Compare commits

..

1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ben Stull 2590c244d6 Release 0.7.0: email/OTC sign-in (Gitea OAuth retained as fallback)
Replaces the Gitea OAuth gesture as the primary human-auth path
(roadmap item #5, SPEC §6.2). Users sign in by entering their email,
receiving a six-digit code via the existing SMTP layer, and entering
the code on a two-step /login surface. The Gitea OAuth callback
remains functional during migration — the new UI links to it as a
fallback for users with active OAuth sessions or older invite paths
— and is scheduled for removal in a future release once OTC adoption
is universal. Existing users are linked by email on first OTC sign-
in (gitea_id preserved); new users are provisioned with NULL
gitea_id and rely on email as the identity key. The migration
introduces backend/migrations/012_otc.sql (otc_codes table + users
schema rebuild for nullable gitea_id and a partial unique index on
email), two new endpoints (POST /auth/otc/request, POST /auth/otc/verify),
bcrypt as a new backend dependency for code hashing, and 11 new
tests in test_otc_vertical.py covering the happy path, expired and
consumed and wrong codes, the per-email rate limit, the allowlist
gate, the OAuth-era link path, fresh provisioning, and prior-code
invalidation on re-request. No new secrets are required — the
existing SECRET_KEY signs sessions and bcrypt's per-row salt covers
the code hashes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 00:55:29 -07:00
4 changed files with 5 additions and 607 deletions
-99
View File
@@ -158,105 +158,6 @@ release and surface as §19.2 candidates:
- **Removing the Gitea OAuth `/auth/callback` route entirely** — a - **Removing the Gitea OAuth `/auth/callback` route entirely** — a
later release after every active user has signed in via OTC. later release after every active user has signed in via OTC.
## 0.6.0 — 2026-05-28
**Minor — no operator action required.** A sweep-the-edges hardening
release (roadmap item #4, "anon discuss + contribute off-limits") that
audits every write-shaped backend endpoint and asserts each one
enforces an explicit `auth.require_contributor` (or stricter) gate
before doing any state-changing work. v0.3.0 hid write affordances
behind a sign-in CTA on the frontend; v0.5.0 added the PR-less
discussion surface with its own write gate; v0.6.0 sweeps the rest
and adds a regression test net so future endpoints can't quietly
ship without a gate. No schema migration, no env-var changes, no
new dependencies. The only behavioural change is one tightening: the
`GET /api/rfcs/<slug>/graduate/progress` SSE now requires
`auth.require_user` since it surfaces operator-visible step detail
(repo name, PR number, rollback steps) not part of the v0.3.0
anonymous-read contract for catalog/RFC bodies.
### Changed
- **`backend/app/api_graduation.py`** — `GET /graduate/progress`
now calls `auth.require_user(request)` as its first line.
Anonymous callers receive 401 instead of being able to subscribe
to a graduation's SSE. The floor is `require_user` (not
`require_contributor`) so a write-muted operator can still observe
the progress of a graduation they kicked off before being muted.
- **SPEC `§6.1`** (`SPEC.md`) — the Anonymous role's bullet now
documents the v0.6.0 audit: every write-shaped endpoint in §17
enforces an explicit gate; anonymous writes refuse 401. The list
of audited write families is recorded in-line.
- **SPEC `§10.10`** — the discussion-vs-contribution section now
records that the v0.5.0 write gates have a regression test net
(`test_anon_offlimits_vertical.py`) added in v0.6.0.
- **SPEC `§17`** — the `GET /api/rfcs/<slug>/graduate/progress`
bullet now documents the `require_user` gate added in v0.6.0,
with the rationale.
### Added (tests)
- **`backend/tests/test_anon_offlimits_vertical.py`** — twelve new
tests asserting that every write-shaped endpoint surveyed in the
v0.6.0 audit refuses anonymous callers with 401, and that the five
anonymous-read surfaces (health, philosophy, auth/me, catalog,
RFC view, discussion threads, proposals) stay reachable. Sixty-six
assertions in total, covering: propose; proposal merge / decline /
withdraw; branch promote-to-branch / start-edit-branch / metadata /
manual-flush / visibility / grants (POST + DELETE) / threads (POST)
/ messages (POST) / resolve / chat-seen / changes (accept / decline
/ reask) / chat-stream; super-draft start-edit-branch + metadata;
PR pr-draft / open / seen / review / merge / withdraw /
description / resolution-branch; discussion thread create + message
post + resolve; admin role / mute / allowlist (POST + DELETE) plus
the admin reads; notification preferences / quiet-hours / watch /
mark-read / user-mute (POST + DELETE); funder credentials (POST +
DELETE) + consent (POST + DELETE); graduation kickoff + claim +
progress SSE; PR review page anonymous-readable.
### Anonymous-writeable allowlist
Two endpoints are intentionally anonymous-by-design. They are not
audit findings; they are documented here so the contract is
explicit:
- `GET /auth/login` and `GET /auth/callback` — the OAuth
round-trip. Anonymous-by-design because they ARE the sign-in
entrypoint.
- `POST /api/webhooks/gitea` and `POST /api/webhooks/email-bounce`
— anonymous in the session sense but authenticated by HMAC shared
secret (`GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET` and `WEBHOOK_EMAIL_BOUNCE_SECRET`
respectively). The webhook receiver is the wrong place for an
authenticated session; the shared-secret shape is correct.
### §19.2 candidates surfaced
- None unique to this release. The two pre-existing candidates the
audit touched — anonymous-read polish for the discussion surface
(carried from v0.5.0) and the operator-visibility floor on
graduation progress — were settled here as `require_user` on
`/graduate/progress` rather than deferred.
### Upgrade steps (from 0.5.0)
1. The deployment **MUST** rebuild the frontend (`npm install &&
npm run build`) so the frontend bundle's reported version matches
the backend's. No new env vars; existing `frontend/.env` is
sufficient.
2. The deployment **MUST** restart the backend so the new
`require_user` gate on `/graduate/progress` is enforced. No
schema migration runs.
3. The deployment **MAY** announce the audit completion to
operators: every write-shaped backend endpoint now enforces an
explicit gate, and the `test_anon_offlimits_vertical.py` test
net asserts the contract on every CI run. The audited surfaces
are listed in the `Added (tests)` section above and in `SPEC.md`
§6.1.
4. The deployment **MUST NOT** assume any new envelope behaviour:
v0.6.0 is purely a hardening release. No schema, no env, no
dependency changes; the operator's role is reduced to rebuild +
restart.
## 0.5.0 — 2026-05-27 ## 0.5.0 — 2026-05-27
**Minor — no operator action required.** This release wires the **Minor — no operator action required.** This release wires the
+4 -22
View File
@@ -367,15 +367,7 @@ facing sign-in surface moved.
1. **Anonymous.** Can read public RFCs (the meta repo's main branch, 1. **Anonymous.** Can read public RFCs (the meta repo's main branch,
every RFC repo's main branch), read any branch whose `read_public` every RFC repo's main branch), read any branch whose `read_public`
is true, read any PR. Cannot chat, propose, create branches, or is true, read any PR. Cannot chat, propose, create branches, or
open PRs. v0.6.0 (roadmap item #4) closed the audit: every open PRs.
write-shaped endpoint surveyed in §17 enforces an explicit
`auth.require_contributor` (or stricter) gate before doing any
state-changing work; anonymous writes refuse 401. The explicit
audit covers propose, branch create, branch threads, PR-less
discussion threads + messages, PR open / merge / withdraw,
funder credentials + consent, admin allowlist add, graduation
kickoff + claim. Anonymous reads on every catalog and RFC-body
surface remain open per the v0.3.0 contract.
2. **Contributor.** Default role for any authenticated account. A 2. **Contributor.** Default role for any authenticated account. A
first OTC sign-in by a previously unknown email provisions a row first OTC sign-in by a previously unknown email provisions a row
at this role; v0.7.0 keeps the v0.3.0 allowlist gate (`allowed_emails`) at this role; v0.7.0 keeps the v0.3.0 allowlist gate (`allowed_emails`)
@@ -1702,12 +1694,8 @@ them was the failure mode of generic-PR-comments-as-only-conversation.
Reads on the discussion surface follow §14 / the v0.3.0 anonymous-read Reads on the discussion surface follow §14 / the v0.3.0 anonymous-read
contract: anyone can see the conversation. Writes require contributor contract: anyone can see the conversation. Writes require contributor
role per §6.1: v0.5.0 implemented the gate on the three discussion role per §6.1 (v0.5.0 implements the gate; v0.6.0 — item #4 — hardens
write paths (POST threads, POST messages, POST resolve); v0.6.0 (item adjacent surfaces to match). The notification routing reuses the
#4) audited the adjacent surfaces and added the matching test net
(`test_anon_offlimits_vertical.py`) so a regression on any write
endpoint is caught immediately. The gates use `auth.require_contributor`
as the canonical helper. The notification routing reuses the
existing `chat_message_in_participated_thread` / existing `chat_message_in_participated_thread` /
`chat_reply_to_my_message` event kinds with `branch_name=null` on the `chat_reply_to_my_message` event kinds with `branch_name=null` on the
fan-out row; the §15.7 reconciler and §15 inbox prose render fan-out row; the §15.7 reconciler and §15 inbox prose render
@@ -2607,13 +2595,7 @@ The follow-up session will refine this. A minimal starting set:
trailing `rollback` step's events if any earlier step fails. The trailing `rollback` step's events if any earlier step fails. The
Graduate dialog opens this stream on confirm and renders the step Graduate dialog opens this stream on confirm and renders the step
stack from the events. The stream closes on success or on stack from the events. The stream closes on success or on
rollback completion. Requires `auth.require_user` per v0.6.0 rollback completion.
(item #4): the step detail (repo name, PR number, rollback steps)
is operator-visible state and isn't part of the v0.3.0
anonymous-read contract for catalog and RFC bodies. The floor is
`require_user` (not `require_contributor`) so a write-muted
operator can still observe a graduation they kicked off before
being muted.
- `GET /api/rfcs/<slug>/blocking-prs` — list open meta-repo PRs - `GET /api/rfcs/<slug>/blocking-prs` — list open meta-repo PRs
against `rfcs/<slug>.md` per §13.2's precondition popover. Returns against `rfcs/<slug>.md` per §13.2's precondition popover. Returns
PR number, title, author, last-activity timestamp, and the PR number, title, author, last-activity timestamp, and the
+1 -10
View File
@@ -520,16 +520,7 @@ def make_router(
@router.get("/api/rfcs/{slug}/graduate/progress") @router.get("/api/rfcs/{slug}/graduate/progress")
async def graduate_progress(slug: str, request: Request): async def graduate_progress(slug: str, request: Request):
# v0.6.0 (item #4): the progress SSE surfaces admin-internal step del request
# detail (repo name, PR number, rollback steps) that isn't part of
# the v0.3.0 anonymous-read contract for catalog/RFC bodies. The
# corresponding POST /graduate is gated to RFC owners/arbiters and
# app admins/owners via `_can_graduate`; the read SSE shares that
# operator-visible surface, so it requires at least an
# authenticated viewer. We keep the floor at require_user (not
# require_contributor) so a write-muted operator can still observe
# the progress of a graduation they kicked off before being muted.
auth.require_user(request)
state = _get_active(slug) state = _get_active(slug)
if state is None: if state is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "No graduation in flight for this slug") raise HTTPException(404, "No graduation in flight for this slug")
@@ -1,476 +0,0 @@
"""v0.6.0 (roadmap item #4) — "anon discuss + contribute off-limits"
vertical.
A sweep-the-edges hardening release. The v0.3.0 release hid the write
affordances from anonymous viewers; v0.5.0 added the PR-less discussion
surface with its own write gate. v0.6.0 audits both: every write-shaped
endpoint refuses anonymous callers with 401 (or 403 when the role check
runs after the auth check), and every anonymous-read surface stays
reachable.
This test is the regression net for the audit. It walks each module's
representative write endpoint as an anonymous client and asserts the
401/403, then walks the same surfaces' representative read endpoints
as anonymous and asserts the 200. The intent is breadth over depth:
one assertion per write endpoint family is enough to catch a
regression where someone strips the `auth.require_contributor` line.
Endpoints covered (one or two from each module):
- api.py: propose, decline (admin), withdraw,
funder credentials POST/DELETE, funder consent
POST/DELETE
- api_branches.py: promote-to-branch, start-edit-branch, metadata,
manual-flush, visibility, grants POST/DELETE,
threads POST, thread messages POST, resolve,
chat-seen, change accept/decline/reask
- api_prs.py: pr-draft, open-pr, seen, review, merge, withdraw,
description, resolution-branch
- api_discussion.py: thread create, message post, resolve
- api_admin.py: role POST, mute POST, allowlist POST/DELETE
- api_notifications.py: prefs POST, watch POST, mark-read POST,
quiet-hours POST, user-mute POST/DELETE
- api_graduation.py: graduate POST, claim POST, progress GET
The §15.7 reads (`/api/notifications`, `/api/watches`,
`/api/users/me/*`) are per-user surfaces they require an
authenticated viewer by definition; an anonymous 401 on those reads is
shape-correct, not a regression. The test does not assert reads on
those.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
# Reuse the fixture / session / fake-Gitea harness from Slice 1.
from test_propose_vertical import ( # noqa: F401 — fixtures land via import
FakeGitea,
app_with_fake_gitea,
provision_user_row,
sign_in_as,
tmp_env,
)
from test_rfc_view_vertical import SEED_BODY, seed_active_rfc
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_anonymous_can_read_every_public_surface(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Per §14 / the v0.3.0 anonymous-read contract: the catalog, the
RFC view, the PR-less discussion surface, the philosophy page, and
the health probe must remain reachable for unauthenticated viewers.
This is the read side of the item #4 contract — the read surfaces
must NOT regress to require auth as the write gates tighten.
"""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
provision_user_row(user_id=1, login="alice", role="contributor")
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
# No session cookie — viewer is anonymous.
client.cookies.clear()
# The five read surfaces an anonymous viewer must reach.
assert client.get("/api/health").status_code == 200
assert client.get("/api/philosophy").status_code == 200
assert client.get("/api/auth/me").status_code == 200
assert client.get("/api/rfcs").status_code == 200
assert client.get("/api/rfcs/ohm").status_code == 200
assert client.get("/api/rfcs/ohm/main").status_code == 200
assert client.get("/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads").status_code == 200
assert client.get("/api/proposals").status_code == 200
def test_anonymous_propose_refused(app_with_fake_gitea):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
client.cookies.clear()
r = client.post(
"/api/rfcs/propose",
json={"title": "X", "slug": "x", "pitch": "p", "tags": []},
)
assert r.status_code == 401
def test_anonymous_proposal_admin_paths_refused(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The admin-gated proposal actions — merge, decline — must refuse
anonymous callers with 401 (the auth check runs before the role
check; both refusals are correct, but 401 is the structural signal
"no session at all")."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
client.cookies.clear()
# PR number doesn't need to exist — the gate runs first.
assert client.post("/api/proposals/1/merge").status_code == 401
assert (
client.post("/api/proposals/1/decline", json={"comment": "no"}).status_code
== 401
)
assert client.post("/api/proposals/1/withdraw").status_code == 401
def test_anonymous_branch_writes_refused_on_active_rfc(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Branch-scoped writes on an active RFC: promote-to-branch,
manual-flush, visibility, grants, threads create, message post,
resolve, chat-seen, change accept/decline/reask. All must 401 for
anonymous callers."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
client.cookies.clear()
# Branch-scoped writes — slug + branch values are placeholders;
# the auth gate runs before any state lookup.
slug = "ohm"
branch = "feature-x"
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/main/promote-to-branch",
json={},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/manual-flush",
json={"new_content": "hi", "paragraph_count": 1},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/visibility",
json={"read_public": False},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/grants",
json={"grantee_gitea_login": "alice"},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.delete(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/grants/alice",
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/threads",
json={"thread_kind": "chat", "anchor_kind": "whole-doc"},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/threads/1/messages",
json={"text": "hi"},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/threads/1/resolve",
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/chat-seen",
json={"last_seen_message_id": 1},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/changes/1/accept",
json={"proposed": "x"},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/changes/1/decline",
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/changes/1/reask",
).status_code == 401
)
# Chat stream — POST shaped, same auth gate.
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/threads/1/chat",
json={"text": "hi"},
).status_code == 401
)
def test_anonymous_super_draft_writes_refused(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Super-draft-scoped writes: start-edit-branch and metadata. The
PR open / merge paths share the gate via api_prs.py see the
PR-flow test below for those."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
client.cookies.clear()
assert (
client.post(
"/api/rfcs/anything/start-edit-branch", json={}
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
"/api/rfcs/anything/metadata", json={"title": "x"}
).status_code == 401
)
def test_anonymous_pr_flow_writes_refused(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""All §10 PR-flow writes — open, merge, withdraw, description,
review, seen, pr-draft, resolution-branch must 401 for anonymous."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
client.cookies.clear()
slug, branch, pr = "ohm", "feature-x", 1
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/pr-draft"
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/branches/{branch}/open-pr",
json={"title": "t", "description": "d"},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/prs/{pr}/seen",
json={"last_seen_message_id": 1},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/prs/{pr}/review",
json={"text": "x", "anchor_payload": {}},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/prs/{pr}/merge"
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/prs/{pr}/withdraw"
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/prs/{pr}/description",
json={"title": "t", "description": "d"},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
f"/api/rfcs/{slug}/prs/{pr}/resolution-branch"
).status_code == 401
)
def test_anonymous_discussion_writes_refused(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The v0.5.0 PR-less discussion surface — write gates must hold.
This duplicates the assertion in `test_discussion_vertical.py` and
keeps it here too as the canonical home for the item #4 audit."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
client.cookies.clear()
assert (
client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads",
json={"message": "drive-by"},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads/1/messages",
json={"text": "drive-by"},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
"/api/rfcs/ohm/discussion/threads/1/resolve"
).status_code == 401
)
def test_anonymous_admin_writes_refused(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Admin surfaces — role, mute, allowlist — refuse anonymous.
The auth check runs before the require_admin role check, so the
response is 401."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
client.cookies.clear()
assert (
client.post(
"/api/admin/users/1/role", json={"role": "admin"}
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
"/api/admin/users/1/mute", json={"muted": True}
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
"/api/admin/allowlist", json={"email": "x@y.z"}
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.delete("/api/admin/allowlist/x@y.z").status_code == 401
)
# Admin reads also gated.
assert client.get("/api/admin/users").status_code == 401
assert client.get("/api/admin/audit").status_code == 401
assert client.get("/api/admin/permission-events").status_code == 401
assert client.get("/api/admin/graduation-queue").status_code == 401
assert client.get("/api/admin/allowlist").status_code == 401
def test_anonymous_notification_writes_refused(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""Notification preference / watch / mark-read / user-mute writes —
all per-user surfaces, all require an authenticated viewer."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
client.cookies.clear()
assert (
client.post(
"/api/users/me/notification-preferences",
json={"email_personal_direct": False},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post(
"/api/users/me/quiet-hours",
json={"start": None, "end": None, "timezone": None},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post("/api/rfcs/ohm/watch", json={"state": "watching"}).status_code
== 401
)
assert client.post("/api/notifications/1/read").status_code == 401
assert (
client.post("/api/notifications/read", json={}).status_code == 401
)
assert client.post("/api/users/1/notification-mute").status_code == 401
assert client.delete("/api/users/1/notification-mute").status_code == 401
def test_anonymous_funder_writes_refused(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""§6.7 funder credential + consent writes — registering a key,
consenting to fund all refuse anonymous callers."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
client.cookies.clear()
assert (
client.post(
"/api/users/me/funder/credentials",
json={"provider": "anthropic", "api_key": "sk-test"},
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.delete(
"/api/users/me/funder/credentials/anthropic"
).status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.post("/api/rfcs/ohm/funder/consent").status_code == 401
)
assert (
client.delete("/api/rfcs/ohm/funder/consent").status_code == 401
)
def test_anonymous_graduation_writes_refused(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""§13 graduation: the POST kickoff and POST claim both refuse
anonymous. The progress SSE was gated to require_user in v0.6.0
(item #4) since it surfaces admin-internal step detail."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app, _fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
client.cookies.clear()
assert (
client.post(
"/api/rfcs/anything/graduate",
json={
"rfc_id": "RFC-0001",
"repo_name": "rfc-0001-x",
"owners": ["alice"],
},
).status_code == 401
)
assert client.post("/api/rfcs/anything/claim").status_code == 401
# v0.6.0 tightening: progress SSE now requires require_user.
# No graduation is in flight, but the auth check runs first.
assert (
client.get("/api/rfcs/anything/graduate/progress").status_code == 401
)
def test_anonymous_can_read_published_pr_view(app_with_fake_gitea):
"""The PR review page is §11.3 universal-public — once a PR is
open, anonymous viewers can read it. This guards against a
regression where the read endpoint accidentally grows an auth
gate."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app import db
app, fake = app_with_fake_gitea
with TestClient(app) as client:
seed_active_rfc(fake, slug="ohm", title="OHM", body=SEED_BODY)
# Seed an open PR row directly — the cache shape is enough for
# the read endpoint; the live Gitea fetch falls back gracefully.
db.conn().execute(
"""
INSERT INTO cached_prs
(rfc_slug, pr_kind, repo, pr_number, title, description, state,
opened_by, opened_at, head_branch, base_branch, head_sha)
VALUES ('ohm', 'rfc_branch', 'wiggleverse/rfc-0001-ohm', 7, 't', 'd',
'open', 'alice', datetime('now'), 'feature-x', 'main', 'sha7')
"""
)
client.cookies.clear()
# Anonymous read on an open PR: should be 200. The endpoint may
# surface a partial response (the FakeGitea won't have the head
# branch's RFC.md, so branch_body falls back to empty) but the
# auth gate must let the read through.
r = client.get("/api/rfcs/ohm/prs/7")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert body["capabilities"]["is_anonymous"] is True
assert body["capabilities"]["can_merge"] is False
assert body["capabilities"]["can_post_review"] is False