Release v0.27.0: security hardening (audit 0026)
Remediates the rfc-app application + deploy-config findings from the Session 0026 security audit. Cut as the "v0.25.0-security-hardening" branch (from v0.24.0); reversioned to 0.27.0 on rebase onto main since v0.26.0 (#28) shipped while this was in flight. - C1 (Critical): single sanitizeHtml.js chokepoint (DOMPurify) for every marked→innerHTML / dangerouslySetInnerHTML sink (MarkdownPreview, ProposalView x2, Editor); rel=noopener hook on target=_blank links. - H1: per-account OTC-verify lockout (migration 023, auto-applied) + per-IP throttle via new ratelimit.py; wired on otc verify/request + passcode check/verify. - M1: device_trust.lookup() single indexed-row read — cookie value is now "<row_id>.<raw_token>"; bcrypt-checks one row, not a global table scan. (Behavior change: existing device-trust cookies re-prompt once.) - M2: HTTP security headers (CSP/HSTS/XFO/XCTO/Referrer-Policy) at nginx. - M4: session cookie Secure-by-default (SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE opt-out). - M5: bounce webhook fails CLOSED (503) when secret unset, instead of open; RFC_APP_INSECURE_BOUNCE_WEBHOOK=1 dev opt-in. - L2/L3: per-IP cooldown + check-endpoint throttle. - L4: systemd sandbox knobs. L8/I1: nginx server_tokens off + TLS1.0/1.1 out. VERSION + frontend/package.json → 0.27.0; CHANGELOG documents the upgrade steps (incl. the out-of-band nginx + systemd apply, which the flotilla deploy gesture does not perform). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
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import { useEffect, useRef, useState, useCallback } from 'react'
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import { Marked } from 'marked'
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import { sanitizeHtml } from '../lib/sanitizeHtml'
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import { decorateAcceptedChanges } from './trackedOverlay.js'
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import ChangeTooltip from './ChangeTooltip.jsx'
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@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ export default function MarkdownPreview({
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// synchronously with the body itself — no flash of un-decorated text.
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useEffect(() => {
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if (!hostRef.current) return
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const html = previewMarked.parse(content || '')
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const html = sanitizeHtml(previewMarked.parse(content || ''))
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hostRef.current.innerHTML = html
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const token = ++renderTokenRef.current
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// Reset memo so the new block set re-renders from scratch.
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