Roadmap item #16 / §6.1. From the v0.9.0 /admin/users surface, an
admin can now create a user record before that person has ever
signed in — typing first name, last name, email, role, and an
optional custom message — and the framework sends an invite email
carrying a single-use claim link. The invitee clicks through to
/invites/claim?token=…, the token is consumed, the session is
established, and the user is routed to the passcode-set screen on
first sign-in.
New endpoints:
* POST /api/admin/users — admin-only; provisions the users row +
user_invite_tokens row + sends the invite email + writes a
permission_events row with event_kind='user_invited'.
* GET /api/admin/users/invites — admin-only; lists active
(not-claimed, not-expired) invites with the issuing admin.
* POST /api/invites/claim — anonymous-reachable; validates the
token, consumes the row, signs the invitee in (skipping OTC
per the roadmap — clicking the email link is itself proof of
email control), returns needs_passcode for the frontend's
route-onward decision.
Schema: migration slot 019 — user_invite_tokens (id, email, role,
first/last name, custom_message, bcrypt token_hash, expires_at,
created_at, created_by_admin_id, claimed_at, claimed_by_user_id,
invited_user_id). Slot 018 reserved for the parallel #12 release
(per-RFC invitation) shipping in the same wave; distinct table
(rfc_invitations there vs. user_invite_tokens here) so they
coexist cleanly. No users-table changes — the brief floated a
NULL-column discriminator for "(pending invite)" but the existing
users.last_seen_at is NOT NULL with a datetime('now') default, so
the discriminator is the active user_invite_tokens row joined on
invited_user_id; the admin user-listing carries a pending_invite
field populated via that join.
Claim route: frontend /invites/claim?token=… (new
InviteClaim.jsx). Anonymous-reachable; renders "Claim my account"
CTA with an optional v0.11.0-style "trust this device" checkbox,
calls the claim endpoint, routes onward.
Token shape: opaque DB token (256 bits CSPRNG via
secrets.token_urlsafe(32), bcrypt-at-rest), not JWT. Opaque
chosen because admin revocation is then a single SQL UPDATE — JWT
would be stateless but harder to invalidate.
Open-question decisions: immediate-send (no admin-review-then-
send queue; future enhancement), no bulk-invite (deferred to
follow-up; v0.17.0 is one-at-a-time), 7-day expiry as a constant
(INVITE_TOKEN_TTL_DAYS in backend/app/invites.py; env-var
configurability is a §19.2 candidate), OTC skipped on first
sign-in (the token in the email is itself proof of email control;
subsequent sign-ins go through OTC / passcode unchanged).
Refusals on POST /api/admin/users:
* 422 self-invite (use the role-change channel for self-edits)
* 409 duplicate email (use the existing grant/role gestures)
* 422 owner-grant by non-owner admin (§6.1 owner-zero is the
only owner bootstrap path)
* 422 pydantic — malformed email / unknown role /
custom_message > 500 chars
* 403 non-admin caller / 401 anonymous
15 new backend tests in test_admin_create_user_invite_vertical.py
(happy path, all four refusals, claim with valid / expired /
already-claimed / unknown token, pending-invite badge before and
after claim, listing admin-only). 234 total backend tests pass;
frontend build succeeds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
After a successful OTC sign-in, a contributor can set a passcode
(4-20 characters, bcrypt-hashed) and use email + passcode for
subsequent sign-ins. OTC remains the structural fallback: five
consecutive failed verifies lock the passcode path for 15 minutes
(HTTP 423), and a forgotten passcode is recovered by requesting a
fresh code. Migration 015_passcode.sql adds four nullable columns
to the users table; existing rows pass through as OTC-only and can
opt into a passcode from a new Sign-in tab in /settings/notifications.
The /login surface is extended to a five-step flow (email → either
passcode or OTC code → optional post-OTC passcode offer → optional
set-passcode). SPEC corrections per §19.3 rule 2: §6 names the
three auth paths, §14.1 documents the stepped login flow, §17 lists
the four new /auth/passcode/* endpoints, §19.2 surfaces four new
candidates and refreshes the cross-refs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the v0.3.0 / v0.7.0 allowed_emails admission gate with an
admin-grant flow (roadmap item #6, SPEC §6.1 / §6.2 / §14.1 / §17).
Any valid email can sign in via OTC; a fresh user lands in
permission_state='pending' with a captured first/last/why profile,
and an admin grant flips them to 'granted' before write endpoints
accept them. Grandfathered users pass through the migration with
the column default 'granted' so existing contributors are unaffected.
The allowed_emails table stays in the schema as a fast-path bypass
pending v0.9.0's admin user-management page (item #7).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the Gitea OAuth gesture as the primary human-auth path
(roadmap item #5, SPEC §6.2). Users sign in by entering their email,
receiving a six-digit code via the existing SMTP layer, and entering
the code on a two-step /login surface. The Gitea OAuth callback
remains functional during migration — the new UI links to it as a
fallback for users with active OAuth sessions or older invite paths
— and is scheduled for removal in a future release once OTC adoption
is universal. Existing users are linked by email on first OTC sign-
in (gitea_id preserved); new users are provisioned with NULL
gitea_id and rely on email as the identity key. The migration
introduces backend/migrations/012_otc.sql (otc_codes table + users
schema rebuild for nullable gitea_id and a partial unique index on
email), two new endpoints (POST /auth/otc/request, POST /auth/otc/verify),
bcrypt as a new backend dependency for code hashing, and 11 new
tests in test_otc_vertical.py covering the happy path, expired and
consumed and wrong codes, the per-email rate limit, the allowlist
gate, the OAuth-era link path, fresh provisioning, and prior-code
invalidation on re-request. No new secrets are required — the
existing SECRET_KEY signs sessions and bcrypt's per-row salt covers
the code hashes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an email allowlist (toggleable per deployment) that restricts
OAuth sign-in to listed emails while keeping read paths public.
Anonymous visitors now see the full app shell in read-only mode
instead of the §14.1 landing wall. Empty allowlist = gate off, so
deployments that don't enable it behave exactly as 0.2.3.
Also fixes single-finger scroll on /philosophy and other .chrome-pane
views on iOS Safari (.app: 100vh → 100dvh).
Renames deploy/nginx/rfc.wiggleverse.org.conf →
ohm.wiggleverse.org.conf to match the deployed-domain rename
(rfc.wiggleverse.org deprovisioned 2026-05-27).
See CHANGELOG.md for full details + upgrade steps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add §12 30/90 hygiene scheduler in hygiene.py, mirroring the
DigestScheduler shape; wires next to digest in main.py with the
same start/stop/run_tick test seam.
- Extend bot.delete_branch to accept actor=None for system gestures,
per §15.9 (actor_user_id=NULL, on_behalf_of=bot_login).
- Convert every branches/{branch} route in api_branches.py and
api_prs.py to {branch:path}; move the bare GET to the bottom of
the router so deeper GETs match before greedy-path swallow.
- Extend api_prs.py's _require_pr to accept pr_kind='meta_metadata'
so the §9.5 metadata-pane PRs land an in-app merge.
- Graduation rollback now deletes the graduate-<slug>-<6hex> branch
after closing the PR — §19.2 candidate that lands here.
- Email-bounce webhook gains a WEBHOOK_EMAIL_BOUNCE_SECRET seam.
- FakeGitea grows a DELETE /branches/{branch:path} handler and a
slashed-branch read; integration tests for the hygiene vertical
cover the 30d close, 90d delete, post-merge delete, pinned
exemption, per-user cursor preservation, no-notification rule,
and the graduation-rollback cleanup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per the §19.1 brief: the three-column shape (§8.1) opens on main
in discuss mode (§8.2), supports the §8.3 discuss-vs-contribute
flip on non-main branches, hosts §8.4's per-branch chat with AI
participation (§18's <change> protocol → §8.14 changes rows), the
§8.8 change-card panel with §8.9 accept/decline/edit-before-accept,
the §8.10 tracked-change markup + DiffView toggle, the §8.11
manual-edit flushes with the stale-change mechanic, the §8.12
range and paragraph sub-threads, the §8.13 flag affordance, and
the §8.14 discuss-mode buffer.
Backend: bot.py grew per-RFC-repo write ops (cut_branch_from_main,
commit_accepted_change with the structured original/proposed/reason
body and Change-Id + Source-Message-Id + On-behalf-of trailers,
commit_manual_flush, ensure_rfc_repo_seed). cache.py grew
refresh_rfc_repo and the webhook dispatches on repository.full_name.
providers.py and chat.py port the §18 carryovers — multi-provider
LLM abstraction and SSE-streaming chat against the §5 threads /
thread_messages / changes schema. api_branches.py mounts the §17
branches/<branch>/* and threads/<thread_id>/* routes with the §6
/ §11 permission checks inline.
Frontend: RFCView.jsx rebuilt as the §8 surface; Editor.jsx,
ChatPanel.jsx, ChangePanel.jsx, PromptBar.jsx, SelectionTooltip.jsx,
DiffView.jsx, ModelPicker.jsx, modelStyles.js lifted from the
prototype and adapted to the canonical schema.
Covered by `backend/tests/test_rfc_view_vertical.py` — eleven new
integration tests against an extended FakeGitea (PUT contents,
POST orgs/{org}/repos, seed_rfc_repo): main-view read,
promote-to-branch, accept (with and without edit-before-accept),
decline, manual flush + system message, flag creation, visibility
flip, anonymous read-but-no-contribute, stale-change refusal, and
the chat-streaming path with a fake provider injected. The 5
Slice 1 tests continue to pass alongside.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings the §1 bot wrapper, the §4 cache (webhook + reconciler), the
§5 schema (six numbered migrations), Gitea OAuth + §6 user
provisioning, the §7 catalog left pane, and the propose-to-merge
vertical: propose modal opens an idea PR against the meta repo, an
owner merges from the pending-idea view, the cache picks it up via
webhook or reconciler sweep, and the catalog renders the new
super-draft.
Per §1 the bot is the only Git writer; every commit, branch
creation, and PR merge carries the §6.5 On-behalf-of: trailer and
an `actions` audit row. Per §4 the cache is never written from a
user action — it's webhook+reconciler only.
Covered by `backend/tests/test_propose_vertical.py` against an
in-process Gitea simulator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ben Stull