
             </label>
@@ -170,11 +265,56 @@ function UsersTab() {
             <span className="muted">N/A</span>
           )}
         </td>
-              <td className="muted">{u.last_seen_at}</td>
+        <td className="muted">{u.created_at || '—'}</td>
+        <td className="muted">{u.last_seen_at || '—'}</td>
       </tr>
-          ))}
+      {state === 'pending' && u.beta_request_reason ? (
-        </tbody>
+        <tr className="user-row-reason">
-      </table>
+          <td colSpan={6}>
+            <div className="user-reason-block">
+              <strong>Why they want access:</strong>
+              <p>{u.beta_request_reason}</p>
+            </div>
+          </td>
+        </tr>
+      ) : null}
+    </>
+  )
+}
+
+function PermissionCell({ user: u, busy, onFlipPermission }) {
+  const state = u.permission_state || 'granted'
+  const decidedSuffix = u.permission_decided_at
+    ? ` · by ${u.permission_decided_by_login ? '@' + u.permission_decided_by_login : '—'} at ${u.permission_decided_at}`
+    : ''
+  return (
+    <div className="permission-cell">
+      <span className={`permission-badge permission-badge-${state}`}>{state}</span>
+      <div className="permission-actions">
+        {state !== 'granted' && (
+          <button
+            type="button"
+            className="btn-link-quiet"
+            disabled={busy}
+            onClick={() => onFlipPermission('granted')}
+          >Grant</button>
+        )}
+        {state === 'granted' && (
+          <button
+            type="button"
+            className="btn-link-quiet"
+            disabled={busy}
+            onClick={() => {
+              if (confirm(`Revoke access for ${u.display_name || u.email}?`)) {
+                onFlipPermission('revoked')
+              }
+            }}
+          >Revoke</button>
+        )}
+      </div>
+      {decidedSuffix && (
+        <div className="permission-decided muted">{decidedSuffix.replace(/^ · /, '')}</div>
+      )}
     </div>
   )
 }

frontend/src/components/BetaPending.jsx

@@ -1,38 +1,62 @@
-// BetaPending.jsx — the post-OAuth-rejection page.
+// BetaPending.jsx — the "your request is in review" page (§6.1 / §14.1).
 //
-// When a deployment is in private-beta mode (i.e. its `allowed_emails`
+// v0.3.0 introduced this surface as the post-OAuth-rejection page (a
-// table has any rows), the OAuth callback redirects unrecognised users
+// user whose email wasn't on the `allowed_emails` table bounced here).
-// here instead of provisioning them. The framework cannot know the
+// v0.8.0 (roadmap item #6) repurposes it as the post-OTC pending-grant
-// deployment operator's preferred contact channel — so the deployment
+// page: any authenticated user whose `permission_state='pending'` lands
-// supplies one via VITE_BETA_CONTACT (an email, URL, or short
+// here on root visits, after a fresh-OTC profile capture, or via the
-// instruction). If unset, we render a generic ask-the-operator line.
+// header "Your beta access is in review" affordance.
+//
+// The deployment supplies a contact channel via VITE_BETA_CONTACT (an
+// email, URL, or short instruction). If unset, we render a generic
+// ask-the-operator line.
 
 import { Link } from 'react-router-dom'
 
-export default function BetaPending() {
+export default function BetaPending({ viewer }) {
   const contact = import.meta.env.VITE_BETA_CONTACT || ''
+  const isPending = viewer?.permission_state === 'pending'
   return (
     <div className="beta-pending">
       <div className="beta-pending-inner">
-        <h1>{import.meta.env.VITE_APP_NAME} is in private Beta.</h1>
+        <h1>
+          {isPending
+            ? 'Your request is in review.'
+            : `${import.meta.env.VITE_APP_NAME} is in private Beta.`}
+        </h1>
+        {isPending ? (
+          <>
             <p>
-          Discussion and contribution are gated to invited emails for now.
+              Thanks for telling us a bit about yourself. The deployment's
-          Reading is open — every super-draft, every active RFC, and every
+              admins are notified by email as soon as a request lands;
-          public conversation is visible without signing in.
+              we don't commit to a fixed SLA — turnaround depends on
+              operator availability — and the deployment operator is
+              the right person to ask if a wait runs long.
             </p>
+            <p>
+              While you wait, the catalog on the left lists every super-draft
+              and active RFC in the framework — reading is open. Discussion
+              and contribution unlock once your access is granted.
+            </p>
+          </>
+        ) : (
+          <p>
+            Discussion and contribution are gated to invited contributors for
+            now. Reading is open — every super-draft, every active RFC, and
+            every public conversation is visible without signing in.
+          </p>
+        )}
         {contact ? (
           <p className="beta-pending-contact">
-            To request access, contact <strong>{contact}</strong> with the
+            Questions? Contact <strong>{contact}</strong>.
-            email address you'd like to sign in with.
           </p>
         ) : (
           <p className="beta-pending-contact">
-            To request access, contact the deployment operator with the email
+            Questions? Contact the deployment operator.
-            address you'd like to sign in with.
           </p>
         )}
         <div className="beta-pending-actions">
-          <Link className="btn-primary" to="/">Browse as a guest</Link>
+          <Link className="btn-primary" to="/">Browse the catalog</Link>
           <Link className="btn-link-quiet" to="/philosophy">Read the philosophy →</Link>
         </div>
       </div>

frontend/src/components/CookieConsentBanner.jsx

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+// CookieConsentBanner.jsx — v0.13.0 / roadmap item #11 / SPEC §14.5.
+//
+// A non-modal bottom-of-page banner that asks the user once which
+// categories of cookies they accept. The framework's strictly-necessary
+// cookies (session, signed payloads) are always on; the user can opt in
+// or out of analytics (which gates the §13 SDK landing in v0.15.0) and
+// "other" (third-party embeds, social widgets if a deployment adds any).
+//
+// Visible until the user makes a choice. Hides itself once the choice
+// is recorded. The /settings/notifications "Privacy & cookies" tab
+// surfaces the current choice and re-opens the banner via `forceOpen`.
+
+import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
+import { Link } from 'react-router-dom'
+import { getConsent, setConsent, hasChosen, hydrateFromServer } from '../lib/consent.js'
+import { getCookieConsent, setCookieConsent } from '../api.js'
+
+const CATEGORIES = [
+  {
+    key: 'essential-only',
+    label: 'Essential only',
+    description: 'Just the cookies the app needs to keep you signed in and protect submissions. (Sign-in session, signed payloads.)',
+    flags: { analytics: false, other: false },
+  },
+  {
+    key: 'essential-analytics',
+    label: 'Essential + analytics',
+    description: 'Adds anonymous usage analytics so the framework can see which surfaces get used. No third-party scripts beyond the analytics SDK.',
+    flags: { analytics: true, other: false },
+  },
+  {
+    key: 'essential-analytics-other',
+    label: 'Essential + analytics + other',
+    description: 'Adds analytics plus any third-party embeds the deployment configures (e.g. social widgets). Choose this if you want the full surface.',
+    flags: { analytics: true, other: true },
+  },
+]
+
+function selectionKeyFor(consent) {
+  if (consent.analytics && consent.other) return 'essential-analytics-other'
+  if (consent.analytics && !consent.other) return 'essential-analytics'
+  return 'essential-only'
+}
+
+export default function CookieConsentBanner({ viewer, forceOpen, onClosed }) {
+  const [open, setOpen] = useState(() => forceOpen || !hasChosen())
+  const [choice, setChoice] = useState(() => selectionKeyFor(getConsent()))
+  const [saving, setSaving] = useState(false)
+  const [error, setError] = useState(null)
+
+  // When forceOpen flips (settings "Change" affordance), re-render the
+  // banner and pre-select the user's current choice.
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (forceOpen) {
+      setOpen(true)
+      setChoice(selectionKeyFor(getConsent()))
+    }
+  }, [forceOpen])
+
+  // Server-side hydrate for authenticated viewers per the v0.13.0
+  // precedence rule: a server row overrides local; absent server row,
+  // upload the local choice.
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (!viewer?.user_id) return
+    let cancelled = false
+    getCookieConsent()
+      .then(record => {
+        if (cancelled) return
+        if (record.recorded_at) {
+          // Server is authoritative — adopt + hide the banner unless
+          // the settings page forced it open.
+          hydrateFromServer(record)
+          setChoice(selectionKeyFor(record))
+          if (!forceOpen) setOpen(false)
+        } else if (hasChosen()) {
+          // Local has a choice the server doesn't know about yet — push.
+          const local = getConsent()
+          setCookieConsent({ analytics: local.analytics, other: local.other })
+            .then(r => hydrateFromServer(r))
+            .catch(() => {})
+        }
+      })
+      .catch(() => {
+        // Network or auth error — leave the local-only path in place.
+      })
+    return () => { cancelled = true }
+  }, [viewer?.user_id])  // eslint-disable-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
+
+  if (!open) return null
+
+  async function save() {
+    setSaving(true)
+    setError(null)
+    const picked = CATEGORIES.find(c => c.key === choice) || CATEGORIES[0]
+    try {
+      setConsent(picked.flags)
+      if (viewer?.user_id) {
+        // Best-effort server persistence. A failure here doesn't
+        // invalidate the local choice; the banner still hides because
+        // the user expressed their preference. The server can catch up
+        // on the next sign-in via the hydrate path above.
+        try {
+          const r = await setCookieConsent(picked.flags)
+          hydrateFromServer(r)
+        } catch (e) {
+          setError(`Saved locally; server sync failed (${e.message}).`)
+        }
+      }
+      setOpen(false)
+      onClosed?.()
+    } finally {
+      setSaving(false)
+    }
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div className="cookie-consent-banner" role="region" aria-label="Cookie consent">
+      <div className="cookie-consent-body">
+        <h2 className="cookie-consent-title">Cookies &amp; privacy</h2>
+        <p className="cookie-consent-intro">
+          This site uses cookies. Essential cookies keep you signed in and
+          protect your submissions; analytics and other cookies are
+          optional. Choose what you allow — you can change this any time
+          from <Link to="/settings/notifications">Settings &rarr; Privacy &amp; cookies</Link>.
+        </p>
+        <fieldset className="cookie-consent-choices">
+          <legend className="visually-hidden">Cookie categories</legend>
+          {CATEGORIES.map(c => (
+            <label key={c.key} className={`cookie-consent-choice ${choice === c.key ? 'is-selected' : ''}`}>
+              <input
+                type="radio"
+                name="cookie-consent-choice"
+                value={c.key}
+                checked={choice === c.key}
+                onChange={() => setChoice(c.key)}
+                disabled={saving}
+              />
+              <span className="cookie-consent-choice-text">
+                <span className="cookie-consent-choice-label">{c.label}</span>
+                <span className="cookie-consent-choice-desc">{c.description}</span>
+              </span>
+            </label>
+          ))}
+        </fieldset>
+        <p className="cookie-consent-links">
+          <Link to="/cookies">Cookies policy</Link>
+          <span aria-hidden> &middot; </span>
+          <Link to="/privacy">Privacy policy</Link>
+        </p>
+        {error && <p className="cookie-consent-error">{error}</p>}
+        <div className="cookie-consent-actions">
+          <button
+            type="button"
+            className="btn-primary"
+            onClick={save}
+            disabled={saving}
+          >
+            {saving ? 'Saving…' : 'Save choice'}
+          </button>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  )
+}

frontend/src/components/Docs.jsx

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// `/docs` — the user-facing guide.
+//
+// Sibling of Philosophy.jsx: same chrome, same data path, different
+// source file. Renders DOCS.md verbatim with light chrome around it.
+// Reachable anonymously, same as `/philosophy`, so a visitor can read
+// the guide before deciding to sign in.
+
+import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
+import { Link, useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom'
+import MarkdownPreview from './MarkdownPreview.jsx'
+import { getDocs } from '../api.js'
+
+export default function Docs({ authenticated }) {
+  const [body, setBody] = useState('')
+  const [error, setError] = useState(null)
+  const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true)
+  const navigate = useNavigate()
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    let active = true
+    getDocs()
+      .then(r => { if (active) setBody(r.body || '') })
+      .catch(e => { if (active) setError(e.message || String(e)) })
+      .finally(() => { if (active) setLoading(false) })
+    return () => { active = false }
+  }, [])
+
+  return (
+    <div className="philosophy-page">
+      <header className="philosophy-header">
+        <button
+          className="philosophy-back"
+          onClick={() => (history.length > 1 ? navigate(-1) : navigate('/'))}
+        >
+          ← Back
+        </button>
+        <span className="philosophy-title">User guide</span>
+        {!authenticated && (
+          <Link className="philosophy-signin" to="/">Home</Link>
+        )}
+      </header>
+      <article className="philosophy-body">
+        {loading && <p className="muted">Loading…</p>}
+        {error && <p className="error">Could not load the guide: {error}</p>}
+        {!loading && !error && (
+          <MarkdownPreview content={body} />
+        )}
+      </article>
+    </div>
+  )
+}

frontend/src/components/Login.jsx

@@ -1,41 +1,108 @@
-// Login.jsx — v0.7.0's primary sign-in surface (§6.2).
+// Login.jsx — the composed sign-in surface (§6.2) after the v0.10.0
+// (passcodes, roadmap item #8) rebase onto v0.8.0 (beta-access-request
+// capture, §6.1 / §14.1, roadmap item #6). v0.7.0 (roadmap item #5)
+// established the email + OTC scaffolding both releases extended.
 //
-// Two-step:
+// Four-to-six-step flow (most users see three; the longest path is
-//   1. Enter email → POST /auth/otc/request → on 200, advance.
+// pending-user with no passcode, who never sees the passcode steps):
-//      On 429 (rate-limit), surface a "wait a moment" hint and keep
-//      the user on step 1.
-//   2. Enter the six-digit code from the email → POST /auth/otc/verify
-//      → on 200, redirect to the post-login landing. Cmd/Ctrl+Enter
-//      on the code field is the keyboard shortcut.
 //
-// Server-side, /auth/otc/request always returns 202 for an unrecognized
+//   1. 'email'           Enter email → GET /auth/passcode/check.
-// email (so the allowlist gate doesn't leak), so this surface never
+//                        * has_passcode=true  → step 'passcode'.
-// distinguishes "we couldn't reach you" from "we don't know you" —
+//                        * has_passcode=false → POST /auth/otc/request,
-// it just advances to step 2. If a user is genuinely blocked, the
+//                                               step 'code'.
-// code never arrives.
+//                        429 on either dispatch surfaces a "wait a
+//                        moment" hint and keeps the user on step 1.
 //
-// The legacy Gitea OAuth callback remains at /auth/login → /auth/callback
+//   2a. 'passcode'       Enter passcode → POST /auth/passcode/verify.
-// during the v0.7.0 migration; we surface a "Sign in with Gitea" link
+//                        * 200 → redirect to "/".
-// as a fallback in the footer so users with active OAuth sessions or
+//                        * 423 (lockout, 5 consecutive failures) →
-// older invite emails still have a path.
+//                          auto-fall back to OTC by requesting a fresh
+//                          code and advancing to step 'code'.
+//                        * 400 → wrong passcode; user can retry or
+//                          click "Use a code instead" to fall back
+//                          manually.
+//
+//   2b. 'code'           Enter the six-digit code → POST /auth/otc/verify.
+//                        On 200, fetch /api/auth/me and branch:
+//                          * needs_profile === true  → 'capture-profile'
+//                          * has_passcode  === false → 'offer-passcode'
+//                          * otherwise               → redirect to "/".
+//                        needs_profile WINS over has_passcode — a
+//                        pending user goes through the §6.1 capture
+//                        flow first; setting a passcode while waiting
+//                        for admin grant gains them nothing.
+//                        Cmd/Ctrl+Enter on the code field is the
+//                        keyboard shortcut.
+//
+//   3. 'capture-profile' (v0.8.0, §6.1) First name, last name, and "why
+//                        I should be included in the beta" → POST
+//                        /api/auth/me/beta-request → redirect to
+//                        /beta-pending. The user's row stays
+//                        permission_state='pending' until an admin
+//                        grants access; they can set a passcode later
+//                        from settings, or on a future sign-in once
+//                        granted.
+//
+//   4a. 'offer-passcode' (v0.10.0) "Set a passcode for faster sign-in
+//                        next time?" Yes → 'set-passcode'. Skip → "/".
+//
+//   4b. 'set-passcode'   Pick a passcode (4–20 chars) → POST
+//                        /auth/passcode/set → redirect to "/". A
+//                        "Skip for now" link also redirects to "/".
+//
+// Server-side, /auth/otc/request returns 202 uniformly and
+// /auth/passcode/check returns has_passcode=false for an unknown
+// email, so this surface never distinguishes "we couldn't reach you"
+// from "we don't know you" — an unknown email always lands in the
+// OTC path with no account-enumeration signal.
+//
+// The legacy Gitea OAuth callback remains at /auth/login →
+// /auth/callback during the v0.7.0 migration; we surface a "Sign in
+// with Gitea" link as a fallback in the footer so users with active
+// OAuth sessions or older invite emails still have a path. We hide
+// the fallback on 'capture-profile' so a half-captured pending user
+// doesn't bail out into the OAuth path mid-form.
 
 import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from 'react'
 import { useNavigate, Link } from 'react-router-dom'
-import { requestOtc, verifyOtc } from '../api'
+import {
+  requestOtc,
+  verifyOtc,
+  submitBetaRequest,
+  checkPasscode,
+  verifyPasscode,
+  setPasscode as apiSetPasscode,
+} from '../api'
 
 export default function Login() {
+  // Steps: 'email' → 'passcode' or 'code' → (on the OTC path, after
+  // verify) one of: 'capture-profile' (pending user), 'offer-passcode'
+  // (no passcode yet), or straight to "/". 'set-passcode' is reached
+  // from 'offer-passcode'.
   const [step, setStep] = useState('email')
   const [email, setEmail] = useState('')
   const [code, setCode] = useState('')
+  const [passcode, setPasscode] = useState('')
+  const [newPasscode, setNewPasscode] = useState('')
+  // v0.8.0 — capture-profile fields.
+  const [firstName, setFirstName] = useState('')
+  const [lastName, setLastName] = useState('')
+  const [reason, setReason] = useState('')
   const [status, setStatus] = useState('')
   const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
   const emailRef = useRef(null)
   const codeRef = useRef(null)
+  const passcodeRef = useRef(null)
+  const newPasscodeRef = useRef(null)
+  const firstNameRef = useRef(null)
   const navigate = useNavigate()
 
   useEffect(() => {
     if (step === 'email') emailRef.current?.focus()
-    else codeRef.current?.focus()
+    else if (step === 'code') codeRef.current?.focus()
+    else if (step === 'passcode') passcodeRef.current?.focus()
+    else if (step === 'capture-profile') firstNameRef.current?.focus()
+    else if (step === 'set-passcode') newPasscodeRef.current?.focus()
   }, [step])
 
   async function submitEmail(e) {
@@ -47,20 +114,72 @@ export default function Login() {
     setBusy(true)
     setStatus('')
     try {
+      const { has_passcode } = await checkPasscode(email.trim())
+      if (has_passcode) {
+        setStep('passcode')
+        setStatus('')
+      } else {
         await requestOtc(email.trim())
         setStep('code')
         setStatus('Check your inbox — a six-digit code is on the way.')
+      }
     } catch (err) {
       if (err.status === 429) {
         setStatus('Slow down — wait a minute before requesting another code.')
       } else {
-        setStatus(err.message || 'Could not request a code. Try again.')
+        setStatus(err.message || 'Could not start sign-in. Try again.')
       }
     } finally {
       setBusy(false)
     }
   }
 
+  async function submitPasscode(e) {
+    if (e) e.preventDefault()
+    if (!passcode.trim()) {
+      setStatus('Enter your passcode.')
+      return
+    }
+    setBusy(true)
+    setStatus('')
+    try {
+      await verifyPasscode(email.trim(), passcode.trim())
+      // Reload so App.jsx's getMe() picks up the fresh session. A
+      // returning passcode user is by definition already past the
+      // §6.1 capture step (they couldn't have set a passcode while
+      // pending), so we go straight to "/".
+      window.location.assign('/')
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err.status === 423) {
+        // Lockout — auto-fall back to OTC. The OTC request endpoint
+        // is independent of the passcode lockout, so this lands a
+        // fresh code in the user's inbox immediately.
+        setPasscode('')
+        try {
+          await requestOtc(email.trim())
+          setStep('code')
+          setStatus(
+            'Too many failed attempts. We sent a one-time code to your email — use it to sign in.',
+          )
+        } catch (e2) {
+          if (e2.status === 429) {
+            setStep('code')
+            setStatus(
+              'Too many failed attempts. Wait a minute, then request a one-time code to sign in.',
+            )
+          } else {
+            setStatus(
+              'Too many failed attempts. Use the "Use a code instead" link to sign in via email.',
+            )
+          }
+        }
+      } else {
+        setStatus('Wrong passcode. Try again, or use a one-time code instead.')
+      }
+      setBusy(false)
+    }
+  }
+
   async function submitCode(e) {
     if (e) e.preventDefault()
     if (!code.trim() || code.trim().length !== 6) {
@@ -71,9 +190,38 @@ export default function Login() {
     setStatus('')
     try {
       await verifyOtc(email.trim(), code.trim())
-      // Reload so App.jsx's getMe() picks up the fresh session. We
+      // OTC verified — the server has signed in the user. Fetch the
-      // navigate to "/" via a hard load so any cached "anonymous"
+      // canonical /api/auth/me to decide where to land:
-      // view state in memory is dropped cleanly.
+      //   * needs_profile  → §6.1 capture (then /beta-pending).
+      //   * no passcode    → §6.2 offer-passcode (then /).
+      //   * otherwise      → /.
+      // needs_profile wins over has_passcode: a pending user can't yet
+      // do anything that benefits from faster sign-in, so we don't
+      // distract them with the passcode offer mid-admission.
+      const meResp = await fetch('/api/auth/me', { credentials: 'include' })
+      let me = null
+      if (meResp.ok) {
+        try {
+          me = await meResp.json()
+        } catch (_) {
+          me = null
+        }
+      }
+      if (me?.needs_profile === true) {
+        setStep('capture-profile')
+        setStatus('')
+        setBusy(false)
+        return
+      }
+      if (me?.has_passcode === false) {
+        setStep('offer-passcode')
+        setStatus('')
+        setBusy(false)
+        return
+      }
+      // Either /me returned the granted-with-passcode shape, or the
+      // call failed but the session cookie is set — fall through to
+      // a hard reload so App.jsx re-fetches and renders accordingly.
       window.location.assign('/')
     } catch (err) {
       setStatus('That code is invalid or expired. Try again, or request a new code.')
@@ -81,6 +229,54 @@ export default function Login() {
     }
   }
 
+  async function submitProfile(e) {
+    if (e) e.preventDefault()
+    const fn = firstName.trim()
+    const ln = lastName.trim()
+    const why = reason.trim()
+    if (!fn || !ln || !why) {
+      setStatus('All three fields are required.')
+      return
+    }
+    setBusy(true)
+    setStatus('')
+    try {
+      await submitBetaRequest({
+        first_name: fn,
+        last_name: ln,
+        beta_request_reason: why,
+      })
+      // Hard-load so App.jsx re-fetches /api/auth/me and picks up
+      // the captured fields. The user stays permission_state='pending'
+      // until an admin grants access — the next thing they should
+      // see is the "your request is in review" page.
+      window.location.assign('/beta-pending')
+    } catch (err) {
+      setStatus(err.message || 'Could not submit your request. Try again.')
+      setBusy(false)
+    }
+  }
+
+  async function submitNewPasscode(e) {
+    if (e) e.preventDefault()
+    const pc = newPasscode.trim()
+    if (pc.length < 4) {
+      setStatus('Passcode must be at least 4 characters.')
+      return
+    }
+    setBusy(true)
+    setStatus('')
+    try {
+      await apiSetPasscode(pc)
+      window.location.assign('/')
+    } catch (err) {
+      // 422 carries the validation message verbatim (denylist /
+      // length); surface it as-is so the user knows what to change.
+      setStatus(err.message || 'Could not set passcode. Try a different one.')
+      setBusy(false)
+    }
+  }
+
   function onCodeKey(e) {
     // §6.2 ergonomic: Cmd/Ctrl+Enter submits from the code field.
     if ((e.metaKey || e.ctrlKey) && e.key === 'Enter') {
@@ -88,12 +284,59 @@ export default function Login() {
     }
   }
 
+  function onPasscodeKey(e) {
+    if ((e.metaKey || e.ctrlKey) && e.key === 'Enter') {
+      submitPasscode(e)
+    }
+  }
+
+  function onReasonKey(e) {
+    // §6.1 ergonomic: Cmd/Ctrl+Enter submits the capture form from
+    // the reason textarea (the multi-line input that would otherwise
+    // swallow Enter as a newline).
+    if ((e.metaKey || e.ctrlKey) && e.key === 'Enter') {
+      submitProfile(e)
+    }
+  }
+
+  function onNewPasscodeKey(e) {
+    if ((e.metaKey || e.ctrlKey) && e.key === 'Enter') {
+      submitNewPasscode(e)
+    }
+  }
+
   function backToEmail() {
     setStep('email')
     setCode('')
+    setPasscode('')
     setStatus('')
   }
 
+  async function fallbackToOtc() {
+    // Manual "Use a code instead" from the passcode step. Same shape
+    // as the email-step OTC dispatch.
+    setBusy(true)
+    setStatus('')
+    try {
+      await requestOtc(email.trim())
+      setPasscode('')
+      setStep('code')
+      setStatus('Check your inbox — a six-digit code is on the way.')
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err.status === 429) {
+        setStatus('Slow down — wait a minute before requesting another code.')
+      } else {
+        setStatus(err.message || 'Could not request a code. Try again.')
+      }
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(false)
+    }
+  }
+
+  function skipPasscodeOffer() {
+    window.location.assign('/')
+  }
+
   return (
     <div className="otc-login">
       <div className="otc-login-inner">
@@ -101,7 +344,8 @@ export default function Login() {
         {step === 'email' && (
           <form onSubmit={submitEmail}>
             <p className="otc-hint">
-              Enter your email. We'll send you a one-time code.
+              Enter your email. If you've set a passcode, you'll enter that
+              next; otherwise we'll send a one-time code.
             </p>
             <input
               ref={emailRef}
@@ -114,10 +358,49 @@ export default function Login() {
               disabled={busy}
             />
             <button type="submit" disabled={busy || !email.trim()}>
-              {busy ? 'Sending…' : 'Send code'}
+              {busy ? 'Checking…' : 'Continue'}
             </button>
           </form>
         )}
+        {step === 'passcode' && (
+          <form onSubmit={submitPasscode}>
+            <p className="otc-hint">
+              Enter the passcode for <strong>{email}</strong>.
+            </p>
+            <input
+              ref={passcodeRef}
+              type="password"
+              autoComplete="current-password"
+              value={passcode}
+              onChange={e => setPasscode(e.target.value)}
+              onKeyDown={onPasscodeKey}
+              placeholder="Your passcode"
+              required
+              disabled={busy}
+            />
+            <div className="otc-actions">
+              <button type="submit" disabled={busy || !passcode.trim()}>
+                {busy ? 'Signing in…' : 'Sign in'}
+              </button>
+              <button
+                type="button"
+                className="btn-link-quiet"
+                onClick={fallbackToOtc}
+                disabled={busy}
+              >
+                Use a code instead
+              </button>
+              <button
+                type="button"
+                className="btn-link-quiet"
+                onClick={backToEmail}
+                disabled={busy}
+              >
+                Use a different email
+              </button>
+            </div>
+          </form>
+        )}
         {step === 'code' && (
           <form onSubmit={submitCode}>
             <p className="otc-hint">
@@ -155,12 +438,126 @@ export default function Login() {
             </p>
           </form>
         )}
+        {step === 'capture-profile' && (
+          <form onSubmit={submitProfile}>
+            <p className="otc-hint">
+              You're signed in. {import.meta.env.VITE_APP_NAME} is in private
+              beta — tell us a bit about yourself and an admin will review
+              your request.
+            </p>
+            <label className="otc-field-label">First name</label>
+            <input
+              ref={firstNameRef}
+              type="text"
+              autoComplete="given-name"
+              value={firstName}
+              onChange={e => setFirstName(e.target.value)}
+              required
+              disabled={busy}
+              maxLength={120}
+            />
+            <label className="otc-field-label">Last name</label>
+            <input
+              type="text"
+              autoComplete="family-name"
+              value={lastName}
+              onChange={e => setLastName(e.target.value)}
+              required
+              disabled={busy}
+              maxLength={120}
+            />
+            <label className="otc-field-label">
+              Why you'd like to be included in the beta
+            </label>
+            <textarea
+              value={reason}
+              onChange={e => setReason(e.target.value)}
+              onKeyDown={onReasonKey}
+              required
+              disabled={busy}
+              rows={5}
+              maxLength={4000}
+              placeholder="A sentence or two is plenty."
+            />
+            <div className="otc-actions">
+              <button
+                type="submit"
+                disabled={busy || !firstName.trim() || !lastName.trim() || !reason.trim()}
+              >
+                {busy ? 'Submitting…' : 'Submit request'}
+              </button>
+            </div>
+            <p className="otc-shortcut-hint">
+              Tip: <kbd>⌘</kbd>+<kbd>Enter</kbd> (or <kbd>Ctrl</kbd>+<kbd>Enter</kbd>) to submit.
+            </p>
+          </form>
+        )}
+        {step === 'offer-passcode' && (
+          <div className="otc-offer-passcode">
+            <p className="otc-hint">
+              You're signed in. Want to set a passcode for faster sign-in
+              next time? You can always use a one-time code instead — and
+              you can change or remove the passcode from your settings.
+            </p>
+            <div className="otc-actions">
+              <button
+                type="button"
+                onClick={() => { setStep('set-passcode'); setStatus('') }}
+              >
+                Set a passcode
+              </button>
+              <button
+                type="button"
+                className="btn-link-quiet"
+                onClick={skipPasscodeOffer}
+              >
+                Skip for now
+              </button>
+            </div>
+          </div>
+        )}
+        {step === 'set-passcode' && (
+          <form onSubmit={submitNewPasscode}>
+            <p className="otc-hint">
+              Pick a passcode (4–20 characters). You'll use it with your
+              email to sign in next time.
+            </p>
+            <input
+              ref={newPasscodeRef}
+              type="password"
+              autoComplete="new-password"
+              value={newPasscode}
+              onChange={e => setNewPasscode(e.target.value)}
+              onKeyDown={onNewPasscodeKey}
+              placeholder="New passcode"
+              required
+              disabled={busy}
+              minLength={4}
+              maxLength={20}
+            />
+            <div className="otc-actions">
+              <button type="submit" disabled={busy || newPasscode.trim().length < 4}>
+                {busy ? 'Saving…' : 'Save passcode'}
+              </button>
+              <button
+                type="button"
+                className="btn-link-quiet"
+                onClick={skipPasscodeOffer}
+                disabled={busy}
+              >
+                Skip for now
+              </button>
+            </div>
+          </form>
+        )}
         {status && <p className="otc-status">{status}</p>}
+        {step !== 'capture-profile' && (
           <p className="otc-fallback">
             <Link to="/philosophy">Read the philosophy →</Link>
             <span className="otc-fallback-sep">·</span>
             <a href="/auth/login">Sign in with Gitea (fallback)</a>
           </p>
+        )}
       </div>
     </div>
   )

frontend/src/components/NotificationSettings.jsx

@@ -28,7 +28,12 @@ import {
   unmuteUser,
   muteUser,
   searchUsers,
+  getCookieConsent,
+  getMe,
+  setPasscode,
+  clearPasscode,
 } from '../api.js'
+import { getConsent, onConsentChange, hydrateFromServer } from '../lib/consent.js'
 
 const CHURN_REFUSAL = 'Per-commit and per-message email is intentionally not offered. The digest aggregates this activity weekly.'
 
@@ -48,10 +53,223 @@ export default function NotificationSettings({ viewer }) {
       <QuietHoursSection />
       <WatchesSection />
       <MutesSection viewer={viewer} />
+      <SignInSection />
+      <PrivacyCookiesSection />
     </div>
   )
 }
 
+// ── §6.2 sign-in (v0.10.0 / roadmap item #8): passcode management ──────────
+
+function SignInSection() {
+  // Source of truth for `has_passcode` and `passcode_set_at` is the
+  // /api/auth/me payload (v0.10.0 added both fields). We re-read after
+  // every mutation so the surface reflects what just landed.
+  const [me, setMe] = useState(null)
+  const [error, setError] = useState(null)
+  const [mode, setMode] = useState('idle') // 'idle' | 'set' | 'change'
+  const [draft, setDraft] = useState('')
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
+  const [savedNote, setSavedNote] = useState('')
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    getMe()
+      .then(payload => setMe(payload.user || null))
+      .catch(e => setError(e.message))
+  }, [])
+
+  async function refresh() {
+    const payload = await getMe()
+    setMe(payload.user || null)
+  }
+
+  async function save(e) {
+    if (e) e.preventDefault()
+    const pc = draft.trim()
+    if (pc.length < 4) {
+      setError('Passcode must be at least 4 characters.')
+      return
+    }
+    setBusy(true)
+    setError(null)
+    setSavedNote('')
+    try {
+      await setPasscode(pc)
+      setDraft('')
+      setMode('idle')
+      setSavedNote('Passcode saved.')
+      await refresh()
+    } catch (err) {
+      // 422 carries the validation message verbatim (denylist /
+      // length); surface it as-is so the user knows what to change.
+      setError(err.message || 'Could not save passcode. Try a different one.')
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(false)
+      setTimeout(() => setSavedNote(''), 2000)
+    }
+  }
+
+  async function remove() {
+    if (!confirm('Remove your passcode? You will sign in with a one-time code next time.')) {
+      return
+    }
+    setBusy(true)
+    setError(null)
+    setSavedNote('')
+    try {
+      await clearPasscode()
+      setSavedNote('Passcode removed.')
+      await refresh()
+    } catch (err) {
+      setError(err.message || 'Could not remove passcode.')
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(false)
+      setTimeout(() => setSavedNote(''), 2000)
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!me) return <SectionShell title="Sign-in" subtitle={error || 'Loading…'} />
+
+  const hasPasscode = !!me.has_passcode
+
+  return (
+    <SectionShell
+      title="Sign-in"
+      subtitle="How you sign in. A passcode lets you skip the one-time-code email; the one-time-code path is always available as a fallback (and as the recovery path if you forget your passcode)."
+    >
+      <div className="settings-row">
+        <span className="settings-note">
+          <strong>Passcode:</strong>{' '}
+          {hasPasscode ? 'Set.' : 'Not set — you sign in with a one-time code each time.'}
+        </span>
+      </div>
+      {hasPasscode && me.passcode_set_at && (
+        <p className="settings-note muted">Set on {me.passcode_set_at}.</p>
+      )}
+
+      {mode === 'idle' && (
+        <div className="settings-row">
+          {hasPasscode ? (
+            <>
+              <button
+                className="btn-primary"
+                onClick={() => { setMode('change'); setDraft(''); setError(null) }}
+                disabled={busy}
+              >
+                Change passcode
+              </button>
+              <button
+                className="btn-link-muted"
+                onClick={remove}
+                disabled={busy}
+              >
+                Remove passcode
+              </button>
+            </>
+          ) : (
+            <button
+              className="btn-primary"
+              onClick={() => { setMode('set'); setDraft(''); setError(null) }}
+              disabled={busy}
+            >
+              Set passcode
+            </button>
+          )}
+        </div>
+      )}
+
+      {(mode === 'set' || mode === 'change') && (
+        <form className="settings-row" onSubmit={save}>
+          <label>
+            {mode === 'change' ? 'New passcode' : 'Passcode'}
+            <input
+              type="password"
+              autoComplete="new-password"
+              value={draft}
+              onChange={e => setDraft(e.target.value)}
+              placeholder="4–20 characters"
+              minLength={4}
+              maxLength={20}
+              required
+              disabled={busy}
+            />
+          </label>
+          <button className="btn-primary" type="submit" disabled={busy || draft.trim().length < 4}>
+            {busy ? 'Saving…' : 'Save'}
+          </button>
+          <button
+            type="button"
+            className="btn-link-muted"
+            onClick={() => { setMode('idle'); setDraft(''); setError(null) }}
+            disabled={busy}
+          >
+            Cancel
+          </button>
+        </form>
+      )}
+
+      {savedNote && <p className="settings-note">{savedNote}</p>}
+      {error && <p className="settings-note warning">{error}</p>}
+    </SectionShell>
+  )
+}
+
+// ── §14.5 cookie / privacy consent (v0.13.0 / roadmap item #11) ────────────
+
+function PrivacyCookiesSection() {
+  const [consent, setConsent] = useState(() => getConsent())
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    // Pull the server-side row on mount; if it has a recorded_at the
+    // local snapshot is updated via hydrate.
+    getCookieConsent()
+      .then(record => { if (record.recorded_at) hydrateFromServer(record) })
+      .catch(() => {})
+    return onConsentChange(next => setConsent(next))
+  }, [])
+
+  function reopenBanner() {
+    // App.jsx listens for this event and bumps the forceOpen tick on
+    // <CookieConsentBanner>. The banner pre-selects the current choice
+    // from the snapshot, so the user can revise rather than restart.
+    window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('rfc-app:cookie-consent-reopen'))
+  }
+
+  const summary = (() => {
+    if (!consent.recorded_at) {
+      return 'No choice recorded — the consent banner is being shown to you.'
+    }
+    if (consent.analytics && consent.other) {
+      return 'Essential + analytics + other.'
+    }
+    if (consent.analytics) {
+      return 'Essential + analytics.'
+    }
+    return 'Essential only.'
+  })()
+
+  return (
+    <SectionShell
+      title="Privacy & cookies"
+      subtitle="What categories of cookies you've allowed. Essential cookies are always on; analytics and other categories are opt-in."
+    >
+      <div className="settings-row">
+        <span className="settings-note"><strong>Current choice:</strong> {summary}</span>
+      </div>
+      {consent.recorded_at && (
+        <p className="settings-note muted">Recorded {consent.recorded_at}.</p>
+      )}
+      <div className="settings-row">
+        <button className="btn-primary" onClick={reopenBanner}>
+          Change
+        </button>
+        <Link to="/cookies" className="btn-link-muted">Cookies policy</Link>
+        <Link to="/privacy" className="btn-link-muted">Privacy policy</Link>
+      </div>
+    </SectionShell>
+  )
+}
+
 // ── §15.4 email category toggles ───────────────────────────────────────────
 
 function EmailPreferencesSection() {

frontend/src/lib/consent.js

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+// consent.js — cookie / privacy consent state (v0.13.0, SPEC §14.5).
+//
+// The framework's analytics SDK gating (roadmap item #13, target v0.15.0)
+// will read from this module. v0.13.0 ships the storage + the banner +
+// the on-change pub/sub; no analytics SDK ships yet.
+//
+// Shape of a consent record:
+//
+//     { essential: true, analytics: bool, other: bool, recorded_at: string | null }
+//
+// `essential` is always true at the API surface; it's included for
+// symmetry. `recorded_at` is null when the user has not yet made a
+// choice — the banner is shown until it's non-null.
+//
+// Precedence:
+//   - Anonymous viewer: localStorage is the only source.
+//   - Authenticated viewer: on sign-in, the server row (if any) overrides
+//     local; if the server has no row, the local choice is uploaded.
+//
+// The fan-out is intentionally tiny — three flags. The banner writes
+// once; subscribers re-read on demand via `getConsent()` and can
+// register `onConsentChange(cb)` to be notified of subsequent updates.
+//
+// IMPORTANT: don't import this from analytics SDKs that themselves
+// set cookies on load. Read consent first, then conditionally `import()`
+// the SDK module — that's the contract item #13 will follow.
+
+const LS_KEY = 'rfc-app.cookie-consent.v1'
+
+const DEFAULT = Object.freeze({
+  essential: true,
+  analytics: false,
+  other: false,
+  recorded_at: null,
+})
+
+const listeners = new Set()
+
+function readLocal() {
+  try {
+    const raw = localStorage.getItem(LS_KEY)
+    if (!raw) return null
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw)
+    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object') return null
+    return normalize(parsed)
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+function writeLocal(record) {
+  try {
+    localStorage.setItem(LS_KEY, JSON.stringify(normalize(record)))
+  } catch {
+    // localStorage may be unavailable (private mode, disabled storage).
+    // In that case we behave as if no choice was ever made — the banner
+    // shows on every load. Acceptable per §14.5: the user can still
+    // refuse to consent on each visit.
+  }
+}
+
+function normalize(record) {
+  return {
+    essential: true,
+    analytics: !!record.analytics,
+    other: !!record.other,
+    recorded_at: record.recorded_at || null,
+  }
+}
+
+// In-memory snapshot. Initialised lazily on first read so the module
+// import order doesn't matter; refreshed by `setConsent` and
+// `hydrateFromServer`.
+let _snapshot = null
+
+function snapshot() {
+  if (_snapshot == null) {
+    _snapshot = readLocal() || { ...DEFAULT }
+  }
+  return _snapshot
+}
+
+function emit() {
+  for (const cb of listeners) {
+    try { cb(snapshot()) } catch {}
+  }
+}
+
+/** Read the current consent record. Always returns a normalized object;
+ *  `recorded_at: null` means the user has not yet chosen. */
+export function getConsent() {
+  return snapshot()
+}
+
+/** True if the user has made a choice. The banner uses this to decide
+ *  whether to render itself on load. */
+export function hasChosen() {
+  return snapshot().recorded_at != null
+}
+
+/** Subscribe to consent updates. Returns an unsubscribe function. */
+export function onConsentChange(cb) {
+  listeners.add(cb)
+  return () => listeners.delete(cb)
+}
+
+/** Write a new choice locally and emit. Returns the new snapshot. The
+ *  server-side persistence path is handled separately by the banner /
+ *  settings surface via the API client; this helper is for both anon
+ *  and authenticated callers because localStorage is the always-on
+ *  layer (the server row is a backup that survives sign-out). */
+export function setConsent({ analytics = false, other = false } = {}) {
+  const next = normalize({
+    analytics,
+    other,
+    recorded_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+  })
+  _snapshot = next
+  writeLocal(next)
+  emit()
+  return next
+}
+
+/** Adopt a server-side record as authoritative. Called by the banner /
+ *  settings surface after sign-in when the server returns a non-null
+ *  recorded_at. Updates local + memory + emits to subscribers. */
+export function hydrateFromServer(record) {
+  if (!record || !record.recorded_at) return snapshot()
+  const next = normalize(record)
+  _snapshot = next
+  writeLocal(next)
+  emit()
+  return next
+}
+
+/** Reset local state — used by the settings "Change" affordance to
+ *  re-prompt the banner. Does not touch the server row; the user must
+ *  re-confirm a choice and the banner uploads on save. */
+export function clearLocal() {
+  try { localStorage.removeItem(LS_KEY) } catch {}
+  _snapshot = { ...DEFAULT }
+  emit()
+  return _snapshot
+}
+
+// Cross-tab sync: if another tab writes the key, mirror the change here.
+// Wrapped in a guard so SSR / non-browser test contexts don't blow up.
+if (typeof window !== 'undefined' && typeof window.addEventListener === 'function') {
+  window.addEventListener('storage', e => {
+    if (e.key !== LS_KEY) return
+    _snapshot = readLocal() || { ...DEFAULT }
+    emit()
+  })
+}

frontend/src/pages/Cookies.jsx

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+// Cookies.jsx — v0.13.0 / roadmap item #11 / SPEC §14.6.
+//
+// Lists the framework's cookies, by category, with each cookie's
+// purpose. Deployments override via `VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL` (linked
+// below the framework's stub list, same shape as the privacy page).
+//
+// Keeping the list in source makes the framework self-documenting:
+// when a future framework release adds or removes a cookie, this page
+// is the change-record. Item #13's analytics SDK will add its own row
+// to the analytics-category list in v0.15.0.
+
+import { useNavigate, Link } from 'react-router-dom'
+
+const COOKIES = [
+  {
+    name: 'rfc_session',
+    category: 'Essential',
+    purpose: "Signed session cookie that remembers who you're signed in as. itsdangerous-signed; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax.",
+    lifetime: 'Session (cleared on sign-out).',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'rfc-app.cookie-consent.v1',
+    category: 'Essential',
+    purpose: 'localStorage entry (not a cookie strictly, but tracked here for symmetry) that remembers your consent choice on this device. Cleared on browser data reset.',
+    lifetime: 'Until cleared.',
+  },
+]
+
+export default function Cookies() {
+  const navigate = useNavigate()
+  const deploymentUrl = (import.meta.env.VITE_COOKIES_POLICY_URL || '').trim()
+  const appName = import.meta.env.VITE_APP_NAME || 'this deployment'
+
+  return (
+    <div className="policy-page">
+      <header className="policy-header">
+        <button
+          className="policy-back"
+          onClick={() => (history.length > 1 ? navigate(-1) : navigate('/'))}
+        >
+          ← Back
+        </button>
+        <span className="policy-title">Cookies policy</span>
+      </header>
+      <article className="policy-body">
+        <h1>Cookies policy</h1>
+        <p className="policy-subtitle">
+          What {appName} stores in your browser, by category.
+        </p>
+
+        <h2>Categories</h2>
+        <ul>
+          <li>
+            <strong>Essential</strong> — required for the app to keep
+            you signed in, protect submissions, and remember your
+            consent choice. Cannot be switched off (without these the
+            app cannot function).
+          </li>
+          <li>
+            <strong>Analytics</strong> — optional anonymous usage
+            telemetry. Off by default; opt-in via the consent banner.
+            As of v0.13.0 no analytics SDK ships; roadmap item #13
+            (v0.15.0) adds one behind this gate.
+          </li>
+          <li>
+            <strong>Other</strong> — third-party embeds, social
+            widgets, or anything else the deployment chooses to enable.
+            Off by default; opt-in via the consent banner. The
+            framework ships no such cookies by default.
+          </li>
+        </ul>
+
+        <h2>Current cookies set by the framework</h2>
+        <table className="policy-table">
+          <thead>
+            <tr>
+              <th>Name</th>
+              <th>Category</th>
+              <th>Purpose</th>
+              <th>Lifetime</th>
+            </tr>
+          </thead>
+          <tbody>
+            {COOKIES.map(c => (
+              <tr key={c.name}>
+                <td><code>{c.name}</code></td>
+                <td>{c.category}</td>
+                <td>{c.purpose}</td>
+                <td>{c.lifetime}</td>
+              </tr>
+            ))}
+          </tbody>
+        </table>
+
+        <h2>Manage your choice</h2>
+        <p>
+          Change your consent any time from{' '}
+          <Link to="/settings/notifications">
+            Settings &rarr; Privacy &amp; cookies
+          </Link>. The "Change" affordance re-opens the consent banner
+          with your current selection pre-loaded.
+        </p>
+
+        {deploymentUrl ? (
+          <>
+            <h2>Deployment-specific cookies</h2>
+            <p>
+              This deployment may add additional cookies on top of the
+              framework's. See the full deployment policy at:
+            </p>
+            <p>
+              <a href={deploymentUrl} target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">
+                {deploymentUrl}
+              </a>
+            </p>
+          </>
+        ) : null}
+
+        <p className="policy-footnote">
+          See also the <Link to="/privacy">privacy policy</Link>.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+    </div>
+  )
+}

frontend/src/pages/Privacy.jsx

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+// Privacy.jsx — v0.13.0 / roadmap item #11 / SPEC §14.5.
+//
+// The framework's default privacy policy page. Reachable by anonymous
+// and authenticated viewers alike at `/privacy`. The text below is a
+// minimal stub that describes the framework's stance; deployments are
+// expected to override it via the `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` env var.
+//
+// When `VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL` is set:
+//   - http(s) URL → the page renders the framework's stub above a
+//     "Read the full deployment policy" link to the configured URL.
+//     We don't iframe-embed third-party policy hosts because their
+//     Content-Security-Policy frequently refuses framing; the link is
+//     the predictable affordance.
+//
+// The framework's stub is intentionally short — the rules that matter
+// to a user are: (1) what categories of cookies the app sets, (2) how
+// to change consent, (3) where to reach the deployment operator with a
+// complaint. Each deployment's content repo can carry a fuller version.
+
+import { useNavigate, Link } from 'react-router-dom'
+
+export default function Privacy() {
+  const navigate = useNavigate()
+  const deploymentUrl = (import.meta.env.VITE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL || '').trim()
+  const appName = import.meta.env.VITE_APP_NAME || 'this deployment'
+
+  return (
+    <div className="policy-page">
+      <header className="policy-header">
+        <button
+          className="policy-back"
+          onClick={() => (history.length > 1 ? navigate(-1) : navigate('/'))}
+        >
+          ← Back
+        </button>
+        <span className="policy-title">Privacy policy</span>
+      </header>
+      <article className="policy-body">
+        <h1>Privacy policy</h1>
+        <p className="policy-subtitle">
+          What {appName} stores, why, and how to control it.
+        </p>
+
+        <h2>What we store</h2>
+        <p>
+          {appName} runs on the Wiggleverse RFC framework. The framework
+          stores the identity you sign in with (your Gitea login,
+          display name, email, and avatar URL), the proposals and edits
+          you author, the discussion threads you participate in, and
+          your notification preferences. Authoring is public by design —
+          this is a framework for public-async RFC work, and threads,
+          changes, and PRs are visible to anyone who reaches the
+          deployment. Settings (notification toggles, quiet hours, mute
+          list, cookie consent) are private to your account.
+        </p>
+
+        <h2>Cookies</h2>
+        <p>
+          The app sets a small set of cookies. The full list is on the{' '}
+          <Link to="/cookies">cookies policy page</Link>. You can choose
+          which categories you allow from the consent banner shown on
+          your first visit or from <Link to="/settings/notifications">
+          Settings &rarr; Privacy &amp; cookies</Link> any time
+          afterwards.
+        </p>
+
+        <h2>Analytics</h2>
+        <p>
+          The framework supports an optional anonymous analytics layer
+          gated behind your consent choice. As of v0.13.0 no analytics
+          SDK ships in the framework; deployments that enable analytics
+          do so via a later framework version (roadmap item #13). The
+          consent toggle exists today so the gate is already in place
+          when the SDK lands.
+        </p>
+
+        <h2>Your data, your control</h2>
+        <ul>
+          <li>Revoke cookie consent any time from settings.</li>
+          <li>
+            Edit notification preferences — including the global email
+            opt-out — from{' '}
+            <Link to="/settings/notifications">notification settings</Link>.
+          </li>
+          <li>
+            Your authored content (proposals, threads, edits) is public
+            and not retractable from the meta-repo's Git history. If you
+            need a redaction, reach the deployment operator directly.
+          </li>
+        </ul>
+
+        {deploymentUrl ? (
+          <>
+            <h2>Deployment-specific policy</h2>
+            <p>
+              This deployment may layer additional policy on top of the
+              framework's defaults. Read the full deployment policy at:
+            </p>
+            <p>
+              <a href={deploymentUrl} target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">
+                {deploymentUrl}
+              </a>
+            </p>
+          </>
+        ) : (
+          <>
+            <h2>Deployment contact</h2>
+            <p>
+              For deployment-specific privacy questions — data subject
+              requests, redaction requests, complaints — contact the
+              operator of {appName}.
+            </p>
+          </>
+        )}
+      </article>
+    </div>
+  )
+}