Per the v0.18.0 email + webhook hygiene proposal §3:
* `backend/migrations/020_outbound_emails.sql` — new table
capturing every send attempt: to_address, from_address,
subject, kind, sent_at, status ('sent' | 'failed' | 'deferred'
| 'bounced'), error, notification_id (FK), message_id (for
Slice 5 bounce correlation).
* `email.record_outbound()` — best-effort write helper every
send path calls. Status='sent' on SMTP success, 'failed' on
exception (with class + message in `error`), 'deferred' on
the dev-fallback path where SMTP_HOST is unset (the send
didn't happen but the row records the attempt).
* `email._deliver` (watcher notifications + bundles), `digest.py`,
`email_otc.py`, `email_invite.py` — every send path now records.
* `GET /api/admin/outbound-emails` — admin-only listing,
filterable by kind / status / to_address. Answers "did this
person ever get their invite?" without grepping VM logs. No
admin UI in v0.18.0; operator queries via curl + jq for now.
7 new integration tests covering: OTC / invite / notification all
write rows with matching Message-ID; admin endpoint lists,
filters by kind, filters by to_address (case-insensitive),
refuses non-admins.
Full suite: 291 passed.
Wave 5. Roadmap item #16. Folds in #21 Part C Amplitude wiring inline.
From the v0.9.0 /admin/users surface, an admin can create a fresh
users row, assign a role (admin/owner/granted-beta-user), include
an optional custom message, and dispatch an invite email carrying
a single-use opaque claim token (256-bit CSPRNG, bcrypt-at-rest,
7-day TTL). The invitee clicks through, lands at /invites/claim,
optionally checks "trust this device for 30 days", and is signed
in without going through OTC (the token in the email is itself
proof of email control).
Backend: migration 019_user_invite_tokens.sql (auto-applied);
backend/app/invites.py (create + claim + list module);
backend/app/email_invite.py (sibling of email_otc); POST
/api/admin/users + GET /api/admin/users/invites in api_admin;
POST /api/invites/claim in main.py's oauth_router (shares
trust-device cookie helper with /auth/otc/verify). 15 new tests in
test_admin_create_user_invite_vertical.py. permission_events row
with event_kind='user_invited' for the audit trail.
Frontend: Admin.jsx Create-user-invite modal + (pending invite)
badge in UserRow; InviteClaim.jsx /invites/claim landing page.
App.jsx route registration. api.js helpers.
Design choices documented in the CHANGELOG: immediate-send (no
admin-review queue); no bulk-invite (deferred); OTC skipped on
first sign-in (token = proof of email control); no users table
changes (discriminator is active user_invite_tokens row, not a
new first_sign_in_at column); refusal cases (self-invite 422,
duplicate email 409, non-owner admin granting owner 422).
Amplitude wiring (inline, #21 Part C):
- USER_INVITED from CreateUserInviteModal { target_user_id,
initial_role, custom_message_chars }
- INVITE_CLAIMED from InviteClaim { invited_by_admin_id,
initial_role, needs_passcode, trust_device }
- identify() BEFORE the claim event with properties:
claim_method 'admin-invite', invited_at (setOnce),
invited_by_admin_id (setOnce), initial_role (setOnce) —
so the Amplitude user record is created with the OHM
user_id from the very first event the invitee fires
Subagent ο shipped the feature on feature/v0.17.0-admin-create-user
(41b0c6a). Driver-side integration squash-merged into main,
hand-resolved 5 files (VERSION, package.json, CHANGELOG —
strict-descending to 0.17.0 → 0.16.0 → 0.15.0; App.jsx — both
new routes kept; api_admin.py — both per-user additive fields
+ pending-invite query both kept). Added inline Amplitude wiring
in CreateUserInviteModal + InviteClaim. 252 backend tests pass
(33 new across #12 + #16 surfaces). Frontend build verified green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wave 5 / Track B. Roadmap item #12. Folds in #21 Part C Amplitude
wiring inline (operator ask: "best practices from the very get-go").
RFC owners can invite specific users to one of two per-RFC roles:
contributor (open PRs + join discussion) or discussant (discussion
only). Non-invited users keep the v0.6.0 anonymous-read contract.
The per-RFC write gate layers on top of the existing
require_contributor gate; a super-draft with no owners yet falls
through to the platform-granted contract, preserving the
v0.6.0/v0.7.0/v0.8.0 contracts in their domains.
Backend: migration 018_rfc_invitations.sql (auto-applied — two
tables: rfc_invitations + rfc_collaborators); api_invitations.py
with five endpoints + transactional email; auth.py helpers
(is_rfc_owner / is_rfc_collaborator / can_discuss_rfc /
can_contribute_to_rfc / can_invite_to_rfc); api_discussion +
api_branches + api_prs gate composition; api_admin.py additive
rfc_invitations[] per user. 237 backend tests pass (18 new in
test_rfc_invitations_vertical.py).
Frontend: InvitationsModal.jsx (owner surface), AcceptInvitation.jsx
(/invitations/accept route), api.js helpers, RFCView.jsx
Invitations button, App.jsx route registration.
Amplitude wiring (inline, #21 Part C):
- INVITATION_SENT from InvitationsModal { rfc_slug, role_in_rfc }
- INVITATION_ACCEPTED from AcceptInvitation { rfc_slug, role_in_rfc }
- identify() BEFORE the accept event with properties: invited_at
(setOnce), last_invited_to_rfc, last_invite_role_in_rfc,
claim_method: 'rfc-invite'
- EVENTS taxonomy extended with INVITATION_SENT + INVITATION_ACCEPTED
No new secrets, no new overlay keys, no operator gesture beyond the
v0.15.0 overlay-set + restart. Frontend build verified green.
Subagent ν shipped the feature on feature/v0.16.0-owner-invite
(a51beec). Driver-side integration squash-merged into main,
hand-resolved VERSION + package.json + CHANGELOG (strict-descending
0.16.0 → 0.15.0), and added the inline Amplitude wiring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an email allowlist (toggleable per deployment) that restricts
OAuth sign-in to listed emails while keeping read paths public.
Anonymous visitors now see the full app shell in read-only mode
instead of the §14.1 landing wall. Empty allowlist = gate off, so
deployments that don't enable it behave exactly as 0.2.3.
Also fixes single-finger scroll on /philosophy and other .chrome-pane
views on iOS Safari (.app: 100vh → 100dvh).
Renames deploy/nginx/rfc.wiggleverse.org.conf →
ohm.wiggleverse.org.conf to match the deployed-domain rename
(rfc.wiggleverse.org deprovisioned 2026-05-27).
See CHANGELOG.md for full details + upgrade steps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
§14.1 richer landing, §14.2 /philosophy route (disk-backed), §14.3
persistent About link. /settings/notifications surfaces Slice 6's
preferences/quiet-hours/mute/watches endpoints. /admin home base
consolidates role management, the §6.2 write-mute, the audit-log
viewer, the permission-events log, and the §13.2 graduation queue.
Backend: backend/app/philosophy.py, backend/app/api_admin.py (seven
admin endpoints + user-search), GET /api/users/me/notification-mutes.
Frontend: Landing.jsx (deck), Philosophy.jsx, NotificationSettings.jsx,
Admin.jsx, App.jsx routing for the chrome surfaces.
Tests: backend/tests/test_chrome_vertical.py — 13 cases. Full suite
75/75 green.
Spec corrections: §14.2 (PHILOSOPHY.md source is a deployment-time
decision), §17 (admin block extended to name the seven new endpoints
+ user-search and notification-mutes read). §19.1 rewritten for
Slice 8 hardening; §19.2 grew four candidates (owner succession,
mute-from-actor, the "Following since <date>" disclosure, audit-log
row prose).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ben Stull